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Abstract 
This dissertation is a comparative historical analysis of institutional and cultural 
transformations in post-totalitarian societies of post-World War II West Germany 
and post-Soviet Russia. It addresses democratization efforts in the two countries 
trying to discover and understand determinants of political culture 
transformations as well as the factors affecting democratic consolidation in them.  
Given the complexity of post-totalitarian contexts, the interplay between 
different levels of post-totalitarian transformations – political, economic, social, 
and cultural – is researched. More specifically, this study investigates how 
institutional transformations in post-totalitarian societies affect political culture.  
The dissertation is based on critical evaluation and synthesis of the 
following theoretical fields: democratic transition, political culture, collective 
memory and national identity. It employs and develops a view of political 
culture as a system of symbols and meanings that determines both the collective 
identification and the citizens’ attitudes and orientations towards the political 
system. This understanding of political culture has defined a twofold analysis of 
political culture transformations in West Germany and Russia from both 
attitudinal and symbolic perspectives. The analysis combines, thus, the focus on 
political attitudes and orientations of citizens with the focus on the history-
related symbolic structures in public opinion. 
The variables under consideration in the comparative study of West 
German and Russian societies on the individual level are interest in politics, the 
feeling of political efficacy, political participation, social trust, and support for 
democratic values. The study investigates how attitudes toward self (civic 
attitudes, and primarily, the feeling of political efficacy) and toward others in 
politics (trust, cooperative competence) as well as toward the political system 
changed in the cause of post-totalitarian transformations in the two analyzed 
cases.  
Given the central place of memory in the constitution of identity the 
development of collective memory discourses of the two totalitarian pasts is also 
analyzed in detail. More specifically, the dissertation explores the ways in which 
West Germany and Russia confronted their totalitarian legacies and how they 
remembered their respective totalitarian regimes - the Third Reich and the Soviet 
Union. The questions addressed in this regard are: How collective memory 
discourses influenced the national identity and political processes in postwar 
West Germany and post-Soviet Russia? And more generally: How the shift in the 
official memory narratives from a nation-centered positive memory towards a 
more complex and more critical memory framework may affect democracy and 
national political development? 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Understanding Democratization in West Germany and Russia: 
the Basis for Historical Comparison 
 
This study is a comparative historical analysis of institutional and cultural 
transformations in post-totalitarian societies. Initially my intention was to 
improve understanding of political and cultural transformations in post-Soviet 
Russia. In fact, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the new independent 
Russian state has formally taken a path of democratization. The Constitution 
adopted in 1993 proclaimed the Russian Federation a “democratic federative 
constitutional state with republican form of government.”1 Since then, in the 
language of legal terms as well as in the public rhetoric of Russian officials, the 
democratic character of the new Russian state has been seldom put under 
question. In his 2004 Federal Assembly address, then-President Vladimir Putin 
emphasized “considerable success” which had been achieved by the “young 
Russian democracy” and reproached those who “persistently ignored these 
achievements.”2 However, with each passing year since the beginning of the 
political reforms in post-Soviet Russia it has been getting more and more obvious 
that the emerging system is anything but classically democratic. 
Since the mid-1990s there have been many attempts to classify the Russian 
political regime as either a ‘hybrid regime,’ combining the traits of democracy 
and dictatorship (Schmitter and Karl 1994); or as a ‘demokratura’ - the term used 
to describe an authoritarian regime which strongly limits political participation 
but is dressed up in the garb of democracy. Guillermo О’Donnell, in turn, 
defined it as ‘delegative democracy’ (О’Donnell 1994). Other classifications also 
                                                 
1 The Constitution of the Russian Federation. Мoscow: Prospect, 2003.  
2 Transcript of the Federal Assembly Annual Address by President Vladimir Putin, Moscow. 26 
May, 2004. 
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existed, such as ‘authoritarian democracy and regime system’ (Sakwa 1997), 
‘illiberal democracy’ (Zakaria 1997), ‘electoral democracy’ (McFaul 1999), 
‘democratic dictatorship’ (Daniels 2000), ‘managed pluralism’ (Balzer  2003) and 
even ‘market Bolshevism’ (Reddaway and Glinski 2001), etc.  
As the authoritarian tendencies in Russian politics intensified, especially 
with President Putin’s rise to power in 2000, the political regime in Russia was 
more often described as ‘competitive authoritarian’ (Levitsky and Way 2002), 
‘electoral autocracy’ (Shevtsova 2004), and simply ‘authoritarian’ (Shlapentokh 
2007;  McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008; Vorozheikina 2009). 
As the Russian political scientist Lilia Shevtsova put it in her article How 
Russia Hasn’t Coped with Democracy: The Logics of Political Sliding Backward (2004), 
the Russian reality reveals that after years of attempted reforms it is “sliding 
backward to the state it painfully tried to overcome in the 1990s.”3 
The attempts to investigate the reasons for such a retreat required turning 
to other national experiences to study the problem of post-totalitarian 
democratization in a comparative perspective. Among other countries that had 
faced the challenges similar to the challenges faced by Russia in the 20th 
century the experience of the post-World War II Federal Republic of Germany 
appeared one of the most viable.  
It is viable and relevant, above all, due to the fact that Germany and 
Russia are united in many similar aspects of their respective histories, and 
consequently, similar cultural heritage. The imperial German past and state-
centered mode of development profoundly impacted both the German state 
institutions and the political culture of the German society. For example, 
mythology of the “unique path” and a “strong hand” mentality were inherent in 
the German and Russian cultures. Besides, in Germany and Russia, the countries 
of secondary modernization and medium levels of development, bureaucratic 
authoritarian methods of management used to dominate and the state used to 
play a significant role in national integration.  
Furthermore, the idea of empire used to be of paramount importance in 
the histories of both states as each of them harbored the expansionist, hegemonic 
ambitions. Both The German Empire (Deutsches Reich, or Kaiserreich, 1871-1918) 
and the Russian Empire (Rossijskaja Imperija, 1721-1917) aspired from the 19th 
century to become ‘modernized’ countries, seen above all in terms of rapidly 
                                                 
3 Shevtsova, Lilia. How Russia Hasn’t Coped with Democracy: The Logics of Political Sliding 
Backward // Pro et Contra, Vol. 8, № 3, 2004. p. 36. 
 3 
advanced industrial development. This was regarded as the only way to 
expansionism and the attainment of great-power status.4 
At the same time, democratic traditions in both cultures were historically 
rather weak. The German political culture, according to some experts’ 
evaluations, used to display such traits as passive participation, rely on 
administrative rather than political procedures, and the lack in a very general 
sense of tolerance to “the other” manifested primarily in strong anti-Semitism. 
These cultural characteristics appear to be very similar to the Russian 
counterpart.  
Furthermore, in the 20th century both Germany and Russia became the 
sites of ignition for the greatest century’s catastrophe embodied in a “total” (or 
totalitarian) state becoming the scenes of most inhuman cruelty. Within the limits 
of these two countries, totalitarian regimes regarded subsequently as “classic” 
cases found soil for their realization. 
Despite essential differences in the two totalitarian dictatorships of the 
Third Reich and the Soviet Union (expressed primarily in different ideologies as 
well as different durations of existence and scenarios of collapse), it is important 
to note the evident similarities in their political toolkits and methods of goal 
achievement, as well as in the destinies of the countries afflicted by them. As the 
authors of the volume Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison 
conceptualized, “the unprecedented inroads into all mobilization and new levels 
and types of repression and terror are crucial features that bracket these regimes 
together and distinguish them from other modern dictatorships.”5 
The similar destinies of Russia and Germany lie also in the fact that 
although with almost semicentenial rupture (Germany in 1945, Russia in 1991), 
both countries in the long run had to take the path of large scale socio-political 
transformation caused by the collapse of their respective totalitarian regimes.  
The likeness of political, economic and social context in postwar Germany 
and post-Soviet Russia can also be easily hallmarked. The consequences of defeat 
in World War II for Germany were economic collapse, breakdown of the political 
system, liquidation of state independence, and an identity crisis due to a 
prevailing complex of national defeat. In Russia the consequences of ‘losing’ in 
the Cold War which resulted in the country’s disintegration were also hard to 
cope with. The problems of severe economic crisis, narrowed national borders, 
destroyed Soviet institutions which lost both functionality and legitimacy, 
                                                 
4 See Kershaw, Ian; Lewin, Moshe (eds.) Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison, 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. p. 345. 
5 Ibid. p. 344. 
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demanded the same immediate solution as half a century before in postwar 
Germany. 
 The collapse of totalitarian regimes in both countries required not simply 
reforming, but in many respects, creating political, economic, and social spheres 
anew. Both post-WWII Germany and post-Soviet Russia not only had to carry 
out political democratization, but also were compelled to introduce a liberal 
market system, launch prices liberalization, remove numerous regulations and 
controls, and establish federative relations among the countries’ regions. The exit 
from totalitarian rule in both countries took place in a situation of severe 
economic recession.  
The legacies of Germany’s and Russia’s turbulent histories, however, have 
often raised serious questions about the possibility and viability of the 
democratic system in these countries. 
It is important also to point out that the political cultures of postwar 
Germany and post-Soviet Russia were very much alike. The observers from The 
Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS) in the American zone of 
occupation as well as such researchers as Friedrich von Hayek (1944), Karl 
Jaspers (1945, 1966), Theodor Adorno (1950, 1959), Gabriel Almond and Sidney 
Verba (1963), Ralf Dahrendorf (1965), Steven Warnecke (1970), Kurt Sontheimer 
(1973), to name just a few, underscored the lack of democratic traits in Germans 
and pointed to such characteristics of the German political culture as 
“pragmatic,” “detached,” “almost cynical,” and “passive.” Observers of the 
Russian political culture, most notably Stephen White (1984, 2000, 2004), Yuri 
Levada (1993, 1995, 2000), Jeffrey W. Hahn (1991, 1993, 2001, 2005), similarly 
underscored cultural continuities with the inheritance of the Soviet regime in 
post-Soviet Russia. To illustrate, Yuri Levada and his colleagues pointed to the 
persistence of such features of ‘Soviet Man’ as self-isolation, state paternalism, 
cynicism and slyness, etc. The totalitarian regimes in Germany and Russia, thus, 
left very similar traces in the culture and social relations of the two societies. 
Review of specific political and economic differences of the two cases 
provides valuable insight. These differences ultimately defined the specifics of 
the respective post-totalitarian regimes. For instance, the fact that private 
property was not prohibited under Hitler explains why privatization reform in 
postwar Germany was not required. Another significant difference refers the 
levels of civil society development. In fact, political parties, trade unions, 
businesses, local grassroots associations, and churches of various denominations 
were all part of German civil society since the second half of the 19th century. 
Since the Nazi rule lasted much less than the Soviet, the elite counter movement 
formed during the Weimar period, despite rather severe repressions, largely 
survived the Third Reich (either in inner emigration or abroad) becoming a basic 
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driving force of postwar democratization. In Russia the civil society which had 
started developing in the short inter-revolutionary period between 1905 and 1917 
certainly could not survive the Stalin’s reign of terror.6 But even after the 
dictator’s death in 1953 and the Khrushev’s de-Stalinization campaign the secret 
police penetration of society and the deterrent effect of that penetration remained 
too high for civil society to be able to develop. The dissidents that started 
appearing in the Soviet Union during that period lived in an atmosphere of fear 
and in constant expectation of arrest. Nevertheless, namely these groups of 
underground activists were later in the forefront of post-Soviet democratization 
processes on the civil society level. 
The main difference of the two situations was, however, Germany’s 
postwar occupation. The political institutions of postwar Germany were created 
under the direct impact and supervision of the Western Allies, who controlled 
the initial stages of the postwar transformation. By contrast, Russian reforms had 
to be launched and implemented without any outward strict supervision and 
support. Most important is that the denazification program carried out by the 
Allied occupation forces in Germany resulted in liquidation of the Nazi party, 
any affiliated organizations and repressive institutions such as the Elite Guard 
(SS), the Security Agency (SD) of the SS, the Secret State Police (Gestapo). In 
Russia where no similar program took place, the Soviet secret police Committee 
for State Security (KGB) and other law enforcement agencies survived the 
collapse of the USSR. Though formally KGB was dismantled and ceased to exist 
in 1991, its successor from late 1991 – the Federal Counterintelligence Service 
(FSK) – preserved many of the former KGB functions and much of its structure.7 
In 1995, the FSK was reorganized into the Federal Security Service (FSB) which 
soon reemerged into one of the most powerful political forces in Russia. 
Nevertheless, as a closer look at the German postwar situation makes it 
clear, the impact of the occupation and denazification program as its part was 
albeit highly important but limited. In the first instance, it was due to the fact 
that the occupation period appeared limited in terms of time lasting 
incomparably less than the subsequent independent West German state. 
                                                 
6 On development of civil society in pre-revolutionary Russia see, for example, Wartenweiler, 
David. Civil Society and Academic Debate in Russia 1905-1914. (Oxford Historical Monographs). 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. Conroy, Mary Schaeffer. Civil Society in Late Imperial Russia. In: 
Evans, Alfred B. Jr.; Henry, Laura A.; Sundstrom, Lisa McIntosh (eds.) Russian Civil Society: A 
Critical Assessment. New York, M. E. Sharpe, 2005.  
7 Gevorkian, Natalia. The KGB: “They Still Need Us” // Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 
1993. pp. 36–39. <http://books.google.com/books?id=aQsAAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=PA36>; 
Albats, Yevgenia. The State within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia—Past, Present, and 
Future. Trans. by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994. 
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Secondly, the occupation authorities’ policies were more aimed at helping 
Germans to get over their problems themselves rather than solving the problems 
for them. There is much evidence that the Allied authorities in the western parts 
of postwar Germany were primarily concerned with ensuring that Germany 
overcame its economic and social difficulties, thereby getting well gradually and 
independently.8 
In his September 1946 speech Restatement of Policy on Germany (also known 
as The Speech of Hope), James Francis Byrnes, the United States Secretary of State, 
expressed the intention of the American people to “return the government of 
Germany to the German people.”9 
Thus the Allies’ active support and involvement took place only during 
the initial stages of the new state. Subsequently Germans, just like Russians, had 
to build up their political system independently.  
Furthermore, the occupation authorities were unable to provide all the 
necessary personnel for deciding everyday issues in such a complex and densely 
populated country as Germany. This encouraged the delegation of local 
responsibilities back to the German authorities as quickly as possible. 
A vivid indicator of the “national” factor relevance in the course of German 
reforms was the fact that the Economic Council responsible for adoption and 
realization of the Allies’ basic decisions was headed by a German citizen who 
acted with a rather high degree of independence. 
While France and Great Britain nationalized most of their economies and 
introduced central planning, Ludwig Erhard, elected in 1948 by the Bizonial 
Economic Council to the office of Director of Economics, launched currency 
reform and abolished the price fixing and production controls that had been 
enacted by the prior military administration. His actions definitely exceeded the 
authority of his office.10 
                                                 
8 See Drabkin, Jakov et al. (eds.) Totalitarizm v Evrope 20 veka: Iz istorii ideologij, dvizhenij, 
rezhimov i ih preodolenija. Moscow: Pamjatniki istoricheskoj mysli, 1996. p. 376. 
9 Byrnes, James Francis. Restatement of Policy on Germany. Speech held in Stuttgart on 6 
September, 1946. <http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga4-460906.htm> 
10 One day General Lucius Clay, commander of American forces in Germany, called Erhard into 
his office and said, “Herr Erhard, my advisers tell me you’re making a terrible mistake.” Erhard 
replied, “Don’t listen to them, General. My advisers tell me the same thing.” Journalist Edwin 
Hartrich also described Erhard’s confrontation with a U.S. Army colonel who asked him the same 
week: “How dare you relax our rationing system, when there is a widespread food shortage?” 
Erhard’s reply this time was: “But, Herr Oberst. I have not relaxed rationing; I have abolished it! 
Henceforth, the only rationing ticket the people will need will be the deutschemark. And they 
will work hard to get these deutschemarks, just wait and see.” In: Hartrich, Edwin. The Fourth and 
Richest Reich. New York: Macmillan, 1980. pp. 4, 13. 
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The difference between the initial plans of the Western Allies and the 
actual outcome of the reforms also provides evidence that the German leaders 
acted quite independently and that decisions made by the national political elites 
were determinant of the country’s postwar development. In fact, according to the 
Potsdam Conference agreements Germany was compelled “to compensate to the 
greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering that she had caused to the 
United Nations and for which the German people cannot escape 
responsibility.”11 This meant payment of essential reparations to the Allied 
countries. Within the country the Allies intended “to assure the production and 
maintenance of goods and services […] essential to maintain in Germany average 
living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European 
countries.”12  
Adopted by the Allied Control Council in March 1946 the Industry Plan 
for Germany introduced even more rigid requirements than had been fixed in 
the Potsdam Declaration. In essence, this plan intended to lower and control 
German industrial potential after World War II so that it would not represent a 
military threat in the future. However, the plan was also likely to prevent 
Germany from competing seriously in the world markets over a long term 
perspective. According to historian Boris Zaritsky, the idea of the Potsdam 
agreements and the Industry Plan was to convert postwar Germany into an 
agricultural and light industry economy where reduced industry would function 
mainly to supply reparations and the minimum needs of the German 
population.13 
In light of the Allies’ goals, how can the high growth rates of the late 1950s 
be explained? The economic growth as well as other achievements of the West 
German postwar state provide evidence that German leaders were capable of 
leading the nation out of the systemic crisis and managed to assert the German 
peoples’ right to independence. 
The occupation of the western parts of postwar Germany by the Allied 
powers appears thus an important, but not a decisive factor in German 
transformations. Active intervention of the occupation authorities took place 
only at the initial stage of transformations, in the formative first years of the 
Federal Republic. After that Germans also had to build and further sustain their 
political system on their own.  
                                                 
11 The Potsdam Declaration. Tripartite Agreement by the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Soviet Russia concerning Conquered Countries, 2 August, 1945.  
<http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/450802a.html> 
12 Ibid. 
13 Zaritskij, Boris. Ludwig Erhard: sekrety “ekonomicheskogo chuda”. Moscow: BEK, 1997. pp. 44-
45. 
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As known, Germany achieved considerable success this way, having 
restored its legitimate place in Europe after a long isolation by creating a stable 
political system of representative democracy. By the 1960s it became the 
homeland of the Economic Miracle, having reached a high level of economic 
growth and people’s welfare. As for post-Soviet Russia, its path of 
transformation appeared much more problematic.  
The comparative analysis of the two cases could be helpful thus in 
discerning the “weak points” of the failed Russian transition and so contribute to 
an understanding of the conditions necessary for a successful exit from 
totalitarian rule, which Russia may yet achieve. 
It is noteworthy that despite explicit similarities of the two countries that 
have not only endured totalitarian rule but were burdened by highly repressive, 
criminal national pasts, there have been virtually no studies comparing postwar 
Germany and post-Soviet Russia. This is why I chose to investigate post-
totalitarian transformations in these two cases through their historical 
comparison. By this work I not only intend to fill in the gap in the literature, but 
to refine a more general understanding of post-totalitarian democratization. 
The main research question addressed in this dissertation is: What were 
determinants of political culture transformations and the factors affecting 
democratic consolidation in the post-World War II Federal Republic of Germany 
and the post-Soviet Russian Federation? 
While comparative research of transformations in the two cases might 
primarily interest those concerned about German and Russian politics and 
culture, this analysis has certainly broader implications, and thus is closely 
linked to a set of more general questions that are relevant for a broader audience: 
What is the correlation between institutional change, transformations of political 
culture and national identity? Under what circumstances citizens are more likely 
to acquire democratic attitudes and skills? Which are the effects of the 
institutional transformations over the individual attitudes of citizens towards 
themselves and others in politics? What factors contribute to attainment of 
congruence between political culture and structure? What role collective memory 
of the traumatic past plays in shaping the national identity and fostering 
democratic consolidation? What are the sources of change and the mechanisms 
through which change occurs? 
In the following section of this introductory chapter I will develop the 
theoretical foundations of my general argument that lies at the crossroads 
between the democratization, political culture and collective memory theories. 
Addressing the main theoretical issues will allow me to discuss the rationale 
behind the selected strategy of comparative analysis. In the following section I 
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will also discuss how I have designed the research to address and compare 
political culture transformations in the two analyzed cases.  
 
1.2 Theoretical Framework and the Thesis Structure 
 
As I have stated above, this dissertation represents a comparative study of post-
totalitarian transformations of post-WW II West Germany and post-Soviet 
Russia.  
The dissertation has three different, albeit highly interdependent parts: in 
the first one (Chapter 2), I present an overview of political context of 
transformations and trace the impact of economic reforms on democratic 
consolidation in the two cases. In the next Chapter 3 I move to the individual-
level analysis of political culture. The rationale behind that chapter is to offer an 
overview of the political culture developments from the perspective of citizens’ 
orientations towards political system and their participation in it. Chapter 4, in 
turn, moves into the explanatory analysis of the symbolic dimension of political 
culture which primarily affects the legitimation of polities and the formation of 
national identity. More specifically this part of the dissertation explores the 
determinants of German and Russian collective memory narratives of their 
respective totalitarian pasts and investigates how they have evolved in the 
course of the exit from totalitarian rule.  
To begin addressing the theoretical foundations of the research, it is 
important to point out that since the 1970s problems of democratic transitions 
have been extensively developed in the so-called ‘transitology’ literature 
primarily based on the studies of transitions from authoritarian rule in the 
countries of Southern Europe and Latin America. The discussions about regime 
change in that region of the world were launched by Dankwart Rustow’s 1970 
pioneering article and the tenets of a lengthy debate on democratic transitions 
were largely summarized in the influential 4-volume edition by Guillermo 
O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (1986). 
With the end of the Cold war, marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc, researchers’ attention was increasingly 
drawn to the transformations of the former communist Eastern European states. 
At the initial stage some scholars of comparative politics were eager to present 
post-communist regime change as a process analogous to the democratization 
that had been previously taking place in other parts of the world. At the 
beginning of the 1990s such authors as Samuel Huntington (1991), Adam 
Przeworski (1991), and Giuseppe di Palma (1990) published books that treated 
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the Eastern European transformations of 1989 as part of a global tendency 
toward democratization. However, other prominent thinkers with expertise in 
the post-communist region questioned this approach pointing to the peculiarities 
of the communist regimes and underscoring the inadequacy of applying the 
entire transitological framework to post-communist analysis (most notably, 
Bunce 1995, 1998, 2000, 2003; O’Donnell 1996; Jowitt 1996, 1998). The transition 
paradigm was also criticized for its alleged teleological assumption of linear 
historical progress leading toward a single and pre-determined endpoint—
liberal democracy (Carothers 2002; Cohen 2000; Gel’man 1999; Pickel 2002; 
Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Stark 1992; Verdery 1996; Stark and Bruszt 1998).14 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, scholars have more often pointed to the 
more dramatic character of transformations in post-communist Eastern Europe 
(whereat entire economies were to be restructured, national consciousnesses and, 
in some cases, national boundaries were to be reshaped) in comparison with the 
former authoritarian transitions. Valerie Bunce (1995) was among the first to 
point to the difference between the nature of authoritarian regimes in Southern 
Europe and Latin America and the totalitarian states of the Eastern Bloc. In their 
comparative research Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (1996) Juan Linz and Alfred 
Stepan also drew attention to some unique traits of post-communist regimes 
such as the legacies of totalitarianism in their case studies of Eastern Europe. 
Though I do consider a transition framework a useful analytical construct, 
in this work I will operate mostly with a less teleological and more open-ended 
concept of “transformation.”15 My focus will be primarily on the developments in 
the two analyzed cases and on evaluation of empirical evidence in relation to 
them. 
The study of post-totalitarian transformations could not, certainly, get 
along without reference to the literature on totalitarian rule developed primarily 
in the works Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (1956) by Carl J. Friedrich and 
Zbignew K. Brzezinski, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1958) by Hanna Arendt and 
Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (1975) by Juan J. Linz.  
In this thesis I adopt the definition of a totalitarian system introduced by 
Lev Gudkov (2001) who defined it as “the structure of institutions of repressive 
and isolated societies, the functioning of which is provided by the definite 
                                                 
14 See Gans-Morse, Jordan. Searching for Transitologists: Contemporary Theories of Post-
Communist Transitions and the Myth of a Dominant Paradigm // Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 20, № 
4, 2004. pp. 320–349. 
15 According to a dictionary definition, a transformation connotes a “marked change, as in 
appearance or character, usually for the better.” See the American Heritage Dictionary at 
<http://dictionary.reference.com/> Quoted in Gans-Morse, Jordan. Op. cit. 
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technology of power.”16 Based on this definition it is possible to conceptualize 
that the extrication from totalitarian rule is to be manifested in the 
transformation of both the specific structures of totalitarian rule and the societies 
which sustain them.  
In this study I will be focusing primarily on cultural aspects of post-
totalitarian transformations. However, I do realize that the complexity of post-
totalitarian contexts cannot be understood without attention to different, albeit 
interrelated, spheres in which the transformations occur – political, economic, 
social and cultural. More specifically, such factors as domestic politics, economic 
well-being, social attitudes and behavior, historical legacies as well as external 
factors should be considered in order to grasp the complexity of post-totalitarian 
societies. 
Similarly, though representatives of different schools of thought tend to 
stress the importance of either cultural (culturalists) or institutional 
(institutionalists) factors in the cause of social transformations, both factors, as it 
appears, are equally relevant as they mutually affect each other. Both theses that 
“the behavior of peoples is determined by their respective cultural traditions,” 
and that “political engineering” is determinant in terms of transformations’ 
success appear credible and worthy of analysis.17 
Therefore in this research I would like to investigate how the institutional 
changes in the course of exit from totalitarian rule affected political cultures of 
the analyzed societies. It will be also interesting to see how cultural changes 
affected political system of each country. 
In the following sections of this introductory chapter I will address 
theoretical issues of political and cultural change and introduce the main 
concepts that will be used in this work. The overview of the main theoretical 
discourses will help me in defining key variables of the further comparative 
analysis. 
 
                                                 
16 Gudkov, Lev. “Totalitarinism” kak teoreticheskaya ramka (“Totalitarism” as a Theoretical 
Framework) In: Gudkov, Lev. Negativnaja identichnost’. Stat’i 1997-2002 godov. Moscow: Novoe 
literaturnoe obozrenie, VCIOM-A, 2004. p. 419. 
17 On controversy between culturalists and institutionalists see: Werlin, Herbert H.; Eckstein, Harry. 
Political Culture and Political Change // The American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, №. 1, 
March 1990. pp. 249-259. White, Leslie A. Science and Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization. 
New York: Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux, 1969. p. xxiv. 
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1.2.1 Analyzing Political Context of Transformations (Institutional 
Dimension of Democratic Consolidation) 
 
Transition from authoritarian and, particularly, totalitarian regimes is a highly 
complicated and ambiguous process. During these periods, society experiences a 
loss of the former stability and an uncertainty of the future. Also, there is an 
institutional vacuum characterized by the absence of well-defined ‘rules of the 
game’ and ambiguity surrounding the mechanisms of conflict resolution. Not 
surprisingly then, many transformation periods do not end with the triumph of 
democracy, but often with chaos and anarchy, leading to new dictatorships. 
According to the Argentine sociologist Guillermo О’Donnell, “The crucial 
element in determining the outcome of the transition to democracy is success or 
failure in the building of a set of institutions which become important decisional 
points in the flow of political power. Such an outcome is contingent upon 
governmental policies and political strategies of various agents which embody 
the recognition of a paramount shared interest in the task of democratic 
institution building. Successful contemporary cases have exhibited great care, by 
a winning coalition of political leaders, in advancing toward the creation and 
strengthening of democratic political institutions and, to a lesser extent, of 
interest representation. In turn, these achievements have facilitated reasonable 
success in dealing with the social and economic problems inherited from the 
authoritarian predecessors.”18 
According to modern political science, democratic transition is generally 
regarded as a cycle beginning with the collapse of the previous regime and 
concluding with the initiation of democratic consolidation. Juan Linz and Alfred 
Stepan, having united various approaches to the concept of democratic 
consolidation, concluded that “a democratic transition is complete when 
sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an 
elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result 
of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to 
generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power 
generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies 
de jure.”19 
These two political dimensions, which Linz and Stepan name as a 
necessary condition of a democratic regime consolidation, correspond directly 
with the two dimensions of the power accountability described by О’Donnell. 
                                                 
18 O’Donnell, Guillermo. Delegative Democracy // Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, № 1, January 1994. 
19 Linz, Juan, Stepan, Alfred. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996. p. 3. 
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Prevalence of formal institutions, according to the scholar, creates conditions for 
“horizontal” accountability of power, which supplements the mechanism of 
“vertical” accountability realized by means of electoral competition. Horizontal 
accountability is carried out in “a network of relatively autonomous powers (i.e., 
other institutions) that have the capacity of calling into question and eventually 
punishing “improper” ways of discharging the responsibilities of the given 
officer.”20 Accountability in institutionalized representative democracy is 
realized both vertically and horizontally. 
Democracy, in other words, presupposes the presence of institutions (or 
sets of standard norms and rules of political activity) in the framework of which 
the state-power appears accountable to citizens for its decisions and actions. 
These institutions also carry out representation and consequently accountability 
of power holders, providing thus a republican dimension of democracy.21 
Among these democratic institutions the institution of elections or the electoral 
competition in modern democratic societies certainly reigns supreme. A regular 
change of government in the course of general free and fair competitive elections 
is a key criterion which differentiates democratic and non-democratic regimes.  
However, democracy should not be reduced to a “procedural minimum,” 
to a pure institutional process of implementing elections or other practices. 
Empirical analysis reveals many examples of political systems in which the 
presence of elections does not guarantee elimination of authoritarian rule which 
continues to exist covered up by a democratic façade. Thus, despite the 
significance of vertical accountability of power for establishment and 
consolidation of a democratic regime, the process of transition from a command-
administrative, totalitarian system to a system of liberal democracy should be 
also marked by addressing the problem of horizontal accountability, i.e. the 
formation of formal, public, independent institutions. 
It is horizontal accountability that actually creates a political space in any 
state system. Despite О’Donnell’s pointing to existence of vertical accountability 
alongside the right to form parties and influence the public opinion in the so-
called “delegative” democracies (which upon closer examination resemble much 
more authoritarian than democratic regimes), a regime might be seriously 
questioned when the mechanisms of horizontal accountability are lacking. It is 
obvious that the absence of horizontal accountability of the executive by the 
                                                 
20 See. O’Donnell, Guillermo. Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies // Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 9, № 3, 1998. pp. 112-26; Delegative Democracy // Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, 
№ 1, January 1994. pp. 55-69. 
21 According to O’Donnell (1994), “Representation entails the idea of accountability: somehow the 
representative is held responsible for the ways in which he acts in the name of those for whom he 
claims to be entitled to speak.” 
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legislature and the judiciary will either considerably reduce the efficiency of 
vertical accountability in a form of electoral competition, or completely eliminate 
it in case of a likely absorption of political space by the executive. Anyhow, it is 
possible to speak about the dilution of vertical accountability in case of its 
horizontal counterpart absence. Moreover, it can become a serious obstacle to 
formation of a democratic law-based state observing the citizens’ rights and 
freedoms and governed by the rule of law.  
As already Charles Montesquieu conceptualized in The Spirit of Laws, 
“when the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or 
body there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same 
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical 
manner. Again: Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life 
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge 
would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might 
behave with all the violence of an oppressor.”22 Similarly, according to the 
pluralistic concept of “polyarchy” introduced by Robert Dahl, observance of the 
basic civil and political rights serves as the main indicator of the democratic 
character of society.23 
The creation of formal, depersonalized political institutions ensuring 
governmental accountability may be also viewed as an expression of 
sociopolitical modernization characterized by continuous structural 
differentiation in the major institutional spheres of the society as well as the 
continual weakening of ascriptive and direct allocation and regulation, and the 
development of various mechanisms of nonascriptive allocation.24 
The understanding of importance of the system’s institutional dimension 
should prevent the extremely broad use of the term “democracy” generally 
employed in the recent years. This tendency, that evidently started with the 
world-wide euphoria about the alleged “end of history” and inevitable 
democratization of the failed authoritarian regimes in the late 1980s, has led to 
naming the states, having endured the collapse of authoritarian or totalitarian 
regimes and trying to get out of their ruins, new “democracies” without much 
differentiation. However defining the countries which lack the necessary content 
or the institutional framework as democracies seems inappropriate. One can 
speak about the completed democratic consolidation no sooner than the 
democratic institutions, manifested in an effective system of “checks and 
                                                 
22 Montesquieu, Charles. The Spirit of Laws. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2002. p. 151. 
23 Dahl, Robert. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven / London, 1989. 
24 Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah. Modernization: Protest and Change. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 
1966. pp. 9, 11. 
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balances,” a strong parliament, an independent judicial system, government by 
the rule of law, etc. have been formed and established. 
As it appears, the research and analysis of political transformations of 
post-authoritarian and post-totalitarian societies should be focused, primarily, 
not on the declarative statements of its leaders and not only on the constitutional 
provisions, but on the institutional characteristics of the emerging political 
systems. As O’Donnell justly observed, “formal rules about how political [and 
administrative] institutions are supposed to work are often poor guides to what 
actually happens.”25 
From this perspective in Chapter 2 of this research I will address the 
political context of post-totalitarian transformations in post-WWII West 
Germany and post-Soviet Russia. I will investigate how political institutions, 
primarily the national executives and legislatures, in the two countries were 
changed and compare these changes.26 In the same chapter I will also explore 
how the economic reforms affected the institutional building processes in both 
countries, acknowledging the utmost importance of economic transformations 
for societies who have to reform their political and economic systems 
simultaneously. I believe that the general understanding of the institutional 
context of transformations in the analyzed cases can provide an important basis 
for further analysis of cultural transformations in post-totalitarian West Germany 
and Russia.  
In the following subsections of this introductory chapter I will dwell on 
the political culture discourse development and present the relevant thesis 
chapters afterwards. 
 
1.2.2 Analyzing Political Culture: Focusing on Political Attitudes, 
Orientations and Behavior 
 
Interest in cultural aspects of politics, emphasis on the importance of the cultural 
factors, as well as awareness that culture in general and values in particular play 
an important part in human life are not new phenomena. As one of the founding 
fathers of the political culture theory Gabriel Almond observed, “Something like 
a notion of political culture has been around as long as men have spoken and 
written about politics.”27 The development of the political culture concept, 
                                                 
25 O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. Op. cit. p. 40. 
26 NB: Due to space limitations I will not be able to discuss the transformations of the German and 
Russian judiciaries in this thesis. Besisdes, for the same reasons I will not focus on the cadre 
rotation system in postwar West Germany and post-Soviet Russia. 
27 In: Almond, Gabriel; Verba, Sidney (eds.) The Civic Culture Revisited. Newbury Park, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1989. p. 1. 
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however, dates back to the late 1950s - 1960s when relevant research in political 
science was stimulated by several sociopolitical factors. At that point of time the 
collapse of representative governments in interwar Italy and Germany as well as 
the failures of democratic transitions in some non-Western countries, trying to 
copy Western political models, required explanation and the political system of 
democracy in the Western context needed finding new ways of stabilization. 
Additionally, the necessity to “democratize” former dictatorships faced by 
political and cultural elites in the post-World War II period asked for renewal of 
existing theories. 
Although interest in political culture faded in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
debate has been revitalized since the 1990s as a result of efforts in Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet republics to construct democracy out of the ashes of 
communism, as well as growing concern in “old” democracies about the 
apparent decline of social engagement, electoral turnout and about other signs of 
public weariness and skepticism. 
In the 20th century the political culture concept was introduced by the 
American social scientists Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in their seminal 
1963 study The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, 
where it was argued that in addition to the institutional and constitutional 
features of political systems, the political orientations of the individuals who 
constitute them are also relevant.28 Almond and Verba’s work thus redirected 
empirical enquiry from an inclusive preoccupation “with the structure and 
function of political systems, institutions, and agencies, and their effects on 
public policy” and their concept of political culture bridged the gap between 
macro-level politics and micro-politics.29 As the scholars suggested, “The 
relationship between attitudes and motivations of the discrete individuals who 
make up the political systems and the character and performance of political 
systems may be discovered systematically through concepts of political 
culture.”30 
The major point of Almond and Verba’s comparative study was thus 
addressing the role of subjective values and attitudes of national populations in 
the stability of democratic regimes. They defined “political culture” as the 
                                                 
28 Barnard (1969) pointed out that the term ‘political culture’ was used as early as the 18 th century 
by Johann Gottfried von Herder, student of Immanuel Kant, a dialogue partner of Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing, and a mentor and friend of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe // See Johann 
Gottfried Herder on Social and Political Culture. Edited and translated by F. M. Barnard, 1969. 
29 Almond, Gabriel A.; Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. p. 31. 
30 Ibid. p. 32. 
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aggregate pattern of individual subjective attitudes and political dispositions in 
the populace to political institutions and outcomes.31 
In a newer formulation Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell (1980) 
elaborated the concept of political culture in three directions: (1) substantive 
content; (2) varieties of orientation; and (3) the systemic relations among these 
components, and argued that analysis of a nation’s political culture would have 
to concern itself with all three. From the point of view of substantive content one 
may speak of system culture, process culture, and policy culture. The system culture of 
a nation consisted of the distribution of the attitudes toward the national 
community and its authorities, including the sense of national identity, attitudes 
toward the legitimacy and effectiveness of the incumbents of the various political 
roles. The process culture included attitudes toward the self in politics (e.g. 
parochial – subject – participant) and attitudes toward other political actors (e.g. 
trust, cooperative competence, hostility). The policy culture consisted of the 
distribution of preferences regarding the outputs and outcomes of politics, the 
ordering among different social groupings of such political values as welfare, 
security and liberty.32 
Orientations toward the system, process and policy objects may, in turn, 
be cognitive, consisting of beliefs, information, and analysis; affective, consisting of 
feelings of attachment, aversion, or indifference; or evaluative, consisting of moral 
judgments of one kind or another (what they think of how things are).  
A third aspect of a political culture would be the relatedness or systemic 
character of its components. Based on Philip Converse’s concept of “constraint” 
characterizing situations in which attitudes toward political institutions and 
policies go together, the researchers argued that the political cultures of nations 
and groups may be distinguished and compared according to their internal 
constraint or consistency: “Thus, in a given population, attitudes toward foreign 
policy, domestic economic policy, and racial segregation may be parts of a 
consistent ideology; for most individuals in this group, if one knew how they 
stood on foreign policy one could predict their views on taxation, on busing, and 
the like. In other groups these attitudes might be independent. Similarly, 
information, beliefs, feelings, and moral judgments are interrelated.”33  
On the basis of extensive cross-national survey research in five nations – 
the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy and Mexico, - The 
Civic Culture theorized three basic orientations toward political institutions and 
                                                 
31 Ibid. p. 12. 
32 Almond, Gabriel A.; Powell, Bingham Jr. (eds.) Comparative Politics Today: A World View. 
Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1980. 
33 Almond, Gabriel A.; Verba, Sidney. 1989. Op. cit. pp. 27-28. 
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outcomes: parochial, where politics is not differentiated as a distinct sphere of life 
and is of relatively little interest; subject, in which individuals are aware of the 
political system and its outcomes but are relatively passive; and participant, 
where citizens have a strong sense of their role in politics and responsibility for 
it. In their comparative research Almond and Verba paid attention to the citizens’ 
orientations toward political institutions and outcomes, and rated five countries 
on these qualities, finding the United States and the United Kingdom to be 
participant political cultures, Germany to be subject, Italy and Mexico to be 
relatively parochial.  
Subsequent work in this tradition developed Almond and Verba’s original 
argument regarding the link between citizens’ attitudes and orientations and the 
stability of political system of democracy. Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues’ 
broad-ranging cross-national study of democracy and citizen attitudes The World 
Value Survey confirmed that both the inauguration and stability of democracy is 
promoted by certain traits of political culture among the citizenry. The 
researchers discovered the link between democracy, economic affluence, basic 
satisfaction with political life and high levels of interpersonal trust thus arguing 
that democracy depends on cultural as well as economic factors. Inglehart and 
his coauthors particularly emphasized the importance of “secular-rational” and 
“self-expression” values over “traditional” and “survival” values in the 
attainment of democracy.34 Seymour Martin Lipset (1959, 1994) also devoted 
much attention to the causal links between levels of social development, culture 
and democracy. 
Other scholars in this tradition – James S. Coleman (1988), Robert Putman 
(1993, 2000), Francis Fukuyama (1995) et al. – further developed the political 
culture theory by introducing a concept of “social capital” defined by Putnam in 
the early 1990s as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and 
networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions.”35  
In 2000, an important collection of essays Culture Matters: How Values 
Shape Human Progress, drawn from a symposium sponsored by the Harvard 
Academy for International and Area Studies and edited by Lawrence E. Harrison 
                                                 
34 Inglehart, Ronald. The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Postindustrial 
Societies // American Political Science Review, 65, 1971. pp. 991–1017. 
35 Putnam, Robert. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993. p. 167. Later Putnam also referred to “connections among 
individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from 
them.” See Putnam, Robert D. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. 
New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000. p. 19. 
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and Samuel P. Huntington, addressed worldwide effects of culture on 
liberalization, prosperity, and justice in different national contexts.36 
It is noteworthy that one of the major debates around the political culture 
concept occurred in relation to the role of citizens’ participation and behavior. In 
fact, Almond conceptualized that the civic culture concept is largely based on 
“the ‘rationality-activist model’ of democratic citizenship, the model of a 
successful democracy that required that all citizens be involved and active in 
politics and their participation be informed, analytical and rational.”37 He added, 
however, that this model is considered to be only one component of the civic 
culture and that “only when combined in some sense with its opposites of 
passivity, trust and deference to authority and competence […] is a viable and 
stable democracy possible.”38 The theoretical framework of the five-nation study 
put thus major emphasis on the “mixed” character of the “civic culture,” which 
combined “some measure of competence, involvement, and activity with 
passivity and non-involvement.”39  
Although this emphasis on passivity was criticized by those who argued 
that political participation was the very stuff of democratic government, Almond 
and Verba underscored the correlation between strong democracy and rational 
involvement and participation of citizens. They argued that civic culture is, in the 
first place, an allegiant participant political culture in which the political culture 
and political structure are congruent. According to the scholars, “the democratic 
citizen is expected to be active in politics and to be involved in it. He is also 
supposed to be rational in his approach to politics, guided by reason, not by 
emotion and he is supposed to be well-informed and a decision is made on the 
basis of careful calculation as to the interests and the principles he would like to 
see furthered.”40  
Furthermore, Almond and Verba stressed the importance of participation 
and engagement even in non-political organizations and associations for 
democratic development and democratic political culture, arguing that 
“membership in some associations, even if the individual does not consider the 
membership politically relevant and even if it does not involve his active 
participation, does lead to a more competent citizenry.”41 More recently, Robert 
Putnam confirmed that non-political organizations in civil society are vital for 
                                                 
36 Harrison, Lawrence E.; Huntington, Samuel P. Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human 
Progress. New York: Basic Books, 2000. 
37 Almond, Gabriel A.; Verba, Sidney. 1963. Op. cit. p. 16. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Almond, Gabriel A.; Verba, Sidney. 1989. Op. cit. p. 221. 
40 Almond, Gabriel A.; Verba, Sidney. 1963. Op. cit. pp. 29-30. 
41 Ibid. p. 322, see also Verba et al. 1978, 1995; Parry et al. 1992. 
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democracy as they build social capital, trust and shared values, which are 
transferred into the political sphere and help to hold society together, facilitating 
an understanding of the interconnectedness of society and interests within it.42  
Over time the allegation that civic engagement and democracy are 
inseparable has become widely acknowledged. As Jan van Deth has recently 
observed, “Democracy is not worth its name, if it does not refer to government 
by the people; hence democracy cannot function without some minimum level of 
political involvement. A lack of political involvement is considered destructive 
for democracy and debates are focused on the degree of involvement – not on the 
necessity of participation.”43 
Although students of political culture were not particularly united over 
inclusion of political behavior in the definition of political culture, even those 
followers of the subjectivist approach who like Archie Brown and Jack Gray 
(1977), as well as Jeffrey W. Hahn (1991, 1993, 2001, 2005) excluded political 
behavior from the definition, they did not completely disregard it. As Brown 
noted, “To define political culture in such a way as to exclude behavior in no 
way implies a lack of interest in behavior.”44 According to this view, however, 
the significance of political culture is independent of its ability to explain political 
behavior, although the two may be related.  
Other researchers, however, moved beyond the attitudinal dimension to 
include political behavior and political participation in the definition of political 
culture. The representatives of another, more “interpretivist” approach to 
political culture, became associated with the anthropological methods used by 
the followers of Clifford Geertz and Max Weber argued for inclusion of behavior 
and participation in the definition.45 
Following this tradition, in this work I include the participatory aspect in 
the analysis of political culture developments in Germany in Russia. By political 
participation I understand citizens’ activities aimed at influencing political 
decisions. Jan van Deth observed that though various definitions of political 
participation (for e.g. by Milbrath and Goel 1977; Verba and Nie 1972; Kaase and 
Marsh 1979; Parry et al. 1992; Verba et al. 1995; Norris 2001) emphasize distinct 
                                                 
42 Putnam, Robert D.; Leonardi, Robert; Nanetti, Raffaella Y. Making Democracy Work: Civic 
Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
43 van Deth, Jan W. Studying Political Participation: Towards a Theory of Everything? Paper 
presented at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research, 
Grenoble, 6–11 April 2001. pp. 4-5. 
44 Brown, Archie. Political Culture and Communist Studies. London: Macmillan, 1984. p. 150. 
45 See more on this discussion in Hahn, Jeffrey W. ‘Yaroslavl’ Revisited: Assessing Continuity and 
Change in Russian Political Culture Since 1990. In: Whitefield, Stephen (ed.), Political Culture and 
Post-Communism, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and New York, 2005. 
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aspects differently they share the common understanding of this phenomenon. 
Political participation refers to people in their role as citizens and is understood 
as an activity, i.e. presupposes some action. To add to this, the activities of 
citizens defined as political participation should be voluntary and not ordered by 
the ruling class or obliged under some law or rule. Finally, political participation 
concerns government and politics in a broad sense of these words (‘political 
system’) and is neither restricted to specific phases (such as parliamentary 
decision making, or the ‘input’ side of the political system), nor to specific levels 
or areas (such as national elections or contacts with officials).46 
It is noteworthy that the study of political participation since the mid-20th 
century has been developing in direction of constant expansion reflecting the 
social changes in modern societies. The research in this field has dealt with 
numerous forms of political participation such as casting a vote in elections and 
campaigning by politicians and parties (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948; Berelson 1952); 
participation in community groups and direct contacts between citizens, public 
officials, and politicians (Verba and Nie 1972); participation in social movements 
and public protests (Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979); civil activities as volunteering and 
social engagement (Putnam 2000; Norris 2001; Thränhardt and Hunger 2000). 
Whether citizens take part in public life through direct forms of political 
participation, such as voting, party work, organizing for a cause, demonstrating, 
lobbying, or in more indirect forms, such as membership in civic groups and 
voluntary associations, both kinds of participation, it is argued, influence the 
quality of government.47 
If the correlation between political democratization and citizens’ 
involvement in political affairs has been widely acknowledged, there was a 
considerable debate regarding the causation of this correlation. 
In his famous critique of The Civic Culture study, Brian Barry (1978) 
pointed out that political culture should be viewed as the effect and not as the 
cause of political processes. He believed that correlation between civic culture 
attitudes and democracy does not say anything about causal chain. The 
presumption that a civic culture is conducive to democracy can also be 
interpreted the other way round, but such a conclusion would be less exiting, 
namely that “‘democracy’ produces ‘civic culture’.”48 In a similar vein, Dankwart 
Rustow (1970) argued that “democracy makes democrats” rather than vice versa. 
                                                 
46 van Deth, Jan W. Studying Political Participation: Towards a Theory of Everything? Paper 
presented at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research, 
Grenoble, 6–11 April 2001. pp. 4-5. 
47 Ibid. See also Remington, Thomas F. Politics in Russia. London: Longman, 2006. p. 385.  
48 Barry, Brian. Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1978. pp. 51-52. 
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Carol Pateman (1980) criticized the assumed relationship between people’s 
orientations and political outcomes, arguing that it remained unclear how the 
values of people should affect the political system.49 The direction of causality 
imputed between democracy and political culture has also been subject to some 
empirical scrutiny by Richard Rose et al. (1998), Edward N. Muller and Mitchel 
Seligson (1994), and John Sides (1999). 
Developing this line of argumentation Jeffrey Hahn (2005) underscored 
that it is wrong to assume that political outcomes are directly linked to, or 
explained by, political culture. Hahn shared the view that institutional outcomes 
and political culture are mutually dependent and that the causal arrow can go 
either way. While political culture may condition political outcomes and 
institutions, it is equally clear that political institutions can and do shape political 
cultures.50 
In his answer to this critique Almond underscored that he and his 
coauthor regarded culture and political structure as interconnected, mutually 
dependent and dynamically interacting: “Political culture is treated as both an 
independent and a dependent variable, as causing structure and as being caused 
by it.”51 Beliefs, feelings, and values are the product as well as the cause of the 
political system. 
To conclude this brief overview of the development of political culture 
theory, it is important, as it appears, to add one consideration. Whenever one 
conceptualizes democratic political culture and considers political participation 
as well as membership in various associations and organizations as a key factor 
in the development of a competent citizenry, it is important to bear in mind an 
institutional and, more precisely, a political regime factor. 
It is reasonable to suggest that the emergence of associational life requires 
a definite type of institutional structure and can develop more or less freely only 
in a definite institutional framework. A prerequisite of such a differentiation is at 
least a minimum realization of the principle of pluralism and competition, as 
well as a certain degree of freedom in the political sphere. “Democracy, - states  
Neera Chandhoke, - requires as a precondition a space where various groups can 
express their ideas about how society and politics should be organized, where 
they can articulate both the content as well as the boundaries of what is desirable 
in a good society. Correspondingly, individuals and groups should possess the 
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right to conceptualize in conditions of relative freedom their notions of the 
desired and the good society.”52 
The observance of the above mentioned freedoms and rights serves as a 
foundation for the emergence and development of the public sphere as “a realm of 
social life where citizens can confer in an unrestricted fashion about matters of 
general interest and through that discussion exert influence on political life.”53  
The concept of the public sphere (Öffentlichkeit), first introduced by Jürgen 
Habemas in his seminal work The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere – 
An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (1962), appears, in my view, one of 
the central concepts in political culture research.54  
Oscar Negt and Alexander Kluge (1993) pointed out that the term 
Öffentlichkeit encompasses a variety of meanings implying “a spatial concept, the 
social sites or arenas where meanings are articulated, distributed, and 
negotiated, as well as the collective body constituted by, and in this process, “the 
public.”55 The public sphere represents, thus, an arena on which interests and 
concerns of different actors can be articulated, presented, debated, negotiated 
and distributed. 
Representing “a discursive space in which individuals and groups 
congregate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a 
common judgment,” the well-functioning public sphere serves as a chief 
indicator of a participant political culture characterized by the polity members’ 
acceptance of their responsibilities of citizenship, their active involvement, civic 
competence and the sense of efficacy.56 It is possible, thus, to hypothyze that the 
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advent of participatory political culture is to be manifested in expansion of the 
public sphere as citizens will be taking a more active role in public affairs.  
In this sense the public sphere as the realm of associational life of civil 
society is distinct from the private sphere of family and close friends.57 This 
distinction refers to the difference between social activities that are within close 
and trusted circles and those that go beyond them to involve interaction with 
other forms of organization in the society at large. In other words, there is a 
qualitative difference between a gathering with a circle of family and friends – 
whether small or large, occasional or regular – and activities that involve an 
established group, where different kinds of people come together based on a 
common ideas, interests, talents, or causes.58  
The distinction between the private and the public sphere is best 
expressed in the civil society concept which refers an array of groups, 
associations, and organizations that transcend family relations, are independent 
of the state and actually serve as a mediator between the individual and the 
state.59 It is argued that civil society organizations and civic groups may 
contribute to democratic stability in two ways: internally they may inspire habits 
of cooperation, solidarity, public-spiritedness, and trust; whereas externally, 
these networks aggregate interests and articulate demands to ensure the 
government’s accountability to its citizens. It is this dense infrastructure of 
groups, experts argue, that is the key to making democracy work.60 
 
1.2.3 Analyzing Political Culture: Focusing on Symbolic Structures of 
Collective Identity and Collective Memory 
 
As noted previously, since its introduction in the late 1950s the political culture 
concept has engendered a lot of controversy and criticism. Most trenchant, 
however, were charges that Almond and Verba focused excessively on the 
psychological aspects of the problem and defined political culture in terms of 
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subjectivity thus eviscerating the importance of culture as symbols and 
meanings. “What ‘theory’ may be found in anyone’s head is not,” one set of 
critics charged, “culture. Culture is interpersonal, covering a range of such 
theory. […] Political culture is the property of a collectivity.”61 Without a richer 
understanding of symbols, meanings, rituals, and the like, critics charged, 
political culture could not be distinguished conceptually from political 
psychology. 
Lowell Dittmer (1977), among others, argued for understanding political 
culture in relation to political symbolism as an independent dimension of 
political life, remarking that political culture cannot otherwise be distinguished 
conceptually from political psychology, on the one hand, or from political 
structure, on the other: “If political culture can be reduced to the distribution of 
attitudes among a given population, wherein lies the need for a distinct 
conceptual framework and line of inquiry?... If reduction of ideology to social 
structure was possible, we would have no need for a concept of culture or a 
category of meaning. A sociology of knowledge would suffice… To the extent 
that political culture contains elements of political psychology or political 
structure in its definition, its use to explain change in either of these variables is 
of course tautological.”62 Dittmer believed that “political culture should be 
conceptualized as an emergent variable, one whose properties transcend the sum 
of its members’ belief and value systems.”63  
Subsequently the concept of political culture was reinvented by 
interpretive social scientists such as Charles Taylor (1971), Clifford Geertz (1973), 
Ronald Rogowski (1975), Lowell Dittmer (1977), Brian Barry (1978), Lynn Hunt 
(1984), Keith Baker (1990), Mabel Berezin (1994), Steven Brint (1994), Margaret 
Somers (1995), Marc Howard Ross (1997), and other scholars. 
One of the authors of the new political culture theory Jeffrey Olick (1997) 
wrote that “in contrast to older reductionisms (to both the subjectivism of earlier 
political culture theory and those who answered it by de-emphasizing culture, 
viewing attitudes were seen as epiphenomenal, as mere expressions of (or at the 
very least tools for) the more real – that is, objective social structure), new 
political culture analysis defines culture neither narrowly as subjective ideas, 
values, or attitudes, nor disdainfully as epiphenomenal, but broadly as the 
symbolic aspect of all social situations. Culture is regarded as intersubjective and 
as embodied in symbolism and patterns of meaning (Alexander 1990); it is 
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pervasive.”64 Olick conceptualized that political culture “is not something which 
can be measured by traditional opinion surveys, but is something which needs to 
be excavated, observed, and interpreted as a system in terms of its own 
constitutive features.”65 
Sociologist Yuri Levada who focused on the research of symbolic 
structures in public opinion drew attention to the coexistence of the two systems 
or levels of action, one of which, “the program of experience,” sets, controls and 
optimizes some goal-oriented sequences of actions, while the second, “the 
program of culture,” places those present actions in a more general context.  
According to Levada, “the program of culture” reveals the degree of 
importance and relevance of the goal itself and thus confirms the sense and the 
direction of one’s movement towards it. The program of culture appears thus 
superior to the actual actions and behavior of social actors setting their meaning 
and direction. Differently, at the level of culture selection, sanctioning, 
authorization, and generally setting (explicit or implicit) of the framework for 
behavior and actions of individual actors takes place. This behavior, in turn, 
becomes an indicator of the social identification of individuals with a suggested 
or mutually elaborated cultural program. Levada noted that linking these two 
dimensions or levels of meaning becomes possible only through some, primarily 
symbolic, mediating mechanisms or structures.66  
The importance of symbolic structures in the processes of collective 
identification and the necessity to study them has become widely recognized in 
social research. As Levada observed, “Appeal to symbolic structures simplifies a 
person’s relation to social reality, relieves him from autonomous efforts of 
understanding, evaluation, etc. It is used as a proof of loyalty to a tradition, 
ideology, social group or institution.”67 
The problem of identification with political system retains, however, 
particular significance in societies coping with the former regime’s collapse and 
facing thus the necessity to search for and select new symbols of identifications. 
Similar societies are particularly in need of symbolic structures that would 
contribute to legitimation of the new regime’s political institutions and processes, 
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on the one hand, and that would secure the identification of citizens with them, 
on the other. 
Importantly, collective identity that may be broadly defined as the feeling 
of belonging to a certain group or groups, the sense of collective “we-ness,” rests 
on an awareness of continuity through time.”68 A sense of continuity binding a 
community together can be regarded, thus, as both the basis and sign of personal 
or collective identity.  
This explains the sustained interest in the problems of temporality and 
temporal coordination of polities in the 20th century social sciences. As early as 
1905 the French sociologist Henri Hubert defined time as a symbolic structure 
representing the organization of society through its temporal rhythms.69 The 
thesis about the use of time for control, regulation and synchronization of social 
life was discussed in the writings of Wilbert Moore (1963) and Pitirim Sorokin 
(1964). The issues of using time in advancement of power interests were 
developed in the works by Michele Foucault (1977), and subsequently in Western 
sociology. Max Weber (1978), for instance, showed that control over information, 
including information about the past, can become an instrument of power and 
control. 
Getting back to the problem of identity, it should be pointed out that 
temporality here is expressed primarily through the concept of memory. 
Awareness of continuity over time necessary for sustaining a collective 
identification depends largely on the commonality of memory of past events. In 
this sense collective identity formation is intimately linked with collective 
memory and the latter can be viewed as “a signifying practice and as a 
cornerstone of group identity.”70 
In 1925 the student of Émile Durkheim French sociologist Maurice 
Halbwachs in his landmark study The Social Frameworks of Memory described 
memory as a social phenomenon, arguing that “it is in society that people 
normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, 
and localize their memories.”71 Halbwachs was the first to introduce the concept 
of collective memory which he defined as a shared account of the past by a group 
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of people. However, for Halbwachs, the collective memory of a certain group 
was bound in space and time. Decades later the French historian Pierre Nora 
enhanced the theory of memory by breaking through time and space limitations 
with the help of symbols and cultural codes.72 Nora introduced the notion of “the 
sites of memory” (lieu de mémoire) by which he understood “any significant 
entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will 
or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of 
any community.”73 In other words, the sites of memory, according to Nora, are 
the realms “where [cultural] memory crystallizes and secretes itself.”74 These 
may include: places such as archives, museums, cathedrals, palaces, cemeteries, 
and memorials; concepts and practices such as commemorations, mottos, and 
rituals; objects such as inherited property, commemorative monuments, 
manuals, emblems, basic texts, and symbols.75  
German Egyptologist Jan Assmann specified the idea of memory 
conceptualizing two different types of memory within a community – 
“communicative” and “cultural memory.” While “communicative memory” is 
fairly unorganized, unstructured and formed by communication of every day life 
situations, cultural memory stands for the “outer dimension of human 
memory.”76 It is constituted by cultural molding – such as texts, rites, or 
memorials, as well as institutionalized communication such as recitation, 
solemnization, or contemplation. It is from the content of its cultural memory, 
according to Assmann, that the self-perception of a nation derives.77 
Since policies are largely legitimated through appeals to the past events, 
collective memory can be viewed as one of the main factors in the national 
identity and political culture formation.78 The correlation between collective 
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memory, national identity, and political culture was noted in the works of 
Charles Maier (1988), Jeffrey Olick (1993, 2005), Jeffrey Olick and Daniel Levy 
(1997), Takashi Yoshida (2006), James W. Booth (1999, 2007), Richard Ned Lebow 
(2006), and other researchers. 
According to Jeffrey Olick and Daniel Levy, “Political cultures operate as 
historical systems of meaning – that is, as ordered but changing systems of claim-
making – in which collective memory obliges the present (as prescription) and 
restricts it (as proscription) both mythically and rationally.”79  
In the recent study on collective memory Communities of Memory: On 
Witness, Identity, and Justice of Memory (2007) a social philosopher James Booth 
analyzed the central place of memory in the constitution of identity, introducing 
the concept of “memory-identity.” Drawing observation from Aristotle’s Politics, 
Booth conceptualized that, in the first instance, “the issue of identity explicitly 
involves a temporal dimension: the question of the sameness of a person / 
community that undergoes change over time.”80 He also argued that sameness 
through time is at its core normative in character. According to Booth, since 
“communities exist in time and are responsible in time,” “political identity is not 
just a temporal proposition but a moral-temporal one: Continuous selves are the 
foundation of holding individuals and political communities to account for their 
past; and they also lay out a claim of duty toward the future continuation of this 
same self.”81 While “our” membership in communities is largely unchosen, 
choice appears only in how “we” understand and rework such inherited 
attachments, and in how “we” understand their history and do justice to it. Thus, 
Booth concluded that “democracies old and new have a choice with respect to 
how to assume responsibility for their past” and that people’s freedom rests in 
“whether and how we bear witness to the past which is ours.”82 
This raises the issue of responsibility for coming to terms with national 
pasts as an important part of collective identity formation in post-totalitarian 
societies. Helmut Dubiel, among others, has pointed to a new “culture of 
legitimation” that has emerged throughout the world and that is defined by “the 
abandonment of the traditional ‘positive’ form of political legitimation” — 
typically marked by “triumphalistic assertions of national history”—in favor of 
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one that “incorporates the remorseful commemoration of collective injustice” 
perpetrated by nations at some point in their past.83  
At the same time Dubiel posited that when the memory of national 
trauma such as genocide is silenced or repressed, the strength of the democracy 
in terms of a democratic political culture is weakened. According to the author, 
“Post-totalitarian societies that deny, repress, or narrowly define pasts that 
include state-organized terrorism would continue to bear signs of the regimes 
from which they emerge. Democratic polities, in contrast, are those in which the 
past, however painful, becomes a living part of the present.”84 
Other observers have also underscored that the way the country deals 
with its history has a major effect on national identity and the democratization 
efforts of a nation after tyranny and dictatorship and that the political use of 
history in form of politics of memory has a significant effect on the success and 
failure of democracy.85 
Thus, besides important goals of forming democratic political culture and 
civil society destroyed or seriously weakened by the dictatorial regime, former 
totalitarian and authoritarian societies face the necessity of confronting their 
repressive pasts.86 Or, differently, the processes of democratization in similar 
contexts are to be supplemented with the societies’ active attempts to deal with 
their past legacies and ‘work through’ their repressive pasts in the public sphere. 
In the Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis I will focus on the transformations of 
political cultures in the postwar Federal Republic of Germany and the post-
Soviet Russian Federation. Given the importance of the two observed dimensions 
of political culture – individual-level or subjective, on the one hand, and 
symbolic, on the other – I will analyze both these levels in their interaction, 
mutual impact on each other and on the formation of political culture in 
analyzed societies. 
In Chapter 3 I will at first determine the variables that will be analyzed in 
a comparative study of the two individual political cultures. The chapter will 
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focus then on attitudes and participatory orientations of citizens towards 
political system in West Germany and Russia. 
Chapter 4, in turn, will explore the ways in which West Germany and 
Russia confronted their totalitarian legacies and how they remembered their 
respective totalitarian regimes - the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. The 
developments of collective memory discourses of the respective national 
totalitarian pasts will be analyzed and compared in that chapter. On presenting 
the collective memory developments in both cases, I will turn to an analysis of 
the sources of change (and continuity) in official narratives of traumatic historical 
events.  
In the concluding Chapter 5 I will face the task of untangling how these 
multiple transitions in political and cultural spheres affected each other and 
overall social development in the two cases. On the one hand, I will try to 
understand how political change and institutional transformations in post-
totalitarian societies have affected political cultures. At the same time, I will try 
to see how collective memory discourses influenced the national identity and 
political processes in post-WWII West Germany and post-Soviet Russia. 
 
1.3 The Case-Studies’ Literature Overview and Remarks on 
Methodology 
 
It is important to point out that the area of West German studies in general is 
highly developed. Various aspects of democratic transition in the postwar War II 
Federal Republic were analyzed in detail by both German and foreign 
researchers. Most important contributions to the analysis of political changes 
were made in the works by Kurt Sontheimer (1971), Klaus von Beyme (1971, 
1990, 1999, 2004), David P. Conradt (1972, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1996, 2000, 
2004, 2008), Kurt Sontheimer and Wilhelm Bleek (1984), Peter Katzenstein (1987), 
Russell J. Dalton (1993), Timothy Garton Ash (1993), Gordon Smith et al. (1996, 
2004), Max Kaase and Günter Schmid (1999), Ludger Helms (2000), Manfred 
Schmidt (2003), to name just a few.  
Descriptions of political culture transformations can be found in the 
writings by Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, Theodor Adorno, 
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963, 1980), Sidney Verba (1965), Ralf 
Dahrendorf (1965), Karl Jaspers (1966), Steven Warnecke (1970), Max Kaase 
(1971), Kurt Sontheimer (1971, 1973, 1990), Bradley Richardson (1973), R. 
Boynton and Gerhard Lowenberg (1973, 1974), Kendell Baker (1973, 1978), 
William Chandler (1974), David Conradt (1974, 1980, 1981), M. Kent Jennings 
(1976), Walter Jaide (1976), Klaus Allerbeck (1976, 1977), Samuel Barnes and Max 
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Kaase, et al. (1979), Martin Greiffenhagen and Sylvia Greiffenhagen (1979), 
Kendall Baker, Russel Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt (1981), Elisabeth Noelle-
Neumann and Edgar Piel (1983), Martin Greiffenhagen (1984), and other 
scholars. 
 Perhaps the most elaborated research field in German studies is the 
studies of collective memory and cultural representations of the Holocaust. The 
politics of memory, the problems of dealing with Nazi legacies, the German 
national identity and the related debates have attracted much scholarly attention 
from diverse fields such as history and intellectual history (for example, Charles 
Maier 1988; Saul Friedländer 1992; Jeffrey Herf 1997; Andrei Markovits and 
Simon Reich 1997; Mary Fulbrook 1999; Dan Diner 2000; Rudy Koshar 2000; 
Siobhan Kattago 2001; Omer Bartov 2003; Wulf Kansteiner 2006; Dirk Moses 
2007), cultural and literary theory (for example, Aleida Assmann and Ute Frevert 
1999; Sebald 1999; Stuart Taberner and Frank Finlay 2002; Caroline Pearce 2008), 
psychoanalysis (for example, Alexander Mitscherlich and Margarete Mitscherlich 
1975; Domenick LaCapra 1998; Eva Hoffman 2004), sociology (for example, 
Helmut Dubiel 1999; Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider 2001), German studies 
(Caroline Wiedmer 1999; William Niven 2002; Jan-Werner Müller 2000; Konrad 
Jarausch and Michael Geyer 2003), political science (Peter Reichel 1995, 2001; 
Gesine Schwan 2001), Judaic studies (James Young 1993, 1995, 2000), and 
journalism (Jane Kramer 1996; Judith Miller 1990). 
 Political transformations in post-Soviet Russia were also rather thoroughly 
discussed, primarily, in the works of such scholars as Michael McFaul (1993, 
1995, 1999), Tatiana Vorozheikina (1994, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009), Leon Aron 
(1995), Steven Solnick (1998, 1999), Archie Brown (1999), Dmitry Furman (1999, 
2010), Alfred Stepan (2000), David Laitin (2000), Mikhail Afanasiev (2000), 
Vladimir Gel’man (1999, 2000, 2002, 2003), Lilia Shevtsova (1999, 2001, 2004), 
Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski (2001), Andrei Melville (1999), Timothy J. 
Colton (2000), Valerie Sperling (2000), James Hughes (2000), Steven Fish (2000), 
Michael Burawoy (2001), Paul Kubicek (2002), Lev Gudkov (2004, 2007), Stephen 
White, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa (2005), Thomas Remington (2006), 
Stephen White, Richard Sakwa, and Henry E. Hale (2009).  
Most notable publications on the Russian political culture include works 
by Jeffrey W. Hahn (1991, 1993, 2001, 2005), Yuri Levada (1993, 1995, 2001, 2005), 
James L. Gibson (1996, 1998, 2001), Timothy J. Colton (2000), Stephen White 
(2000), Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul (2002), Jan Teorell (2002), Stephen 
White and Ian McAllister (2004), Richard Rose (1998, 2000), Stephen Whitefield 
(2005), Lev Gudkov (2002, 2004, 2007), Lev Gudkov and Boris Dubin (2007, 2008). 
 The field of memory studies in the Russia case is, however, much less 
developed. As Alexander Etkind asserted, “The scholarship on the Russian 
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memory of Soviet terror is negligible.”87 Still there were several important 
contributions to this topic as well. Such authors as Nancy Adler (2001), Boris 
Dubin (2003, 2004, 2005, 2008), Alexander Boroznyak (2004), Lev Gudkov (2005), 
Leon Aron (2008), Alexander Etkind (2009), Maria Ferretti (2003, 2007), Dina 
Khapaeva (2007, 2009), Christian Folk (2009), Arseny Roginsky (2008), Sarah E. 
Mendelson and Theodore P. Gerber (2005, 2006, 2008) have written on the issues 
of national memory of the Soviet past. 
 As noted previously, given the fact the comparisons of the post-
totalitarian transformations of West Germany and Russia are virtually 
nonexistent, this research work represents an attempt to fill in this gap. The 
analysis presented in this dissertation is largely based on the existing sociological 
data and secondary literature. For analytical and illustrative purposes I also use 
some primary sources documents such as official addresses of leaders, public 
speeches, transcripts of relevant meeting and conferences, relevant press news 
and newspaper articles, etc. 
In terms of timing I will refer to postwar, i.e. the post-1945, period of the 
West German history. Since the West German state ceased to exist with the 
unification of the two parts of Germany in 1989, I will try to limit my analysis by 
that point. However, as some of the processes that occurred beyond that time-
point appear to be a direct continuation of some discourses that had developed 
and the decisions that had been made before, in some cases, when it is required 
by the logics of narration and objectives of the research, this time-limit will 
inevitably be crossed.  
Similar remark can be made in relation to the Russian case. Since de jure the 
post-Soviet period starts with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, I will 
regard it as a general starting point. However, it should be remembered that an 
important point of departure in terms of socio-cultural and political 
transformations was the perestroika period of the second half of the 1980s. 
Therefore in my analysis I will definitely refer to the mentioned period as well. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Political Context of Transformations in 
post-WWII West Germany and post-Soviet 
Russia 
 
 
As discussed in the Introduction, democratic system is expressed not in the 
constitutional texts only but primarily in the well-realized principles proclaimed 
in them or, more specifically, in the existence of mechanisms of power 
accountability. In their work Formal and Informal Institutions in Defective 
Democracies Wolfgang Merkel and Aurel Croissant argued that constitutional 
self-restraint of democracy has to provide necessary mechanisms of protection 
from the menace of self-destruction by the tyranny of the majority and from 
despotic rule of democratically legitimized power bearer.88 Juan Linz and Alfred 
Stepan, in turn, asserted that a rule of law embodied in a spirit of 
constitutionalism entails a relatively strong consensus over the constitution and 
especially commitment to “self-binding” procedures of governance that require 
exceptional majorities to change. It also requires a clear hierarchy of laws, 
interpreted by an independent judicial system and supported by a strong legal 
culture in civil society.89 The indispensable democratic principle of the rule of law 
can be realized only within a framework of institutions. The proclaimed 
constitutional principles and values do not possess much worth unless there is 
an institution serving as their guardian.90 
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Strasbourg, 21 June 1999. 
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In 1999 the Russian political scientist Igor Klyamkin pointed to the 
traditional absence of political system in the Russian state which used to possess 
only a political subject represented by one ruler (an autocrat or a Secretary 
General of the party at office) who incorporated in himself all power functions.91 
In this sense the transformations launched in the second half of the 1980s during 
the so-called perestroika period and followed by the collapse of the communist 
regime, provided Russia with a chance for changing such an obviously 
unproductive (from the viewpoint of state development) status quo. Nevertheless, 
it is evident that the only way of genuine state reforming was in creating and 
establishing public political institutions and introducing modern mechanisms of 
government. 
 This chapter will address the political context of post-totalitarian 
transformations in postwar West Germany and post-Soviet Russia. As noted in 
the introduction, the post-totalitarian democratic transformation presupposes 
change of the structure of a state-party monolith into a new formation, a totally 
different political system. The term “political system” implies, in turn, the 
aggregate of autonomous power institutions responsible for performing certain 
functions in society and the accountability mechanism for this performance to 
citizens. According to the founders of the structural-functional approach to 
political science, Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., political systems 
consist of several types of structures: political parties, interest groups, 
legislatures, executives, bureaucracies, and courts.  The authors claim these 
structures exist in any modern political system. These structures are not 
universally evident, however, and when present they do not always function as 
independent, autonomous institutions. In addition, only the existing “set of 
institutions and agencies concerned with formulating and implementing the 
collective goals of society or groups within it” can testify, as it seems, to the fact 
of that political system’s real presence in a country.92 
Political systems consisting of all abovementioned types of structures are 
realized in full, as it appears, only in modern systems of representative 
democracy, defined as “a system of governance in which rulers are held 
accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens acting indirectly 
through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.”93 In 
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other words, a distinctive feature of modern democracy is the presence of 
independent autonomous institutions in the framework of which the authorities 
appear accountable for their decisions and actions by other institutions and 
citizens. Although not all transition periods end up with the formation of this 
system, the extrication from totalitarian rule cannot be regarded as complete 
unless such a system emerges. 
The set of questions that I am going to address in analyzing the political 
transformations in the two cases are thus as follows: Has a political system in 
each case been formed and has it replaced the command-administrative systems 
in the analyzed countries? Have there been created mechanisms of horizontal 
accountability in the form of effective system of “checks and balances”, where 
each branch of power can veto the decisions of the others in critical 
circumstances, but where, at the same time, exists the possibility to negotiate, 
make coalitions, search for compromises? Have the lessons of the past regarding 
the collapse of the former totalitarian systems been taken into account in both 
analyzed contexts?  
Additionally this chapter will address the impact of economic reforms on 
political transformations. As the West German and Russian opinion polls data 
reveal, in a situation of severe economic crisis the population regard economic 
stability as the most important goal. The poll carried out by the Levada 
Analytical Centre (former VCIOM) in 1989 showed that economic prosperity was 
viewed as the main end by the majority of citizens of the Soviet Union (57 
percent). Only small percentage of the respondents (11 percent) acknowledged 
the lack of political rights and freedoms as a necessity and a problem.  
Similarly, in the April, 1946 poll held in the American occupation zone of 
the postwar Germany 75 percent of the respondents expressed opinion that the 
state should mainly provide essential material needs, and only 25 percent 
mentioned the importance of individual and political rights observance.94 In May 
1947 another poll was conducted by the American sociologists and this time 62 
percent of the respondents favored the political system guaranteeing economic 
stability and full employment while 26 percent chose rather the one guaranteeing 
primarily political rights and freedoms (12 percent of respondents refrained from 
making any assessments).95 
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In the cause of exit from dictatorship the efficiency of economic 
transformations (as the appropriate answer by the authorities to the powerful 
social demand) can become a major prerequisite for successful consolidation of a 
new political regime. Differently, legitimation of a newly established democratic 
system and success of its consolidation largely depends on success of economic 
reforms carried out in the course of transformations. Since democratic societies 
cannot survive for a long time unless their people believe democracy a legitimate 
form of government, one of the key reformers’ concerns while carrying out 
economic reforms should be creation and further preservation of democratic 
values in society.96 Effective economic reforms alongside with establishment of 
functional and effective political systems are certainly the most important factors 
in values legitimition. 
Thus, economic transformations in the analyzed contexts will interest us, 
first of all, from the specified perspective, - as an essential condition of political 
system consolidation during the exit from totalitarian rule. Taking into account 
the priority of institutional building (as according to О’Donnell (1994), 
institutions, above all, facilitate “success in dealing with the social and economic 
problems inherited from the authoritarian predecessors”), it would be interesting 
to analyze the efficiency of institutional changes in the post-Nazi Germany and 
post-Soviet Russia in terms of achievement of democratic consolidation through 
implementing the mechanisms of governmental accountability, on the one hand, 
and the economic prosperity as and increase of the population well-being, on the 
other. 
 
2.1 Comparative Analysis of Political Transformations post-WWII 
West Germany and post-Soviet Russia 
 
West Germany 
 
As it was already mentioned, after the end of the Second World War Germany 
mostly lay in ruins. The industrial production had fallen to one-third of its 
prewar level (since 1936 the steel production decreased almost 7 times, while the 
production of coal suffered 2.2 times decrease). Since the available housing stock 
had been largely destroyed during the war whereas more than 9 million 
Germans had been sent back to Germany from East Prussia, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia there was the acutest housing problem. The level of living had 
dropped by one third. The money had lost its value; barter trade and black-
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marketing flourished. The industrial equipment started to be removed from 
Germany by the Allies following the policy of reparations and industrial 
disarmament. Worn out real capital, destroyed infrastructure, undermined 
financial system complicated socio-economic situation even more.97 
To add to this Germany ceased to exist as an independent state: having 
lost one forth of its prewar territories, it was occupied. Following the agreements 
reached by the four Allied powers in the Yalta Conference and in the Potsdam 
Conference of 1945, Germany was divided into four occupation zones with the 
United States, the Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union each occupying one 
zone. The Allies decided that they would pursue a policy based the principles 
known as the four “Ds”: demilitarization, decentralization, democratization and 
denazification. In the Potsdam Declaration signed in August 1945, it was written: 
“It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity 
to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and 
peaceful basis.”98  
Realization of decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences on 
denazification of Germany was launched simultaneously in all zones of 
occupation alongside with the final preparations for the launching of the 
Nuremberg Trials. The denazification program was intended to accomplish 
several socio-political steps (carried out in a legal way) called to prevent any 
reproduction of the former socio-cultural and socio-political relations.  
It included, first of all, the practice of condemnation and criminal 
prosecution of the Nazi criminals (primarily, ideologists of Nazism and 
functionaries of the higher and middle ranks); a chain of international, and later - 
German tribunals and trials of different levels. Besides, the denazification 
program was called to achieve the removal of the Nazis from the governmental 
bodies and from the other positions of influence (from the legislative and judicial 
structures, and to a lesser extent – from the army and the police), as well as the 
exclusion of those involved with the Nazi regime from the reproductive systems 
of society – their non-admission to teaching positions at universities and high 
schools, to mass media, restriction of their influence on culture, art, literature, etc. 
(e.g. a temporary ban on publications).99 
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Denazification became an important benchmark in the struggle between 
those who “tried to collect on the Reich’s ruins everything that would be possible 
to use once again” and those who strived for a total elimination of the National 
Socialism from the country’s public life.100 According to the Potsdam conference 
decisions the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) with all its 
affiliated and supervised organizations was banned; all Nazi institutions were 
dissolved; all Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or 
established discrimination on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion were 
abolished. The Nuremberg process and the court proceedings which followed it 
were intended not only to punish the Nazi criminals, but also to facilitate the 
cleanup of the German political life and overall democratization of the German 
people. 
After the unification of the American and British occupation zones in the 
Bizone (or Bizonia) in December, 1946 the United States got a decisive influence 
on the economic organization and the legislation in the area.101 The 
administrative activity in Bizonia was coordinated by the Executive Council which 
consisted of the Federal States’ (Länder) representatives appointed by the 
corresponding Federal States’ governments (Landtags). The Executive Council 
activity was supervised by the Economic Council formed from 52 members, 
nominated by the Landtags. Political parties were presented in these assemblies 
proportionally to the level of their political popularity. In the beginning of 1948 
the Economic Council increased twice in number reaching thus 104 members and 
becoming a sort of quasi-parliament. 
In addition to the Executive and Economic Councils in the western parts of 
the country there was created the Administrative Council or Direktorium (a 
prototype of the future Federal government), authorized to manage the current 
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economic activity in the area. Another administrative organ that appeared 
simultaneously - the Federal States’ Council - was called to empower regional 
administrations with the right to vote for the new economic legislation.  
Thus, in Bizonia was established a proto-government, institutional 
structure of which provided the model for the future national government 
established later with some minor modifications in the Federal Republic of 
Germany.102 
As for the formation of the new constitutional order, a special body – the 
Parliamentary Council – was formed to work out and adopt the Basic Law for 
West Germany. After completing its work, the Parliamentary Council, consisting 
of 65 delegates from the respective 11 Federal states’ parliaments and chaired by 
the leading CDU politician Konrad Adenauer, met in Bonn in the fall of 1948 to 
work out the final details of the document.103 After months of debate, a final text 
of the Basic Law was approved by a vote of 53 to 12 on 8 May, 1949. The new law 
was ratified by all Landtags, with the exception of the Bavarian parliament, which 
objected to the emphasis on a strong central authority for the new state. After 
approval by the Western military governors, the Basic Law was promulgated on 
23 May, 1949. Thus a new state, the Federal Republic of Germany came into 
existence. 
The historian Henry Turner (1992) later remarked that although many of 
the Council members had actively participated in the political life of Germany 
during the Weimar times, their present actions testified that they had learnt the 
lessons from the collapse of the former political system. While the Weimar 
parliament had been notorious for its uncompromising attitudes and adherence 
to hard line, the Parliamentary Council revealed its inclination to a sober 
practicality and aspiration to making compromises.104 
Upon the whole, overcoming institutional deficiencies that had brought 
down the Weimar Republic became the main objective of the Parliamentary 
Council in fashioning the articles of the Basic Law. They sought, therefore, to 
approve a law that would make it impossible to circumvent democratic 
procedures, as had happened in the past. In meeting this end they tried to 
establish more accurate frameworks of political power and its responsibilities 
and to guarantee a strong system of “checks and balances”, capable of 
preventing power usurpation similar to that in the Third Reich.  
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Though initially the Basic Law was supposed to create a temporary 
political system to serve the Federal Republic until the reunion of West and East 
Germanys, it, nevertheless, has passed a serious test by time. Adopted in May 
1949 the Basic Law endured the long expected unification of the two German 
states in October 1990, revealing an exclusive example of political engineering. It 
formed the system of the parliamentary democracy, capable of involving wide 
social groups, of encouraging political responsibility of the elite, of dispersing 
political power and limiting the influence of extremist groupings.105  
According to many Weimar Constitution analysts one of the reasons for the 
Weimar Republic’s decline was the existence of a super-powerful head of the 
state. Therefore in the new Basic Law the powers of the lower house, the 
Bundestag, and the Federal Chancellor (Bundeskanzler) were enhanced 
considerably at the expense of the Federal President (Bundespräsident), who was 
reduced to a figurehead and whose office was transformed into a mostly 
ceremonial post. 
In the first instance, this was achieved by changing the way of electing the 
Federal President. Unlike the Weimar Republic, the President in the Federal 
Republic of Germany is not elected directly, but by the Federal Convention 
(Bundesversammlung) consisting of the members of the Bundestag and an equal 
number of representatives delegated from the state legislatures. The term of the 
President’s office was reduced to five years, and the possibility of his re-election 
was limited to only one time.  
Second, the President’s power was significantly reduced assuming a 
relatively weak role. He is no longer the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, 
nor does he play any significant role in foreign policy. In contrast to the Weimar 
Republic, the Federal President in post-1949 Germany does not have the right to 
govern by emergency decree. Even more important is the fact that the President 
lost the possibility to influence the Cabinet, which is now formed by the 
Parliament and accountable primarily to it. Thus, in contrast to the Weimar 
Republic, the founding fathers of the Federal Republic of Germany prevented a 
newly institutionalized conflict between the head of the state and the federal 
government by a wide variety of constitutional arrangements, including a mainly 
representative and ceremonial role for the President.106 
 The intention to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of any 
single actor or institution was manifested in the relationship established between 
the legislative and executive branches. For instance, the Chancellor lacks the 
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discretionary authority to dissolve the legislature and call for new elections, 
something that is normally found in parliamentary systems. The Bundestag and 
the Bundesrat have the right to criticize the actions of the Cabinet and revise its 
legal initiatives.  
On the other hand, the Basic Law limits the legislature’s control over the 
Chancellor. In a parliamentary system the legislature normally has the authority 
to remove a chief executive from office by a simply majority vote. During the 
Weimar Republic, however, extremist parties used this device to destabilize the 
democratic system by opposing incumbent chancellors. The Basic Law modified 
this procedure and created a constructive non-confidence vote. According to the 
Article 67.1 of the Basic Law, “The Bundestag may express its lack of confidence 
in the Federal Chancellor only by electing a successor by the vote of a majority of 
its Members and requesting the Federal President to dismiss the Federal 
Chancellor. The Federal President must comply with the request and appoint the 
person elected”. This ensures continuity in government and an initial majority in 
support of a new chancellor. It also makes removing the incumbent more 
difficult; opponents cannot simply disagree with the government – a majority 
must agree on an alternative.107 
As Russell Dalton explains, the functioning of the federal government 
follows three principles laid out in the Basic Law. First, the chancellor principle 
says that the chancellor defines government policy (Article 65.1) which means 
that the formal policy guidelines issued by the chancellor are legally binding 
directives on the Cabinet and the ministries. Thus, in contrast to the British 
system of shared Cabinet responsibility, the German Cabinet is formally 
subordinate to the chancellor in policymaking. The second principle of ministerial 
autonomy gives each minister the authority to direct the ministry’s internal 
workings without Cabinet’s intervention as long as the policies conform to the 
government’s guidelines. Ministers are responsible for supervising the activities 
of their departments, guiding their policy planning, and overseeing the 
administration of policy within their jurisdiction. The cabinet principle is the third 
organizational guideline. When conflicts arise between departments over 
jurisdictional or budgetary matters, the Basic Law calls for them to be resolved in 
the Cabinet.108 
The founding fathers of the West German constitution while defining a 
role and a due place of parties in political system also took into account the 
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Weimar tragic experience and tried to create effective legal obstacles to 
establishment of a dictatorial regime. Consequently for the first time in the 
German history the role of political parties was so highly appreciated and in 
detail described in the Basic Law. The constitution specifies a number of basic 
requirements to political parties which are intended to “participate in the 
formation of the political will of the people.” According the Article 21 of the 
Basic Law political parties (1) may be freely established; (2) their internal 
organization must conform to democratic principles; (3) they must publicly 
account for their assets and for the sources and use of their funds; (4) parties that, 
by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to undermine or 
abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional. The Federal 
Constitutional Court shall rule on the question of unconstitutionality.109 
Among the reasons of the Weimar Republic’s collapse analysts also named 
a proportional representation (PR) electoral system (a system that allocates legislative 
seats based on a party’s percentage of the popular vote) fixed in the Weimar 
Constitution. Such an electoral system usually fits a small and well organized 
party system. The Weimar Republic however had a considerable quantity of 
parties - 43 parties participated in the parliamentary elections in May 1928 and 
more than 60 in summer of 1932. Their political ‘immaturity’, inability to make 
compromises led to the exclusion of parliament from a constitutional-legal 
mechanism. Besides, the fundamental rights and the role of parties in the 
country’s political life were not well-defined and fixed. Consequently, a steady 
and well-functioning party system was not established. 
Proportional representation system, in turn, led, according to some 
experts, to depersonalizing of the parliamentary representation and conduced to 
a fast spread and budding off of small parties. This brought about the state of 
things well-described by Hanna Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism and other 
publications. Institutions in democratically ruled countries were not able to 
promote popular participation in politics as they actually excluded the vast 
majorities from participation in the management of public affairs. This led to 
appearance of the politically neutral and indifferent – “slumbering” – masses, 
which later became organized on the basis of totalitarian movements. The 
success of the latter, according to Arendt, meant the end of illusions that “the 
people in its majority had taken an active part in government and that each 
individual was in sympathy with one’s own or somebody else’s party.”110  
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Political parties with their programs reminding of “’ready-made formulas’ 
which demanded not action but execution” were turned into “very efficient 
instruments through which the power of the people is curtailed and 
controlled.”111 It is evident, however, that the blame was not only with parties 
but with the limitations of a proportional representation system itself where 
parties running the show led to depersonalization of politics and the general loss 
of interest in public matters. 
To avoid the fragmentation of the Weimar party system and ensure some 
accountability between electoral districts and their representatives, the architects 
of the postwar Federal Republic of Germany changed the national electoral 
system from proportional representation (PR) to mixed member proportional 
(MMP) system. While one half of the Bundestag members is elected by 
proportional representation, the other half is directly elected from single-seat 
constituencies, voters casting their votes for a candidate running to represent a 
particular district. 
In conclusion, it is worth mentioning that ‘learning from catastrophes’ in 
the history of the country became the major feature of political transformations 
in postwar Federal Republic of Germany. Its constitutional structures were 
attributable to learning from the institutional pathology of the Weimar 
Republic.112 Especially important here is the fact that West  German political 
elites managed not only to comprehend and evaluate the negative experience of 
the Weimar Republic period, which had led to the Third Reich, but also to find 
institutional mechanisms of overcoming the Nazi legacy. 
The major achievement of the West German political elite, as it appears, 
was their ability to come to the consent on the basic issues of the new state 
project with the new “rules of the game”. The Basic Law of 1949 was adopted as 
a result of the coordination of interests of the postwar major political forces with 
an overall orientation at the pluralistic system of democracy. The reached 
consent on the key parameters of the newly created political system testified to 
the fact that culture of confrontation and irreconcilability habitual for the 
Weimar Republic was changing into the culture of compromise.  
Second, learning from the lessons of the past was revealed in the 
overcoming of the excessive concentration of power in the hands of the Federal 
President, as well as in the clearly defined limits of powers within the executive 
branch in general.  
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Third, the proportional electoral system which had led to depersonalizing 
of politics in the past was changed in the Federal Republic of Germany into a 
mixed member proportional system. Partial single-mandate representation of 
deputies in Parliament opened, as it appears, wider perspectives for the future 
system’s legitimation. Knowing one’s own representative in an electoral district 
and the possibility to call this very person (and not some abstract power 
institutions) to account served, undoubtedly, as an important stabilizing factor, 
conducing to the greater level of the citizens’ trust in the system. 
On adoption of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany in May 
1949, the first parliamentary elections took place in August and the 
parliamentary chambers – the Bundestag and the Bundesrat - were constituted. It 
is important to point out that carrying out general elections in postwar Germany 
became an important result of the consensus achieved by different groups of the 
political elite in their negotiations on the country’s Basic Law. In the Policy 
statement delivered in the Bundestag on 20 September, 1949 the first Federal 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer underscored that his “election to the Federal 
Chancellorship and the formation of the Government are a logical consequences 
of the political conditions which had arisen in the Bizonial area.”113 
 
Russia 
 
If in case of Germany the collapse of the Nazi regime was caused by the military 
defeat in World War II, the Soviet system in the conditions of a closed society 
and a constant confrontation with the West was gradually falling into decay on 
its own. According to Jakov Drabkin, it was the comprehension of the inevitable 
system deadlock (and not any other external or internal threat to the Soviet 
regime) that made General Secretary Gorbachev “turn on the tap” and launch the 
reforms. Despite indisputable courage of the perestroika’s initiators, it is obvious, 
however, that they could not foresee the radical demolition of all economic and 
political Soviet structures and “even in a bad dream they could not imagine the 
collapse of the CPSU and disintegration of the Soviet Union.”114 Consequently all 
changes in the organization of power taking place during the perestroika period 
(intended as a liberalization of the communist regime) followed by the Soviet 
system liquidation were not the results of some strategic plan realization, but of 
the ad hoc solutions made mostly out of economic and political expediency.  
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If in postwar West Germany the initial control of the occupation 
authorities and the obvious democratic orientation of the leading political forces 
became a reference point for carrying out democratic transformations, in post-
Soviet Russia no such transformation goals were set. The transformations in 
Russia went spontaneously which meant they could have ended with any 
imaginable outcome, including the Soviet system restoration. Moreover, in the 
Russian context the likeliness that the traditional power logics of ‘a single power’ 
would after all prevail was particularly high.  
Nevertheless, the disintegration of the USSR and the emergence of the 
Russian Federation as an independent state required an adoption of a new 
constitutional order. In 1990 the first Russian President Boris Yeltsin (in office 
1991-1999) set up a parliamentary Constitutional Commission. The Commission 
formally chaired by the President co-operated with highly skilled experts while 
creating a first Constitution draft.115 According to Lilia Shevtsova, in that context 
the possibility to develop several variants of a new power design was rather 
high. High was also a chance to facilitate an extensive public discussion of the 
contours of the future political system, thus getting a society accustomed to 
political responsibility.116 However, as Shevtsova underscored, Yeltsin’s actions 
evidenced that a political reform, creation of new institutions and their 
legitimization in the new elections were not among his priorities: “Having 
created the Constitutional Commission, Yeltsin practically forgot about its 
existence. Even after the August coup he was not interested in formation of new 
institutions though, apparently, this was what actually had to be done.”117  
It is obvious that this unwillingness to solve essential problems of political 
system restructuring cost the country a lot. Unlike Germany where the power 
during the postwar period was concentrated in the representative bodies - 
initially in the Economic and the Administrative councils, and later in the 
Parliament and the Cabinet formed by a parliamentary majority, - the post-Soviet 
Russia from the beginning of its existence faced a situation of the “dual power,” 
i.e. a paralyzing standoff between the executive and legislative branches. It 
manifested in an acute political crisis, continuous two-years-long antagonism of 
the President and the Congress of People’s Deputies in which each of these 
institutions struggled for absolute power monopoly. 
By the end of 1992 the conflict between the President and the Parliament 
aggravated so that the mutual distrust between the two institutions excluded 
                                                 
115 See also Sheinis, Victor. Sostjazanie proektov (k istorii sozdanija rossijskoj Konstitutsii) // 
Obshestvennye nauki i sovremennost’, № 6, 2003.; Afanas'ev, Mikhail. Klientelizm i rossijskaja 
gosudarstvennost'. Moscow, 1997. 
116 Shevtsova, Lilia. Regim Borisa Yeltsina. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999. p. 43. 
117 Ibid.  
 47 
their further coexistence. The ambiguity of functions and the both parties claim 
for monopoly, their unwillingness to make compromises and concessions created 
a situation of political deadlock.  
The “dual power” crisis of 1992 - 1993, however, is often linked to the fact 
that, after the August 1991 coup, neither general elections were held, nor a new 
Constitution was adopted. According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, if the new 
parliamentary and presidential elections had been called in the fall of 1991, the 
democratic forces, united largely within Democratic Russia coalition, might have 
done well most likely winning the majority within the Congress of People’s 
Deputies. “A newly legitimized, independence-era Russian parliament could 
have voted support for the economic plan […] and could have provided the 
government with a constitutional foundation for political, economic, and social 
reform,” – the scholars concluded.118 
The Russian political scientist and one of the authors of the 1993 
Constitution Victor Sheinis agreed that democratic Constitution could have been 
adopted in the immediate aftermath of the coup defeat at the forefront of the 
democratic wave of August 1991, but the favorable moment was missed.119 
It is also noteworthy that Adam Przeworski in his seminal study of 
democratic transitions insisted that the institutional framework is better to be 
adopted in the moment following the collapse of the dictatorial regime when the 
relation of forces is unknown ex ante. In this case, Przeworski argued, the 
institutions will comprise extensive checks and balances and will last in the face 
of a variety of conditions. He wrote that if different political actors “know little 
about their political strength under the eventual democratic institutions, all opt 
for a maximin solution: institutions that introduce checks and balances and 
maximize the political influence of minorities, or, equivalently, make policy 
highly insensitive to fluctuations in public opinion. Each of the conflicting 
political forces will seek institutions that provide guarantees against temporary 
political adversity, against unfavorable tides of opinion, against contrary shifts of 
alliances. […] Hence, constitutions that are written when the relation of forces are 
still unclear are likely to counteract increasing returns to power, provide 
insurance to the eventual losers, and reduce the stakes of competition. They are 
more likely to induce the losers to comply with the outcomes and more likely to 
induce them to participate. They are more likely, therefore, to be stable across a 
wide range of historical conditions. […] Institutions adopted when the relation of 
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forces is unknown or unclear are most likely to last across a variety of 
conditions.”120 
If the democratic institutions were established in 1991, there was a real 
chance for creating an effective system of democracy (the “parliamentary 
project” of the Constitution the authors of which supported the idea of 
parliamentary-presidential republic provided such a possibility).121 However, 
this favorable chance of fulfilling a timely political transition through consensus 
or compromise agreements was lost and the political crisis was finally resolved 
by force. The Congress of People’s Deputies was dissolved by presidential decree 
on 21 September, 1993 and on 4 October the White House was shelled by the 
army tanks and seized by the military following the parliamentary supporters 
barricading themselves inside the building.  
Yeltsin’s order to open fire on the obstinate Parliament showed that in 
Russian politics, despite a declarative adherence to democratic values, the 
traditional Russian rule of force again prevailed over the rule of law. The further 
violations of democratic standards and principles by the Russian political elite 
reconfirmed that establishment of democracy as an effective system of “checks 
and balances,” conducing to realization of the public control over the power 
institutions, was highly unlikely in Russia.  
After the events of October 1993, as Michael Brie explained, President 
Yeltsin remained the unique legal factor of power and after the dissolution of 
parliament he could operate “in an environment free from institutions”, no 
longer restricted by any obligations (including obligations towards his political 
supporters).122 Thus already on 15 October, 1993 together with parliamentary 
elections there was simultaneously proclaimed a referendum on a new 
Constitution the text of which had been hasty drafted by Yeltsin without any 
consultations with other political forces. The project published on 10 November 
just a month before the referendum was known only to a handful of experts and 
could not be publicly discussed.123  
Unlike postwar Germany which managed to overcome confrontational 
tendencies peculiar to the Weimar Republic period, post-Soviet Russian 
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transformation represented a mere imposition from above.124 The tragic events of 
the fall 1993 revealed the unwillingness of the leading Russian social and 
political forces to fulfill socio-political restructuring based on democratic 
procedures and principles. Instead the rule of force prevailed over the political 
conflicts resolution. The project of the new Constitution drafted by the Kremlin 
and approved in the December referendum became actually “the constitution of 
the winner,” and was neither a reflection of, nor a basis for a political consensus, 
- something that the Constitution of a country is intended to be - “not the act of 
its Government, but of the people constituting a Government.”125 
Inability to learn historical lessons from the country’s past, and also 
unwillingness to take advantage of the other countries’ political experiences 
entailed another basic error also successfully overcome in postwar Germany: the 
concentration of power in the hands of one political actor.  
The Constitution of the Russian Federation adopted by the national 
referendum on 12 December, 1993 established a presidential regime which 
provided the President with such powers that it let experts speak about the 
“super-presidential republic.”126 Though the separation of powers was formally 
provided in the 1993 Constitution text, the powers of the President as the head of 
the state either incorporated some major functions of the other branches of 
power, or allowed to limit their independence at any point. 
The legislature in the Constitution thus assumed a secondary role 
compared to the executive which, in turn, appeared completely controlled by the 
President. As Vladimir Ryzhkov explained in his book The Fourth Republic, all the 
articles safeguarding accountability of the government and the executive before 
the State Duma were excluded from the Constitution. First, the parliament was 
completely deprived of such a traditional right as the parliamentary control over 
government. Besides, it was deprived of the possibility to participate de jure in 
government’s formation. According to Article 111.4 in case the State Duma 
rejects three times the candidates for the post of the prime-minister suggested by 
the President, the latter can still appoint the desired person dissolving the Duma 
and calling new elections. The Constitution thus actually provides the President 
with an exclusive right to appoint the prime-minister (although with necessity of 
the political consent of the State Duma). Besides, Yeltsin assigned himself the 
right to dissolve the parliament also in case the prime-minister raises before the 
State Duma the issue of no-confidence to the government and if the Duma votes 
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no-confidence twice in a three-months period, the President may adopt a 
decision on the resignation of the government or dissolve the State Duma and 
announce new elections (Article 117.4). Thus, the President secured himself not 
only by maximum dilution of the Parliament’s role, but also by creating a 
constant threat of its dissolution which could be realized in the course of political 
crisis.127 
As for the “checks and balances” of the presidential power, though 
formally the President may be impeached (Article 93) in reality the Constitution 
architects made everything to transform this procedure into something, in 
Ryzhkov’s formulation, “absolutely impossible.” The Duma has, first of all, to 
vote in favor of proceedings by a two-thirds majority on the initiative of at least a 
third of the deputies after a special commission of deputies had decided he had 
been guilty of treason or a crime of similar gravity; the Supreme Court had to 
rule that there were grounds for such an accusation, and the Constitutional Court 
had to confirm that the proper procedures had been followed. The Federation 
Council had then to vote in favor by a two-thirds majority, not later than three 
months after the original charges had been presented.128 According to Stephen 
White (who actually defined Russian presidency as “formidable”) it was 
unlikely, given this elaborate procedure, that Yeltsin or any future president 
would be forced out of office on this basis, although the Duma might sometimes 
find a sufficiently large majority to initiate these proceedings.129 
At the same time no real responsibility of the President for non-
observance of the Constitution was specified. The possibility of his impeachment 
“on the basis of the charges of high treason or another grave crime” (Article 93.1) 
has no relation to the Constitutional law and consequently cannot guarantee 
responsibility of the head of state in any way as the Constitution guarantor. 
Thus, the Russian political system was deprived of the major channels of 
horizontal accountability. 
The legalized concentration of powers in a single personified institution, 
quite corresponding to the Russian political tradition of full possession of power, 
was legitimized however in a new way – through national elections of the head 
of the state. Nevertheless, many experts agreed that these elections did not 
initially correspond to the democratic standards – they were neither completely 
free nor fair, nor did they possess an important characteristic of unpredictability 
of result. Neither during presidential elections of 1996, nor during the elections 
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following them the ruling elite was changed. That testifies to the fact that the 
institution of elections in Russia did not become a basic element of vertical 
accountability of power.130 
The establishment of a super-presidential system in post-Soviet Russia 
became a serious obstacle on the way of democratic consolidation as well as 
further democratic development. As Steven Fish observed, the growth of 
unaccountability and irresponsibility of the executive power resulted in the most 
terrible errors made by the Russian government. One of the greatest among those 
catastrophic failures was the Chechen war launched personally by Yeltsin and a 
group of siloviki, without any consultations with the Parliament and with the 
public.131 From the very beginning this war was extremely unpopular among the 
population and many of the politicians. In 1994-95 60 percent of Russians 
believed that troops should be withdrawn from Chechnya and a peaceful 
solution should be found.132 Obviously this and many other grave mistakes 
would not have taken place, be the legislative and judicial branches given more 
control over the executive.  
One of the most evident signs of the governmental unaccountability in 
Russia became an enormous scope of the state corruption. In the annual 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index where Russia was 
included for the first time in 1996 it ranked 47 out of 54 countries surveyed.133  
The link between corruption and super-presidentialism is found in the 
executive’s control over public expenditure and the weakness of checks on 
executive-branch officials. Thus, corruption in the sprawling executive-branch 
bureaucracy rages unchecked by legislative or judicial oversight. Those who 
control the state’s resources at the national level are accountable only to the 
President.134 Furthermore, the corruption in Russia is similarly rampant at all 
levels of the state bureaucracy including the legislature and the judiciary. 
  As for the third issue, namely, the electoral system choice, the problem 
here was that though initially Russia, just like postwar Germany, adopted a 
mixed member proportional system, this choice appeared significantly devalued 
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by the secondary, minor role of the legislature in a political system. Although the 
exclusion of the Russian parliament from government formation contradicted the 
Russian Election Law (according to which half of the State Duma was elected 
under proportional representation from party lists), the tendency to eliminate 
representation prevailed so that in 2005 the mixed member proportional system 
was replaced with proportional representation system. Furthermore, the electoral 
threshold was increased from 5 to 7 percent. The government formation again 
remained unaffected by the party composition of the parliament. 
Though in general the system of the Soviet institutions during the post-
perestroika period was largely destroyed, many of its elements and different kinds 
of links penetrating its structures remained intact.135 Additionally, the structure 
of the Russian elite was largely conserved as the former Soviet nomenclature 
occupied the majority of leading positions in politics and business.136 This 
bureaucracy has gradually restored its domination in the spheres of influence 
previously lost. At the same time the separation of powers – both vertical and 
horizontal - outlined in the early 1990s has been almost completely eliminated 
and the basic rights and freedoms of individuals (primarily, the freedoms of 
expression, conscience, assembly, etc.) have been increasingly limited. As some 
formal and informal rules subordinated the property rights to the control of 
bureaucracy, market and private property in Russia have also been strongly 
restricted. 137 
 
2.2 Characteristics of West German and Russian Economic Reforms  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the extrication from totalitarian rule cannot be 
imagined without transformation of the central planning system into a free 
market economy characterized by decentralized decision making and market 
principles of interaction (the so-called “invisible hand”). Overcoming the 
inefficiency of coordination and management of central planning economy gets 
greater importance as it affects the consolidation of a new democratic regime. In 
this section of the chapter I will address the impact of economic reforms in West 
Germany and Russia on their sociopolitical transformations. 
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West Germany  
 
It is remarkable that when people speak about the West German “miracle” they 
mean the Economic Miracle (Wirtschaftswunder) in the first instance. However it 
is necessary to remember that economic reforms were launched in the western 
parts of Germany within the limits of a coalition proto-government of Bizonia, 
formed already in December 1946. It means that economic reforms were 
implemented on the base of though not yet legally fixed, but de facto established 
institutions which formed an institutional basis for the Federal Republic’s 
political system. 
The German currency reform launched in June 1948 was intended to 
restore monetary stability and to end the inflationary after-effects from the Nazi 
period. Not only was a new currency put in place, but it was done through a 
process of reducing the money supply. Shortly after that, Ludwig Erhard, 
Director of Economics of the Bizonial Economic Council, introduced another 
element of the reform: abolition of the price and production controls. On Sunday, 
June 20, 1948, when Allied officials were resting, Erhard announced an end to 
exchange controls as well as to price controls, rationing regulations, central 
planning practices, and trade restrictions.138 
The strategic line of Erhard’s radical reorganization of economic 
mechanisms consisted in using stabilizing effect of rigid currency reform with 
simultaneous launching of prices’ liberalization, removing numerous regulations 
and controls holding down the initiative of economic agents, and creating the 
conditions for competition by adopting antitrust laws that would prevent 
monopoly. Additionally, the reform consisted in reorienting investment streams 
into the production of consumer goods and housing construction fields as well as 
in implementing social shock-absorbers for protection of the weakest and the 
unprotected.139 
Creation of effective and strong economy competitive in the world 
markets and favoring well-being of the German citizens became the main 
leitmotif of the reforms. Erhard, who formulated his ultimate goal as “prosperity 
for all” (Wohlstand für alle), saw a way of achieving this aim in formation of 
socially focused market economy based on free competition and mutual 
responsibility of the citizens and the state.140 
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An important component of the German economic reform was providing 
workers’ with co-determination rights – the rights to participate in decision 
making in their enterprises and in shaping of their working environment. 
Workers’ participation was introduced in the Federal Republic in 1951 in coal, 
iron and steel industries’ enterprises with more than 1,000 employees. In all other 
major German enterprises workers’ participation was introduced by the 1976 Co-
determination Act which stipulated that employees and shareholders should be 
equally represented on the companies’ supervisory boards. The act applied to 
private and public limited companies (Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung and 
Aktiengesellschaften, respectively) with more than 2,000 employees.141 The activity 
of work councils provided a workers’ participation activity in smaller companies 
(with more than five employees). 
The postwar economic reforms resulted in a remarkable growth of 
national economy. The growth rate of industrial production was 25.0 percent in 
1950 and 18.1 percent in 1951. Growth continued at a high rate for most of the 
1950s, despite occasional slowdowns. By 1960 industrial production had risen to 
two-and-one-half times the level of 1950 and far beyond any that the Nazis had 
reached during the 1930s in all of Germany. GDP rose by two-thirds during the 
same decade. Although wage demands and pay increases had been modest at 
first, wages and salaries rose over 80 percent between 1949 and 1955, catching up 
with growth.142 After an initial spike in prices when the controls were abolished, 
by the end of 1950 the greater industrial and agricultural output that was offered 
on a more open market significantly reduced the cost of living. Germany’s 
economic-recovery path assured that well into the 1960s its rate of growth in 
output and productivity would place it far ahead of virtually all the other 
countries of western Europe, including the victors in the war.143 
The highest growth rates took place in metallurgy, mechanical 
engineering, electric power and chemical industries. Deep qualitative changes in 
economy occurred under the influence of the scientific-technical revolution. 
Successful economic development also allowed to rapidly increase the export 
capital. Since 1951 Germany had started its export performance which by 1953 
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ranked third in the world following that of the United States and Great Britain. 
About half of all German products were exported to the European and world 
markets. Germany paid off the national debts, created considerable gold and 
exchange currency reserves, the West German deutschmark becoming one of the 
most reliable world currencies. 
Significant role in restoration and development of economy was played by 
financial and credit regulation. In the first postwar years the government assisted 
in restoring large monopolies and providing large corporations with labor force. 
This, in turn, caused expansion of housing construction, the fast growth of direct 
state capital investments in restoration of housing destroyed by war. From the 
beginning of the 1950s the share of indirect state investments has been increasing 
in the structure of capital investments. The focus was made on supporting key 
economic branches of industry through state credits and grants. In the 1960s the 
state capital investments in the form of direct investments in science and 
education also increased. Considerable investments in infrastructure promoted 
acceleration of economic growth rates, qualitative development of the social 
sphere, and overall growth of the standard of living of the population. 
Kendall Baker and his colleagues asserted that the dramatic economic 
improvement made since World War II was undoubtedly one of the factors 
contributing to the Federal Republic’s accelerated political development. By 1950 
industrial production had exceeded its 1936 value, and by 1961 it had increased 
by an additional 162 percent. At the beginning of the 1980s, Germany’s industrial 
production far exceeded that any of its European neighbors, placing the German 
economy in the forefront of advanced industrialism.144 
 
Russia 
 
Just like postwar Germany shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
Russia initiated transition from state-controlled economy central planning to a 
market-oriented economy. The chosen conversion policy included the sudden 
release of price and currency controls, withdrawal of state subsidies, and 
immediate trade liberalization within a country – the so-called “shock therapy.” 
The privatization of the previously state-owned assets also followed in the early 
1990s.  
The chosen timing however outlined a major difference of the Russian 
reforms from those in West Germany and later – in the countries of Eastern and 
Central Europe. The matter is that economic reforms in Russia were launched 
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before the adoption of a new constitutional order. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, instead of creating the institutional base for the future reforms President 
Yeltsin chose to carry out an economic reform with retaining the inherited Soviet 
institutions (and with intention to gradually substitute them with the new ones).  
This choice defined in many respects the country’s future development. In Lilia 
Shevtsova’s view, “Yeltsin’s decision to embark on economic reforms while 
refusing to introduce independent institutions inevitably reduced reform to a 
mechanism for delivering privatized state property into the hands of the “old 
new” ruling class.”145 
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, who believed timing to be “crucial in all 
politics, but especially in democratization processes,” also concluded that the 
Russian political class selected the worst possible sequence of reformatory steps. 
In their judgment, “Yeltsin’s decision to privilege economic restructuring over 
democratic state restructuring weakened the state, weakened democracy and 
weakened the economy.”146 The researchers asserted that, “Yeltsin’s choice in the 
fall of 1991 to privilege economic restructuring and completely to neglect 
democratic restructuring of the parliament, the constitution, and the state further 
weakened an already weak state, deprived the proposed economic reform 
program of the minimal degree of political and state coherence necessary for its 
successful implementation, and contributed to the mutual deligitimization of the 
three democratic branches of the government.”147 
Officially President Yeltsin declared drastic economic reforms at the 5th 
Congress of People’s Deputies in late October 1991. He promised then that 
difficulties and deprivations would last no longer than six - eight months and 
that already the following fall, in 1992, the country would encounter real 
changes: economic stabilization and gradual improvement of the standards of 
living. On 2 January, 1992 Yeltsin declared the liberalization of foreign trade, 
prices, and currency. The program of liberalization and stabilization, which had 
been designed and further carried out by Yeltsin’s deputy Prime Minister Yegor 
Gaidar, entailed removing Soviet-era price and currency controls, legal barriers 
to private trade and manufacture, and cutting subsidies to state farms and 
industries while allowing foreign imports into the Russian market in order to 
break the power of state-owned local monopolies.  
The deregulation of most of the prices in January 1992 resulted in 
unprecedented prices increase which reached 245 percent in that month alone. In 
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1992, the first year of economic reform, retail prices in Russia increased by 2,520 
percent.148 Shock therapy had wiped out the savings of most Russians: the 
savings of the people in state-owned Sberbank were frozen and subsequently 
destroyed by hyperinflation. 
Though the consumer market was filled with goods due to the 
combination of prices increase and opening of the borders for imports, low 
competitiveness of domestic products, however, became one of the main reasons 
for decrease in sales and production in the Russian enterprises. In 1992 industrial 
production was reduced by 18 percent, and by 1994 (comparing with 1991) – by 
52.9 percent; gross national product decreased by 35.6 percent, capital 
investments – by 76 percent. The country had not known economic decline of 
similar scope since the Second World War. 
 
* * * 
 
Despite the outward similarity of the economic policies initiated in the 
course of reforms in Russia and West Germany, review of specific differences of 
the reforms’ outcomes in both countries provides valuable insight. In this respect 
it is worth singling out several characteristics of West German economic reforms 
conducive to the Economic Miracle. 
First of all, trying to understand the reasons for success of the West 
German economic transformation, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact of 
preliminary preparation to the reforms within the country. Walter Eucken, a 
founder of the Freiburg School and an intellectual architect of West Germany’s 
postwar economic miracle, started to develop his transition program from the 
centrally administered Nazi economy to a free state and market economy already 
in the late 1930s. Following the National Socialists’ seizure of power in 1933, 
Eucken maintained contact with other anti-Nazi Germans who understood the 
need to think about how to transition a post-Nazi Germany towards a society 
marked by ordered liberty rather than socialism or communism. In 1940 his well-
known research entitled Basis of National Economy (Die Grundlagen der 
Nationalökonomie, 1939) was published. While West Germany’s 1948 currency 
reform and abolition of price-controls was engineered later on by Ludwig 
Erhard, the latter himself called Eucken an intellectual godfather of the changes 
that took West Germany “from rubble to riches” in less than ten years. 
Starting from 1942 Ludwig Erhard, supported by the Reich Group for 
Industry (Reichsgruppe Industrie), also worked on concepts for postwar reforms. 
He did so both privately as well as in the newly founded Institute for Industrial 
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Research (Institut für Industrieforschung). In 1944 Erhard completed his War 
Finances and Debt Consolidation Memorandum (Kriegsfinanzierung und 
Schuldenkonsolidierung), which later served as a theoretical basis of the 1948 
economic reform.149 
Unlike architects of reforms in postwar Germany, Russian liberals had no 
well-defined program of social and economic transformations, and the economic 
reforms were launched by Yeltsin and Gaidar without any particularly well-
developed program.150 Though some Russian economists also developed 
economic programs during the perestroika (e.g. Grigory Yavlinsky’s 500 Days), no 
one presented a really worked out strategy similar to Erhard’s almost 300-pages 
Memorandum. Taken largely by surprise, the political elite of post-perestroika 
Russia did not possess any prepared plans of action, whether be conversion of 
the centrally planned system into the market economy, transformation of the 
communist system, or introduction of parliamentarism. 
At the same time the ability of some representatives of the German elite to 
correctly forecast and prepare alternative economic programs became, as it 
seems, one of the most significant factors for success in the West German reform 
process. A crucial role in the economic transformations was played, certainly, by 
Ludwig Erhard who, combining qualities of a scholar, an expert and a politician, 
was able to eventually achieve the realization of his elaborated program. 
Through sharp criticism both from the Allied authorities and his own 
compatriots he managed to successfully implement his ideas and groundwork. 
Russia, in turn, certainly lacked people with Erhard’s leadership qualities such as 
determination, combined, importantly, with the readiness to make compromises, 
renouncing at times personal ambitions for the sake of the general welfare. 
The factor of qualitative preparation for reforms in Germany is 
intrinsically linked with another important factor, - the way in which the reforms 
where carried out. Interestingly, Erhard started outlining his economic transition 
program not with defining concrete financial and economic recipes, but with 
human psychology. According to Boris Zaritsky, a narrow technocratic approach 
to economic problems was alien to the Economic Minister. Any potentially 
successful economic policy, according to him, should have begun with gaining 
popular trust and support for reforms, for a man with his psychology, hopes, 
plans, with delusions was a centre of economic life. Realizing that without this 
trust even the most reasonable policies might be frozen, Erhard formulated the 
basic requirements to the effective policy during transition. In the first instance, 
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this policy should be clear to citizens, consistent, open and fair and politicians 
should convince people of its rightness. Besides, the policy should be correctly 
designed tactically, i.e. reformers should make provision not only for long-term 
intended outcomes, but also try to meet people’s expectations within a 
reasonable time, convincing through some vivid demonstrative effects and 
results. Among the first anti-crisis measures Erhard chose deregulation of 
economy, liberalization of prices and restoration of viable currency with the help 
of which, according to him, it was possible to fill the market and provide valid 
working stimulus in a short period of time.151  
In his manifesto Prosperity for All (Wohlstand für alle) Erhard wrote: 
“Modern psychology demands precisely that the national economic process be 
not merely considered in the technical sense. It is equally important that the 
human beings who animate this machinery be included in national economic 
calculations. How we ourselves act is of decisive importance for the trend of the 
economy.”152 It is evident that for Erhard-economist the market was not an end in 
itself, but only means for achieving a socially-oriented economy. He was aiming 
at overcoming a strong stratification of society and the maximum development 
of a creative power of the country. The desire to provide a minimum “exclusion” 
of the needy resulted in implementation in the postwar Federal Republic of a 
large-scale welfare system supporting the old, the sick and the unemployed.153  
In Russia, by contrast, no one seemed to care about these groups of the 
population. Liberals-technocrats started reforms hypothesizing that market 
relations would improve economy at once, that market economy was universal 
and favorable for all. There dominated an illusion that the market grace would 
be poured out immediately, without deterioration of living standards of the 
majority of the population and that a new “middle class” would ostensibly 
emerge in the long run. At the same time reformers did not trouble themselves to 
inform the population of their decisions, to convince people with the help of 
decent arguments and explanations. For some paradoxical reason, called 
“democrats,” the new Russian leaders were not eager to ensure an open and 
transparent policy-making. The American journalist Paul Khlebnikov, for 
instance, expressed sincere perplexity on how little reformers seemed to care 
about the Russian people, how “many members of the Yeltsin government often 
spoke about their country with such icy detachment that you thought they were 
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describing a foreign land.“154 In confirmation of his impressions the author 
quoted the words of the opposition leader Grigory Yavlinsky describing the 
approach and views of the reformers of those years: “Gaidar and his colleagues 
believed that Russia was populated by sovki (rotten Soviets), that everything that 
exists in Russia should be wiped out and that only then can you build something 
new. Any methods or means are all right. […] That’s the way Gaidar spoke – 
‘The scientific establishment can wait! The northern regions are unnecessary for 
us! The older generation is guilty...’ The paradox of those years is that they were 
building capitalism using purely Bolshevik methods. A Bolshevik is a man for 
whom the aim is important but the means are not.”155 This purely technocratic 
approach of the Russian reformers sharply contrasted with the much more 
human-centered one of the West German leaders.  
Another feature of the West German economic transformations, in my 
view, consists in the fact that German reformers perceived economic 
liberalization not as an ultimate goal, but primarily as means of democratization. 
The formation of political system of democracy was, seemingly, their priority, 
and consequently, everything including economic reforms should have 
promoted meeting this end. The West German political elite seem to have fully 
realized the role which economic transformations are able to play in building 
and consolidating a democratic state. 
To illustrate, Ludwig Erhard wrote: “Through the increase in general 
prosperity economic policy contributes to the democratization of West Germany. 
The thread, then, is a desire, after years of effort, for increased general prosperity, 
and, if the only possible path leading to this goal is through increased economic 
competition, then economic policy is bound at the same time to strengthen the 
many traditional basic human freedoms.”156 And also: “If the future of our young 
democratic country is to be assured, it is high time it returned to the path of 
virtue. In this economic and social policy join forces. In the middle of the 20th 
century a prosperous economy is closely linked with the fate of a country, as, 
conversely, every government or country is immediately affected by the failure 
of its economic policy. This interdependence of politics and economics forbids all 
narrow thinking. In the same way as the economist must feel a duty towards the 
democratic state, so must every politician recognize the outstanding importance of the 
economic well-being of the people and act accordingly.”157 
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Unlike Ludwig Erhard and other West German political leaders, Russian 
liberal-reformers believed that “only free market and private property had an 
inherent worth, not democracy.”158 Such an approach was approved by a 
necessity of solving modernization problems. The latter, in turn, according to 
many ideologists of transformations, could be solved exclusively in an 
authoritarian way. Thus the authors of modernization program for Russia, which 
was developed in the Russian Independent Institute of Social and Nationalities 
Problems (RIISNP) with the support of the Russian Foundation for Basic 
Researches in 1992-1993, stated that “in Russia in the foreseeable future there 
would be no such a question: democracy or authoritarianism? The question 
should be put in a different way: what type of authoritarianism will be 
established in Russia?”159 
According to the program developers, among whom were Victor 
Krasil’shikov from RIISNP, Vladimir Gutnik and Victor Kuznetsov from the 
Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAN), as well as some other experts, the 
modernization necessity in post-Soviet Russia required “the establishment of an 
authoritarian regime, liberal-technocratic and patriotic in essence, which would 
assume responsibility as a political and legal guarantor of the genuine renewal of 
Russia. Without a strong, even rigid power, it will not be possible just by 
economic means to restrain mafia clans, to put an end to the continuous 
saturnalia of corruption and to call lumpen proletariat to order. Such 
“enlightened” authoritarianism, protecting conditions for the civil society 
development, open for innovations and gradual democratization, can become an 
effective alternative to the country’s present backwardness and chaos. […] To be 
successful modernization authoritarianism should create and form an ideological 
and political consensus in the society.”160 
Another illustration of the similar approach is the analytical note of the 
Leningrad Association of Social and Economic Sciences headed then by a famous 
liberal technocrat and one of the Yeltsin’s reforms architect Anatoly Chubais. The 
note written in March 1990 presented authoritarian methods and instruments to 
be utilized while carrying out economic reforms. Among the mentioned 
measures were “a dissolution of trade unions in case of their opposing 
government policies,” “emergency antistrike legislation,” “control over mass 
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media,” “measures of direct suppression of the body of active party 
functionaries,” which however should be combined with such “softening” 
measures as “pluralism and publicity in all the aspects which are not related to 
the economic reform.” As for the measures promoting fragmentation of social 
links and weakening of resistance to reforms, it was offered “to close one mine 
out of three, keeping the normal wages in the two remaining mines” or “to 
partially reduce the labor force in several enterprises.”161  
Similar viewpoint was shared by many intellectuals while Yegor Gaidar’s 
government was in power. As Boris L’vin remarked in a 1990 publication, for the 
sake of the whole society while carrying out reforms the government should 
ignore all private and group interests as well as the institutions expressing them, 
including parliament (what actually Gaidar’s government tried to do in the first 
months of 1992).162 
The Russian reforms’ ideologists and apologists of authoritarianism as a 
necessary condition of post-totalitarian transition seem to have turned a blind 
eye to the experience of postwar West Germany (as well as to democratic 
transitions in some countries of Southern Europe and Latin America) which had 
accomplished democratization and market liberalization without any 
intermediate deliberately authoritarian stages. 
Certainly the tactical choices made by the West German and Russian elites 
in the course of transformations had long-term and far-reaching consequences. 
Although in both countries decontrol of prices was an important element of the 
economic reform, the Federal Republic chose to pursue a social market economy 
with a strong social welfare component and a system of codetermination, which 
gave workers some say about their management. The establishment of a 
generous system of social services that included statutory health, 
unemployment, and pension insurance programs, provided a long-term 
protection and security for the Federal Republic’s citizens. In Russia no such 
protective measures were undertaken and the 1992 hyperinflation immediately 
resulted in a sharp decline of the level and quality of life of the Russian 
population. 
Another difference in approaches was manifested in the restraint of 
liberalization of the external economic relations in postwar Germany. In fact, up 
to the convertibility of the deutschmark in the early 1950s the state preserved 
monopoly in foreign trade. The restraint of liberalization in foreign trade helped 
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to prevent the capital flight from the country and to attract the capital from the 
outside.163 
The Russian leaders, in turn, acted the other way round. Paul Khlebnikov 
underscored that, the state’s withdrawing from the export-import business and 
abolishing customs duties became disastrous for Russia in 1991-1992. As the 
journalist explained, “The country functioned on a double price system with 
respect to its key export commodities – one price on the world markets and 
another price (much lower) on the domestic market. This was a license for 
private traders to make enormous profits. The new foreign trade companies 
tended to hide most of their profits abroad. Capital flight from Russia during 
these years was estimated at $ 15 billion to $ 20 billion a year as crime bosses, 
corrupt officials and factory directors set up bank accounts in Switzerland, 
Luxembourg, Austria, Germany, England, Israel, the United States and the 
Caribbean islands.”164 
By 1994 the majority of Russia’s foreign trade was being handled by 
private trading companies. The country’s official exports dropped by 40 percent 
in two years; the government suffered an even sharper drop in revenue it 
traditionally received from export and import tariffs. By 1996, the total amount of 
Russia’s flight capital reached an estimated $ 150 billion.165 
 
2.3 Conclusions 
 
1. The retrospective analysis political transformations allows to conclude that a 
political system (as a system of independent institutions) was not created in post-
Soviet Russia. As a result of adoption of the 1993 Constitution, which became 
“the constitution of the winner” and established a super-presidential regime, 
Russia obtained a system lacking accountability of the government to the 
legislature. This absence of horizontal accountability, in turn, reduced efficiency 
of vertical accountability in the form of electoral competition. As a result the real 
centers of power in the country were concentrated not within the formal 
representative institutions, but in nontransparent structures of the Presidential 
Administration and Federal Security Service (FSB). 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, in turn, the 1949 Basic Law 
established a parliamentary system where the federal government actually 
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represented the parliamentary majority and the Chancellor elected by the 
Bundestag was responsible to it for the government’s actions. The representative 
institutions of the parliamentary republic became the main centers of decision-
making in the country. The economic reforms, for instance, were carried out in 
the frameworks of proto-government of Bizonia formed on the basis of coalition 
of the CDU/CSU and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Later the government of 
the constitutionally established Federal Republic formed in the publicly elected 
Bundestag appointed the figure of Ludwig Erhard as the Minister of Economics, 
thereby sharing with ex-head of the Economic Council the responsibility for the 
painful market reforms.  
In Russia, by contrast, the two branches of power were not able to reach a 
consensus on the key issues of the country’s development and on economic 
reforms in the first instance. It testified to the fact that the Russian leaders could 
not, unlike their German colleagues, draw lessons from the country’s history and 
rise above narrow corporate ambitions. As Virginie Coulloudon observed, “At 
the core of the reality is the Russian elites’ continued lack of respect for, or even 
understanding of, the notion of the public good. Soviet ideology offered its own 
concept of the public good. But when that ideology was totally discredited, 
nothing emerged to take its place. If things had gone differently, the Soviet state 
could have given way to the rule of law. Instead, Russian elites have reproduced 
the old pattern without the constraints of Soviet ideology. As a result, many 
individuals and the government itself operate in an ethical and moral vacuum. 
The new system has drifted into political arbitrariness and generalized 
criminality. Russian public officials have gradually forged a new political system 
where the notions of the rule of law and the public good are secondary to the 
necessity of keeping power and managing the state’s wealth. They have adorned 
this system with democratic trappings, including a constitutional court, a 
democratically elected parliament, and a free press. But they reject the idea of a 
real alternation of power in the Kremlin.”166 
2. As the analysis of the postwar Federal Republic development reveals, 
the Economic Miracle accelerated consolidation of the new German state. While 
the Weimar Republic – as the first German experience with democracy – 
perpetually struggled against economic difficulties, democracy became 
associated largely with never-ending hardships and anxieties and the democratic 
Weimer state was blamed for the failure to solve economic problems. In the 
Federal Republic, by contrast, Germans became for the first time convinced that 
democracy is compatible with economic growth. While during the Weimar 
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period many tended to look back at the authoritarian but more economically 
successful German Empire as the Golden Age of the German state, the Third 
Reich which had initially restored the standards of living, but had precipitated 
the country into a destructive war and economic catastrophe, aroused nostalgia 
only in the first postwar years. For the majority of the Economic Miracle 
contemporaries, as Henry Ashby Turner summarized, the financially safe, 
democratic present seemed the best of all periods.167  
In Russia, on the contrary, unprecedented economic recession took place 
in the era of post-Soviet “democratization.” It is not surprising therefore that 
democracy, associated with the chaos of the 1990s, became linked in the public 
opinion with poverty and humiliation. Already in 1995 half of the Russian 
countrymen and a quarter of the town dwellers believed that democracy had 
brought Russia and its citizens only harm.168 72 percent of the respondents of the 
1998 poll approved of the pre-Gorbachev situtation and only 35 percent 
positively estimated the existing regime.169 
The experiences of West Germany and Russia, thus, confirmed that 
through raising of living standards economic development provides a political 
regime with necessary legitimacy and long-term sustainability. Legitimacy, being 
an important condition of any regime’s existence, gets its prime value in 
democratic states.  
Besides, economic development positively affects cultural changes which, 
in turn, facilitate democracy stabilization. In the following chapter I will turn to 
analysis of the cultural transformation in West Germany and Russia.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Transformations of Political Culture in 
post-WWII West Germany and Post-Soviet 
Russia: Attitudinal and Participatory 
Dimension 
 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
The importance of studying cultural aspects of post-totalitarian democratization 
is largely determined by the fact that democratic institutions, as Francis 
Fukuyama argued, rest on civil society which, in turn, has the predecessors and 
prerequisites on the cultural level.170 As voluntarily associations constituting civil 
society are formed and sustained by individuals, individual attitudes and 
orientations towards self and others in politics and towards political system 
constitute an important part of cultural analysis. As Marc Morjé Howard put it, 
“Only by considering the motivations of individuals will we be able to 
understand and explain their behavior. And only by considering individual 
behavior will we be able to make sense of collective patterns within and across 
societies.”171 Although Howard acknowledged the importance of such country-
level variables as the economy and the roles of the state and political institutions, 
a focus on individual-level factors, in his view, could provide the most direct link 
to understanding and explaining political participation in a comparative 
perspective.172 
 As previously noted, the nature of causation between the political culture 
of citizens and the quality of democracy has evoked considerable controversy 
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over time. Nevertheless, the link between these two phenomena has become 
widely recognized and the congruence between culture and structure has been 
seen as an important prerequisite of a successful democratization. As Jürgen 
Habermas observed, “A republic can ultimately be stable only insofar as the 
principles of its constitution take root in the convictions and practices of its 
citizens. Such a mentality can be formed only within the context of a free and 
combative political culture; it emerges through criticism and confrontations in 
the arena of a public sphere that has not lost heart, is still accessible to 
arguments, and has not been ruined by commercial television. Such a network of 
motives and opinions cannot be created with administrative means, and it 
constitutes the yardstick for measuring the political civilization of a 
community.”173 
Evidently achieving such a “civilization” in the countries that have gone 
through highly repressive totalitarian regimes is more complex than in other 
social contexts. The very nature of totalitarian rule presupposes resort to violence 
and terror at least to some extent and to some groups of the population. This 
violence is directed first of all against certain groups of citizens who are regarded 
by the regime as enemies and who become thus its main victims. Violence and 
terror, however, inevitably affect society as a whole, destroying social links, 
making an individual withdraw into himself, leaving fear and distrust behind 
themselves.174 
The students of the legacies of totalitarianism Donna Bahry and Brian 
Silver argued that such regimes “atomize society so that people become isolated 
and mistrustful of one another and hence unable to concert their efforts in 
organized political activity.”175 Under a system of totalitarian atomization, 
“Society itself thereby becomes an instrument of coercion: the memory of mass 
terror, the elimination of autonomous intermediary groups between state and 
individual, and the continued reliance on informers breed an atmosphere of 
social intimidation that undermines any collective activity not officially 
sanctioned by the state.”176 
Barrington Moore, writing before the end of Stalinism, asserted: “The 
regime deliberately seeks to sow suspicion among the population, which to a 
marked extent results in the breakup of friendship groupings, in the work 
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situation and elsewhere, and the isolation of the individual… Terror ultimately 
destroys the network of stable expectations concerning what other people will do 
that lie at the core of any set of organized human relationships.”177 James Gibson 
agreed that totalitarianism undermines civil society through the atomization of 
individual citizens.178  
The repressive character of totalitarianism eliminates the public sphere as an 
area of social life where people can get together and freely discuss and identify 
societal problems and, consequently, makes any voluntary organized, 
institutionalized forms of public participation, activity and solidarity impossible.  
In their study of totalitarian regimes Carl Friedrich and Zbignew 
Brzezinski described the state of things under totalitarian rule as follows: “No 
organizations are allowed unless they bear the stamp of official approval and are 
effectively coordinated with the ruling party. Nor do the means exist by which 
an enterprising person might gather others for effective cooperation. The 
regime’s total control of all the means of mass communication, as well as post, 
telephone, and telegraph; its complete monopoly of all weapons; finally, its all-
engulfing secret-police surveillance, which utilizes every available contraption of 
modern technology, such as hidden recording devices, as well as the older 
methods of agents-provocateurs and the like – these and related features of 
totalitarianism make any attempt to organize large numbers of people for 
effective opposition well-nigh hopeless.”179 Thus in a totalitarian society, 
“opposition is prevented from developing by the organization of total terror, 
which eventually engulfs everyone.”180 
Writing about the countries whose citizens have been subject to 
generalized or centralized violence, the authors of the volume Fear at the Edge: 
State Terror and Resistance in Latin America Juan Corradi, Patricia Weiss Gagen 
and Manuel Antonio Garréton pointed to the fact that the populations of such 
countries “have experienced the erosion of public values, of legal and even 
primary social bonds. Uncertainty, self-doubt, insecurity have been the staples of 
public life. In such contexts, fear is a paramount feature in social action: it is 
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characterized by the inability of social actors to predict the consequences of their 
behavior because public authority is arbitrarily and brutally exercised.”181 
Thus totalitarian reign of terror undermines the ground on which 
participation normally grows – the citizens’ assurance that their actions can be 
influential and effective, i.e. the feeling of efficacy. In a situation where “total fear 
reigns” and terror “embraces the entire society, searching everywhere for actual 
or potential deviants from the totalitarian unity,” where “the repressive 
measures of a regime aim first at eliminating their open enemies and are 
gradually extended to other sections of society” one cannot be under an illusion 
that he or she can exercise any political influence.182 Moreover, the thought 
control under the totalitarian rule “dehumanizes the subject of the regime by 
depriving them of a chance for independent thought and judgment.”183  
Political efficacy taps an individual’s belief that ordinary people have some 
influence and control over what the government does. To many commentators, 
this feeling that one can have some impact on government is extremely 
important in a democracy even though it won’t lead to any actual attempts at 
exercising any influence.184 As Almond and Verba pointed out, the democratic 
citizen “is not the active citizen; he is the potentially active citizen,” i.e. he is the 
one who believes he can exercise influence if necessary.185 
The feeling of political efficacy as well as a sense of civic competence, or 
the citizens’ belief they can influence the course of governmental decisions, have 
been generally regarded as the key elements of the civic culture model and 
democratic participation, as they are found to lead to higher levels of political 
involvement. Giuseppe di Palma, for example, noted that “political efficacy is the 
orientation most strongly correlated with participation.”186  
Furthermore, Kendall Baker and his colleagues asserted that “strong 
feelings of political efficacy indicate more than mere support for a political 
system; they also suggest that the norms and behaviors expected of a citizen in a 
democracy have been learned and internalized.”187 George Balch, in turn, pointed 
to the fact that political efficacy is a part of a larger cluster of civic attitudes: “The 
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citizen who has a high sense of political efficacy is [...] politically active, 
supportive, informed, interested, loyal, satisfied and public regarding.”188 
The sense of efficacy and readiness to participate is linked with another 
basic orientation representing the most general level of politicization, namely 
interest in politics. Any participation presupposes interest and in the past 
comparative research interest in politics has been shown to be positively related 
to political participation and to constitute a foundation on which other political 
attitudes such as political efficacy and political trust are built (Bratton 1999; Duch 
1993; Mishler and Rose 1995).  
Political interest (as tapped by the simple question “Generally speaking, 
are you interested in politics?”) represents alongside with the feeling of efficacy a 
measure of one of the attitudinal antecedents to political participation, which can 
also serve as a general measure of politicization.189 As a rule, such general 
interest is manifested in following the news and discussing political issues with 
friends, acquaintances and relatives.  
Students of comparative communism have described the cultural legacy 
of communist regimes as a widespread habit among the population of 
dichotomizing society into two spheres: the private sphere of relationships with 
family members and close friends, where people can be trusted and they 
genuinely try to help each other, and the public sphere, where mistrust prevails, 
as each can expect the conduct of others to be motivated by narrow self-interest 
and statements of ideological or ethical principle to be essentially hypocritical.190  
Indeed, because of the fear of repressions discussing politics under a 
totalitarian rule becomes possible only within close circles of trusted friends and 
family (e.g., the so-called “kitchen-talk” in the USSR). It means that the 
totalitarian reign of terror not only eliminates the public sphere and undermines 
civil society, it also inevitably leads to the loss of general trust, on the one hand, 
and to strengthening of private relationships with a close circle of relatives and 
friends or, differently, to the strengthening of “strong ties,” on the other.191  
In his research of post-communist societies Marc Morjé Howard observed 
that during the Soviet times the relations in the private sphere “were extremely 
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meaningful and genuine,” first, because due to the highly politicized and tightly 
controlled public sphere only in the private sphere people could express 
themselves openly, and, second, because of the shortage of goods “connections 
played an essential role, whether the need was for spare parts to fix a car or for 
products that were rarely available in stores.”192  
Evidently, neither social atomization nor “strong ties,” that are excluded 
from public sphere, is conducive to the strengthening of civil society, the 
development of which is facilitated, it is argued, by broader social interactions 
transcending the limits of family relations and close friendships. Such “weak 
ties” are more likely to “link members of different small groups than are strong 
ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular groups.”193 Civil society 
profits from social networks characterized by relatively weak and hence 
permeable boundaries for such networks facilitate cooperation among citizens.  
Contemporary students of civil society mostly agree with Alexis de 
Tocqueville in that social interaction, especially outside the narrow confines of 
one’s family, contributes to the development of broader, less selfish, and more 
socially engaged attitudes.194 Jeffery Mondak and Adam Gearing, for example, 
asserted: “Although some forms of political participation can occur despite the 
absence of social interaction, it is difficult to overstate the pivotal role civic 
engagement plays in mass politics. People who do not interact with one another 
may fail to develop an appreciation for any form of communal good, and thus 
they may be limited in their capacity to see politics in terms of general rather 
than purely personal interests. Talk – actual face-to-face discussion about politics 
and society – is an essential ingredient for the emergence of an effective 
citizenry.”195 
Robert Putnam, in turn, argued that “dense but segregated horizontal 
networks sustain cooperation within each group, but networks of civil 
engagement that cut across social cleavages nourish wider cooperation” which 
facilitates democratic governance.196 Paraphrasing Tocqueville, Putnam asserted 
that civil society organizations served as “schools for democracy.” As Howard 
explained it, the fact that “autonomous organizations exist and flourish allows 
ordinary citizens to interact with one another outside of their networks of family 
and close friends and thereby develop greater trust, tolerance, and bargaining 
skills, all of which are beneficial for democracy. Furthermore, their experience 
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with the organizations of civil society allows people to gain a greater sense of 
their own roles and capacities in a participatory democratic system, thus creating 
a more proficient and engaged citizenry. The more people participate in 
voluntary organizations of civil society – the more they internalize the norms and 
behavior of a participatory democratic citizenry, which can only strengthen the 
institutions and performance of a country’s democratic government.”197  
Social networks, to the extent they are heterogeneous and politically 
relevant, also contribute to democratic values through the simple process of 
political discourse. Diana Mutz concluded that “cross-cutting exposure” (by 
which she meant political discussions with non-like-minded network members) 
contributed substantially to the development of democratic values in the 
American mass public. Thus, “weak” social networks that are politically relevant 
are conducive to the development of democratic values through processes of 
diffusion and through practice at democratic discussion.198 
Experts argue that civic groups may contribute to democratic 
development and stability in two ways: internally, they may inspire habits of 
cooperation, solidarity, public-spiritedness, and trust; whereas externally, these 
networks tend to aggregate interests and articulate demands to ensure the 
government’s accountability to its citizens. It is this infrastructure of groups, it is 
argued, that actually makes democracy work.199 
The concept of “strong / weak ties,” in turn, corresponds with another 
important sociological concept of trust. It is important to point out in this regards 
that the concept of general trust presupposes trust not only in close relatives and 
friends but also in unknown people (cf “weak ties”). In contrast with 
interpersonal trust, which structures the relations with a socially close and, 
consequently, personally known partner (cf “strong ties”), general trust concerns 
any potential partner, however socially remote he is. Institutional or “vertical” 
trust, in turn, might arise in the relationship with the third party: a judge, an 
arbiter, a mediator, the justice system, or the state as a whole.200 
 In Richard Rose’s opinion, one of the sides of the process of 
modernization consists in supplementation of interpersonal with institutional 
trust. The scholar used the term “pre-modern” to refer to the tendencies to solve 
everyday problems exclusively with the help of close relatives and acquaintances 
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when a rational bureaucracy does not exist. The same practices become “anti-
modern” if they result from the willingness to turn aside all formal institutions 
due to distrust in them.201  
As previously mentioned, post-totalitarian societies are likely to face the 
problems of the lack of mutual trust, sense of efficacy, solidarity, communication 
skills, associational life, and participation in public affairs as well as other 
important civic attitudes and habits. Transformation of political culture in such 
societal contexts retains special significance for, as Claus Offe noted, “the 
institutional reorganization of post-totalitarian societies cannot be regarded as 
successfully completed until this subsequent rooting of the new regime in the 
values and loyalties of the population has been achieved.”202  
The variables that will interest us in the comparative analysis of West 
German and Russian societies are thus interest in politics, the feeling of political 
efficacy, political participation, social trust, and support for democratic values. I will try 
to explore how attitudes toward self (civic attitudes, and primarily, the feeling of 
political efficacy) and toward others in politics (trust, cooperative competence) as 
well as toward the political system changed in the cause of post-totalitarian 
transformations. In the comparative analysis I will focus on citizens’ 
participation in political processes and on their readiness to associate as 
important characteristic of civil society agents. 
The data presented in this chapter drew upon several different 
sociological sources.  
The data on West Germany come, primarily, from various surveys 
conducted by the German and American scholars in the postwar period. 
Beginning in 1945, public opinion surveys were conducted on a regular basis to 
assess the progress of the Western allies’ reeducation programs by the Opinion 
Surveys Section of the Office of Military Government of the United States for 
Germany (OMGUS).203 
Prior to the 1959 Civic Culture survey, extensive studies of political 
attitudes and values had been conducted under official and semi-official auspices 
both by the Western occupation authorities and by the post-1949 German 
government. Since 1950, the Adenauer government’s Press and Information 
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Office commissioned German polling organizations to conduct monthly surveys 
that in various ways were designed to examine German political culture.204 
Since the late 1940s – early 1950s monthly surveys of domestic public 
opinion were carried out by the leading West German centers for public opinion 
research such as the EMNID Institute of Public Opinion in Bielefeld (TNS Emnid 
Medien- und Sozialforschung GmbH) founded in 1945 and the Allensbach Institute 
for Public Opinion Research (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach), a private 
conservative opinion polling institute founded in 1947. 
In 1959 and 1960 public opinion surveys were administered within 
Almond and Verba’s The Civic Culture project. Later studies, including The Civic 
Culture Revisited volume (1980) drew upon a large body of empirical data 
collected by the Allensbach and the EMNID institutes, as well as upon GETAS 
survey, an international random sample, directed by Max Kaase and Hans-Dieter 
Klingemann from Mannheim University; the German Electoral Data Project 
(GED) (1953-1976), and some other surveys. 
Kendall Baker, Russell Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt’s 1981 research, in 
turn, was based upon a timeseries of ten surveys of German political behavior 
conducted in the following election years: 1953, 1961 (three surveys), 1965 (two 
surveys), 1969 (two surveys), 1972, and 1976. These data have been made 
available to researchers as the result of a joint archival project of the Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) in Michigan, the 
Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung (ZA) in Cologne, and the Zentrum 
für Unfragen, Methoden, und Analysen (ZUMA) in Mannheim. 
The data on post-Soviet Russia come primarily from the public opinion 
surveys carried out since the late 1980s by a Russia’s leading non-governmental 
polling and sociological research organization the Levada Analytical Center (till 
2003 - All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center, VCIOM).  
Another source of data on Russian society is a longitudinal cross-cultural 
measurement of variation of values carried out in four waves in 1990, 1995, 2000, 
and 2005 within Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues’ The World Values Survey 
project. The nationally-representative samples from Russia were also included 
starting with the second wave in The Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 
(CEEB), an annual general public survey carried out from 1990 to 1998.  
Relevant data on the Russian public opinion are also found in the 
publications by Jeffrey W. Hahn (1991, 1993, 2001, 2005), James L. Gibson (1996, 
1998, 2001), Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul (2001), Stephen White (2000), 
Lev Gudkov, Boris Dubin, and other scholars.  
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3.2 Political Culture in West Germany 
 
It is important to point out that the analysts of the postwar period were mostly 
united in their evaluations and descriptions of German society. Already in 1944 
Friedrich von Hayek underscored the lack of democratic traits in what he called 
a “typical German.” He wrote: “Few people will deny that the Germans on the 
whole are industrious and disciplined, thorough and energetic to the degree of 
ruthlessness, conscientious and single-minded in any tasks they undertake; that 
they possess a strong sense of order, duty, and strict obedience to authority, and 
that they often show great readiness to make personal sacrifices, and great 
courage in physical danger. All these make the German an efficient instrument in 
carrying out an assigned task and that has accordingly been carefully nurtured in 
the old Prussian state and the new Prussian-dominated Reich. What the “typical 
German” is often thought to lack are the individualist virtues of tolerance and 
respect for other individuals and their opinions, of independence of mind and 
that uprightness of character and readiness to defend one’s own convictions 
against a superior which the Germans themselves, usually conscious that they 
lack it, call Zivilcourage; of consideration for the weak and infirm, and of that 
healthy contempt and dislike of power which only an old tradition of personal 
liberty creates.”205 
In his 1965 study on Society and Democracy in Germany the sociologist Ralf 
Dahrendorf addressed the issue of the structural obstacles to liberal democracy 
in Germany by asking: “Why is it that so few in Germany embraced the principle 
of liberal democracy? What is it in German society that may account for 
Germany’s persistent failure to give a home to democracy in its liberal sense?”206 
Dahrendorf thus tried to explain what characteristics of the German society had 
prevented the establishment of a democratic order in the country and made an 
attempt to apply an instrument of knowledge to the analysis of German society 
that may also promote its change.207 
Dahrendorf linked the problems of liberal democracy in Germany with 
the absence of certain social structures on which the constitution of liberty could 
be based and located the causes of his country’s “structural incapacity for 
democracy” in its modernization deficit, which he attributed to conflict aversion, 
the monopoly of elites, and withdrawal into private life. These flaws, according 
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to the author, prevented the establishment of democratic institutions, for “where 
the effective equality of autonomous citizens is lacking; where conflicts are not 
regulated rationally, but allegedly “solved” and in fact suppressed; where elites 
either cannot or do not want to compete with one another in cohesive diversity; 
where people are oriented to private rather than public virtues – the constitution 
of liberty cannot thrive.”208 
The poor state of the German political culture became particularly 
revealing during the immediate postwar period when the first opinion surveys 
conducted by The Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS) were 
published. The earliest OMGUS surveys disclosed little popular enthusiasm for 
political activity alongside with high levels of indifference to the public affairs 
and low levels of participation. In a situation of total economical, political and 
moral collapse typical were such comments as “Politics is a dirty business” and 
“One is a politician for ten years and then lands in a concentration camp.” In 
April 1946, three-quarters of the respondents flatly said, if they had a son leaving 
school, they would not like him to pursue a political profession.209  
In September 1946, just before referenda on provincial constitutions and 
elections to provincial parliaments, a series of questions demonstrated that only 
one in five potential voters was sufficiently interested to have even the barest 
information on the issues at stake. Indeed, just a few expressed interest in politics 
or reported being active politically. Nine in ten AMZON respondents indicated 
in May 1946 that they were personally doing everything possible to help rebuild 
Germany – but only 7 percent agreed to help carry out the census of October 
1946 voluntarily, 6 percent did voluntary work in their local community, and no 
more than 4 percent were members of political parties. Moreover, as many as 40 
percent claimed no preference for any political party.210 
To add to this, AMZON Germans were inclined to ascribe responsibility 
for governance to officials rather than to voters: asked about poor governance, 38 
percent held government officials responsible and 26 percent the voting public, 
with 12 percent assigning responsibility to both. Even two years later in May 
1949 two-thirds continued to prefer leaving politics to others, only 38 percent 
believed their fellow citizens to have any interest in political affairs.211 
As the country struggled to rebuild, the great majority of the German 
people succumbed to political apathy. Observers from the U.S. military 
government explained the widespread retreat into private life by claiming that 
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the Germans, suffering “from the consequences of the long Nazi dictatorship and 
the impact of the recent total defeat,” were “much too preoccupied with 
questions of survival such as food and shelter” to think of anything else. As a 
result of such traumatic experiences, “only a minority regarded” a fresh start as 
an “opportunity,” while the majority thought of it as an “onerous obligation.”212 
The public reaction to the adoption of the Basic Law on 23 May, 1949 was 
similarly apathetic. In his study The German Polity the political scientist David 
Conradt wrote that, “The declaration of ratification hardly evoked any 
celebration… In a national survey conducted at the time, 40 percent of the adult 
population stated that they were indifferent to the constitution, 33 percent were 
‘modestly interested’ and only 21 percent were ‘very interested.’ Only 51 percent, 
in another survey conducted in 1949, favored the creation of the Federal 
Republic; the remainder of the sample were either against it (23 percent), 
indifferent (13 percent), or undecided (13 percent).”213 
It should be pointed out that these attitudes of German citizens persisted 
in the postwar period, revealing considerable stability. After more than a decade 
of experience with the Federal Republic observers acknowledged that democratic 
attitudes were still in short supply. Numerous studies of the postwar period 
continued to convey the impression that the lack of democratic tradition was a 
major obstacle to a democratic political culture. Theodor Adorno (1959), Gabriel 
Almond and Sidney Verba (1963), Ralf Dahrendorf (1965), Karl Jaspers (1966), 
Steven Warnecke (1970), Kurt Sontheimer (1973), and other researchers generally 
agreed upon such characteristics of the German political culture as “pragmatic,” 
“detached,” “almost cynical,” and “passive.”  
In his well-know 1959 lecture on The Meaning of Working through the Past 
(Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit?) that was published and broadcast 
over radio, Adorno pointed to the fact that “the system of political democracy 
[…] has not become naturalized to the point where people truly experience it as 
their own and see themselves as agents (Subjecte) of the political process. […] 
Using the language of philosophy, one indeed could say that the people’s 
alienation from democracy reflects the self-alienation of society.”214 
In 1963 Almond and Verba’s The Civic Culture concluded, that “In 
Germany a passive subject orientation persists and has not yet been balanced by 
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a participation orientation.”215 Verba observed that, “the orientation to politics in 
Germany is in terms of the specific outputs of the political system and the 
individual sees himself as either the beneficiary or not the beneficiary of this 
output [...] His view of himself as a participant tends to be rather passive – one 
fulfills obligations rather than participated in the decision-making process of 
government.”216 
In seeking to explain the pattern of German political culture, Almond and 
Verba essentially posited the following ‘independent variables’: low levels of 
social trust and cooperative activities; a subject-oriented socialization process in 
the family and school; and, a residual variable, the “bitter” and “traumatic” 
historical experience.217  
Even after the outburst of civic activism during the 1968 student 
movement, experts continued to state the persistence of the old culture. In 1970, 
for instance, Steven Warnecke pointed to the “continued existence of attitudes 
among substantial segments of the electorate which prevent a sense of 
responsibility for politics and political efficacy from developing, impede the 
legitimation of the role of public opinion, prevent the individual from seeing 
society as a emanation from himself and others, and impede the voter from 
perceiving government as the executive committee of society.”218  
Similarly, in the early 1970s Kurt Sontheimer argued that “democratic 
consciousness” in Germany “is a collection of attitudes and behaviors which is 
not strong enough to stand the test of any serious crises of the system.”219 He 
noted that “Germans have placed their desire for harmony, for a national 
community binding the whole population together, above their interest in fair 
competition and open contest [...] In Germany more than anywhere else the 
individual feels that he is neither in a position to do anything about the situation 
nor to leave the mark of his political activity by participation in political life.”220  
Generally speaking, despite rather successful establishment of democratic 
institutions, “the cultural process of adopting the spirit of democracy remained 
difficult, as authoritarian thought patterns and habits of behavior tended to 
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persist.”221 Even after the founding of the Bonn Republic, domestic observers 
detected “greatest distrust [toward] and internal rejection” of the newly 
implanted form of government, coupled with a quest for genuine participation 
that one might call “perhaps somewhat romantically, a German organic and 
functional democracy.” This contradictory mixture of outright skepticism and 
inflated expectations produced both dissatisfaction and apathy: “It should be 
said clearly that all efforts toward a truly lived democracy still lack the broad 
resonance that is needed.”222 
However, despite the researchers’ almost unanimously negative 
characteristics of the West German political culture, opinion polls taken in the 
postwar period reflected a gradual turn away from authoritarian patterns of 
thought and a tentative embrace of democratic values.223 According to the survey 
data, the most drastic attitudinal change took place in the late 1960s and, 
particularly, in the early 1970s. The changes in postwar political culture were 
thus intrinsically linked with the West German protest student movement of the 
late 1960s. 
The German student movement (also called 68er-Bewegung, or movement 
of 1968) grew mostly out of the main student organization Socialist German 
Student Union (Der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund, SDS), which used to be 
a college organization of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) since 
1946. After its exclusion from the SPD in 1961 for “left deviation,” it became the 
leading organization in the Extraparliamentary Opposition 
(Außerparlamentarische Opposition, APO).  
It is noteworthy that this protest movement of young people emerged 
largely as a reaction against the perceived authoritarianism and hypocrisy of the 
German government. The students demanded democratization of society, in 
general, and educational system in particular; they required reforming of the 
curriculum and asked for dealing with Germany’s National Socialist past. 
Among other issues, the student movement’s activists strongly opposed the 
planned passing of German emergency legislation (Notstandsgesetze) – the 
German Emergency Acts which would allow the government to limit civil rights, 
restrict freedom of movement and to limit privacy and confidentiality of 
telecommunications correspondence in case of an emergency.  
Alternative lifestyles, the right to abortion and equal rights for women, 
environmental rights and other New Politics issues were also associated with the 
APO and the SDS as its best known representative. The methods of protest 
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employed by the students such as sit-ins and demonstrations were generally 
similar to the United States anti-war movement of that time. 
Although the student movement existed for a relatively short period of 
time, reaching its height in 1968 (its membership peaking at 2,500 at that time) 
and being actually dissolved in 1970, its overall activity as well as agenda 
impacted the German society a lot. In the first instance, it can be argued that the 
movement of 1968 brought about a transformation of West German political 
culture. From that point onward West German society has shown a shift towards 
a more democratic political culture. 
First of all, throughout the 1950s the proportion of Germans expressing at 
least a general interest in politics never exceeded 30 percent. In 1952, for example, 
only 27 percent of the population thought of themselves as interested in politics. 
However, in the late 1960s the percentage of those interested in politics crossed 
the 40 percent mark and by 1977 half of the adult population reported they were 
interested in politics.224 
The frequency of political discussion with friends, neighbors and within the 
family, as reported by respondents, also continuously showed a marked increase 
over time. In 1953, political discussion was dismally low with over 60 percent of 
the electorate admitting to rarely or never discussing politics. Already by 1959 
the German electorate was much more likely to discuss politics. The number of 
uninvolved citizens declined to fewer than 40 percent. Further evidence of this 
trend was the gradual increase in political discussion through the 1965 election 
with the most drastic increase taking place between 1965 and 1969.225  
As for political efficacy, it was alarmingly low till the end of the 1950s for 
only about a quarter of the population felt they had a say in what the 
government did and little more than a tenth saw means other than voting for 
influencing politics.226 Nevertheless, in the late 1960s and particularly in the early 
1970s a gradual increase in political efficacy did finally take place. If in 1959 
around 70 percent of the population agreed with the statement “People like me 
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have no say in what the government does” and only 27 percent disagreed with it, 
in 1972 and 1976 the latter figure increased to 40 percent. In 1953, 45 percent of 
the population said that one cannot do anything against “things that one can be 
dissatisfied with in the government,” but in 1979 only 26 percent did so.227 
Conradt observed that the proportion of German respondents who felt 
competent to influence national legislation they considered unjust rose from 38 
percent in 1959 to 59 percent in 1974.228 Moreover, approximately 40 percent of 
the respondents in the 1972 survey thought that politics is understandable and 
that an average person can have some say in political affairs.229 
Generally speaking, West Germans attributed increasing importance to 
political matters in their personal lives as they were becoming more convinced in 
their personal ability to influence politics. The feeling of political efficacy 
increased together with the feeling that politics is important for one’s personal 
existence. In 1953, 65 percent of the population agreed with the statement: “What 
happens in politics is very important; it affects my personal well-being”; by 1974, 
however, this figure rose to 78 percent and by 1979 it stabilized at 71 percent.230 
Furthermore, these attitudinal changes led finally to the considerable 
increase in political participation. According to David Conradt, “By the mid-1970s 
West Germans were participating in politics at rates no less than citizens in older 
democracies like the United States and the Netherlands and in some areas (party 
membership, attendance at political meetings, etc.) had even higher levels of 
political participation. Also in a 1976 survey of the populations’ attitude towards 
certain “unconventional modes” of political participation found substantial 
political support, especially among the younger age groups, for participation in 
rent or tax strike, boycotts, demonstrations, citizen-initiative groups and petition 
drives. There was little support, however, for no more extreme forms of political 
activity.”231  
So alongside conventional political participation, political involvement 
has taken on new forms of expression. Such methods like demonstrations, sit-ins, 
boycotts, strikes, civil action groups, petitions, etc. developed historically in the 
context of various civil rights movements. A 1974 comparative study by Max 
Kaase and Alan Marsh on the development of “unconventional” forms of 
political action in five Western industrialized societies came to the conclusion 
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that the political action repertory expanded between 1959 and 1974 in the Federal 
Republic in particular.232 
According to the calculations carried out by the Ministry of the Interior in 
Bonn, the number of demonstrations in the Federal Republic quadrupled from 
approximately 1300 to around 5000 per annum between 1970 and 1982. This rise 
gives an impressive indication of increasing participation in political life, with its 
considerable effect on public opinion and the media. The big jump took place in 
1980, when the number of demonstrations passed the 4000 mark. At the same 
time, according to the Interior Ministry, violent forms of political articulation did 
not increase during this period, but tended rather to decline.233 
Kendall Baker and his colleagues pointed to the particularly sharp 
increase in political involvement during the 1969 and especially 1972 election 
campaigns: “[1969] election, which was characterized by high levels of citizen 
participation, saw the emergence of voter initiative groups (Wählerinitiativen). 
Over a third of the electorate claimed to discuss politics daily during the 1969 
campaign. At the time of the 1972 election, citizen involvement rose to an even 
higher plateau. Voting turnout in 1972 was the highest in the history of the 
Federal Republic, and American-style electioneering tactics proliferated. To 
culminate this trend of increasing politicization, the 1973 European Community 
study found German levels of political discussion to be the highest in the 
European Community.”234 Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann also 
documented a substantial increase in political interest for the period between 
1952 and 1973.235 
Conradt observed that these changes in attitudes toward participation 
coincided with the emergence in the late 1960s of a qualitatively new form of 
participatory behavior for Germany - citizen-initiative groups (Bürgerinitiativen). 
By the late 1970s there were about 3000 such groups in the Federal Republic with 
a total membership of about 2 million (according to observers, they had more 
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members than the political parties). In 1978 Meulemann noted the emergence 
since the 1960s of about 15,000 different grassroots groups.236  
These groups, the purposes of which ranged from protesting hikes in 
streetcar fares to the prohibition of nuclear power plants, tried to influence policy 
decisions, particularly concerning the environment, atomic energy, consumer 
and neighborhood issues. Most of them, drawing the bulk of their membership 
from younger, well-educated, middle-class segments of the population, had 
often only one issue and operated at the local level. Nonetheless, surveys showed 
that over a third of the adult population was contemplating membership in some 
citizen-initiative group. Given the passivity found in the 1959 study, the 
emergence of these groups, especially on this scale, attested to the changes that 
took place in political participation during the 1960s and 1970s.237  
Die Zeit journalist Rolf Zundel pointed to the appearance of “thousands of 
initiatives that are often known only locally; lobby for a better – or at least 
different – form of city planning, organize assistance for foreigners, and speak 
out for children’s playgrounds, protection against noise, aid for the elderly, the 
re-socialization of prisoners, and much more. Some initiatives are short-lived 
spontaneous movements, some become traditionalist associations.”238 
According to the study conducted in the early 1970s by the German 
Institute for Urban Studies, which examined 1,400 citizens’ initiatives, 16.9 
percent of them were concerned with environmental protection; 15.8 percent 
with daycare facilities and playgrounds. Traffic issues were the focus of 11.8 
percent, followed by schools (8.1 percent), urban development (8.0 percent), and 
marginal groups (7.1 percent). There were even some purely commercial 
initiatives (2 percent) and at least one third of all citizens’ initiatives made up the 
social self-help organizations.239 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that citizen– initiative groups did 
not appear all of a sudden but that they owed their emergence, primarily, to the 
protest student movement of the late 1960s without which they would have been 
arguably unimaginable. 
As Paul Hockenos explained, in the aftermath of the Socialist German 
Student Union’s dissolution, the student movement’s activists scattered across 
the left side of the republic’s political spectrum, the overwhelming majority 
taking the reformist path. Importantly, Hockenos underscored that the radical 
path represented by the activity of the violent left-wing groups, the most well-
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known of which was The Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion, RAF) or Baader-
Meinhof Group, was followed by a clear minority. Between 1969 and 1972, some 
300,000 young people aged 18-25 joined the SPD inspired by the reforms of Willy 
Brandt’s government. No less important, Hockenos argued, was the fact that 
former 1968ers took their ethic of self-initiative and do-it-yourself politics into 
local communities by forming single-issue grassroots citizens-initiatives. 
Consequently, many thousands of Bürgerinitiativen mushroomed across the 
republic in the early 1970s.240  
These numerous post-1968 grassroots initiatives born of the student 
movement had the greatest impact on the Federal Republic as they linked up 
during the 1970s to form powerful “new social movements”: the environmental, 
the anti-nuclear energy, the women’s, and the peace movement. These mass 
movements, in turn, mobilized millions of ordinary Germans considerably 
extending the social base of the middle-class, university-based 1968 movement.241 
The most influential of the new social movements was the environmental 
movement of the 1970s. Combining extra-parliamentary student opposition of 
the 1960s and antinuclear movement, the environmental popular movement 
evolved in the 1970s into a strong political force whose political considerations 
extended opposition to nuclear energy far into other areas, especially energy, 
growth, and economic policies.  
In 1972, 16 citizen groups founded the Federal Association of Citizens' 
Initiatives for Environmental Protection (Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen 
Umweltschutz, BBU), which would soon comprise more than a thousand affiliated 
action groups and more than 300,000 individual members.242 In 1975, the non-
governmental League for the Environment and Nature Conservation (Bund für 
Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, BUND) was founded as a federation of 
already existing regional groups, uniting about 40,000 members.243 
Being to some extent a continuation of the student movement of the 1960s 
environmentalists shared certain similarities with the extra-parliamentary 
student opposition of the 1960s. Among these similarities Rolf Zundel 
mentioned, first, the profound disappointment in the establishment. Besides, like 
the members of the student movement, environmentalists also had a very strong 
sense of being an elite and unwillingness to compromise. Also similar to the 
student movement, exceptional rights for the participants were grounded on the 
basis of an unusually higher moral aim (the motto for the draft of the BBU action 
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catalog is: “When justice becomes unjust, then resistance becomes a duty”). 
Widespread in the initiatives was the certainty that they represented the most 
important instrument of grassroots democracy and that the people had a voice 
through them. It did not matter that at the moment this was a minority 
(depending on the survey, between 20 percent and 40 percent of the population 
opposed to nuclear energy at that time).244 Subsequently the environmental 
movement gave birth to the Green Party (Die Grünen) that won representation at 
the national level in 1983. 
 
 Thus, evidence from several sources indicates the advent of a more active 
and involved German electorate in the aftermath of the student movement. 
Clearly, by 1972 the German public was involved in a full range of participatory 
activities. The overwhelming majority of Germans voted in national and federal 
state (Land) elections, discussed politics and expressed high interest in political 
affairs. Even in the more demanding forms of campaign activity – showing party 
support and attending meetings – sizable minorities said they were politically 
active.245 
If in 1959, 44 percent of The Civic Culture’s German sample reported that 
they belonged to some voluntary organization, by 1967 this German proportion 
has risen to 50 percent, and in 1975 fully 59 percent of a national sample reported 
that they were members of at least one organization. Perhaps more important is 
the fact the proportion of respondents who noted that they were active in these 
organizations increased at a faster rate than mere membership. In 1959 Almond 
and Verba found that only 7 percent of German respondents had been active 
participants in one of the voluntary organizations. As the data show, this 
proportion of active members had increased to 10 percent by 1967 and 17 percent 
by 1975.246 
As previously mentioned, the ability to form groups and make 
coordinated actions is linked with such social value as trust. In The Civic Culture 
German political culture was portrayed as having a relatively low level of 
general social trust, - the finding that corresponded to most descriptions of 
postwar Germany as a privatized, if not anomic society.247 In the absence of social 
trust, more suspicion, distrust, isolation, and lower levels of social cooperation 
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were identified in West German political culture than in the Anglo-American 
case and even Mexican counterparts.248 
 As the survey data show, however, the low level of trust found in the 
1959 study (19 percent) represented an increase from the levels found in 1948 (9 
percent). At least, Germans during that period became more, not less, trusting of 
their fellow citizens. And this tendency has only increased over time. By the 
1970s Germans perceived their social environment as less hostile than in the 
early postwar period. When asked the general question as to whether “there are 
more evil-minded (bösewillige) than good-minded (gutwillige) people” almost half 
of the respondents in 1949 (46 percent) perceived the “evil-minded” as 
outnumbering the “good-minded.” By the mid-1970s, however, the proportion of 
pessimists had dropped to only 16 percent. Perhaps more significantly, there 
were no important differences between age or social-class groups in the 1976 
responses.249 
 There also appeared to be a significant decline in social isolation or 
privatization. When asked whether they had “few or many” acquaintances, over 
a fourth (26 percent) of Germans in 1957 reported that they had “few friends.” By 
the early 1970s only 8 percent were in this category. During the same period the 
proportion indicating that they had many acquaintances increased from 42 
percent to 57 percent.250 It means that the importance of weak ties in social 
interaction has grown.  
 As noted previously, numerous studies of German political culture 
underscored the lack of democratic tradition as a serious impediment to the 
country’s democratization. In The Civic Culture Almond and Verba concluded 
that democratic attitudes were still in short supply after more than a decade of 
experience with the Federal Republic. Similarly, in the early 1970s Kurt 
Sontheimer still concluded that “democratic consciousness” in Germany “is a 
collection of attitudes and behaviors which is not strong enough to stand the test 
of any serious crises of the system.”251 
The general conclusions drawn from the public opinion surveys 
conducted regularly by the Western Allies since 1945 were not very optimistic. 
During the early 1950s researchers found lingering support for the principles and 
institutions of earlier German regimes, including the Third Reich. More than half 
of respondents agreed with the conclusion that National Socialism was a good 
idea that was badly carried out.252 Other old authoritarian reflexes, manifested 
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primarily in patriarchal claims to superiority, continued to influence thinking 
and behavior. 
However, in the following years, particularly during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, the survey research has found a steady increase in supportive 
attitudes toward key values of liberal democracy. This made careful observers 
suggest that the traditional characteristics of the German political culture were 
actually changing.  
For instance, survey data from 14 separate surveys performed by the 
Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research between 1950 and 1968 
indicated a steady increase in favor of political competition. Notably, within the 
younger age cohorts and among those who perceived their economic condition 
as favorable this variable increased the fastest.253 
On the basis of longitudinal analyses of data collected by the Allensbach 
Institute for Public Opinion Research, Bradley Richardson (1973), R. Boynton and 
Gerhard Lowenberg (1973), David Conradt (1978, 1980, 1981) documented 
increasing support for components of a democratic system. Furthermore, Max 
Kaase (1971), Kendell Baker (1973), William Chandler (1974), and Walter Jaide 
(1976) presented data from youth samples which suggested that democratic 
values and political interest became common among German youth. 
 Such political events as the 1969 change in government, record voting 
turnouts and the emergence of widespread citizen-initiative groups also 
indicated an increase of support for democratic principles. Over time almost all 
survey studies have indicated increasing support for democratic values (such as 
tolerance, freedom of expression, interest in political events, etc.) alongside an 
increasing sense of identification with the present political order (i.e. Germans 
increasingly considered themselves to be better off in the Federal Republic than 
under any other 20th century political regime). 
In his 1965 study Society and Democracy in Germany Ralf Dahrendorf 
quoted the question posited four times by the Allensbach Institute for Public 
Opinion Research: “Two men talk about how a country should be governed. Which of 
the two opinions comes closest to your own – the first or the second? 
 One says: “I like it best if the whole people places the best politician at the top and 
confers on him the entire power of government. Together with a few selected experts he 
can then make clear decisions. There is not much talk, and things really get done”. 
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 The other says: “I prefer it if several people have a say in the state. Sometimes 
there is some hither and thither before things are done, but it is not so easy to abuse the 
power of government”. 
In 1955, 55 percent of respondents agreed with the second statement 
(while 31 percent with the first and 14 percent remained undecided); by 1957 the 
number of this viewpoint supporters has risen to 60 percent (26 percent, 14 
percent), by 1960 to 62 percent (21 percent, 17 percent), and by 1962 to 66 percent 
(18 percent, 16 percent). 
 A very similar trend could be observed in respect to the question: “Do you 
believe that it is better for a country to have several parties so that different 
opinions may be represented freely or only one party so that there is as much 
unity as possible?” Between 1951 and 1961 the multiparty system consistently 
gained in support from 61 to 73 percent.254 
These data made Dahrendorf conclude that more than two thirds of 
Germans in 1965 accepted the principle of government by conflict and that this 
principle seemed firmly established in the Federal Republic as opposed to the 
Weimar Republic.255 Wilfried Röhrich, in turn, observed in 1983 that freedom of 
press and information were high ranking political values and rights, evaluated as 
perhaps the most powerful control-institution of the government.256 Participative 
and communicative orientations referring to the core of democratic political 
culture thus seemed to have changed significantly since the mid-1960s in the 
direction of “civic” culture. 
The fact that many Germans began to move beyond conventional political 
activities into more activist and assertive roles (which was reflected, among other 
things, in emergence of thousands of citizen-initiative groups across the country) 
certainly testified to democratization of West German political culture. 
Numerous citizen-initiative groups groups, while clearly expressing the 
frustration and dissatisfaction of citizens against powerful government and 
business interests, nevertheless, reflected the internalization of democratic values 
and rising participation at least in the output side of the system. They also 
indirectly represented a demand on the system for greater democracy and citizen 
participation in decision-making. According to Richard Merelman and Charles 
Foster, the appearance of the citizen-initiative movement appeared to be a 
symptom of the development of the middle class activism in Germany and 
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exhibited many of the characteristics of American civil, environmental and 
consumer groups.257 
Another sign of West German democratization, according to Konradt 
Jarausch, was the emergence of a critical public sphere that was willing to defend 
the “free constitutional state, based on the rule of law.”258 Jarausch pointed to the 
development of a critical discourse on democracy that advocated a broader social 
self-determination in the early 1960s. According to him, this new appreciation for 
democracy that went beyond politics enlarged the concept into a demand for a 
continuous transformation of society and culture. Since the mid-1960s there has 
been a growing understanding that West Germany needed to break with its 
remaining authoritarian structures in the pre-political realm. Jarausch quoted, for 
instance, the German sociologist Willy Strzelewicz who in the 1964 publication 
did not consider the concept of democracy as “a completed condition with 
regard to, for example, the constitution”; instead, he understood it as “a process 
that is far from finished and consists not only of political, but also social, 
economic, and cultural relationships in society.”259 Such an expansive notion of 
democracy that aimed at a liberalization of basic convictions and behavior 
implied, thus, a comprehensive reform of the “economy, family, and school.”260 
In his important 1965 public intervention Karl Jaspers underscored that 
“democracy means self-education and information of the people. It means that 
people learn how to think, that they know what’s going on, that they make 
judgments. Democracy constantly spurs the process of enlightenment.”261 
Going far beyond the democratic right to vote, such intellectual demands 
for more participation appealed especially to young people who had grown up 
in the Federal Republic and were indignant at the remnants of authoritarian 
practices and relations. One crucial element of the generational rebellion of 1968 
was therefore the leftist call for the “mobilization and practice of an 
emancipatory and democratic counterpower, codetermination, and self-
determination in all subsystems of society.”262 
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In his reflections on The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 
Jürgen Habermas formulated a justification of public discussion as a critical 
precondition for civic freedom. Instead of understanding democracy merely as a 
series of political game rules, he portrayed self-government as a social process of 
arriving at common understanding through debate in a sphere characterized by 
“critical publicity.” Similarly, Ralf Dahrendorf claimed that only a fundamental 
liberalization of the Federal Republic would be able to truly realize the “socially 
founded constitution of freedom.” Due to the persuasiveness of such analyses, 
democracy became a catchword of the 1960s, expressing a general desire for 
more cultural openness and public participation.263 
 
3.3 Political Culture in Russia 
 
In this section of the chapter I will present an overview of the way citizens’ 
attitudes and orientations towards political system developed in the post-Soviet 
Russia.  
Analyzing Russian political culture developments, it is worth pointing to 
the fact that the Soviet rule lasted almost seven times longer than the Third 
Reich. The fact that the impact of totalitarianism on citizens in the Soviet Union 
was much more long-term and enduring than in Germany is being recurrently 
brought about as one of the main differences of the two totalitarianisms.264  
A uniquely devastating impact of the Soviet rule, in general, and the 
Stalin’s reign of terror, in particular, on the society was indeed noted by many 
researchers. According to Allen C. Lynch “if any society approached the ideal 
type of atomization, in which the vertical links between individual and the state 
supplanted the horizontal ties binding individuals to each other through work, 
residence, class, social and personal interests, civic associations, and even family, 
it was the Soviet Union under Stalin from the late 1920s until the dictator’s death 
in March 1953.”265  
One of the most discerning and subtle observers of the Soviet society at 
the time of Stalin’s reign of terror Nadezhda Mandelstam described the social 
environment of that period of time in the following way: “Nobody trusted 
anyone else, and every acquaintance was a suspected police informer. […] After 
1937 people stopped meeting each other altogether, and the secret police were 
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thus well on the way to achieving their ultimate objective. Apart from assuring a 
constant flow of information, they have isolated people from each other and had 
drawn large numbers of them into their web, calling them in from time to time, 
harassing them and swearing them to secrecy by means of signed statements. All 
such people lived in eternal fear of being found out and were consequently just 
as interested as regular members of the police in the stability of the existing order 
and the inviolability of the archives where their names were on file.”266 
Mandelstam then concluded that “the loss of mutual trust is the first sign of the 
atomization of society in dictatorships of our type, and this was just what our 
leaders wanted.”267 
Other researchers have also underscored that one of the primary 
objectives of Stalinism was precisely the destruction of civil society so that 
potential threats to monocratic rule could be exterminated. To achieve this aim 
the regime “destroyed all self-organized forms of intermediate public 
organization and replaced them with transmission belt organizations whose 
purpose was to monitor society, mobilize it behind the leadership’s program, 
and convey orders from the top downward.”268 
Describing the Soviet society in general, Tatiana Vorozheikina observed 
that the nationalization of economy and of all spheres of social life signified the 
complete exclusions of individual initiative in the structuring of interest groups: 
“The state and the society were merged and inseparable, both in reality and in 
social consciousness, and were intended to function strictly according to 
considerations of the public good. Principally, the nomenklatura system of 
administration and the special role of ideology ensured the integrity of the social 
system. Both the state and the society were based on principles that negated the role of 
individuals as subjects in the achievement of personal aims and excluded private interests 
from the realm of social significance.”269  
 Nevertheless, the unprecedentedly lengthy exposure to totalitarianism 
and the destruction of social links by the overwhelming state during the Soviet 
period did not prevent the Soviet (and then ex-Soviet) citizens from expressing a 
mass support for democratic reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Thousands of activists were coming to the streets in those years in support of 
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democratization. The scholars who could start conducting sociological research 
in the Soviet Union starting with Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost’ and perestroika 
found the results “unexpected in that they indicated the existence of a good deal 
more support for democratic values and institutions than would have been 
predicted by the continuity thesis.”270 For instance, Jeffrey Hahn’s analysis, based 
on research in Yaroslavl’ in 1990 suggested that attitudes, values, and beliefs 
about democracy among Russians were not altogether different from what was 
found in other industrialized democracies, including the USA. Generally 
speaking, these findings were independently confirmed in a number of other 
studies by James Gibson et al. (1992), William Reisinger et al. (1994), Gibson 
(1996) based on survey research conducted in the early 1990s. 
At the initial stage of the Russian transformations, independent civic 
activism indeed flourished so that it filled some observers with hope for a quick 
civil society development in post-communist Russia. Gorbachev’s policy of 
glasnost starting from in 1987 which was manifested in a freed public access to 
information, permitted limited discussion in the official media, the partial 
renewal of the state bureaucracy and the suspension of the criminal prosecution 
for freethinking. This new policy facilitated the struggle within the Communist 
Party and the emergence of an informal democratic opposition movement which 
despite its significant heterogeneity appeared rather massive.  
Importantly, the period of the late 1980s was marked not only a sweeping 
wave of political demonstrations and rallies across the country, but also by 
attempts to unite opposition forces on the common democratic platform. In 
summer of 1988, for example, the representatives of informal civic movements 
submitted a conjoint appeal to the 19th All-Union Conference of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) held in Moscow from June, 28th to July, 1st 1988, 
calling “to transform the party from the organization ruled by the caste of 
degenerate partycrats into a real political organization.”271 
However, this surge of involvement in various forms of public activity, 
including mass protests, strikes and demonstrations, as well as the creation of 
thousands of new informal organizations, stimulated by Gorbachev’s policy of 
relaxing controls on political expression and political participation, appeared 
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rather short-lived. The burst of activism actually faded away within the first 
post-communist years. 
Hahn’s research, replicated in Yaroslavl’ in 1993 and 1996, led him to 
conclude that, “By almost all the measures of diffuse support, including political 
efficacy, political trust, electoral commitment, and political interest, there has 
been an overall drop.”272 As Archie Brown has pointed out, 1990-91 were years of 
excitement and high expectations among Russians, but “a decade later there was 
much more disillusionment.”273 Especially after 1993, many Russians seemed to 
become increasingly disillusioned about what democracy in Russia meant.  
The drop noted by many observers occurred indeed by almost all political 
culture variables. The only variable which appeared more or less stable over time 
was interest in politics, but even in this case there has been an evident decline. 
According to the Levada Center data, 47 percent of respondents in 1990, 51 
percent in 1995, and 49 percent in 1999 expressed at least some interest in political 
affairs while 35, 46 and 51 percent respectively expressed low or no interest at all. 
Of those interested in politics 33 percent in 1993, 44 percent in 1995 and 45 
percent in 1999 reported discussing political matters with friends, but only 
around 1 percent in 1994, 1.5 percent in 1995 and 3 percent in 1999 said they had 
took part in any real political actions such as partaking in rallies and 
demonstrations. Despite the relatively high level of interest throughout the 
1990s, these figures allow concluding that, first, the interest in politics has been 
declining, and second, that the expressed interest appeared rather declarative. 
The later surveys conducted in the 2000s continued to show that about 60 
percent of the adult population in Russia was not interested in politics. When 
asked directly whether they “personally were ready to take a more active part in 
politics,” 77 percent of respondents in both 2006 and 2010 answered negatively.274 
The sense of political efficacy in the Russian citizens also appeared to be 
incredibly low throughout the 1990s. In 1998 only 6 percent thought they could 
exercise some influence on the city in which they lived; and just 3 percent 
thought they had some opportunity to ‘make Russia a better place.’275 
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In 2000, when asked about the extent to which ‘people like you can have a 
direct influence on the actions of central government’ (through casting a vote in 
elections, participation in public rallies and demonstrations, public discussions, 
etc.), 85 percent of the respondents expressed the opinion that they had no 
influence on the decisions of the authorities. In 2006 the proportion of those who 
perceived themselves as powerless to affect governmental decisions increased to 
87 percent and in 2009 to 92 percent with only about 1 percent of respondent 
taking the opposite view.276 
Similar picture was unveiled when the respondents answered the same 
question with reference to the local level of decision-making: in 2009 91 percent 
of Russians acknowledged that ordinary citizens could exercise no or only some 
insignificant influence over the process of local government in their city, town or 
village.277 Similarly, when asked about the opportunity ordinary citizens had to 
make use of the rights with which they had nominally been endowed under the 
post-communist Constitution, the overwhelming majority (88 percent) agreed 
largely or entirely that it was difficult for them to do so.278 In another survey 60 
percent said that their vote would not change anything. 
As opinion polls show, most Russians believe that their involvement in 
political activity is futile, and have little confidence that government serves their 
interests. Participation in organized forms of political activity (that is, not a mere 
declarative interest in politics or simply talking about politics with others) is low. 
These low levels of political participation are a reflection of the low level of 
confidence in political institutions and the widespread view that ordinary 
individuals have little influence over government.279 
To compare, in postwar Germany, as shown before, the percentage of 
those who believed than ordinary people have some say in what the government 
does has grown from 27 percent in 1959 to 40 percent in 1972.280 
Membership in voluntary associations in contemporary Russia is also 
extremely low. According to the Levada Center survey data, in 2006 only around 
1-2 percent of those expressing at least some interest in politics participated in 
some political activities like public actions, demonstrations, rallies or meetings of 
political parties and associations. No more than 1 percent of the respondents 
took part in the activities of social movements and organizations of any type, 
more often only about 0.5 percent. Up to 2 percent participated in various 
                                                 
276 Public Opinion - 2009. The Levada-Center Yearbook. Moscow: Levada-Center, 2009. p. 25. 
277 Ibid. 
278 White, Stephen; McAllister, Ian. Dimensions of Disengagement in Post-Communist Russia // 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 20, № 1, 2004. pp. 84-85. 
279  See Remington, Thomas F. Politics in Russia. London: Longman, 2006. p. 385. 
280 Baker, Kendall L. et al. Op. cit. p. 28. 
 95 
motorists, hikers, hunters, etc. clubs and associations. Even smaller proportion of 
Russians took part in such activities more or less regularly, at least once a month.  
As for the readiness to participate in social organizations and movements, 
the respondents were more willing to get involved in the local, most close to 
them groups (courtyard landscaping, local homeowners associations, etc.) or 
charitable initiatives (assistance to children, the poor, etc.). Upon the whole, the 
declarative willingness to participate in any other types of social initiatives and 
movements did not exceed, according to the Levada Center data, the permissible 
in such polls statistical error.281 
The study of the civil society in Russia conducted by the Levada Center in 
1999 – 2000 showed that more than 90 percent of the population did not belong 
to any organization. Most manifestations of initiative or self-organization of 
citizens were limited to participation in the activities of parent-teacher 
committees (2 percent), sports or recreational clubs (2 percent), veterans’ 
organizations (1.5 percent), amateur or youth (1 percent) and religious groups 
(less than 1 percent). Even youth clubs (such as football fans’ clubs) had less than 
1 percent of members and supporters, while only 0.2-0.3 percent of the adult 
population participated in the activities of entrepreneurs’ unions or human 
rights organizations and only half percent reported being a member of a political 
party (these data are statistically insignificant). 80 percent of Russians did not 
even contemplate any organizational membership or intended to support any of 
non-political NGOs, even by making a one-time donation.282  
According to 2007 survey, less than 5 percent of adults belonged to at least 
one group – any sports or recreational club, literary or other cultural group, 
political party, local housing association, or charitable organization and only 
two-thirds (64 percent) of this subgroup attended the meetings of any of these 
groups at least once a month. It thus turned out that only 1-3 percent of Russians 
were actually involved in the activities of women, youth, religious and any other 
voluntary associations and groups – the figure that actually falls within the 
margin of error.283 
Although around 8-10 percent of Russians have lately reported being 
members of trade unions, only 1-2 percent of them participate in such activities 
at least 2-3 times a year.284 According to the Levada Center data, about 5-8 
percent of Russians have reported attending church at least once a month since 
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1991.285 Although attending religious services as well as trade union membership 
are normally perceived as rather passive forms of participating in public life, yet 
even when these and other types of participation are taken into account, the 
majority of the population in Russia appear to be outside any voluntary public 
associations.286 
These figures are hardly comparably with those noted in postwar 
Germany where the membership in voluntary organization has grown 
significantly since the end of World War II. As shown previously 44 percent of 
Germans reported their belonging to some organization in 1959, 50 percent in 
1967 and 59 percent in 1975. Furthermore, the proportion of respondents who 
reported that they were active in these organizations increased in the same 
period from 7 percent in 1959 to 10 percent in 1967 and to 17 percent in 1975.287 
The recent data on Germany have shown that in 2004 approximately one third of 
the citizens devoted time to some form of volunteering and assumed longer term 
tasks and duties in clubs, societies, initiatives or projects. Another 34 percent in 
2004 was actually involved in some organization, but did not assume any 
concrete voluntary task or duty.288  
When asked about the reasons for their massive nonparticipation and not 
joining any organization 50 percent of Russians named lack of interest (“I am just 
not interested; I just don’t want to belong to any organizations”) and 18 percent 
said that they “find these organizations completely useless.” When these two 
options are combined one sees that a total of 68 percent of Russians have very 
negative views toward voluntary organizations. 21 percent of Russians 
responded affirmatively to one of these two options: “Nobody has 
invited/offered me to join any organizations,” or “I do not really know of the 
activities of any of these organizations; if I knew more, maybe I would consider 
participating.” 6 percent of Russians name the lack of time as the reason for their 
non-involvement (“I am interested in these activities but I don’t have the time to 
participate”).289 
Though some researchers reported an increase in the number of registered 
organizations in Russia during the 1990s, Marc Morjé Howard expressed 
skepticism regarding focusing on such statistics when analyzing civil society in 
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post-communist countries of Eastern Europe.290 In his opinion, first, the statistics 
on the number of organizations are misleading, as many of the organizations 
counted either have disappeared as quickly as they appeared or have been 
leading a “pseudo-existence” that corresponds little with their putative goals and 
activities.291 Second, since so many organizations were completely dependent on 
Western grants for their funds and support, they used to be more beholden to the 
requirements of Western donor agencies than to the larger public whose interests 
they were supposed to serve. Third, and perhaps most important, without the 
energy, sense of purpose, and legitimacy that an active membership provides, 
many organizations can have only a limited influence on the policy-making 
process.292 
Trust is another variable which experienced a visible decline in post-Soviet 
Russia. Again, despite the perpetual destruction of human trust during the 
Soviet rule, the level of general trust during the perestroika period was relatively 
high (and much higher than in the post-Soviet era). In 1989, 52 percent of the 
Levada Center respondents said that most people can be trusted, while only 41 
percent claimed that one has to be careful in dealing with others. In 1991 this 
ratio changed to 34 and 42 percent respectively. Throughout the 1990s a gradual 
decline of general trust took place and the proportion of Russians expressing 
more distrust than trust reached 74 percent in 1998 and 76 percent in 2005. The 
situation stabilized at that point and since the mid-2000 sociological polls have 
shown a constant high level of distrust towards other people in the society with 
no more than 22-27 percent of respondents expressing the conviction that people 
in general can be trusted.293 It is evident, however, that, unlike postwar Germans, 
post-Soviet Russians have become less, not more, trusting of their fellow citizens. 
In the first instance, this lack of trust is expressed in a strong sense of 
distrust of any kind of public organization that a lingering number of citizens in 
Russia feel and a general satisfaction with their own personal networks 
(accompanied by a sense of deteriorating relations within society overall). 
Howard underscored that the social contacts of the majority of Russians 
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remained limited to the persisting family and friendship networks – private, 
particularistic, ascriptive relationships which do not transcend the limits of 
particular traditional groups.294 
According to the research of informal social circles, conducted by the 
Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2007, 69 percent of 
young people under 26 and 87 percent of the ‘fathers’ generation keep in touch 
with their relatives, 65 and 68 respectively mix with the close circle of ‘old’ 
friends and 68 and 66 respectively with their colleagues at work. Informal social 
circles of only 15 percent of the youth and 7 percent of adults include people 
sharing their hobbies or interests, and only 5 percent of both young people and 
adults socialize with like-minded individuals sharing common political or 
religious views.295 
This widespread distrust is manifested, among other things, in one’s 
inability to empathize, to understand other people. To exemplify, this inability 
was manifested in the perception of the so-called “Orange Revolution” in 
Ukraine by the Russian public. In Lev Gudkov’s opinion, Russians general 
suspicion and distrust of the Ukrainian activists’ sincerity expressed in opinion 
surveys pointed to the inability of most respondents to understand other 
people’s enthusiasm and feelings of elation. Gudkov claimed it to be one of the 
key features of the post-totalitarian, post-Soviet population. As he explained, 
“The reason is not, of course, that people living in post-totalitarian Russia are 
essentially stupid, nor that they have failed to develop an ability to understand 
the feelings of others. It is far more the case that the inability to empathize is 
linked to the tendency to assume that other people, whether they are friend or 
foe, are compelled by the lowest motives.”296 
As for the Russians’ support for liberal democracy and its key values such as 
tolerance, freedom of expression, respect for human and minority rights, the 
overall picture appears confusing. In the 2006 Levada Center survey, for 
instance, 57-60 percent of respondents expressed the conviction that Russia needs 
democracy, and 26 percent disagreed with it. But although the majority of 
Russians seem to share belief in the importance of democracy, about two-third of 
the population do not have a clear idea of what democracy means, what kind of 
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political system Russia has today or what system would be desirable. Russians’ 
ideas about democracy are indeed very vague and controversial.297  
Among the main characteristics of democracy the Levada Center 
respondents primarily name economic prosperity – 39 percent in 2009 and 47 
percent in 2008, as well as order and stability (37 percent in 2009 and 41 in 2008). 
Furthermore, when asked in the period of 2001-2007 what contemporary Russia 
needs more – order or democracy – 68-75 percent argued that Russia needs order 
above all, even if meeting this end would require some violations of democratic 
principles and restrictions of liberal freedoms.298 
Though Russians normally acknowledge importance of such freedoms as 
the freedom of expression, the freedom of press and the freedom of religion, the 
overwhelming majority of them (94 percent in 2009) usually choose to learn news 
from the totally state-controlled television. Furthermore, 79 percent of those 
surveyed in 2009 considered television to be the most trustworthy source of 
information. These data show that appreciation of the abovementioned freedoms 
has been rather declarative.299 
Stephen White, analyzing the state of Russian political culture in the 
1990s, observed that for about a quarter of Russians democracy meant “freedom 
of speech and conscience; but almost as many thought it meant ‘strict legacy,’ or 
‘order and stability,’ or for about a fifth a ‘prospering economy.’ Just 7 percent in 
the mid-1990s thought it meant that the leading positions in government should 
be elected, and only 3 percent associated democracy with minority rights.”300 
White also stressed the general unwillingness of Russians during the 
1990s to tolerate the views of others for they were, for instance, “very strongly 
attached to death penalty: it had the support of the great majority of Russians, 
and about a quarter thought it should be applied even more frequently than in 
the past. There was equally little understanding of minority rights, a particularly 
sensitive indicator of democratic values. A substantial number believed that 
society should ‘liquidate’ all prostitutes (18 percent), and even more thought they 
should be ‘isolated’ (23 percent). Similar proportions favored the ‘liquidation’ of 
homosexuals (22 percent), and drug addicts (26 percent), and of children born 
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with birth defects (18 percent); as these and other findings suggested, Russians 
were ‘considerably more intolerant than citizens in the West.’301 
According to Levada Center estimates, since the mid-1990s the importance 
of electing a democratic government has been asserted by no more than 7-16 
percent of the respondents.302 Besides, in the course of the 2000s only 5-7 percent 
noted importance of a guarantee of minority rights.303 Only 8-12 percent of those 
surveyed in the same period agreed that under any circumstances human rights 
of individuals should be put above the interests of the state.304  
In a recent 2009 survey 51 percent of the respondents expressed a 
preference for a strong leader over a democratic government (which was valued 
by 30 percent).305 In the same year, 63 percent of Russians stated that the 
concentration of almost all power in the hands of ex-President Vladimir Putin 
benefits the country, while 40 percent expressed a conviction that Russia was on 
its path towards democracy.306 
When asked what type of democracy Russia needs, 18 percent of those 
surveyed in 2009 preferred the one that existed during the Soviet Union times, 38 
percent believed that Russia needs a very special form of democracy that would 
fit national traditions and specific Russian features, and only 18 percent stressed 
the importance of establishing democracy similar to the one that had been 
formed in the developed countries of Western Europe and the USA. 
Additionally, 73 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that Russian 
democracy should not copy Western models.307 
The research project The Soviet Man (Homo Sovieticus, Sovetskij Chelovek) 
conducted by the Levada Analytical Center since 1989 and indented to identify 
the main trends in the development of Russian society conceptualized the strong 
continuities of the Soviet legacies in the post-Soviet period. Within the project 
five waves of all-Russia public opinion surveys were conducted in 1989, 1994, 
1999, 2003 and 2008. In 2005 the head of the project Yuri Levada stated that “the 
twenty years that have passed since the start of reforms in Russian society have 
not resulted in the emergence of a “new” (contemporary, democratic, civic, etc,) 
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base for self-identification and self-assertion of the Russian people.”308 Based on 
the results of their studies the sociologists concluded that characteristics of the 
Soviet man remained the real reference point. 
As illustrated by most of the Levada Center polls, Russian society as a 
whole is characterized by weak citizenship and lack of trust in social 
relationships. In this context, the building of democratic institutions is quite 
problematic, in so far as the norms and practices of Russian society reflect the 
authoritarian and non-democratic norms and practices at the top. 
However, in the recent years the number of changes has occurred on the 
societal level and it is important to note this new trend. In the recent study on 
New Social Movements in Russia, the director of the Independent Institute of 
Collective Action (IKD), the sociologist Karine Clément has noted an increase in 
social protest in Russia since the mid-2000s arguing that the emerging grassroots 
social initiatives and networks could potentially challenge the dominant model 
of power relationships. 
In the first instance, Clément pointed to a growing number of participants 
in collective actions, especially starting from the winter of 2005 when some 
500,000 people participated in massive demonstrations across Russia for the 
defense of the social benefits system. Furthermore, Clément considered these 
demonstrations that became the most massive social upheaval in the past decade 
to be the starting point for the new social movements in Russia. She wrote: “Tens 
of thousands of people, mostly pensioners but also young leftist, trade union and 
human rights activists and so on, took to the streets of almost every town, in 
some cases for days, to protest against a law that threatened social security 
rights. This first wave continued for several months and forced the government 
to accept a compromise. After the end of 2005, protest actions flared up against 
the new housing code and the current so-called ‘communal’ (housing) reform.”309 
Afterwards, protest actions and other non-institutional forms of citizens’ 
mobilization occurred more frequently. Besides, hundreds of grassroots local 
initiatives were undertaken by so-called ‘initiative groups’ of people at the 
micro-level of their household, neighborhood or town. Monitoring of collective 
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action conducted by IKD showed an average of about 10,000 participants per 
week in collective actions from the beginning of 2006 to March 2007. 310 
An important feature of social protest, according to Clément, is the rise of 
self-organizing initiatives, independent of formal institutionalized political 
parties or power representatives. For example, problems linked with the housing 
reform caused a growing mobilization of housing committees, neighborhood 
associations and groups of community leaders, or simply residents who are more 
active than the average over the issue of management of buildings and lands. 
Just like in Germany in the aftermath of the student movement, collective action 
and grassroots initiatives in present-day Russia usually start with the defense of 
one’s direct and very concrete or pragmatic interests: not to be expelled from 
their home, not to pay excessive communal charges, to protect the park in front 
of the house, to get support for medication and so on. Local campaigns are 
mounted on specific practical issues, such as combating plans to build an 
apartment house or a parking lot on a local recreation ground, to turn people out 
of workers’ hostels, or police brutality, etc. 311 
The organizational forms of these grassroots initiatives vary from 
extended all-Russian associations or unions like the Russian Motorist Federation 
(FAR), the car owners union Freedom of Choice (Svoboda vybora), the Active 
Citizens of Russia Movement (TGIR), the Soviets Coordination Union of Russia 
(SKS), Homeowners Associations (tovarishestva sobstvennikov zhilya), the all-
Russian movement of ‘deceived co-investors’ who are fighting for apartments 
they have paid for in advance, as well as numerous local initiatives. The latter 
may include local associations of housing owners, associations of the joint 
owners of buildings, citizens’ action coordinating councils, independent trade 
unions, as well as different initiative groups, like the group of the inhabitants of 
Moscow suburban town Butovo town, or the group of homeowners from the 
Moscow suburban community of Rechnik.312 
Apart from associations aimed at protection of individual and working 
rights of citizens, there have lately emerged a number of initiatives supporting 
more common public good issues like the protection of environment or 
preservation of cultural heritage. To exemplify the latter case, one can recall the 
movement against the construction of the a 400-metre Okhta Centre “Gazprom” 
skyscraper in the historic centre of St Petersburg, as well as regular protests 
organized by the social movement Architectural Control (ArchNadzor) which 
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unites several organizations aimed at preserving Moscow’s architectural 
heritage.313 
Among environmental initiatives recently launched in various parts of the 
country in attempt to conserve environmental areas and protect the natural 
resources the movements in defense of the Khimki Forest Park near Moscow and 
the famous Lake Baikal near Irkutsk can be singled out.314  
Particularly active in the last year has been the so-called Blue Bucket 
society (Obshetvo sinikh vedyorok) with their biting criticism and protest against 
the impunity of state officials who routinely use blue flashing lights on their 
vehicles to violate traffic rules and drive recklessly.315 
Among the most searched for all-Russian NGOs since early 1990s has 
been the Union of the Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia (Soyuz 
Komitetov Soldatskikh Materei Rossii) providing legal advice to soldiers and their 
families about their rights and conscription laws, as well as intervening on behalf 
of soldiers who are facing abuse and hazing from their superiors and other more 
senior soldiers (dedovshchina). 
Political protest has also seen new forms of expression in the recent years. 
Some new political groups and associations as the Left Front, the anti-fascist 
movement, the Solidarity movement, among others, have emerged. Additionally, 
political opposition have continuously organized regular protests and 
demonstrations like the Dissenters’ March (marsh nesoglasnykh) – a series of 
political opposition protests that took place in 2006-2008 in different cities of 
Russia (Moscow, St Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, Chelyabinsk, 
Voronezh, etc.) and the Strategy-31 (Strategia-31) demonstrations – a series of 
civic protests in support of the right to peaceful assembly guaranteed by Article 
31 of the Russian Constitution held in Moscow on the 31st of every month with 31 
days since July 2009.316 
However, the main problem with the new networks that have appeared in 
the past several years in Russia, as Clément underscored, is that nearly all of 
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them have no formal status or formally elected executive bodies, i.e. they are 
largely not institutionalized. Besides, the overall protest numbers, as we have 
seen from the polling data appear sociologically insignificant. Sociological polls 
are not able to fix such a micro-sociological phenomenon as the growth of 
scattered collective actions on a lesser scale (except for the ‘pensioners’ 
upheaval’). As previously shown, the opinion polls data show a maximum of 1-3 
percent of the population being involved in protest actions. 317  
However, although Russian society can still be generally considered as 
highly fragmented and passive in the realm of social or collective action, the 
research on emerging social movements gives evidence of the possibility for 
collective action to occur and for more activists to become involved in it.318 
In the next section of this chapter I will turn to comparative analysis and 
explanations of changes in citizens’ attitudes and political behavior in West 
Germany and Russia. 
 
3.4 Comparative Analysis of Citizens’ Attitudes and Participatory 
Orientations in post-WWII West Germany and post-Soviet Russia 
 
A number of studies in the field of personal psychology and interpersonal 
relations present personal development as a progressive movement on a 
maturity continuum from dependence to independence to interdependence. On the 
maturity continuum, dependence is the paradigm of you (you take care of me; you 
come through for me; if you didn’t come through, I blame you for the results) 
and it corresponds to the period of infancy characterized by total dependence of 
a child on other people, adults or seniors, who direct, nurture, and sustain him. 
To grow from childhood to young adulthood, one must grow more independent 
(physically, mentally, emotionally and financially) becoming inner-directed and 
self-reliant. Independence is thus the paradigm of I (I can do it; I am responsible; I 
am self-reliant; I can choose). However the highest level of personal maturity is 
reached at a time when an independent, self-reliant and capable individual 
becomes increasingly aware of the interdependence of human life. 
Interdependence on the maturity continuum is the paradigm of we (we can do it; 
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we can cooperate; we can combine our talents and abilities and create something 
greater together). As Stephen Covey put it, “Dependent people need others to get 
what they want. Independent people can get what they want through their own 
effort. Interdependent people combine their own efforts with the efforts of others 
to achieve their greatest success.”319 
Metaphorical transfer of the ‘maturity continuum’ paradigm on social 
relations permits comparing the period of infancy (dependence) with a social 
system characterized by state paternalism, on the one hand, and by social and 
psychological infantilism, on the other. As a personal immaturity is manifested 
in over-dependence on the others (adults or seniors), similarly, social infantilism 
is revealed in a society’s dependence on the overwhelming state, which plays the 
central if not the only role in shaping economic, political and social relations. 
Research of post-totalitarian societies, in turn, suggests that a totalitarian 
system’s disintegration promotes, at least to some extent, a paradigm of 
independence in social relations. The system collapse accompanied by an 
inevitable separation of an individual from the state leads to emergence of a 
highly individualistic society, in which private interests tend to dominate over 
public interests and concerns.320 
Following this line of reasoning, a mature society, in turn, is the one 
where values of interdependence reign supreme. Interdependence, enabling 
citizens to “choose and decide on the effective form of collective existence” 
(Ortega y Gasset) is a crucial value for civil society development.321  Citizens in a 
mature society, thus, try to combine their own efforts with the efforts of others to 
achieve their goals through getting access to the vast resources and potential of 
other individuals. 
As it appears, the difference between civil and totalitarian societies lies 
precisely in the presence of an autonomous social agent – an agent of civil society – 
who is characterized by awareness of his independence and autonomy, on the 
one hand, and by readiness to interact and cooperate with other people or social 
actors, on the other. 
Since solidarity is based on the desire to cooperate and work together, 
cooperation of individuals is inconceivable without mutual respect and 
observance of certain rules of cooperation, or ‘the rules of the game’, shared by 
all participants of the social process. Differently, the employment of solidarity 
mechanisms creates a society as a system of persistent relations based on 
common values, a sense of belonging and mutual interest. 
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Thus, the disintegration of the Soviet system and the consequent 
liberalization of economic relations, certainly, led to certain liberation of an 
individual from the overwhelming governmental control. The insolvent state, 
forced to take off most of its former liabilities, had to leave the society alone with 
its hardships and vis-à-vis the devastating ‘shock therapy.’ This situation 
heightened people’s sense of insecurity, on the one hand, but, on the other, it 
contributed to the citizens’ greater independence and autonomy, or, in 
psychological terminology, to their greater maturity. Just like eaglets pushed out 
of the nest by the mother are taught thus to fly on their own, the separation of an 
individual from an all-controlling, repressive state was inevitably accompanied 
by his increasing independence (though painful and complex this separation 
process did take place in post-Soviet Russia). 
It is important to point out that individual behavior in the situation of a 
large-scale social change may take different forms. According to cultural 
theorists, changes in political cultures that occur in response to social 
discontinuity should initially exhibit considerable formlessness (Eckstein) or, 
using definitions of the same phenomenon – anomie (Durkheim) or 
deinstitutionalization (Merton). As a result of social upheavals culture loses 
coherent structure, becoming highly entropic. In his 1949 study of the bases of 
deviant behavior Robert Merton conceptualized possible behavior outcomes 
under conditions of cultural discontinuity. One of them is the conformity with 
authority that tends to be ritualistic or else self-serving, opportunistic (by this 
compliance without commitment is meant). Another possible reaction is 
retreatism as withdrawing from the ‘alien’ larger society into the smaller, more 
familiar worlds of family, neighborhood, village, and the like (an increased 
“parochialism” in Almond and Verba’s scheme of concepts). The third likely 
response to the experience of cultural decay as conceptualized by Merton is 
rebellion against, and intransigent resistance to, authority. However, as Harry 
Eckstein underscored, since similar reactions are always likely to be costly and 
call for much energy, retreatist behavior into parochial worlds or ritualistic 
conformity are more likely.322 Our analysis of West German and Russian societies 
in a situation of a former system collapse confirmed this thesis. 
In this respect one can argue that the ‘new Russian individualism’ of the 
post-Soviet period was to some extent a direct continuation of the opportunistic 
individualism of the Soviet society, reflecting skepticism not only towards the 
stated norms of the old, socialist order, but also towards the principles of 
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democracy and civil society. As Alfred Evans observed, “The assumption that 
almost all others are engaged in amoral individualism leads to a low level of 
trust in fellow citizens, which discourages a commitment to voluntary 
associations that seek positive social change.”323  
However, post-Soviet Russia was no exception in this regards as seen 
from analysis of the postwar West German developments. In 1965 Ralf 
Dahrendorf noted that in the Federal Republic “a world of highly individual 
values has emerged” and such qualities as “discipline, orderliness, subservience, 
cleanliness, industriousness, precision, and all the other virtues ascribed by many 
to the Germans as an echo of past splendor have already given way to a much 
less rigid set of values, among which economic success, a high income, the 
holiday trip, and the new car play a much larger part than the virtues of the 
past.”324 Generally speaking, Dahrendorf positively assessed the spread of values 
informed by the patterns of economic life throughout the whole of German 
society, for, in his view, “people who have grown accustomed to seeking 
individual happiness are unlikely candidates for totalitarian organization” and 
“economic elites of a market order are ill-suited to the monopoly of political 
leadership groups that characterize modern totalitarianism.”325  
At the same time, Dahrendorf who was known to be a strong proponent 
of public values avowedly admitted that private virtues thriving in Germany 
cannot be regarded as social as they are in no sense virtues of participation. “If, 
in a society of private virtues, the individual takes part in the social and political 
process, this remains “external” to him and he reserves the chance of retreat. This 
is why the prevalence of private virtues may become an instrument of 
authoritarian rule,” – the author stated.326 He claimed that, though the prevalence 
of the contractual values of public virtues is not a sufficient condition of the 
constitution of liberty (as similar prevalence characterizes also totalitarian 
regimes) it is “a necessary condition of liberal democracy” for “without it liberal 
institutions cannot flourish.”327 
As we have seen, the virtues that Dahrendorf defined as ‘public’ have 
been eventually formed in postwar West Germany, but have not become 
widespread in post-Soviet Russia. Unlike West Germany, the individual, 
partially formed in Russia as a result of the collapse of the Soviet state and 
further economic liberalization, continued to view personal freedom as freedom 
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to follow solely his own, rather than social interests, and remained devoid of 
persistent organic links with other individuals.  
The Federal Republic of Germany provides indeed a good example of 
how a previously authoritarian, historically discontinuous regime comes to 
acquire the cultural underpinnings of democracy.328 In their 1981 study Germany 
Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics Kendall Baker and his colleagues 
concluded: “In just three decades the Federal Republic has experienced a massive 
transformation of political and social norms and values: from a traditional social 
order and a war-ravaged economy to a progressive advanced industrial society; 
from a country plagued by severe conflicts and cleavages to a highly stable, 
integrated society in which democratic political system constructed after World 
War II seems to enjoy substantial legitimacy.”329 
Most of the analysts have focused on the following sources of change in 
the West German case: (1) system performance and eventually the absence of any 
credible alternative to liberal democracy; (2) postwar socioeconomic 
modernization; and (3) the changes in postwar socialization patterns, primarily, 
due to transformations of the educational system.330 In this section, therefore, I 
will focus on these variables while comparing the two cases. 
 
3.4.1 System Performance 
 
Experts on Germany mostly agree that system performance has contributed to 
the long-term growth of political efficacy in the Federal Republic. In the postwar 
period West Germans got a chance to participate in the new system, based on the 
rule of law and the separation of powers, and this engagement, in turn, increased 
the citizens’ confidence in their ability to influence public matters. As a result, 
there has been a steady increase in the political skills and resources of the 
German electorate. Differently, as West Germans have become familiar with the 
democratic process of the Federal Republic, they have come to believe that they 
can affect political decision-making. In this way, the functioning democratic 
system performance contributed to the growth of civic norms in Germany.331 
Additionally, G.R. Boynton and Gerhard Loewenberg (1973), David 
Conradt (1980), Kendall Baker (1981), Konardt Jarausch (2006), and other 
observers agreed that the performance of the political and economic system was 
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an important factor in the increase of system support and the growing 
appreciation of democracy in the first two decades following the war. 
According to Konradt Jarausch, it was its practical performance that 
allowed the Federal Republic to win the numerous skeptics over to democracy 
for “Bonn could point to better ‘results’ than earlier Weimar and East Berlin and 
due to the visible improvement in its living situation, the undecided majority 
that placed little faith in the Germans’ ability to govern themselves gradually 
became convinced that a democratic polity could master practical problems of 
everyday life.”332 Jarausch also stressed that in domestic politics West German 
citizens were most impressed by the remarkable stability of the Adenauer 
cabinets, especially when compared to the governmental crises that afflicted the 
Weimar Republic and the Fourth Republic in France. As economic prosperity 
and social support measures reached ever greater segments of the population by 
the beginning of 1950s, satisfaction with the democratic system grew 
appreciably.333 
Notably, if in 1953 just over half of the electorate favored a democratic 
form of government, by 1967 the number of respondents who believed 
democracy was the “best form of government” reached 74 percent. Differently, 
about half of the West German adult population in 1953 and about a fourth in 
1967 was still dissatisfied, undecided, or unwilling to make an evaluation as to 
whether or not democracy was the “best form of government” for Germany. By 
1972, however, fully 90 percent of the adult population was “satisfied” with 
democracy in the Federal Republic. By 1976 there was a strong consensus on the 
basic character and structure of the West German democracy.334 According to the 
eighth Eurobarometer published by the European Community, since 1973 the 
West German satisfaction with the political system of democracy (78 percent) 
reached first place in Europe.335 
Thus, a consensus about the liberal political institutions of the new 
republic eventually developed in the postwar West Germany, and republican 
political institutions became secured by broad agreement in the political class 
and population.336 
In Russia, by contrast, the system non-performance became, as it appears, 
one of the main reasons for the growing disengagement and skepticism. First of 
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all, a severe decline of the Russian economy in the 1990s and the necessity to 
struggle for one’s existence in a situation of a serious economic crisis made many 
Russians frustrated and apathetic. As Thomas Remington observed, “The 
withdrawal from active political participation results from the shattering of the 
expectations for change that rose to unrealistic levels in the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s” and “reflects disillusionment with how conditions have turned 
out.”337 
The drastic consequences of the economic reform were discussed before, 
so we won’t focus much on them here. Suffice it to say that frustration of mass 
hopes led to the mass disillusionment with politics, in general, and democracy, in 
particular. The latter was thought to blame for the failures of transition. Russians 
were indeed increasingly dissatisfied with the development of democracy in 
their country and more so than their counterparts in the other former republics 
of the USSR, in Eastern Europe and in the European Union.338 
In 1991, only 15 percent of the Russian respondents were ‘satisfied with 
the way democracy [was] developing in their country,’ while 67 percent were 
dissatisfied; five years later, in 1996, satisfaction was down to 8 percent and 
dissatisfaction had reached 82 percent.339 By the end of 1998 satisfaction the 
existing political system was down to 5 percent. Since 1997 and till 2003 43-48 
percent of the Levada Center respondents continued to call the Soviet system 
“the best political system” with no more than 30 percent favoring democracy.  
Since 2005 the support for democratic system of government in Russia never 
exceeded 15-19 percent.340 In marked contrast to West Germany where 
democratization was proceeding smoothly, support for democracy in Russia has 
been deteriorating.341 
The fact that democracy as “a system of governance in which rulers are 
held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens” was not formed 
in Russia is also crucial, as it seems, in explaining the low levels of political 
efficacy and weakness of civil society in the post-communist period.342 
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While Russia’s first President Boris Yeltsin concentrated preponderant 
power in the institution of the Russian presidency, he neglected the 
strengthening of political parties, the national parliament and the fragile civil 
society institutions, which would have provided channels of potential influence 
for organized interests to reward the mobilization of support from large numbers 
of citizens.343  
According to political analyst Tatiana Vorozheikina, structuring of the 
civil society subject in post-Soviet era depended crucially on political will of the 
new Russian leaders, on their willingness to establish representative institutions. 
However, a mass political movement and grassroots organizations were not 
perceived by the Russian new political bosses as autonomous political actors – 
their support was expected, while independence of their actions was not 
recognized: “The political sphere was viewed by the groups who came to power 
in Russia in 1991 purely instrumentally, as a means of pressure in their struggle 
for access to power controls. [...] Government authorities of the Russian 
Federation actually absorbed the most active elements of informal democratic 
movements of the late 1980s, thereby weakening the capacity of grassroots, non-
partisan democracy. As a result, democratic potential, political institutions as 
well as non-political public sphere were severely undermined.”344 
As Junghan Bae described this process, in order to mobilize social support 
for the unpopular neo-liberal reform policies, the Yeltsin administration tried to 
initiate its own social movements from above. For that purpose they exploited 
organizational resources of the existing independent Democratic Russia 
(Demokraticheskaja Rossija) movement, providing regional subgroups – if 
supportive – with material and administrative assistance. Although radical 
leaders of the Democratic Russia sharply criticized such attempts of the 
Administration to subordinate the movement to the government, they had no 
other options but to leave or be expelled. As a result, a hybrid of social 
movements and governmental organizations – Choice of Russia (Vybor Rossii) – 
was created in June-October 1993 and participated as a quasi-party in the State 
Duma elections of 1993. The remaining segments of the Democratic Russia 
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movement either disappeared from the public scene or became part of a 
democratic opposition Yabloko party.345 
In this manner, the administrative-bureaucratic system of governance has 
almost totally superseded moral solidarity from the sphere of public social 
relations which led to the almost complete absence of social networks and 
organizations independent from the overwhelming state. The limited socio-
institutional resources continue to result in persistent shortage of social 
solidarity, the lack of positive interest in others, apathy and atomization.346 
It can be asserted that the Russian society remained immature largely due 
to the persistence of the old structure of ‘institutions’ which impeded social 
development and stifled social organization.  
The fact that Russia experienced not a differentiation, but rather a 
decomposition or dissolution of the former Soviet institutions was posited in the 
works by Stephen White (2000), Lev Gudkov and Boris Dubin (2002, 2007, 2008), 
Richard Sakwa (2005), Tatiana Vorozheikina (2008), and other observers. 
In 2000 Stephen White pointed to this peculiarity of the Russian 
‘transformation’ by stating that “in Russia, it had been less a ‘transition to 
democracy’ than a reconfiguration that incorporated many features of the old 
regime together with some more pluralist elements that had themselves in most 
cases been introduced before the end of communist rule.”347 Richard Sakwa later 
agreed that “the Soviet system as a whole did not dissolve but instead it 
fragmented, and great chunks of the old system remain firmly lodged in the 
post-Communist body politic.”348 
"What’s going on, – noted  in one of the articles on this subject Lev 
Gudkov, – can be better described as a dissolution of the Soviet totalitarianism 
and separation of some areas of social life from the former rigid centralized 
structure of administration and control – a process which is expected to go on for 
two-three generations.”349 Gudkov observed that “the main institutions – the 
structures of power, army, courts, prosecutors, political police, education, etc. – 
are preserved or only slightly changed in terms of its organization and 
functioning. And, most importantly, their organization or constitution has 
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remained practically unchanged. The power still remains unbalanced, 
uncontrolled by any social forces or institutions, guided only by its own material 
interests and the desire for self-preservation.”350 
Marc Morjé Howard asserted that for lasting societal change to occur the 
new institutions should be authoritative and binding, not weak and incoherent. 
Otherwise people will be less likely to change their behavioral patterns to adapt 
to them, since they can easily continue behaving as before.351 In the Russian case 
it was precisely the weakness of democratic institutions and sometimes even the 
lack of institutional framework within which democracy could be practiced that 
prevented development of civic skills and political efficiency vital for supporting 
and consolidating a democratic system. Equally important, the weakness of civil 
society as a result of institutional deficiency meant that many citizens would lack 
the institutional representation and leverage otherwise normally provided by 
active voluntary organizations.352 
It should be pointed out that largely due to the political system non-
performance a comprehension of the essence of democracy in Russia has not 
taken place and, consequently, the essential changes in political culture of its 
citizens have not occurred. In the mass consciousness democracy became 
associated not with ideals of state led by ‘the rule of law,’ not with values of civil 
society or civic freedom, but with the chaos and ‘wild capitalism’ of the 1990s, it 
became firmly equated with poverty and degradation. Consequently, the 
majority of people have perceived the concepts ‘democracy’ and ‘the state’ as 
mutually exclusive. In this context, strengthening of a centralized government 
and heightening of all forms of state control became viewed as an effective 
means for ‘overcoming’ the so-called ‘democratic system.’353 
 
3.4.2 Transformations of Social Structure 
 
System performance, nevertheless, is only one explanation for the long-term 
growth of supportive attitudes and political efficacy in West Germany. Another 
important source of change was the changing character of postwar German society 
that was linked with overall system performance and presumably caused by it. 
One of the hallmarks of this change was the overall transformation of the 
German social structure. 
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As noted previously, the postwar German economy has seen phenomenal 
recovery in nearly all sectors, earning the label of Economic Miracle 
(Wirschaftswunder). The individual income of German workers experienced a 
nine times increase between 1950 and 1978 (in 1950 the average German worker 
earned 250 DM per month, but by 1978 his earnings had risen to about 2250 DM 
per month). Along with affluence have come increases in education (despite the 
rigid educational system, the number of students admitted to universities has 
increased), the use of the mass media, and other elements of an advanced 
industrial society.354 
Notably, most observers of West German society such as Norman Nie, 
Bingham Powell and Kenneth Prewitt (1969), Philip Coverse (1972), Kendall 
Baker et al. (1981), and others used to name the rise of income and the expansion 
of higher education among the most important prerequisites of societal change in 
the Federal Republic. Experts typically found such factors as income, status and 
education important sources of change for they helped furnish the sorts of skills 
and resources necessary for political commitment, as well as the self-confidence 
and the access to the political system that nourish a sense of political efficacy.355 
Education was believed to be strongly related to feelings that one can influence 
the government, suggesting that the cognitive skills and political resources 
represented by this indicator were crucial to the growth of civic norms and 
behavior. 356  
Additionally, higher-status individuals were expected to participate in 
politics more than others, partially because they were allegedly more assured of 
ability to influence the government through participation. In 1969 Norman Nie, 
Bingham Powell and Kenneth Prewitt, among others, saw participatory norms as 
an important intervening link between social status and participation. They 
argued that “political life styles of citizens will not be markedly changed until 
extensive industrialization alters the status structure of society and thereby 
increases the overall level of political information, attentiveness and so forth.”357 
In their argumentation the authors actually followed Seymour Martin Lipset who 
as early as 1960 pointed to the Western phenomenon of “upper class liberalism,” 
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arguing that individuals at higher points at the social hierarchy are more likely to 
support democratic regimes.358 
Kendall Baker conceptualized the effects of the Economic Miracle on West 
German society and politics as follows: “The spread of affluence and the 
dramatic growth of the mass media have increased the amount of political 
information available to the electorate. The expansion of educational 
opportunities has gradually increased the political sophistication of the public. 
Greater leisure time has increased the opportunities to participate in politics. 
Thus, the economic development of postwar Germany has contributed to a 
dramatic rise in the political awareness and involvement of the German 
electorate.”359 
Notably, although the Economic Miracle was decisive in establishing the 
foundation of the West German democracy, economic and safety priorities per se 
eventually declined in importance and in the 1970s and 1980s they were being 
supplemented by postmaterialist values like the quest for more participation at 
work and in politics. This shift was vividly expressed in the changes in political 
agenda. Political concerns in Germany have clearly broadened beyond economic 
questions to a group of postindustrial, or the so-called New Politics issues. For 
example, since the 1970s terms such as “educational crisis” (Bildungsnotstand) 
and “quality of life” (Qualität des Lebens) have entered the German political 
vocabulary, while issues like environmental protection, divorce reform, 
legalization of abortion, and codetermination (Mitbestimmung), meaning in a 
broad sense participation in decision making, have increased in salience.360 
Furthermore, while political realities had formerly been taken for granted, 
interest and engagement in politics in the postwar period became gradually seen 
as a chance for personal self-fulfillment. If previously professional achievement 
had served as a means of individual self-realization, in the decades following the 
end of World War II work as an end in itself faded away in favor of extrinsic 
work motivation – work as a means toward other ends.361 As Heiner Meulemann 
conceptualized, this new orientation shift was accompanied by the decrease of 
acceptancy, or taking social reality or social tradition for granted. As Meulemann 
explained, the decrease of acceptancy implies “that meaning in life can no longer 
be taken for granted, but has to be created in a way that is effective and valid in 
everyday life.”362 The increase of political interest stood, according to 
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Meulemann, for the increasing importance of politics as a source of meaning and 
as means of achieving codetermination. Sharing broader horizons and having an 
impact on processes far removed – these feelings, in the author’s view, were 
giving more and more sense of orientation to the citizens of the Federal 
Republic.363  
Indeed, the survey data confirmed that whereas in the 1950s politics were 
seen by the vast majority of Germans as a private matter, which was considered 
rather unseemly to talk about in society, by the 1980s it has become part of 
everyday discourse. In the early 1980s the respondents thought it was extremely 
important that one can take part in discussion and express criticism. It led the 
sociologists Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Edgar Piel to conclude that politics 
in the 1980s could be understood better as a “correlate of social 
communication.”364 
Additionally, in the 1980s observers noted the growing concern for the 
society’s future both among young people and adults. In 1983 Werner Fuchs 
conceptualized this transformation in the following manner: “The way in which 
life in society is experienced in terms of time has undergone a radical 
transformation in the last few decades; the relationship between future and 
present has fundamentally changed. Instead of immeasurability open future – as 
was still conceived of during the 1950s – future now only seems to exist as a 
function of present-day decisions. […] This new experience of time then spread 
definitively in the course of the ecological discussion that started in the early 
1970s. […] Future possibilities, indeed the possibility of a future at all, becomes 
dependent upon measures and developments of today. The future becomes 
present. According to the new patterns of experience of time, future is ‘not 
decided in the future, but today: it is becoming more and more a force field 
incorporating irreversible processes, which are caused and allowed every day in 
society.’”365 
As previously shown, in post-Soviet Russia there was no similar growth 
of citizens’ engagement in political life except for a short period largely in the last 
Soviet years. Since then, the overall civic activity has seen a substantial decline. 
In explaining this trend the relevance of such variables as income, status and 
education in relation to the Russian case can further be tested. 
In fact, in the last decade Russia has seen considerable increase by some of 
these variables. In the first instance, from 1992 to 2005 the number of university 
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students in Russia almost tripled, growing from 2.7 to 6.8 million.366 Russia’s 
economy after the 1998 financial crisis, when the government defaulted on 
foreign debts and the national currency collapsed, has also been expanding 
steadily. Since 2000, mainly due to the increase in oil and gas prices, the economy 
made real gains of an average 7 percent per year, which allowed the World Bank 
to declare in 2007 that the Russian economy had achieved “unprecedented 
macroeconomic stability.”367 
Furthermore, income growth in post-1998 crisis period, although was 
much more modest than in the postwar Federal Republic, but still noticeable. 
Since 2000 real incomes in Russia more than doubled while poverty halved. The 
proportion of population living below the poverty line decreased from 30 
percent in 2000 to 14 percent in 2008. In the period between 2000 and 2008 the 
average wage increased from 2,200 rubles ($90) to 12,500 rubles ($500), and the 
average pension, from 823 rubles ($33) to 3,500 rubles ($140). Most importantly, 
wages and benefits have been growing faster than inflation (by 20 -25 percent in 
2007).368 
Nevertheless, despite the visible increase in all the abovementioned 
variables, Russia did not see a significant increase of civic activity. The question 
arises: Why the social change in Russia has not occurred and what were the 
impediments on the way of change? 
The major problem lies, as it appears, in the fact that the post-Soviet 
system in Russia was neither considerably changed, nor modernized. Starting 
with the early 1990s scholars have pointed to the fact that the new Russian 
system was characterized not by institutional differentiation and strengthening 
of democratic institutions but by the prevalence of clientelism and corruption.  
Initially used to explain hierarchical patron-client relationships in 
traditional rural societies, the concept of clientelism has been often used to 
characterize entire political systems, based non on formal, depersonalized, 
modern institutions, but on quite unequal, hierarchical, clientelist relations. 
Clientelism represents a form of personal, dyadic exchange usually characterized 
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by a sense of obligation, and often also by an unequal balance of power between 
those involved.369 
If political modernization refers to the processes of differentiation of 
political structure and secularization of political culture which enhance the 
capacity – the effectiveness and efficiency of performance – of a political system, 
informal systems of clientelism and patrimonialism, it is argued, are “key 
contributors to stifling popular participation, subverting the rule of law, fostering 
corruption, distorting the delivery of public services, discouraging investment 
and undermining economic progress.”370  
Although clientelism takes on a variety of forms, according to Robert 
Kaufman’s definition it always manifests the following characteristics: (1) the 
relationship occurs between actors of unequal power and status; (2) it is based on 
the principle of reciprocity, that is, it is a self-regulating form of interpersonal 
exchange, the maintenance of which depends on the return that each actor 
expects to obtain by rendering goods and services to each other and which ceases 
once the expected rewards fail to materialize; (3) the relationship is particularistic 
and private, anchored only loosely in public law or community norms.371 
The prevalence of clientelism in the Russian post-Soviet system was noted 
and examined in the works by Tatiana Vorozheikina (1994), Mikhail Afanasiev 
(1997), Thomas Rigby (1998), Lilia Shevtsova (2002), Karine Clément (2008), and 
other observers. 
In this regards the scholars have generally underscored the impressive 
historical continuities in Russia. David W. Brinkerhoff and Arthur A. Goldsmith 
summarized these findings, stating that the Russian tsars ruled through grants of 
property to the nobility and this practice carried over to the Soviet period. The 
Soviet system was marked by hierarchical chains of dependence between party 
leaders and their underlings. Reliable apparatchiks were rewarded with preferred 
access to consumer goods and perquisites such as vacation homes and better 
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schools. This legacy of patrimonial rule also continued to shape public 
administration in the post-communist era, for example in the appointment of 
business “oligarchs” (in fact former members of the Soviet nomeklatura) to key 
positions in Moscow, and in the attitudes and behaviors of Russian civil servants 
toward citizens.372  
The scholars underscored that in neo-patrimonial systems bureaucrats’ 
allegiance focuses upwards toward their superiors who can reward them and, as 
a result, the state exists to serve the rulers, not the ruled. Consequently, a service 
orientation toward citizens is not simply absent, it is a foreign concept. 
Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith have stressed this prevalence of the old patrimonial 
attitudes among present-day Russian civil servants.373 
According to Tatiana Vorozheikina, “the undermining of nomenklatura 
patron-client relations at the outset of the democratization process has 
regenerated itself throughout the polity and will long be one principle 
determinant.”374 The researcher has argued that “access to government property 
has become one of the prime forms of payment in patron-client networks” and 
that “by privatizing government property into the hand of politically loyal 
groups and individuals, political figures both widen their political base and 
create an entirely new legally unhindered economic base of the future.”375 
Notably, Vorozheikina pointed to an ideological justification for the growth of 
corruption invented by the new commercial and government elites who actually 
justified corruption as a quick path to the formation of middle class owners, who 
in theory would support economic reforms.376 
As previously noted, the 1993 Constitution in Russia actually established 
an authoritarian presidential regime which concentrated real power within the 
presidential structures. As a result, using Vorozheikina’s formulation, 
“organizational chaos and the presence of competing groups within the ever-
expanding ranks of the president’s subordinates increased the significance of 
patron-client relations as the system’s only structural factor.”377 
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Communist Party bosses, who had access to state property and 
government funds, quickly figured out ways to take advantage of the economic 
reforms. Privatization of state-owned companies turned into deals for 
government allies who picked up public assets at bargain prices and 
deregulation of capital accounts made it easier to ship ill-gotten wealth abroad. 
According to Joel Hellman, leaders of the countries plagued by clientelism tend 
to exploit market distortions during the early stages of the transition to 
capitalism, siphon off the gains, and then block further reforms that would 
undermine their special advantages.378 That is what actually took place in post-
Soviet Russia. 
The superpresidentialism combined with nondivision of state and 
property actually led here to privatization of state property by the former 
nomenklatura and to formation of nationwide pyramids of patrons and clients. 
Therefore, social status which taps the position or rank of a person or group 
within the society in post-Soviet Russia was generally not earned by one’s own 
achievements (by which modern societies are characterized), but turned out to be 
of a hierarchic origin: people appeared in the stratification system by their 
loyalty or kinship (which reminded more of ascribed status in traditional 
societies). 
During the years of the Putin rule, as Lilia Shevtsova observed, “the shady 
structures and client-patronage relations that had prevailed in Russian politics 
during the 1990s, the merger of power and money, the lack of transparency in 
decision-making, and the increase in favoritism and nepotism led to the 
formation of oligarchic capitalism with criminal overtones and the distortion of 
the market.”379 The Putin’s fight against oligarchs led to culmination of interests 
and property formerly ‘divided’ between several oligarchs with the Kremlin 
administration creating a corporatist state. 
Evidently, in a similar situation it would be naïve to expect from high 
status Russians – both bureaucrats and businessmen, – whose position and 
wealth equally depend not on their personal achievements, but primarily on 
loyalty to their patrons, much independence, critical stance and civic activity. 
Such improbability is confirmed by the preliminary results of the Research 
Development Initiative Particularities of Power in the Post-Soviet Context: Theoretical 
Considerations and Empirical Studies of Bureaucracy, based on the interviews with 
Russian bureaucrats. The sociologist Karine Clément, analyzing these results in 
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2008, concluded: “In their interpersonal relationships, bureaucrats seem to 
observe the rule according to which the most important condition to secure one’s 
position in the hierarchy is to demonstrate loyalty to the persons one is 
dependent on (business groups or power groups). This appears to be the only 
constraint; all other things are permitted, including breaking the law (provided 
this is not too overt). Another interesting point is that one can exercise power as 
one wishes so long as the appearances of democracy and loyalty to the higher 
power are respected; the form of behavior counts more than its content. If these 
two principles (strong subordination and observance of appearances) are 
violated, punishment will follow, generally by being fired, from time to time by 
being subject to juridical or tax investigations, and less frequently by 
imprisonment.”380 
As for the business elites, the notorious case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 
former head of the Yukos oil company, whom civic activity and expressed 
independence cost his company and freedom, taught the Russia’s most rich a 
clear lesson. After the president of the largest Russian enterprise was convicted 
on tax and fraud charges and imprisoned in a Siberian penal colony while his 
company was dismantled the representatives of the Russian businesses are likely 
to beware of getting involved in any independent political or civic activities.381 
Unlike postwar Germany where affluence and educational level appeared 
core factors of societal change, the structure of post-Soviet society revealed an 
opposite picture. The recent opinion polls in Russia have shown that the younger 
and the better-educated cohorts reveal the highest levels of conformism and 
compliance. To illustrate, during the March 2010 regional elections the ruling 
United Russia (Yedinaya Rossia) party was supported by the youngest, the most 
well-to-do and high status voters. It was voted, for instance, by 84 percent of the 
18-14 year old age group, by 65 percent of respondents with high education, and 
by 67 percent of the large cities’ dwellers.382 
As we have seen, the nature of status and income in Russia, being 
essentially unmodern and anti-modern, could not (and still cannot) contribute to 
the country’s modernization and democratization. It leads us to conclude that 
such factors as – income, status and education – acquire relevance only in case of 
modernization of the political system and social relations and formation of the 
framework of formal, depersonalized and functioning institutions within which 
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citizens can freely express their views, articulate their interests, and achieve co-
jointly their common goals. 
Differently, it is rather an institutional context which structures income 
and status formation that matters not income and status per se. Using Ralf 
Dahrendorf’s formulation, “Not prosperity as such, but the type of individual 
participation in its advantages is a source of anti-totalitarian strength, because it 
is categorically opposed to the notion of planning every step of life and regards 
“the whole” as a marketlike, unplanned co-ordination of individual wishes.”383 In 
a system where status and income are determined by one’s place in a hierarchy, 
or in ‘a vertical of power,’ such an ‘unplanned coordination’ is likely to become 
an improbable occurrence. 
 
3.4.3 Educational Reforms 
 
In this section I will address the changes in secondary and higher education in 
the two analyzed cases. 
According to Gert-Joachim Glässner, the unconditional surrender of Nazi 
Germany and the obligation of the Western Allies to ‘reeducate’ the German 
people laid the very basis for a democratic Germany. Glässner argued (and it is 
hard not to agree with his view), that even if compliance had little if anything to 
do with firm convictions, it opened a starting point down the road to 
democracy.384 
Indeed, in the early postwar period, “reeducation became a catchall term, 
a synecdoche for the occupation in general.”385 The Western allies and especially 
the United States were highly committed to an extensive program of reeducation 
designed to change German political values and attitudes so that the formal 
democratic institutions established after the war, in contrast to those of Weimar 
Republic, would have widespread popular support.  
General Lucius Clay later wrote in his memoirs, “…The reconstruction of 
German education meant that the Germans had to overcome both physical and 
spiritual devastation. Many German school buildings had been destroyed, others 
badly damaged, and still others were occupied either by troops or by displaced 
persons. Teaching staffs contained many ardent Nazis; in one city more than 60 
percent of the teaching staff had belonged to the party. Textbooks were so 
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impregnated with Nazi ideology that even mathematics problems were 
expressed in military terms and logistics. German youth learned to add and 
subtract guns and bullets rather than apples and oranges.”386 
Democratizing the defeated Reich was among the essential war aims of 
the Allies who mentioned it in the Potsdam Agreement as a general, but distant 
task for the future. The reeducation program included the removal of active 
Nazis from teaching positions, major changes in the school system as well as a 
massive nationwide campaign of political education designed to reach Germans 
at every age and socioeconomic level.387 In theory at least, “reeducation entailed 
the most extensive plan in recorded history to induce rapid cultural change in an 
entire population.”388 
 As it appears from various reports of that period, the Western and 
particularly American officials mostly feared the continuation of the 
authoritarian teacher figure in the West German classroom. Moreover, they 
shared the belief that education already long before Hitler had never been 
democratic. OMGUS educators and military officials alike realized that teacher 
training colleges would have to combat not only the legacy of National 
Socialism, but the ideas of Kaiserreich educators that dominated pre-1918 German 
schools, stifling the growth of independent thinking, critical observation, and 
participatory practices, and carried by many older teachers through the Weimar 
Republic and into the Third Reich.389  
So, OMGUS officials illustrated their ideal of the democratic teacher in 
widely-circulated publications on how the German educator should perform 
within the classroom. No longer should a teacher be seen as an authoritarian 
figure that lorded over his class for, as the US officials believed, this reinforced 
the tendency of Germans to respect strong leadership and to obey and fear the 
leader. Likewise, the teacher should not be seen as a representative of the state, 
as Germans were also believed to put the state before the individual.390
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American military officials published suggestions in professional teacher 
publications outlining how teachers should instruct young Germans in the ways 
of democracy: “The theoretical knowledge of all events in democratic states is 
not enough, even if it is essential; it must be completed through deep-rooted 
habits as well as through corresponding attitudes. These habits and these 
attitudes can only be achieved through long-standing experience and 
participation in group work of democratic character and through the 
development of individuality, self-confidence, and initiative in every detail. It 
belongs to the realm of the school to offer as many opportunities as possible in 
order to offer experiences which lead to this goal.”391 
OMGUS officials regarded active participation in democratic practices as 
critical to the successful adoption of democratic ideals and encouraged the 
integration of such practices into the classroom.392
 
Suggestions for explicit ways 
by which the German teacher could incorporate democracy into the classroom 
included debates, parliamentary practice, class elections, student clubs, school 
newspapers, and daily questions to the teacher. In addition to establishing 
democratic practices that the Americans deemed fundamental, these proposals 
would also erode the position of the teacher as authoritarian power, a holdover 
from the pre-WWI period. These changes were meant to ensure that the 
nationalistic authoritarian teachers of previous times would not return to 
German classrooms. Instead, the new teacher-student relations would be an 
indispensable component of postwar German democracy.393 
OMGUS officials also tried to stress social studies in the education of both 
German students and teachers by suggesting that “emphasis should be given to 
the attainments of democratic modes of living.”394 As noted above, they provided 
German educators with examples of democratic in-class practices (such as class 
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elections, debates, etc.) in hopes of encouraging similar types of activities in 
German classrooms. Expanding on this understanding of social studies, other 
officials believed social studies to be synonymous with democratic cooperation. 
They envisioned teachers working toward this goal in three ways: through direct 
participation in such activities; by observation of activities of the community in 
which there is evidence, or lack of evidence, of democratic cooperation; and by 
directed study of democratic cooperation and the subsequent analysis, 
evaluation and utilization of these practices under the leadership of democratic 
teachers.395 
As a result of instituting a two-fold process of removal and renewal (or 
simultaneous denazification and teacher training), OMGUS wielded substantial 
control over the elementary teaching profession. While it is true that many 
Germans were frustrated with what they believed to be a flawed denazification 
process, these efforts proved to be beneficial to German education long after 
1945. The crucial determinant of the postwar renewal in the field of secondary 
education was the removal of truly devoted Nazis from Germany’s classrooms.396 
Importantly, OMGUS authorities also motivated German educators to 
rewrite the existing school textbooks, having devised the criteria for textbook 
evaluation at the outset of the Occupation. American education officials, who 
evaluated each book based on objectives, accuracy, student maturity and 
interests, ease of comprehension, relating of learning experiences, learning 
activities, study aids, and illustrations, benefited thus the highly important 
textbooks renewal.397
 
Despite significant resistance to these changes from the majority of 
German citizens, including teachers, the impact of the Occupation in the sphere 
of educational reform was no less significant than in the other realms of social 
life. Although not much change occurred during and after the Occupation, the 
important change in the school system did eventually take place in the mid-1960s 
when the efforts of the Western Allies united with the endeavors of democratic-
oriented German educators started giving fruit. Since that time-point the 
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observers began to note that the German schools generally rated independence 
and self-determination, the capability of discussion and critique in the classroom.  
In his recent study of the West German postwar educational reforms Brian 
Puaca (2009) persuasively argued that long before the protest movements of the 
late 1960s, the West German educational system was undergoing meaningful 
reform from within. Although politicians and intellectual elites paid little 
attention to education after 1945, administrators, teachers, and pupils initiated 
significant changes in schools at the local level. The endeavors by these actors 
resulted in an array of democratic reforms that signaled a departure from the 
authoritarian and nationalistic legacies of the past. Puaca described the changes 
as follows: “Exchange programs inaugurated during the occupation expanded in 
the 1950s and provided Germans practical experience with the workings of 
democratic society. Student government and student newspapers offered pupils 
a wealth of opportunities to acquire personal experience with both the rights and 
responsibilities of those living in a democracy. A new generation of history and 
civics textbooks published in the 1950s introduced innovative pedagogical 
practices to the postwar classroom. Arguably even more important was the new 
conception of democratic citizenship that appeared in these volumes. The 
emergence of political education ensured that young Germans would gain a new 
conception of their role in Germany, as well as their relationship to other 
countries, regions, and peoples. Postwar training and continuing education 
courses for teachers improved their knowledge of new subject matter – such as 
recent history and political education – and also exposed them to innovative 
teaching methods that became increasingly commonplace in the schools. These 
postwar reforms indeed made German pupils and teachers alike more ‘conscious 
of their rights and freedoms,’ […] as well as of their responsibilities and duties as 
citizens.”398 
In the 1950s the system of civic and political education (politische Bildung) 
was introduced by the Federal Republic’s government. Civic education refers to 
a wide system of public education and scientific socially-oriented research. This 
system, that became a vivid example of effective analysis and search for the ways 
of overcoming social problems, has covered schools and higher educational 
establishments, state, public and private organizations and foundations. They 
have carried out educational research and museum projects focusing on different 
age and social groups and dealing with acute historical, social and political 
problems. The integrating centre of this system has been the Federal Agency for 
Civic Education (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, BPB), created in 1952 in the 
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structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It has divisions on the local levels 
(Landeszentrale für politische Bildung) which fulfill large-scale education work 
aimed at popularizing democratic and liberal values as fundamentals of the 
German state and society. In the 1960s a subject “civic education” was 
introduced in West German high schools. 
The BPB mission states: “Considering Germany’s experience with various 
forms of dictatorial rule down through its history, the Federal Republic of 
Germany bears a unique responsibility for firmly anchoring values such as 
democracy, pluralism and tolerance in people’s minds.”399 An important part of 
the BPB activity is the publication of the results of social, historical, political 
research. Besides, the BPB has been publishing a weekly newspaper Das 
Parlament, informing of the Bundestag and Bundesrat activities, of the German 
parliamentary life and political events in other countries.  
German civic education institutions work in close cooperation with 
private foundations (many of them are also supported by the state) and the 
educational organizations which deal with problems of youth historical 
education and aim at prevention of extremism within the young people. Such 
work is conducted, among other organizations, by Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Volkswagen 
Foundation, etc.400 
The system of civic education alongside with other endeavors in the 
educational field has certainly played an important role in the development of 
democratic political culture in Germany. To illustrate this trend, a 1971 ten-
nation comparative study found out that students aged 10 to 14 in West 
Germany were more likely to report that their instructors encouraged 
independent expression in the classroom than their counterparts in such “classic” 
democracies as the USA, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Judith Torney and her 
associates also found that “civic education” teachers in the Federal Republic 
spent many hours in lesson preparation, emphasized political history, and 
willingly discussed many issues in class. West German students reported that 
expression of opinion in class was encouraged. The same study found that 
German respondents ranked higher in their support for democratic norms than 
students in the USA, the Netherlands, Finland, or Italy. Thus, the traditional 
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emphasis upon the “authoritarian” German child-rearing style has become very 
difficult to support with empirical evidence.401  
As for the German postwar higher education, after 1945 the Allied powers 
in the western occupation zones also had to confront the issues regarding the 
role of the university in the coming German democracy. In 1947, the British 
occupation authorities formed commissions of inquiry for university reform with 
German academic and community representation, and in the next year they 
presented their recommendations, the so-called Schwalbinger and Hamburger 
Gutachten (also known as the “Blue Report”).402 The British officials 
recommended (and the American allied authorities concurred with these aims) 
greater contact between the university and the public sphere, a form of general 
education to counter the specialization of research, and a greater emphasis on 
teaching.403  
In 1948, the Free University was founded in West Berlin. The newly found 
university sought to realize Humboldt’s ideal of a community of scholars by 
ensuring direct student representation on university decision-making bodies. It 
subsequently was referred to as the “Berlin model.”404 
 The Blue Report and the “Berlin model,” however, were initially rejected 
by the West German universities, which had soon regained administrative 
autonomy in accordance with the Allied policy. The German university, 
therefore, saw no fundamental structural reform practically for two postwar 
decades.405 Among the reasons for the rejection of structural reform were the 
general preoccupation with repairing the physical damage to the buildings 
(according to experts’ evaluations, some 60 percent of German university 
infrastructure was destroyed during the war), as well as considerable resistance 
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of most professors who held dear the old ideals of their autonomy and distance 
to the world of politics and society.406  
As the historian Waldemar Besson asserted in the late 1960s, 
“Immediately after 1945 the German university felt itself to have been one of 
Hitler’s victims. It took time and hard thinking to realize that the German 
university belonged at least in part to the anti-democratic mainstream of German 
history, and that it carried a heavy responsibility for the rise of Nazism.”407 
In spite of the initial rejection of the Blue Report, the Allied powers’ efforts 
were certainly not in vain. Konrad Jarausch later pointed, for instance, to a 
surprising success of the Western Allies’ intellectual efforts in one area in 
particular, namely, in establishing the discipline of political science in the 
universities during the 1950s as a U.S.-oriented “science of democracy.”  
The occupation powers pressed for the resumption of this interrupted 
tradition in order to provide a kind of “driver’s education for politics” that 
would nourish a more broadly based political education. The founding fathers of 
the new discipline, including Theodor Eschenburg and Eugen Kogon, were 
decided democrats who had been trained as jurists, historians, and journalists. 
Returning emigrants from the United States also played an important part in 
establishing the new discipline; these included the conservative Arnold 
Bergsträsser in Freiburg, who strove to develop a scholarly basis for responsible 
citizenship, and the liberal Ernst Fränkel at the Free University of Berlin, the 
author of an analysis of the dual character of the Nazi dictatorship who wanted 
to see German democracy follow Western models. Jarausch concluded that, 
“With the methodological turn of the second generation toward behavioral 
science and quantification, the social science reclaimed their connection to the 
international standards established by American researchers and continued to 
serve as conduits of Western ideals.”408  
Besides that, the Allied recommendations became an important starting 
point for many German intellectuals who shared the belief in importance of the 
suggested ideas. In fact, some younger scholars were not content with the state of 
affairs in the postwar German university. Student leaders were particularly 
concerned about the restorative policies of university management and about the 
failure of a “new beginning” in the 1940s; they regretted the lack of fundamental 
reform, criticized the university’s reversion to an apolitical posture and insisted 
on the implementation of the reforms recommended by the Blue Report, namely, 
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an orientation to social praxis, communication of scholarship to the public, and 
adult education.409 
Among those who advocated the reform were political scientists Hans 
Heigert, Peter van Oertzen and Wolfgang Abendroth, a leftist Roman Catholic 
and later director of the Institute for Political Education in Tutzing Manfred 
Hättich, an editor of the Deutsche Universitäts-Zeitung and a journalist Ivo 
Frenzel, professor of education in Tübingen Andreas Flitner, university professor 
and federal director of the SDS from 1952 to 1955 Hans Tietgens, the Frankfurt 
legal historian Herman Coing, the author Helmut Becker, the sociologist and 
university professor Ralf Dahrendorf, and one of the future most influential 
sociologists and social philosophers Jürgen Habermas. 
For instance, Peter van Oertzen already in 1948 attacked the old ideal of 
detachment claiming that “otherworldliness and specialized narrowness, 
irresponsibility, and to some extent even dangerous political retardedness 
dominate in the academic world so much that one cannot expect a self-
purification.” He called for the social engagement in the same terms as the Blue 
Report.410  
The older generation of intellectuals, like Max Horkheimer, Theodor 
Adorno, Karl Jaspers, Arnold Gehlen, Carlo Schmid, Arnold Bergsträsser, also 
shared this concern about the end of humanism in an “administered world,” 
notwithstanding their own ideological differences.411 
During the late 1950s, Habermas and his Frankfurt colleagues Ludwig von 
Friedeburg, Christoph Oehler, and Friedrich Welz undertook surveys of student 
political attitudes in order to test their democratic political orientation. The 
survey results, which were published and interpreted in the well-known book 
Student und Politik, showed that the traditional apolitical culture of ‘pure 
knowledge’ and Bildung had continued largely unchanged since the war.412 It was 
precisely this apolitical concentration on private virtues by non-Nazi scholars 
                                                 
409 See Moses, Dirk A. German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007. 
410 Oertzen, Peter von. Reform vor Autonomie // Goettinger Universitäts-Zeitung, № 6, 1948. p. 5. 
411 Gehlen, Arnold. Man in the Age of Technology (English translation by Patricia Lipscomb) New 
York, 1980; Schmid, Carlo. Mensch und Technik. Die sozialen und kulturellen Probleme der 
zweiten industriellen Revolution. Bonn, 1956; Bergstraesser, Arnold. Die Technik und das 
Kulturproblem des 20. Jahrhunderts, 1959. In his Politik in Wissenschaft und Bildung, 2nd ed. 
Freiburg, 1966. pp. 142–58; Horkheimer, Max; Adorno, Theodor W. Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
Trans. by John Cummingsl Boston, 1971. Jaspers, Karl; Ernst, Fritz. Vom Lebendigen Geist der 
Universität / Vom Studieren. Heidelberg; Lambert Schneider, 1946. English translation: Jaspers, 
Karl. The Idea of the University. London: Peter Owen, 1960.  [1944]. 
412 Habermas, Jürgen et al. Student und Politik. Eine soziologische Untersuchung zum politischen 
Bewußtsein Frankfurter Studenten. Neuwied and Berlin, 1961. 
 131 
and students, coupled with a traditional German anticommunism, that had 
rendered the Weimar university so vulnerable to National Socialism. The authors 
found that a majority of West German students were not particularly committed 
to democracy, and they doubted whether the students would defend republican 
institutions were antidemocratic forces to rise again. The students, Friedeburg 
concluded, had drawn no implications from the country’s experience with 
National Socialism; they were hostages of “consumer coercion” and were 
beguiled by the “culture industry.” Habermas observed that many students held 
pragmatic, potentially authoritarian political views devoid of “utopian 
impulses.” It was necessary, therefore, for education to take a “critical” stand.413 
The major debate on the role of university occurred between Jürgen 
Habermas and those who sided with his view that educational institutions 
should unite theory and practice and his opponents, primarily, the social 
philosopher, the secretary of state for education in the Social Democratic 
administration in Northrhine-Westphalia between 1966 and 1969 Hermann 
Lübbe, who advanced an idea of the separation of theory and practice. 
In the height of the education debate in the mid-1960s, the federal 
chancellor Ludwig Erhard proclaimed education expansion and access a priority 
of his inaugural speech in 1963. In the same year, the Max Planck Institute for 
Education Research (Max Planck Institut für Bildungsforschung) was established in 
West Berlin. By that time critical of the present state of the German university 
were intellectuals from different ideological camps. 
In 1965 Ralf Dahrendorf who held at that time an advisory post on 
education policy with the Baden-Württemberg and who had participated in the 
development of the reform conceptions stated that “the lack of experimental 
attitude and the distrust of common sense may be called causes of hierarchical 
stagnation of the German university.”414 Dahrendorf was convinced that “the 
absence of institutionalized liberal procedures in the academic sphere is one of 
the structural obstacles to liberal democracy in Germany.”415  
In the University General Plan of 1967 Dahrendorf proposed a 
“differentiated comprehensive university” that would integrate all existing 
institutions of higher education into a unified system, divided into a “short 
study” of three years, and a “long study” for a smaller number of qualified 
candidates for whom traditional research and teaching would be guaranteed. 
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The latter was partly realized in 1966 in the new University of Constance, a small 
research-focused institution of three thousand students without professional 
faculties, based on the natural and social sciences.416  
This idea, however, was criticized by Habermas who believed that the 
rigid stratification of courses of study and cap of four years, as was the case in 
many Anglophone universities, would prevent the “healthy problematization” of 
academic questions that cultivated critically minded students and which was 
“politically necessary.” West Germany, he argued, could not afford to copy other 
countries until it had learned to master the practical consequences of technical 
progress.417  
When in 1966 the Council of Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat) 
presented a set of recommendations (very similar, in fact, to the reform 
conceptions of Dahrendorf and Lübbe), which sought to limit study to four years 
of regimented courses with an automatic cancellation of student enrollment after 
that time, not only the conservative Rektorenkonferenz opposed them for their 
alleged infringement of academic freedom and pedagogization of undergraduate 
teaching, but also students, especially at the Free University in Berlin, actively 
joined the debate.418 They opposed the recommendations for precisely the same 
reason, denouncing it as “technocratic” university reform. This was on the eve of 
what later would be called “1968-movement.”419 
It is worth mentioning that among German intellectuals who contributed 
to the debate on the role of university in the postwar period were Wolfgang 
Abendroth, Theodor  Adorno, Helmut Becker, Arnold Bergsträsser, Waldemar 
Besson, Hermann Coing, Ralf Dahrendorf, Andreas Flitner, Ivo Frenzel, Hans 
Freyer, Arnold Gehlen, Jürgen Habermas, Manfred Hättich, Hans Heigert, 
Wilhelm Hennis, Werner Hoffmann, Max Horkheimer, Karl Jaspers, Hermann 
Lübbe, Peter van Oertzen, Friedrich Meinecke, Helmut Schelsky, Carlo Schmid, 
Eduard Spranger, Gerd Tellenbach, Hans Tietgens, Ernst Topisch, and many 
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other influential educators, writers, journalists, political scientists and social 
philosophers.420 
 
As in postwar Germany, the transformations launched in the Soviet 
society in the mid-1980s, certainly, could not leave the Russian education system 
untouched. Political conditions for education reforms in Russia after the 
perestroika period were indeed quite favorable.  
The processes of selection and financing of textbooks in the 1990s were 
considerably decentralized becoming the responsibility of the regions and 
schools were granted a significant amount of autonomy and independence. The 
change of the political climate and orientation towards democratic values, 
development of a dynamic and competitive textbook market after 1991 (Kaplan 
et al. 1999; Maier 2005), an urgent need for better quality textbooks, as well as an 
open information climate could provide an important impulse for renewal.  
However, these positive factors were again not taken advantage of in the 
post-Soviet Russia. Russian school was reformed neither in terms of content, nor 
in terms of methods of teaching. One of the main obstacles on the way of change 
became, as it appears, precisely the preservation of old methods of teaching, not 
seldom dogmatic and authoritarian. As the group of observers focusing on the 
introduction of modern pedagogical methods in Russian schools concluded in 
their 1995 report: “Essentially authoritarian treatment of pupils has very little 
changed and unproductive methods of teaching are still dominating.”421 
Similar conclusion was made in the empirical research of history teaching 
in high schools of the Yaroslavl’ province performed in 1992 by the group of the 
British experts. Describing the teaching methods in Russian schools, the authors 
of the report stated: “There is little or no involvement of the pupils in the process 
of a discipline. This has a number of limiting results: There is little or no problem 
solving. We saw no evidence of pupils undertaking tasks which required them to 
reach conclusions through their own investigations. Learning was of a passive 
receptive kind – the transmission model. There is little or no pupil discussion at 
any level. The absence of oral work outside the answering of teacher questions 
and declaiming is striking. There is little or no attempt to differentiate tasks to 
meet the needs of able and slower learning pupils.”422  
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In 1995 Vladimir Barabanov and Piotr Baranov also concluded regarding 
the advancement of modern pedagogical methods that, “The basic authoritarian 
nature with which students are treated has frequently changed very little while 
unproductive teaching methods continue to prevail.”423 Within this context the 
observers also mentioned the traditional “glorification of teachers as knowledge 
bearers,” which blocked the transfer of more student-oriented teaching methods.  
In the following chapter I will focus more on the problems of the school 
education content in relation to history teaching. I would like to finish this 
section by making some comments of the higher education situation in post-
Soviet Russia. In this regards it should be first pointed out that in Russia there 
was no intellectual debate on the role of university similar to the one that had 
taken place in postwar Germany. As a result, post-Soviet higher educational 
establishments preserved many features of their Soviet-time predecessors (and 
arguably in some respects even worsened them). 
The situation with social sciences in Russia also considerably differed 
from the German case. Formally social sciences such as sociology, political 
science and culturology have been taught at Russian universities since the late 
1980s. These disciplines were ‘legalized’ in the Soviet Union following the 
reduction of the Communist Party’s control over the government in 1988 as well 
as Gorbachev’s 1989 decision to allow other political associations coexist with the 
CPSU. These processes resulted in abolishment of Article 6 of the Constitution on 
the guiding role of the CPSU on 14 March, 1990. Ten years later (by early 2000s) 
more than 100 sociology and 300 political science departments functioned at 
Russian universities across the country. 
However, unlike West Germany where the denazification process had 
effectively rooted out Nazi influence and ideology at universities by removing an 
average of 30-50 percent of Nazis from the faculty, in post-Soviet Russia the 
faculty and staff of higher educational establishments mostly remained intact.424 
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Former instructors of Marxism-Leninism, scientific communism, history of the 
CPSU, scientific atheism, socialism, political economy, dialectic materialism 
(diamat), etc. were quickly turned into sociologists, political scientists, 
culturologists, psychologists, and PR specialists, and a little bit later - into 
political strategists and experts on political PR and advertising. Thus the people 
who formerly constituted the Soviet educational nomenklatura gained control 
over the process of teaching social sciences at universities in the post-Soviet 
period. Managing academic institutions and university departments, these 
functionaries defined the nature of professional reproduction, selection of 
graduate students and junior faculty, as well as learning themes and objectives.  
As the former instructors of Marxism-Leninism and dialectical 
materialism started teaching political sciences, sociology and culturology 
(especially in provincial universities), their distorted understanding of the role, 
ends and structure of social sciences was unavoidably imposed on the learning 
process. It is noteworthy that political and social sciences departments became 
focused, primarily, on preparation of marketing, advertising, PR specialists, 
political consultants, and so on. At the same time no courses on democratic 
theory and democratization have been virtually taught at universities’ social 
science departments. Even those social science faculties and programs that tried 
to conform to international standards of teaching continued to exhibit the flaws 
lingering from the Soviet model of higher education. Firstly, there have been 
extremely rigid institutional barriers between different departments and 
branches as interdisciplinary relationships and forms of education remained 
weakly developed. Besides, there has been an overall gap between research and 
teaching of social sciences. The latter was already enshrined in the institutional 
division of research institutions, on the one hand, and universities, on the 
other.425 Evidently, without structural transformation of the Russian school and 
university, further changes in these key social institutions transmitting values 
and norms appear unlikely.  
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3.3 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have focused on political orientations of citizens of Russia and 
Germany as we tried to analyze the changes that took place (if they did) on the 
level of political culture in the two countries. 
As we have seen, despite a rather protracted period of citizens’ apathy 
and non-participation, West German political culture has experienced a gradual 
turn away from authoritarian patterns of thought to a tentative embrace of 
democratic values. The gradual increase in political interest and political 
discussion, in political efficacy, general trust, and, eventually, political 
participation, finally occurred with the most drastic increase by practically all 
analyzed variables taking place in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These changes 
have coincided with (or, arguably, were caused by) the emergence of, first, the 
highly active protest student movement of the 1968, second, thousands of civic 
initiative groups across the country, and, subsequently, the new social 
movements of the 1970s-1980s: the environmental, the anti-nuclear energy, the 
women’s, and the peace movement. It is important to point out that though 
making of a liberal, modern Germany is usually understood as a top-down 
process − guided by the Allies and the country’s founding fathers, but processes 
from below were equally, if not more crucial in transforming German society.426 
In fact, the opposite situation was found in post-Soviet Russia where the 
wave of public activity subsided within the first post-communist years and since 
then there has been an overall decline by practically all variables of political 
involvement. With some minor exceptions of rare and nonsystematic citizens’ 
activism the overall picture, as the survey data show, has largely remained 
unchanged. 
Only in the recent years (approximately since 2005) some grassroots 
initiatives and networks have begun to appear in Russia. These new independent 
endeavors have united both those eager to assert their interests and rights, as 
well as those ready to fight for more general public good issues like protection of 
environment or preservation of cultural heritage (e.g. a number of homeowners 
and car owner associations, environmental and cultural heritage organizations). 
Surely, these new networks and grassroots initiatives, founded on weak ties, 
provide an interesting aspect of further investigation. 
As noted previously, among the most important sources of change of 
West German political culture were the postwar system performance, 
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socioeconomic modernization, and changed socialization, linked with the 
transformation of the educational system. 
1. In the first instance, system performance has contributed to the long-
term growth of political efficacy in the Federal Republic. The new system, based 
on the rule of law and the separation of powers, provided citizens with 
numerous chances of participation in the political system which, in turn, led to a 
steady increase in the political skills and resources of the German society. 
Differently, as West Germans were getting acquainted with the democratic 
processes of the Federal Republic, they were getting more and more involved in 
them, and this involvement, in turn, made them more assured that they can 
affect political decision-making. In this way, the democratic system performance 
contributed to the growth of civic norms in Germany. As most observers agreed, 
the performance of the political and economic system was an important factor in 
the growth of system support and the growing appreciation of democracy in the 
first two decades following the war. 
In post-Soviet Russia, by contrast, the emergence of super-presidential 
regime and non-performance or absence of democratic institutions resulted in 
low levels of political efficacy and weakness of civil society, impeded social 
development and stifled social organization. The weakness or sometimes lack of 
an institutional framework within which democracy could actually be practiced 
prevented in many respects the development of civic skills and political 
efficiency that are vital for supporting and consolidating a democratic system. 
2. Another important source of change was the changing character of 
postwar German society, the transformation of the German social structure which 
was facilitated, primarily, by the rise of affluence and the expansion of higher 
education in the postwar period. The Economic Miracle led to the considerable 
increase of income and educational opportunities which, in turn, eventually 
brought about postmaterialist, New Politics issues (such as environmental 
protection and codetermination) high on political agenda.  
Due to the growing self-confidence and citizens’ sense of dignity, politics 
was acquiring more relevance in everyday life as it provided citizens with a new 
meaning in life and chances of self-expression. Consequently, new forms of 
participation and thousands of citizens-initiatives across the country became the 
manifestation of this newly born political consciousness and increased political 
efficacy.  
At the same time, the survey data presented in this chapter have shown 
that the post-Soviet Russia has experienced no similar growth of civic 
engagement except for a short late Soviet period which was followed by 
protracted ebb. In explaining this trend the relevance of such factors as income, 
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status and education (that affected the German cultural transformations) in 
relation to the Russian case was surveyed. 
As it was shown, the post-Soviet system became characterized not by 
institutional differentiation and strengthening of democratic institutions, but by 
quite archaic unequal, hierarchical, clientelist relations. It means that high status 
and wealth of the new Russian elite have depended not on their personal 
achievements, but primarily on loyalty to their patrons. This forced us to 
conclude that such factors as income, status and education acquire relevance only 
in case of modernization of the political system and formation of the framework 
of formal, depersonalized and functioning institutions. Only in this case these 
variables seem to positively affect cultural democratization.  
3. Finally, thanks to the Western Allies’ ‘reeducation’ program in the 
immediate postwar years German secondary and high school saw considerable 
change. The Western Allies, and especially the United States, were indeed highly 
committed to an extensive program of reeducation designed to change German 
political values and attitudes so that the formal democratic institutions 
established after the war would have widespread popular support.427 
First of all, due to the denazification process, most active Nazis were 
removed from Germany’s schools, school teachers were trained, the new text-
books were developed by the German educators under supervision of the Allied 
authorities, and new teaching methods were eventually introduced into 
traditionally authoritarian German classrooms. In this way, the Western 
occupation opened a starting point down the path to a more liberal and modern 
German school. 
Despite the substantial initial resistance to change in the German society, 
the Allies policies eventually started producing fruit. In the early 1950s new 
social science disciplines, the importance of which was systematically stressed by 
the OMGUS officials, were introduced in West German educational 
establishments – political education in schools and political science in 
universities. 
Western Allies and democratically oriented German educators also 
succeeded in the long run in changing the authoritarian patterns of teacher-
student relationships. Since the mid-1960s the observers have generally 
acknowledged that the schools in Germany generally rated independence and 
self-determination, the capability of discussion and critique in the classroom.  
The establishment of exchange programs between the United States and 
West Germany, the formation of student government organizations and student 
newspapers, the publication of revised history and civics textbooks, the 
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expansion of teacher training programs, and the creation of social studies 
curriculum all contributed to the advent of a new German educational system in 
the postwar period. The subtle, incremental reforms inaugurated during the first 
two postwar decades prepared a new generation of young Germans for their 
responsibilities as citizens of a democratic state. As Brian Puaca conceptualized, 
“The driving force behind the reforms that continued throughout the 1950s and 
1960s came from within. If it was American officials who had laid the 
foundation, it was the Germans who had actually constructed and outfitted the 
schools in which a new generation of young citizens now studied.428 
Equally important, the Allied recommendations became the reference 
point for many German intellectuals who in the 1950s and 1960s actively debated 
the role of the postwar university and took part in designing its fundamental 
reform. The most progressive scholars (like Habermas) insisted on bringing the 
university closer to social life. Importantly, this debate also involved German 
students who actually brought the education reform issue to the agenda of the 
1968 protest movement. 
Unfortunately, no similar intellectual debate on the role of school or 
university took place in post-Soviet Russia. As a result, Russian secondary 
schools, as well as universities preserved many features of the Soviet educational 
establishments, including the old patterns of teacher-student relationships.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Transformations of Collective Memories 
in Post-WW II West Germany and Post-
Soviet Russia 
 
 
4.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
Societies inevitably endure periods of instability and uncertainty of the future. 
These periods of social crisis prompt an awareness of the crucial importance and 
significance of the past, which at such times “returns with a vengeance.”429 
Numerous crises during the second half of the 20th century have caused large-
scale social and political transformations. This has sparked significant interest in 
the problems of “collective memory” - the phenomenon defined by historian 
Charles Maier as the universal “hunger for memory.”430 
The problem of memory retains particular significance in societies 
emerging from repressive totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. In these social 
contexts, appeal to the past is primarily linked to the necessity of finding new 
grounds for collective identification. Examples of these societies include the post-
WWII Federal Republic of Germany and the majority of the former Soviet bloc 
countries of Eastern Europe, including the former USSR republics. The 
unprecedented revival of memories in these societies underscores the close link 
between the concepts of collective memory and collective identity cited in several 
studies.431 
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However, the problem of memory in post-totalitarian societies is not 
limited to the issue of collective identification caused by the destruction of the 
former national identity. There is remarkable difficulty over the very recovery of 
memory in a society emerging from tight state control. The repressive nature of 
any dictatorial or totalitarian regime is manifested not only in blocking the 
possibility of reproduction of individual memory and experience, but also in the 
deliberate destruction of memory per se. 
It is certainly no coincidence that the Nazi Auschwitz concentration camp 
survivor Primo Levi, while describing later his experience, defined the whole 
history of the Third Reich as the “war against memory.”432 The witnesses to 
Stalin’s reign of terror also testified to the fact of memory destruction in the 
Soviet society. According to Nadezhda Mandelstam, the widow of the poet Osip 
Mandelstam, who died in a Siberian Gulag in 1938, “the elimination of witnesses 
was, indeed, part of the whole program” of Stalin’s reign of terror.433  
Another important witness of that period was the poet Anna Akhmatova. 
Her tribute to human suffering, inspired by Stalin’s purges in the 1930s and the 
arrest of her only son Lev Gumilyev, was given in a series of poems collected 
under the title Requiem. She argued that working through this experience of 
“memory killing” would take no less than a century, for “the dead keep silent, 
and the alive keep silent as well otherwise risking of becoming dead.”434 
The important consequence of totalitarian system collapse is thus not only 
an acute identity crisis necessitating the search for a new collective identity, but 
the liberation of individual memory previously repressed under the dictatorship. 
The emergence of freedom of expression as a result of the repressive regime 
collapse is an important prerequisite of the social memory recovery.  
This liberation of memory, however, does not guarantee retrieval of 
memory in formerly repressed societies. As the sociologist Lev Gudkov argued, 
“all that individuals go through, and above all their unreflected suffering, 
vanishes unless it is taken up by specialized institutions, unless it is channeled 
into other means of cultural reproduction and, accordingly, unless private 
opinions are sanctioned by some authority that ranks as supra−individual.”435  
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In the book In Pursuit of German Memory: History, Television, and Politics 
after Auschwitz Wulf Kansteiner also observed that “all memories, even the 
memories of eyewitnesses, only assume collective relevance when they are 
structured, represented, and used in a social setting. As a result, the means of 
representation that facilitate this process provide the best information about the 
evolution of collective memories, especially as we try to reconstruct them after 
the fact.”436  
Therefore the problem of retaining, reproduction and distribution or 
transmission of memory in the new socio-political context gains special importance 
in the former repressive regimes. Studies of post-totalitarian societies should 
therefore focus on the ways that these societies deal with memories of the past 
and the ways they reconcile themselves to these memories. It is important to 
research and understand the ways in which agents of collective memory 
structure and represent their memories. The scholars’ task here, following 
Kansteiner’s formulation, is “to find out what stories about the past matter to whom 
and how they have been distributed.”437 
The concept of “collective memory” in social studies has lately become 
rather an attribute of certain groups or communities of memory than a society as 
a whole. Communities of memory (or remembering collectives) may be 
composed of almost any groups: claim making political and intellectual counter-
elites, civil society groups, grassroots organizations, groups of victims, survivors, 
veterans, religious groups, and even formal institutions such as educational and 
judicial organizations and mass media. They mediate between the individual 
memories and the national or official memories, expressed in official speeches, 
commemorations, and the official versions of national history.438 The 
communities of memory often struggle for the presentation of their versions of 
the past and make claims in the public sphere. In this way they try to exert 
influence on the “politics of memory” which determines which aspects of history 
will appear nationally significant and collectively remembered (or conversely 
forgotten).  
The appearance of the communities of memory in totalitarian states is 
virtually not possible. Totalitarian states are characterized by what Sabine 
Arnold defined as an “occupied memory.” This concept refers to the repressive 
and manipulating control of the process of memory-formation by state 
authorities. By means of a manipulative approach towards history every member 
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of the community is forced to follow a certain set of norms of action; norms 
which determine each member’s place in the community.439  
Following Aleida Assmann’s differentiation between the specific tasks 
social memory can perform, Arnold showed that the difference between storage 
and revision on the one hand (“storage memory”) and identity-formation and 
creation of meaning (“functional memory”) is dissolved in case of an occupied 
memory.440 The access to archives in totalitarian states is restricted or prohibited. 
Under these circumstances independent arrangement, exhibit, processing, 
interpretation and representation of memory are blocked and historiography is 
just producing myths for the sake of a certain notion of identity instead of 
undermining them.441 
It is thus reasonable to suggest that the emergence of “communities of 
memory,” or the formation of collective memories of various social groups, and 
their claim-making in the public sphere requires the emergence of a definite type 
of political structure. A prerequisite of such a differentiation is the realization of 
the principle of pluralism and competition, as well as a certain degree of freedom 
in the political sphere. Only in such context will different groups get an 
opportunity to transmit their experiences and versions of the past and so contest 
with other rival memories.   
In societies where the content of collective memory is a result of 
permanent coordination (or rather struggle) in the intellectual and political 
arenas, the official version of the past may appear dominant, but it is by no 
means the only memory discourse in a given society.442 Neither identity nor 
memory in pluralistic societies are monolithic; they both can vary in accordance 
with real social dynamics, produced as a result of the ongoing process of public 
approval of the various positions and interests, crystallized in the process of 
social interaction, and ultimately determining what Hannah Arendt called ‘the 
human condition of plurality.’443  
Observers warn about the dangers of the state monopoly over the 
collective memory. James Booth, for example, noted that “the political memory-
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identity of a nation-state tends to ‘nationalize’ collective memory and banish the 
group memories of minorities, immigrants, and the powerless generally.”444 
Simultaneously, Booth underscored “insurgent politics of memory-identity” can 
“disrupt a unitary, all-absorbing official story of the past,” whether “to restore a 
collective memory suppressed under dictatorship” or “insist on the plurality of 
memory groups as against a homogenizing national narrative.”445 
In modern communities and states in which an open and controversial 
discourse on history (or at least the possibility to it) exist and where “principles 
and norms are reappropriated and reiterated” by all participants in the discourse 
on history and the past, mythologization of the past can arguably be prevented. 
In such communities the process of identity-formation and self-perception can 
only proceed on the ground of discussion and negotiation in the public sphere.446 
It is possible to hypothyze that in societies with a functioning public 
sphere the official memory, notwithstanding its stability, will be able to respond 
to changing social assessments, demands and circumstances.447 On the contrary, 
the absence of a public sphere able to produce and broadcast social meanings in 
conjunction with the deliberate marginalization or absence of the groups able to 
create and transmit those meanings will block the possibility of retaining and 
reproducing of any collective memory version differing from the official one. 
The collective memory study can thus contribute to a better 
understanding of the political culture transformations in post-totalitarian 
contexts. The shift in political culture of post-totalitarian societies can be traced 
through the appearance of “multiple, diverse, and fluid memory discourses, with 
different institutional fields operating according to different rules and interacting 
with each other in different and shifting ways.” 448  
As noted previously, due to the repressive character of the former regime 
the problem of collective memory in post-totalitarian societies gains special 
significance. Such societies face responsibility of dealing with the legacy of its 
anti-human and profoundly criminal past. 
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As we are trying to analyze the implications of democratic transitions the 
question of responsibility and establishment of a state based on new values 
different from those practiced by totalitarian regime also gains importance. The 
values of human life and human dignity require elaborating new identity which 
is inconceivable without comprehension of the essence of the repressive past, 
learning from the country’s history and remembering it in full. 
According to the French historian and political scientist Bruno Groppo, 
the problem of a new national identity in the former dictatorships is inextricably 
linked with the issue of working through their repressive pasts. Groppo argues 
that the society which intends to be called democratic cannot refuse requital, 
ignore the necessity of redemption and making the judgment, punishing the 
responsible for crimes and murders otherwise the very bases of the public 
contract will be threatened. A traumatic past cannot be mastered or overcome as 
long as the society refuses to analyze it in full, to establish the truth about the 
crimes, to condemn the responsible and, to the extent that it is possible, to 
indemnify the victims. Impunity of those who bear the responsibility for the 
crimes accomplished during the dictatorship undermines the basis of a 
democratic society.449 
The German term ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’, that used to be translated 
into English as ‘overcoming’ or ‘mastering the past’, has been commonly used to 
describe public confrontation with the National Socialist past in postwar West 
Germany and attempts to ‘come to terms with’ this past. The German historian 
Helmut König defined the concept of Vergangenheitsbewältigung as a set of actions 
and knowledge on the basis of which new democracies refer to the predecessor 
states, perceive structural, personal and mental legacy of totalitarian regimes, 
and are working through their own history.450  
Another concept of ‘working through the past’ (Aufarbeitung der 
Vergangenheit) put forward by the philosopher Theodor Adorno in the postwar 
period had a connotation of an ongoing, open-ended obligation. In the 1967 
publication The Inability to Mourn (Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern) the German 
psychologists Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich also stated the necessity of 
the active process of ‘remembering, repeating, working through’ (‘erinnern, 
wiederholen, durcharbeiten’) – originally drawn from Freudian psychology – with 
relation to memory of the National Socialist past.451 
                                                 
449 Groppo, Bruno. Kak byt’ s “temnym” istoricheskim proshlym? (Dealing with a “Dark” 
Historical Past) // The Public Lecture, Moscow, 25 February, 2005.  
<http://www.polit.ru/lectures/2005/02/25/groppo.html> 
450 König, Helmut. Erinnern und vergessen // Osteuropa, № 6, 2008. pp. 27-40. 
451 Pearce, Caroline. Contemporary Germany and the Nazi legacy: Remembrance, Politics and the 
Dialectic of Normality. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
 146 
The Russian philosopher and philologist Sergei Averintsev also shared a 
belief that Vergangenheitsbewältigung, mastering the past or overcoming the 
totalitarian past is the task that all nations that have gone through a totalitarian 
experience have to face.452 
As argued in the previous chapter, transition to democracy should be 
expressed in the change of values and norms and in the formation of a 
democratic political culture. In a post-totalitarian society, however, there is 
another, no less important criterion of democratization – working through the 
criminal past carried out in the public sphere. Orientation to democracy in the 
state which had a repressive, antihuman regime at office should be expressed in 
the active public work aimed at barring the way to this past’s repetition. This 
work can be considered successful no sooner than anti-totalitarian consensus 
starts to dominate in the public opinion. 
In this chapter I will focus on the ways post-totalitarian West German and 
Russian societies dealt with their respective repressive pasts. At first, I will 
present an overview of the ways the dominant collective memory narratives of 
the Nazi and Soviet pasts developed in the corresponding national contexts, 
highlighting the most vivid and symbolically important events, public speeches, 
etc. Then I will turn to analysis of these developments focusing on the issues of 
(1) unidimensionality vs plurality of collective memory discourses; (2) the role of 
collective memory in forming national identities; (3) the problem of 
institutionalization and transmission of memory.  
My major interest would be in finding out what memory discourses 
emerged and how they impacted both the political culture and national identity 
of each analyzed society. 
 
4.2 Collective Memory of the Nazi Past in West Germany 
 
4.2.1 1950s  
 
As a result of military defeat, total surrender and transition under the control of 
the occupation authorities, postwar Germany suffered the strongest complex of 
national defeat – political, economic, social, and personal. Soon after the end of 
World War II the Allied authorities launched the denazification program in the 
occupied country. By the middle of July 1945 tens thousand high ranking officers 
of the Elite Guard (SS), the Security Agency (SD) of the SS, the Secret State Police 
(Gestapo), local leaders of the Nazi Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche 
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Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP), security guards of concentration camps, high ranking 
Nazi officials had been arrested. All in all by the beginning of 1947 the American 
authorities had removed 292,089 persons from public or important private 
institutions and excluded an additional 81,673, while the British removed 186,692 
and excluded 104,106.453 
The International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg established in 
pursuance of the Agreement signed on 8 August, 1945 by the governments of the 
United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the 
Provisional Government of the French Republic was vested with power to try 
and punish persons who committed crimes against peace, war crimes or/and 
crimes against humanity.454 The IMT indicted twenty-four Nazi leaders on four 
counts: conspiracy to wage aggressive war, crimes against peace, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity, defined as “murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds.”455 
Additionally, several Nazi organizations, including the Reich Cabinet, the 
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Elite Guard (SS), and the Secret State 
Police (Gestapo) were declared criminal, and the General Staff and High 
Command of the Nazi government were condemned by the Tribunal as “a 
ruthless military caste.” 
As for the German public, the overwhelming majority of Germans 
regarded the end of war not as liberation from the Nazi rule, but as a national 
catastrophe, a terrible tragedy of state destruction and military defeat. 
Consequently, people lapsed into self-pity and self-justification. In the middle of 
the postwar devastation, they were more interested in the exigencies of day-to-
day survivals than in learning the truth about the Nazi crimes, unveiled during 
the denazification program and especially during the 1945-46 Tribunal. Most 
Germans either rejected or perceived the so-called victor’s justice of the 
Nuremberg trials with considerable suspicion, believing that the ‘collective guilt’ 
argument and the idea of citizens’ responsibility for the crimes of Nazism were 
imposed on them by the Allies – the winners in the war. Consequently the 
condemnation of the Nazi leaders by the Nuremberg Tribunal was viewed not as 
a fair punishment for the crimes, but merely as the result of military defeat. Since 
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the fall of 1945 the counter-thesis about collective innocence of Germans as the 
people seduced and then betrayed by the Nazis started taking root.  
Describing Germans’ postwar state of mind in 1945-6, the philosopher 
Karl Jaspers observed, “The horizon has shrunk. People do not like to hear of 
guilt, of the past; world history is not their concern. They simply do not want to 
suffer any more; they want to get out of this misery, to live but not to think. 
There is a feeling as though after such fearful suffering one had to be rewarded, 
as it were, or at least comforted, but not burdened with guilt on top of it all.”456 
The historian Jürgen Kocka has written that in 1945 “people tried to survive 
in the ruins. The horizon got narrower. You weren’t making world history any 
more.., instead you were standing in line for rations and exchanging coffee for 
margarine...”457 Two years later, in April 1947, the publicist Eugen Kogon 
described the state of German society as follows: “Millions and millions in this 
country of ruins and intolerable psychic and physical suffering are trying to 
understand the sense of what is going on. But the majority wishes to know 
nothing about true interrelation and deep sense of events.... This part of the 
nation wishes to recognize nothing. And it actually looks so as if it was the 
largest part of the German nation. And day by day it is only growing...”458  
In the summer of 1947 the weekly Die Zeit acknowledged that the socially-
psychological situation of that time was defined by “the annulment of the past 
from collective memory” manifested in a general attitude: “I need not know 
about all these, I have absolutely different cares.”459 
Hannah Arendt, who in 1950 highlighted Germans’ inability to confront 
the past, their repression of its most unbearable aspects, and silence about its 
most appalling crimes, wrote: “But nowhere is this nightmare of destruction and 
horror less felt and less talked about than in Germany itself. A lack of response is 
evident everywhere, and it is difficult to say whether this signifies a half-
conscious refusal to yield to grief or a genuine inability to feel. Amid the ruins, 
Germans mail each other picture postcards still showing the cathedrals and 
market places, the public buildings and bridges that no longer exist. And the 
indifference with which they walk through the rubble has its exact counterpart in 
the absence of mourning for the dead, or in the apathy with which they react, or 
rather fail to react, to the fate of the refugees in their midst. This general lack of 
emotion, at any rate this apparent heartlessness, sometimes covered over with 
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cheap sentimentality, is only the most conspicuous outward symptom of a deep-
rooted, stubborn, and at times vicious refusal to face and come to terms with what really 
happened.”460 
Arendt, thus, linked a lack of reaction to the destruction to inability to 
mourn the dead or to confront what happened. Later she suggested that twelve 
years under “totalitarian” rule and subsequent destruction destroyed Germans’ 
ability to speak. This repression of the past and silence about it were inextricably 
linked in her very pessimistic account of the postwar period and its prospects.461  
The historian Helmut Dubiel also observed that most West Germans were 
unified by their unwillingness to accept any responsibility for the past, their self-
identification as victims - of National Socialism, bombs, and the Red Army - and 
their demands for the release of those deemed guilty by the postwar tribunals of 
the Allies.462 
Such victimization, concentration on German sufferings at the expense of 
the sufferings of the real victims of the Third Reich can be regarded as a 
defensive strategy of responsibility avoidance. Indeed, the more Germany was 
seen as a victim, the more difficult it was to for Germans feel moral responsibility 
for their real roles in the Holocaust and the Second World War. In pursuing this 
path of “collective amnesia” and victimization people used different defensive 
strategies such as avoidance, repression, denial, a selective remembering 
(Moeller 2003), a type of negative memory (Bodemann 1998), deliberate 
diversion and displacement onto other topics that could diffuse the issues of the 
past and guilt. 
These general attitudes inevitably got reflected in the West German 
politics of the late 1940s and 1950s. Since the founding of the Federal Republic in 
1949, West Germany’s political leaders focused on democracy, stability and 
integration with the West, which took precedence over critical reflection on the 
past. Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic, was of the 
view that, to quote Jeffrey Herf, “democracy was possible, provided that it was 
inaugurated by a period of silence about the crimes of the Nazi past.”463 Herf 
underscored that German politicians had learned quickly that an open attempt to 
come to terms with the past antagonized a significant bloc of voters that could 
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make the difference in elections. The lesson was that one could speak openly 
about the Nazi past or win national elections, but not both.464 
Moreover, as Wulf Kansteiner observed, Adenauer pursued politics of 
history that combined “extreme leniency” for the Nazi perpetrators with general 
“normative distancing from National Socialism.”465 For the purposes of social 
stability and integration with the West, Adenauer and the members of his 
administration sought to settle accounts quickly with perpetrators and victims. 
They acknowledged many victims of Nazism, including the vast majority of the 
German population, but recognized only a very small number of Nazi 
perpetrators.466  
Indeed, under Adenauer there was a wide-scale amnesty of war criminals 
and many former Nazis were allowed to resume their previous positions, 
particularly in the teaching, legal and medical professions. The ‘131 Law’, for 
example, granted pensions and the possibility of re-employment to 150,000 
persons who had been employed in the civil service or armed forces in 1945. 
Adenauer even appointed some former Nazis to his Cabinet, including Hans 
Globke, who was a key figure in formulating the Nuremberg Race Laws. Such 
approach to the politics of memory let Norbert Frei use the term “politics of the 
past” (Vergangenheitspolitik) to describe “the amnesty and integration of former 
supporters of the Third Reich and the normative split from National Socialism” 
at that period.467 
As Caroline Pearce summed it up, by the mid-1950s, German atrocities in 
the Second World War had largely been reduced to a myth of demonization, 
whereby Hitler and a few associates were deemed responsible and the rest of the 
nation were portrayed as ‘politically “seduced” individuals, who had ultimately 
even themselves become “victims” of the war and its consequences’.468 
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The politics of memorialization also reflected the general understanding 
of victimhood. Instead of erecting monuments and memorials to the victims of 
Nazism, in 1952 the ‘Memorial for the Expelled Ethnic Germans’ was erected in 
Berlin, listing the cities ‘lost’ after the war, such as Danzig and Köningsberg.469 
The erection of such a monument was symptomatic of where the immediate 
postwar commemorative sympathies of many Germans were.470 
Additionally, the official postwar language of memory vividly abounded 
in general and vague formulas about “unspeakable crimes” committed “in the 
name of the German people” and equally vague appeals to remember human 
suffering have informed countless official speeches directed at the citizens of the 
Federal Republic and foreign observers since the 1950s.471 
Jeffrey Olick, who conducted a qualitative discourse analysis on public 
speeches by the West German political leaders over four decades from 1949 till 
1989, pointed to “a number of grammatical, syntactical, and rhetorical moves 
that gird up the rejection of collective guilt, both in explicit arguments about it as 
well as in more passing portrayals of the past that reinforce it.”472 He noted that 
images of the past often employed passive constructions (e.g. “the crimes that 
were committed”). They were almost always actorless (e.g. “the misfortunes that 
met us”), or at very least perpetrated by an alien clique (e.g. “…National 
Socialism bestowed upon us,” or “megalomaniacal rulers brought us…”). The 
past was often portrayed as something wholly beyond human control, as with 
the frequent use of metaphors like “catastrophe” or “forces of destruction.”473 
Furthermore, descriptions of what exactly went on in the concentration camps – 
beyond vague references like “destruction” or “what happened to the Jews” or 
“all that” – are rare.”474  
According to Olick, “The accumulation of such rhetorical patterns 
accomplishes substantially more than simply to repudiate the collective guilt 
thesis. To describe an abstract, impersonal, organizations, or isolated social force 
as the origin of events separates the common people as well as most elites from 
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connection to what happened; there is no bond with the perpetrators (whatever 
the facts of their popularity may have been). Characterizing the events with 
naturalistic metaphors reinforces that it was beyond control of the audience. And 
the lack of anything more than vague reference to the specificity of the crimes 
passes up the opportunity to forge a sympathetic bond with the victims, while a 
more evocative language is reserved for focusing attention on the suffering of the 
common German, exactly those whose support the new government requires.”475 
Olick pointed to the fact that both first leaders of the Federal Republic – 
the first chancellor Konradt Adenauer (in office 1949-1963) and the first Federal 
President Theodor Heuss (1949-1959) – spent substantial time in their inaugural 
speeches (Regierungserklärung) constructing, discussing, and distancing 
themselves from images of the past. 
In his 1949 inaugural address Adenauer, for example, focused on German 
suffering, the unfairness of the German situation, and on what needs to be done 
to reestablish Germany’s image as a reliable nation. Speaking about the German 
prisoners of war he mentioned that “the fate of these millions of Germans, who 
now for years have born the bitter lot of captivity, is so heavy, the suffering of 
their families in Germany so great, that all people must help finally to give back 
these captives and displaced to their homeland and families.”476 Similar was the 
focus of President Heuss in his 1949 inaugural address as well as in his later 
speeches. In one of his official statements on occasion of the Federal Republic’s 
sovereignty on 5 May, 1955, for instance, he mentioned the shame “into which 
Hitler had forced us Germans,” locating thus the blame in Hitler’s hands and 
presenting the German people as having this fate forced upon them.477 
Similarly, in the speech opening the constituent session of the new 
German Parliament in Bonn on 7 September, 1949 Paul Löbe vaguely mentioned 
“a tremendous amount of guilt” (Riesenmass an Schuld) that a criminal system has 
burdened us with.”478 When speaking about victims, he stressed the sufferings of 
German prisoners of war, widows, and expellees, remembered the war-dead 
from other countries in passing and did not mention Jewish victims at all.  
Both Jeffrey Olick and Helmut Dubiel (who reviewed the debates of the 
West German parliament, the “membrane between state and society,” from its 
founding in 1949 through the end of the 1990s) agreed that the leaders of the new 
Federal Republic spent great energy rejecting theses of collective guilt and 
                                                 
475 Ibid. 
476 Olick, Jeffrey K. 1993. Op. cit. p. 102. 
477 Ibid. 
478 Löbe, Paul. Rede als Alterspräsident des ersten Deutschen Bundestages, 7. September 1949 
<www.mitmischen.de/index.php/Common/Document/field/pdffile/id/7026/filename/Paul+L%F6b
e+zur+Er%F6ffnung+der+ersten+Sitzung+des+Bundestages+(1949).pdf> 
 153 
responsibility. It was preferable to portray the German nation as wretched and 
suffering. A suffering was perceived to be brought about by a small criminal 
clique led by Adolf Hitler. 
Importantly, as Olick underscored, the strategies of remembering aimed at 
leaving the uncomfortable past behind as quickly as possible recurred not only 
throughout the Adenauer era, but across other times and in different contexts. 
They mixed with other elements and other issues in different circumstances, 
constituting, however, an enduring pattern in the rejection of collective guilt, 
which used to form an important part of West German political culture. 
Generations of German politicians, intellectuals and consumers have spent an 
extraordinary amount of time and effort, of elaborate avoidance and selective 
confrontation to advance a state of normalization and historicization.479 
 
Nevertheless, although the trajectory of memory aimed at forgetting and 
leaving behind the Nazi past as quickly as possible was dominant in the early 
postwar period it was not the only memory narrative even at that point. It is 
noteworthy that there developed from the very start another trajectory 
challenging the defensive and apologetic official memory narrative.  
In a radio address broadcast to Germany on 8 May, 1945 Germany’s most 
famous living writer, Thomas Mann, who spent the period of the Nazi rule in 
exile, declared that “our shame lies open to the eyes of the world,” and that 
“everything German, everyone who speaks German, writes German, has lived in 
Germany, is affected by this shameful revelation.” “Humanity shudders in 
horror at Germany!” said Mann.480 
As early as 1946, the publications by the eminent German philosophers 
such as Karl Jaspers’s Question of Guilt (Die Schuldfrage) and Friedrich Meinecke’s 
The German Catastrophe (Deutsche Katastrophe) also called on Germans to reflect on 
the Nazi past and shape a new future. Importantly, in his work, which was 
actually a course of lectures taught at Heidelberg University in 1945-46, Jaspers 
provided a terminology for subsequent thinking about the issue of guilt and 
responsibility of Germans for the Nazi past. The philosopher distinguished 
among four different kinds of guilt: criminal (for violations of law), political (for 
acts of one’s state), moral (for submission to immoral orders), and metaphysical 
(for human depravity in general). With this exhaustive typology, it was clear that 
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for Jaspers everyone bore some guilt for what had happened, whether because 
one had committed crimes, tolerated those crimes, or simply existed within a 
society in which such things could occur.481 
Along with political and criminal responsibility for the evil deeds Jaspers 
particularly emphasized the significance of moral responsibility of each person: 
“It is never simply true that “orders are orders.” Rather – as crimes even though 
ordered (although, depending on the degree of danger, blackmail and terrorism, 
there may be mitigating circumstances) – so every deed remains subject to moral 
judgment.”482 The philosopher also tried to convince his fellow citizens in the 
“truthfulness” and “right” of the Nuremberg trial: “The national disgrace lies not 
in the tribunal but in what brought it on – in the fact of this regime and its acts. 
The consciousness of national disgrace is inescapable for every German. It aims 
in the wrong direction if turning against the trial rather than its cause.”483 
Jaspers believed the process of national self-judgment and national self-
criticism to be crucial for the future of Germany. In this context, the philosopher 
called his contemporaries to dialogue, to the national consent, to overcoming of 
barriers of bias and mistrust, to learning “to see things from the other’s point of 
view” and “to talk with each other.” For, according to Jaspers, only “in learning 
to talk with each other we win more than a connecting link between us. We lay 
the indispensable foundation for the ability to talk with other peoples.”484  
Undoubtedly Jaspers’ book became a remarkable phenomenon in a 
cultural life of the postwar Germany its force being in appeal to personal 
responsibility of every individual – the appeal ignored at that moment by the 
majority of his contemporaries eager to get back safely to the old ways.  
Eugen Kogon was one of the first German critics to suggest that what was 
happening in West Germany was rather a “restoration” than a “renewal.” In 1947 
he wrote: “The old ways continue, they have not been eliminated; through 
mistakes, failures, weakness, and all sorts of stupidity on all sides, they are 
poisoning existence and crippling our thought, our actions, they besmirch our 
feelings, they overshadow all hope.”485 A year later Kogon’s evaluation was 
largely confirmed in an opinion poll suggesting that 57 percent of Germans 
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living in the Western occupation zones believed that National Socialism was “a 
good idea but badly carried out idea.”486 
This belief in the foundation of the Federal Republic to be a restoration 
rather than a new beginning, a continuity rather than a rupture, was shared by 
other representatives of the West German intellectual elite. One of them, the 
journalist Walter Dirks, who in 1950 was writing about what he called “the 
restorative character of the epoch” (“der restaurative Charakter der Epoche”), 
suggested that “the recreation of the old world has occurred with such force that 
all we can do right now is accept it as a fact of life.”487 Five years later Kogon 
wrote again that, “Restoration […] exactly reflects our social condition,” 
suggesting that the West German restoration implied a politics “of traditional 
‘values,’ means and forms of thought, of seeming certainties, of the recreation of 
well known interests as much as possible, a politics of lack of imagination.”488 
As Dirk Moses underscored, by the mid-1950s left-wing commentators 
observed with dismay the reestablishment of the old elites and the resurgence of 
ex-Nazis in public life, in different professions, and in the economy after the very 
popular amnesty laws of 1949 for war criminals (including Einsatzgruppen 
commanders), and especially after the 131 law of 1951 that permitted “burdened” 
civil servants to reclaim their jobs. They were speaking of a creeping 
“renazification” and arguing that a moral cleansing and a radical new political 
beginning did not occur. “What our reality is can be seen in the tenured judge 
who broke the law, doctors who once worked in the euthanasia programs and 
now practice privately, pampered functionaries of a brutal state who now again 
have a state function,” wrote the novelist, the member of the literary Gruppe 47 
Siegfried Lenz.489 Another member of this group, the writer Wolfdieter Schnürre, 
in turn, noted: “Soon the Nazis, who were never really removed from power and 
who were declared harmless by the law, inherited the democracy and, with the 
camouflage of bonhomie and joviality, trickled into the public offices, the 
economy, politics, justice, journalism, medicine, the arts, and academia.”490 
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Contemporary historian Karl Dietrich Bracher pointed out that the 
integration of these people had dire consequences for public culture. The Social 
Democrat Hans Tietegens commented that “When concentration camps are 
supposed to be made up for by autobahns, something must be wrong with the 
spiritual-intellectual (seelisch-geistig) economy.” The Deutsche Universitäts-Zeitung 
also worried in 1952 about intellectual conformity of “planned opinion 
formation” due to nationalist resentments and prejudices.491 
The philosopher Jürgen Habermas was also indignant that Germans did 
not take seriously enough the crimes that had been committed by many of them 
and in their collective name and by integration of the former Nazis into the new 
political order. For him, thus, the foundation of the Federal Republic was hardly 
the new, moral beginning for which he had hoped: “The first great political 
disappointment came with the formation of the government in 1949,” wrote 
Habermas later.492 
Already in the 1940s the first artistic attempts to come to terms with the 
criminal past took place. In 1945-46 Wolfgang Staudte directed the first postwar 
film The Murderers Are Among Us (Die Mörder sind unter uns) dealing with 
German responsibility for mass killings of civilians in the occupied territories on 
the Eastern Front. 
It is also noteworthy that during the 1940s and 1950s important records of 
the Nazi crimes in the form of personal accounts of the Holocaust survivors 
started to appear. For instance, the article Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme 
Situations by the Austrian-Jewish psychologist Bruno Bettelheim who spent 
eleven months in 1938-39 in Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camps saw 
light as early as 1943. It was followed by Vassily Grossman’s 1944 publication 
The Hell of Treblinka (Ad Treblinki), in which the Russian war reporter collected 
some of the first eyewitness accounts of the survivors, as well as presented 
descriptions of the Nazi-German Treblinka and Majdanek extermination camps 
and of the Nazi ethnic cleansing in German occupied Ukraine and Poland. 
Notably, Grossman’s article was disseminated at the Nuremberg War Crimes 
Tribunal as evidence for the prosecution.  
In 1946 a book on the SS-State (Der SS-Staat, das System der deutschen 
Konzentrationslager) by an avowed opponent of Nazism and a former 
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Buchenwald prisoner Eugen Kogon became one of the first accounts of the 
German camp system. Simultaneously, another account of the concentration 
camp universe was presented in 1946 L'Univers concentrationnaire by the 
Buchenwald camp survivor, a French writer David Rousset. 
 Another influential eyewitness’s account could be found in the 1946 book 
Man's Search for Meaning (Ein Psycholog erlebt das Konzentrationslager) by an 
Austrian-Jewish neurologist and psychiatrist Viktor Frankl who spent almost 
two years and a half in several Nazi concentration camps. A year later an Italian-
Jewish chemist and writer Primo Levi wrote his first book If This is a Man (Se 
questo è un uomo, 1947) chronicling his experiences as an Auschwitz concentration 
camp inmate. A German translation of the 1947 book The Human Species (L'Espèce 
humaine) by a former inmate of Buchenwald, Gandersheim and Dachau, a French 
writer Robert Antelme appeared in 1949. Other important survival narratives 
included The Diary of Anne Frank, published in Germany in 1950, as well as some 
of the Elie Wiesel’s novels, the best known of which was Night (1958), that were 
based on his experiences as a prisoner in the Auschwitz and Buchenwald 
concentration camps.493 
In 1955 the German public could get acquainted with the German 
translation of the first systematic research of totalitarian regimes The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (1951), performed by a German-Jewish political theorist Hannah 
Arendt who managed to escape Nazi Germany to the United States in 1941. In 
this research Arendt traced the roots of Stalinist Communism and Nazism and 
revealed important structural similarities between the two regimes.494 In this 
connection, one should also mention the appearance in 1956 of the German 
edition of Gerald Reitlinger’s research The Final Solution: The Attempt to 
Exterminate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945 (Die Endlösung: Hitlers Versuch der 
Ausrottung der Juden Europas 1939 - 1945).  
The extensive research of German society continued after some members 
of the Frankfurt School (Frankfurter Schule) such as Theodor W. Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer returned to Germany from exile after the war to continue their work 
at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt am Main. The 
Institute was reopened in 1950 and in 1951 the researchers from the Frankfurt 
School launched a “group study” that aimed to create a kind of psychological 
profile of Germans. This work actually continued the study conducted by 
Adorno and his American colleagues Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, 
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and Nevitt Sanford from the University of California, Berkeley on Authoritarian 
Personality (1950).  
The results of the Frankfurt School research, showing that the majority of 
Germans still considered Hitler to be one of the greatest Germans in history after 
the first chancellor of the united German empire Otto von Bismarck, were 
published in 1955 and received then minimal attention. However, the quality of 
the research, as well as the activeness, devotion and competence of its leaders, 
made the Frankfurt School “an academic and moral compass to a young federal 
republic.”495 
 
* * * 
 
As the brief overview of the memory discourses that have emerged in the 
first postwar decade reveals, the historical culture of the Federal Republic of 
Germany since its foundation has followed two closely intertwined but 
diametrically opposed trajectories represented by the two opposing political 
languages. In his recent study on German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past, the 
intellectual historian Dirk Moses underscored that although both languages were 
generally committed to a German republic, they had, at the same time, very 
different political visions of its future. Trying to fashion narratives of legitimacy 
for their respective visions both groups laid claims to the German past, 
interpreting it in a strikingly different manner. To put it another way, in their 
debates postwar German intellectual and political elites utilized two languages 
of republicanism. Moses defined them as “redemptive” and “integrative” 
languages, the former expressing the “Non-German German” wish for a republic 
separated from corrupted national traditions, and the latter articulating the 
“German German” imperative for positive, national continuities.496 
Thus, redemptive republicans argued for a purely ahistorical political 
identity; they regarded German national subjectivity as irredeemably polluted, 
and sought to construct a political community cleansed of national ideals and 
values. It was to recast Germans as essentially non-German, that is, as European 
citizens of a republic, as bearers of “postconventional” or “postnational” 
identity.497 
The alternative reaction of conservative politicians and intellectuals 
(whom Moses calls “integrative republicanists”) was primarily defensive. It was 
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to protect the integrity of the national ideal by ascribing the causes of the disaster 
to another source. It created narratives to prove that German history before 1945 
had not been a one-way street to 1933 or 1941 in order to permit Germans to 
retain basic trust in their history, to feel good about being German despite the 
Nazism and the Holocaust so that German nationality would not be stigmatized. 
While left-wing intellectuals persisted in wanting Germans to abandon national 
identity altogether, their conservative counterparts, resisted the leftist 
stigmatization of German history and identity by entreating traditions as 
trustworthy sources of identification.498 
The interpretations of the role and origins of the National Socialism were 
also polarized. From the conservative perspective, Nazism was a totalitarian 
movement designed and brought about by a small criminal clique (e.g., Gerhard 
Ritter). Consequently, the Nazi era was regarded as a total break in German 
history and Germans in this assessment were seen as victims of Nazism. The left-
liberals, in turn, argued in favor of a Sonderweg, conception of German history 
that saw National Socialism as the inevitable result of the way German society 
had developed (e.g.,  Fritz Fischer, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Hans Mommsen). 
Different approaches to the past determined the different key points they 
highlighted. If the left-wing liberal thought used to focus on the victims and 
survivors of the Third Reich and Holocaust (Jews, Gypsies, mentally disabled, 
the Soviet POWs, etc.) and to engage – to a greater or lesser extent – with the 
problem of bystanders and perpetrators of the “Final Solution,” the conservative 
mind-set generally either equated all victims within all-victims-together 
paradigm, or ignored the suffering of anyone but the German people who could 
be portrayed as the victims of the Third Reich, the Soviet Army, or the Allied 
bombings. In this victimization paradigm the German POWs, expellees from the 
Eastern territories, the victims of the Allied bombings, etc. became major focus of 
attention. 
Complaints about too much memory have also been regularly heard from 
the conservative camp whose representatives used to demand that Germany be 
allowed to become a “normal nation” and that the tainted past be finally 
“mastered,” i.e. left behind (notably, in the article that actually triggered the 
Historians’ Dispute of the mid-1980s Ernst Nolte lamented The Past That Will Not 
Pass). 
Left-wing liberals (e.g., Jürgen Habermas, Theodor Adorno, etc.), in turn, 
strongly argued against the move toward closure (Schlussstrich) or “mastery” 
(Bewältigung) of the past, believing it was absolutely essential to sustain the 
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memory of the Holocaust as a part of the German present. Furthermore, they 
preferred the Adorno’s notion of ‘working through the past’ (Aufarbeitung der 
Vergangenheit) to ‘mastering’ or ‘coming to terms’ with the past 
(Vergangenheitsbewältigung) and insisted that this dynamic process should be an 
ongoing, open-ended obligation.  
Certainly, individual attitudes and assessments were not always 
ideologically determined. They could transcend ideological lines and party 
politics to a degree, running along the fault-lines of generational difference, 
family background or even simply diversity of personal opinions. Nevertheless, 
the right-wing dichotomy has been very typical of debates on the National 
Socialist past in Germany in the postwar period.499 
It is noteworthy also that this dichotomy was, to an extent, generationally 
determined. If the apologetic, defensive memory was particularly pronounced 
among the conservative members of the war generation who had experienced 
the Third Reich as adults, the second mind-set reflected the approach of the 
liberal members the postwar generation who were born during or after the war. 
As for the representatives of the so-called Hitler Youth generation, born between 
1922 and 1932 and socialized in the youth organizations of the Third Reich, they 
were actually split between the two mind-sets. Moses convincingly proved that 
of all three the paradigm of the Hitler Youth generation, which representatives 
actually entered the postwar academia, the legal profession and subsequently 
political arena in the 1960s-1980s, had the greatest impact on Germany’s 
infrastructure of cultural memory.500 The survey of the birth dates of the leading 
intellectuals of the two ideological camps appears to confirm the truthfulness of 
this argumentation for the representatives of the Hitler Youth generation indeed 
seem to dominate in both groups. 
Among the most prominent ‘Non-German German’ left-liberal 
intellectuals were the leftist publicists Eugen Kogon (b. 1903), Walter Dirks (p. 
1901), Rudolf Augstein (b. 1923), the writers, primarily members of the literary 
circle The Gruppe 47, Hans Werner Richter (b. 1908), Siegfried Lenz (b. 1926), 
Alfred Andersch (b. 1914), Günter Grass (b. 1927), Heinrich Böll (b. 1917), 
Wolfdieter Schnürre (b. 1920); the sociologists Ludwig von Friedeburg (b. 1923) 
and Ralf Dahrendorf (b. 1929), the political scientists Peter von Oertzen (b. 1924), 
Werner Hoffmann (b. 1922), Kurt Lenk (b. 1929), and Jürgen Seifert (b. 1928), the 
philosophers Karl Jaspers (b. 1883), Theodor Adorno (b. 1903) and Jürgen 
Habermas (b. 1929); the psychoanalytics Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich 
(b. 1908 and 1917); the educator Hans Tietgens (b. 1922); the historians Hans-
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Ulrich Wehler (b. 1931), Fritz Fischer (b. 1908), Jürgen Kocka (b. 1941), Hans 
Mommsen (b. 1930), Martin Broszat (b. 1926), Heinrich August Winkler (b. 1938), 
Eberhard Jäckel (b. 1929), Wolfgang Scheffler (b.1929) and Wolfgang Mommsen 
(b. 1930).  
On the other, conservative, side were the historians Ernst Nolte (b. 1923), 
Andreas Hillgruber (b. 1925), Karl Dietrich Bracher (b. 1922), Hellmut Diwald (b. 
1924), Klaus Hildebrand (b. 1941), Rainer Zitelmann (b. 1957), Hagen Schulze (b. 
1943), and Michael Stürmer (b. 1939); the political scientist Wilhelm Hennis (b. 
1923), the writer Martin Walser (b. 1927), the philosopher Hermann Lübbe (b. 
1926), the journalist Joachim Fest (b. 1926), to name just a few. 
As noted previously, from the end of the Second World War until the late 
1950s the conservative trajectory of memory dominated the public sphere. 
However, this situation got gradually changed in the following decade. And 
from that point onward the historical culture of the Federal Republic represented 
an on-going confrontation, interaction, clashes of the two antagonistic but 
dialectically related – conservative and liberal – collective memories of the 
traumatic past. 
 
4.2.2 1960s 
 
Many observers of the postwar West German memory development agree that 
the change of times in terms of collective memory transformation was marked by 
Theodor Adorno’s lecture entitled What Does Working Through the Past Mean? 
(Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit?) published and broadcasted over 
radio in 1959. This lecture posed a high critical standard for German political 
culture. According to Adorno, the Federal Republic was more concerned with 
getting beyond the past, with avoiding difficult memory through what Adorno 
called “an unconscious and not-so-unconscious defense against guilt,” than with 
the genuine working through that would be required to “break its spell.”501 The 
latter would demand an act of clear consciousness, a continual self-critical 
engagement a difficult process very similar to the work of psychoanalysis. 
Adorno’s concept of “working through” the past was drawn from the 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory, which conceptualized silence as a form of 
defensive suppression, withholding, a block to self-realization, and emphasized 
verbalization in the therapeutic situations as a means of achieving understanding 
and insight of the self and its modus operandi. Adorno transferred this 
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interpretation to the societal level opposing a critical self-reflection, i.e. a serious 
working upon the past, to the widespread defensiveness against guilt and 
general desire to close the books on the past. 
According to Adorno, the defensive unwillingness in the Federal Republic 
to confront its traumatic past – at both the personal and official levels – indicated 
not the persistence of fascist tendencies against democracy (such as neo-Nazi 
activism) but of fascist tendencies within democracy which in his view was 
potentially more menacing.502 
As Jeffrey Olick conceptualized, highly profound and influential Adorno’s 
analysis, emblematic of a growing shift in German political culture, formed part 
of the mood in which a new generation later challenged the structures, policies, 
and attitudes of the early Federal Republic, particularly regarding the memory of 
the Nazi period. Against earlier positions, this new mood emphasized 
continuities rather than ruptures between the Third Reich and the Federal 
Republic.503 
The late 1950s and early 1960s were also marked by an intellectual 
confrontation with such literary works as Heinrich Böll’s Billiards at Half Past 
Nine (Billard um halb zehn), Günter Grass’s The Tin Drum (Die Blechtrommel) and 
Uwe Johnson’s Speculations about Jakob (Mutmassungen über Jakob), all published 
in 1959 and breaking new ground with unapologetic examinations of German 
complicity with Nazism. Also, the publication of The Diary of Anne Frank, along 
with the play and film, provided Germans an emotional access to the Nazis’ 
victims. Likewise, Wolfgang Staudte’s film, Roses for the Public Prosecutor (Rosen 
für den Staatsanwalt, 1961) in a form of comedy presented the rehabilitation of the 
infamous Blutrichter, the Nazis’ judicial arm, in the postwar Federal Republic.504 
One should also bear in mind some important institutional changes in the 
sphere of memory politics that took place in the same period. The major 
institutional change occurred in 1958, when justice ministers of the federal states 
(Länder) came together to establish the Ludwigsburg Central Office of the State 
Judicial Authorities for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes (Zentrale 
Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen 
or Zentrale Stelle). The opening of such an institution was necessitated by an 
emerging awareness that a large number of Nazi crimes that had occurred 
outside Germany had remained uninvestigated. The fact became particularly 
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evident during the 1957-58 Ulm trial of Gestapo and SS officers responsible for 
crimes along the German-Lithuanian front.  
Established due to rather practical motivations and despite its apparent 
dissonance with other governmental strategies and attitudes with regard to the 
past, the Central Office in Ludwigsburg was to have a significant impact on the 
prosecution of war criminals and in bringing such issues before the public. 
In the years since 1958, the Central Office carefully researched the 
historical details of the Nazi genocide, focusing at the initial stage only on the 
crimes that occurred outside Germany and were committed against civilians and 
later extending its activity on investigations of all categories of war crimes 
without limitations in time or extent. All in all, since its formation, the Central 
Office has helped (sometimes in collaboration with foreign agencies) track down 
and prosecute almost 7,000 Nazi criminals. Due to the investigation work 
performed by this institution the Nazi past and the details of the “Final Solution” 
were again and again brought before the German public through a number of 
trials involving former personnel of the extermination camps.  
It is noteworthy that the attention of the German public was indeed being 
drawn to the problem of the Holocaust more and more frequently. The public 
attention was attracted, first, by a wave of anti-Semitic vandalism which 
occurred in 1958-60. News about the resurgence of anti-Semitic activity in 
Germany was followed in 1961 by the TV news on the Jerusalem trial of one of 
the chief ‘architects of the Holocaust,’ SS-Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann, 
who had been in charge of facilitating and managing the logistics of mass 
deportation of Jews to ghettos and extermination camps in German-occupied 
Eastern Europe. Furthermore, in 1963-65 Germans could follow the news on a 
series of the so-called Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials (der Auschwitz-Prozess) of the 
former Auschwitz-Birkenau death and concentration camp’s mid- to lower-level 
officials for their roles in the Holocaust. 
Both the highly televised Eichmann trial as well as the Frankfurt 
Auschwitz Trials, running from 20 December, 1963 to 10 August, 1965 and 
charging twenty two defendants under German penal law, presented in detail 
the horrors and scale of the Nazi genocide. Notably, in the course of the 
Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials approximately 360 witnesses were called, including 
around 210 survivors. During the trials the historians Helmut Krausnick, Hans-
Adolf Jacobsen, Hans Buchheim, and Martin Broszat, associated with the Munich 
Institute for Contemporary History (Institut für Zeitgeschichte) founded in 1949, 
wrote expert opinions for German courts, serving as expert witnesses for the 
prosecution. Their research helped settle legal disputes about compensation for 
victims of the Nazi regime and the reinstatement of former civil servants who 
had lost their positions during the Allied occupation. Additionally, especially in 
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the 1960s, they supported renewed efforts to bring Nazi perpetrators to trail. 
Their research for the courts formed the core of the first systematic German 
inquiries into the development of the “Final Solution” and the concentration 
camp universe.505 Subsequently, the information gathered by the historians 
served as the basis for their 1965 book, one of the first thorough surveys of the SS 
based on SS records, Anatomy of the SS State (Anatomie des SS-Staates).506 
The courts’ proceedings were largely public and served to bring many 
details of the Holocaust to the attention of the public in the Federal Republic and 
abroad. They inspired, for instance, the noted 1965 play The Investigation (Die 
Ermittlung) by Peter Weiss, which was composed of direct excerpts from the trial 
transcripts, and can be read as a catalogue of defense mechanisms, repressions, 
and excuses by perpetrators. Together with Rolf Hochhuth’s 1963 play The 
Deputy (Der Stellvertreter), criticizing the role of the Catholic Church during the 
war, Weiss’s play became an important cultural contribution to the development 
of the critical memory narrative in the 1960s.  
Importantly, the proceedings of the Eichmann trial were also reported in 
detail by such famous foreign authors as Harry Mulisch and Hannah Arendt, 
and the translations of their works in German followed immediately. Harry 
Mulisch’s Case 40/61 was published in Germany in 1962 and Hannah Arendt’s 
book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil based on her reports 
on the Eichmann trial for The New Yorker in 1963.507 
Despite the fact that most Germans (58 percent) continued to state they 
felt no guilt for the annihilation of the Jews, the detailed public presentation of, 
and attention to, the trial undoubtedly impacted attitudes towards the past in the 
West German society at large.508 The trials brought before the public, which now 
included a younger generation grown up after the war, a vivid and detailed 
picture of the appalling Nazi crimes and the overall brutality of the Nazi system 
of annihilation.509 It can be argued that the further changes of the West German 
political culture brought about largely by the representatives of the younger 
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generations of Germans have been conceived during this period of early 
confrontations with the Nazi past. 
An additional major moment of official confrontation with the horrors of 
Nazism presented itself in the 1965 Bundestag debates on persecutions of the 
Nazis and the Statute of Limitations (Verjährungsdebatten). According to the West 
German Basic Law, the statute of limitations on prosecuting Nazi criminals was 
to come into effect after twenty years what meant that after 8 May, 1965 it would 
no longer be possible to prosecute anyone for the crimes committed under the 
Nazi dictatorship. As a result of extensive public debates in the Bundestag, the 
limitation on prosecuting Nazi criminals was delayed for four more years. Then, 
in 1969, it was extended for another ten years until in 1979 the statute of 
limitations was finally eliminated altogether.510 
Their importance notwithstanding, the general effect of the 
abovementioned transformations in the public sphere appeared then quite 
limited and marginal. In fact, the selective judicial attempts of coming to terms 
with the past coexisted with a general, dispersive, and diverse inability and 
unwillingness to face the problem of the criminals and the criminal potential in 
the midst of modern German society. Observers who examined prosecutions of 
former perpetrators, the discourses surrounding the Eichmann and Auschwitz 
trials in the early 1960s, as well as the debates over the Nazi prosecutions and the 
statue of limitations of 1965 have generally agreed that the court decisions 
illustrated German society’s “peace with the perpetrators” and that the 
prosecutions constituted appeasement rather than confrontation, representing a 
legal policy which “most important objective was to avoid public debate.”511 In a 
recent study of these issues Marc von Miquel, for example, has argued that a new 
mode of addressing the Nazi past that emerged at that time used to stress legal 
over historical complicity and details over larger context. As a result, “Auschwitz 
could be discussed, but alongside new forms of silence.”512 
Indeed, the unwillingness to deal with perpetration was reflected in all 
spheres of Germany’s historical culture. One of the vivid and tragic examples of 
general unwillingness to confront the problem of the Nazi past was the Berlin 
Senate’s refusal in 1965 to support the project of the historian and Auschwitz 
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survivor Joseph Wulf who tried to create a Holocaust memorial and document 
center in the house where the 1942 Wannsee Conference had been held and 
where Reinhard Heydrich had announced Hitler’s decision to exterminate the 
Jews of Europe. Several days before Wulf, totally frustrated, committed suicide 
he had written to his son, “I have published 18 books about the Third Reich and 
they have had no effect. You can document everything to death for the Germans. 
There is a democratic regime in Bonn. Yet the mass murderers walk around free, 
live in their little houses, and grow flowers.”513 It is noteworthy that it took 
almost three decades for Wulf’s project to be finally realized in Berlin. 
The television programs of the 1960s also used to avoid any direct and 
self-critical engagement with the history of the “Final Solution,” providing only 
indirect and deflected glimpses of the Holocaust.514 The same avoidance of the 
issues of National Socialism and the Holocaust until right into the 1960s was 
characteristic of many German schools. As the curriculum for history lessons in 
Germany was treated chronologically, some teachers preferred to go through the 
syllabus in such a way that the most recent period of history could either no 
longer, or just cursorily, be dealt with at the end of compulsory education.515 So 
until the end of the 1960s the Nazi period either was not taught at all (the final 
examination followed the Bismarck era) or was treated totally unemotionally and 
superficially.516 
The recognition of the postwar eastern border along the Oder-Neisse line 
(actually lost by the postwar Germany following the decision of the Allied 
powers at the 1945 Potsdam Conference) as permanent was long regarded in the 
Federal Republic as unacceptable and the school atlases in the 1960s continued to 
present the prewar borders, marking the lands east of the Oder-Neisse line as 
being “administered by Poland.” 
As for the academic historians, the “Final Solution” was not their central 
research topic in the first postwar decades and most of them, with rare 
exceptions, adopted a defensive tone, arguing that the Holocaust had been but a 
doing of Hitler and his criminal clique. Such an ‘intentionalist’ view of the “Final 
Solution” seen as a result of a long-term plan going back to the foundations of 
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the Nazi Party in 1919 mostly associated with conservative historians was 
dominant in the first postwar decades.  
In the 1960s, however, this established paradigm began to be challenged 
by several left-liberal scholars such as the Hamburg historian Fritz Fischer and 
the representative of the so-called Bielefeld School Hans-Ulrich Wehler. These 
authors became the most famous proponents of the negative version of the 
Sonderweg (special path) thesis arguing that Nazism was the inevitable result of 
the German historical development and that the way German culture and society 
during the German Reich had developed inexorably culminated in the Third 
Reich. Both scholars agreed that the aggressive expansionist foreign policies of 
the German Empire (the ‘social imperialism,’ as Wehler put it), especially under 
Kaiser Wilhelm II (1888-1918) were a device that allowed the German 
government to distract public attention from domestic problems, to impede 
democratization and modernization, and to preserve the existing social and 
political order.517 
In Wehler’s opinion since 1871 the unified Germany retained values that 
were aristocratic, feudal, anti-democratic and pre-modern. Wehler also asserted 
that the effects of the traditional power elite to maintain power up to 1945 “and 
in many respects even beyond that” took the form of “a penchant for 
authoritarian politics; a hostility toward democracy in the educational and party 
system; the influence of preindustrial leadership groups, values and ideas; the 
tenacity of the German state ideology; the myth of the bureaucracy; the 
superimposition of caste tendencies and class distinctions; and the manipulation 
of political anti-Semitism.”518 
Fritz Fisher, in turn, was the first historian who challenged the widely 
shared opinion that held all European powers equally responsible for the 
outbreak of the First World War and provided evidence that the German side 
had been primarily responsible for the outbreak of the war due to particularly 
expansionist war aims of its government. In his groundbreaking 1961 book Griff 
nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegzielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914–1918 
(published in English as Germany’s Aims in the First World War), followed by his 
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other influential writings, he argued that Germany had deliberately instigated 
the First World War in an attempt to become a world power.519 
In the late 1960s some other historians, particularly in such influential 
works as Martin Broszat’s The Hitler State (1969) and Karl A. Schleunes’s The 
Twisted Road to Auschwitz (1970), continued to challenge the prevailing 
intentionalist interpretation of the Holocaust’s origin as a realization of a long-
term program or plan by a small group of Nazis led by Hitler. The 
representatives of the emerging in the late 1960s and early 1970s functionalist 
school of historiography actually revealed the active engagement of the medium 
and lower ranking German officials, representatives of businesses and civil 
servants in the making of the policies that led to the Holocaust casting thereby 
blame for the “Final Solutions” wider than it had been accepted before. 
 
Meanwhile the authoritarian tendencies in West German political life 
continued to prevail reaching their climax in the 1960s.520 They were most vividly 
manifested in the Spiegel Affair (Spiegel-Affäre) of 1962 when a dozen 
representatives of Der Spiegel magazine were illegally arrested for critical 
publications, the magazine’s offices and journalists’ homes were aggressively 
searched with thousands of documents being confiscated and the magazine 
being accused of treason.  
The same tendencies manifested, as noted previously, in the politics of the 
new coalition government run by the CDU Chancellor and former NSDAP 
member Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (in office 1966-1969). Despite the opposition, the 
government enacted in 1968 The German Emergency Acts which would allow it 
to limit civil rights, restrict freedom of movement and to limit privacy and 
confidentiality of telecommunications and correspondence in a case of 
emergency. The government also refused to recognize the postwar borders along 
Oder-Neisse line, to establish normal relationships with GDR and other Eastern 
neighbors, and repeatedly required the recognition of Germany’s right to possess 
nuclear weapons. 
Furthermore, the mid-1960s were marked by a growing activity of the 
radical right-wing groups. Since 1964, the neo-Nazis, i.e. the people opposing the 
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very idea of “overcoming” the Nazi past, possessed an organizational center the 
National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, 
NPD), which having lost the Bundestag elections, got nevertheless into Landtags of  
several federal states. 
This general tendency made some leading German intellectuals beat an 
alarm. The psychoanalysts Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich in their 1967 
publication The Inability to Mourn (Die Unfaehigkeut zu trauern) underscored the 
necessity of “a political working through of the past” and pointed to the failure 
of West Germany to fulfill it. The psychoanalysts claimed that in the Adenauer 
era, from 1949 to 1963, West Germans had collectively suppressed memories of 
their Nazi past and had failed to acknowledge the crimes committed in the name 
of National Socialism. As the authors asserted, “after the enormity of the 
catastrophe that lay behind it, […] the country seems to have exhausted its 
capacity to produce politically effective ideas”; as a result, political life froze into 
“mere administrative routine.”521 
Following Freudian theory and developing Adorno’s argumentation the 
Mitscherlichs stated the necessity of the active process of ‘remembering, 
repeating, working through’ (‘erinnern, wiederholen, durcharbeiten’) with relation 
to the memory of the National Socialist past. They argued that unless people 
confronted the past and worked through the memories and implications of what 
had happened they could not truly get beyond those memories and events. They 
compared this to mourning a death of a loved one; a process that needs to be 
worked through before one can move on with one’s life in a healthy way.522 
Importantly, the Mitscherlichs’ book was preceded by the 1966 
publications by Theodor Adorno Education after Auschwitz (Erziehung nach 
Auschwitz) and Karl Jaspers The Future of Germany (Wohin treibt die 
Bundesrepublik?). 
The essay of Adorno, initially broadcasted over radio, was devoted to the 
issue of the origin of Nazi crimes and the dangers of their repetition. Adorno 
analyzed in it social and psychological conditions which facilitate the formation 
of an “authoritarian personality” and transformation of a person into accessory, a 
participant in a crime or an executioner. Adorno formulated “the premier 
demand upon all education is that Auschwitz not happen again,” the task to 
create “an intellectual, cultural, and social climate in which a recurrence would 
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no longer be possible, a climate, therefore, in which the motives that led to the 
horror would become relatively conscious.”523 
In his book on The Future of Germany (Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?) 
Jaspers, who viewed the Third Reich as a criminal regime with which the 
mankind could not coexist, argued that prevention of the awful past recurrence 
required maximum “truth and veracity.” The philosopher regarded a true 
revolutionary change of the way of thinking as the major political and moral goal 
for the Federal Republic. He called on his compatriots to create “a clear, new 
historic consciousness”: “Today, after a great, fateful caesura, we have to make a 
new start in approaching our own history. The bare facts have not changed, but 
the emphasis has.”524 
Jaspers’ sharp critique of the West German conservative circles was 
caused by “a vacuum in political consciousness,” by forgetting the past, by the 
fear of the truth. According to the philosopher, the political and moral task to 
found a new state in 1945 had not been performed to that day: “It was much 
easier to restore our living conditions than to regain our freedom of thought and 
political will.”525 “The last twenty years have shown that the Germans have not 
changed,” concluded the author. The people did not become “democratically 
minded”: “We have a parliamentary from of government and call it democracy, 
although in its present run it obscures rather than stimulates a democratic spirit. 
It not only fails to appeal to the citizens’ sense of responsibility; it cripples it. It 
will not let them become citizens in the full sense of the word.”526  
Jaspers argued that people become ripe for democracy by becoming 
politically active and by accepting responsibility for solving concrete problems. 
In his view the “vacuum in political consciousness” manifested in the fact that 
Germans “still have no heartfelt political goals, no sense of standing on self-made 
ground, no inspiring will to freedom”, that they “still have neither roots nor an 
ideal in politics, no sense of where we come from or where we are going, and 
hardly a present concern other than with our private welfare, with the good life, 
and with security.”527 This state of things could be overcome, in his view, only by 
eliminating any untruth from the core of the national political consciousness, by 
wanting freedom on the basis of the instances found in German history, when 
freedom existed but fell into decay, and by addressing the tasks in the present 
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world situation. After all, he argued, “there is always a chance that ultimately 
man will conquer the unreason in himself.”528 
Notably, little by little intellectual, judicial, and social endeavors 
undertaken by intellectuals, civil society groups, and other social agents started 
taking root. The pursuit of “working through” the past that initially was a 
primarily intellectual preoccupation directed at relatively small audiences, 
became actually significantly amplified by the protest student movement of 1968. 
At that point even limited confrontation with the Nazi past was “no longer 
restricted to a discursive level but was increasingly anchored socioculturally.”529 
As Habermas’s former doctoral student Hauke Brunkhorst has written, 
“‘1968’ was the ‘hour of the intellectuals’ because for the first time in German 
history the socially critical role of intellectuals was institutionalized.”530 
Henceforth, as Dirk Moses conceptualized, politically committed professors and 
graduates in education, the media, and cultural life generally were in a position 
to effect the political culture of the Federal Republic and make it live up to the 
ideals contained in the Basic Law.531 
As discussed in Chapter 3, over the course of the 1960s West Germany’s 
campuses became the sites of protest against the establishment and status quo. In 
the mid-1960s student activists campaigned to reform Germany’s anachronistic 
universities and screen Nazi-tainted professors and administrators. As the size of 
the student protests grew, so did their scope and the students’ critique of the 
political system and German postwar society. The student activists pushed for a 
reform of those aspects of German society that had not been radically changed 
after 1945. To this end, they emphasized and criticized the lines of continuities 
that linked the Third Reich and the Federal Republic. The young activists were 
particularly enraged by the fact that the German elite and the capitalist order had 
easily survived the catastrophe they had caused.532 
Thanks to the student movement which in the mid-1960s added a critical 
and very distinct voice to the discussions about the meaning of the Nazi past, 
West Germany’s historical culture as a whole underwent substantial 
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transformation. As the memory historian Wulf Kansteiner explained, by the late 
1960s the political elite clearly faced a confluence of mutually reinforcing 
interpretations of the past, emanating from different spheres of West Germany’s 
historical culture, that called into question some basic tenets of the political 
memory of the postwar years. As a result of these developments, politicians lost 
the leadership role in memory politics that they had occupied during the first ten 
years of the republic.533 
The turning point during what historians used to call the “long 1960s” (by 
which the period stretching from the late 1950s to the early 1970s is meant) 
marked if not a general shift in historical consciousness, but an increasing 
diversification and fragmentation of West German’s historical culture. The latter 
were caused, as it appears, by the establishment and significant expansion of the 
public sphere. According to Kansteiner, from that point forward, there were at 
least three major and more or less independent arenas of historical reflection: the 
visual media of cinema and especially television, working in close cooperation 
with the popular illustrated press; the national political scene that was covered 
extensively in the national highbrow press; and a large variety of specialized yet 
interconnected intellectual settings, including theater, art cinema, literature, law, 
architecture, and academic history. For about ten years, from the late 1940s to the 
late 1950s, as Kansteiner argued, those arenas had been surprisingly compatible. 
But they subsequently evolved in different directions, with television and politics 
continuing to favor consensual, defensive formats of collective memory, whereas 
some of the intellectual subfields, for example, law and literature, developed 
more critical types of historical reflection that challenged the conservative 
mainstream.534 
Although real institutional changes in terms of memory have taken root 
very slowly, they did eventually take place due to the insistence of different 
social agents – agents of civil society. To illustrate, increasing criticism of 
organizations of former prisoners and survivors of the Nazi concentration camps 
in the mid-1960s forced local and state authorities to overcome their total 
passivity in confronting the past atrocities.  
At first efforts aimed at turning the places of former concentration camps 
into the “sites of memory” (lieux de mémoire) belonged almost entirely to the 
former camps’ inmates. Certainly, these initial attempts of survivors and their 
relatives to erect memorials, restore buildings and house displays of documents 
and “remainders” were very modest and their activities kept a very low profile, 
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particularly in terms of financing.535 Notably, the emerging memorial sites were 
long perceived as centers of commemoration for certain groups of victims or 
their families, not as places for Germans to reflect on their nation’s crimes. Any 
initial efforts to go beyond abstract or “general” commemoration of “the 
victims,” attempts at documentation, with its inevitable focus on the crimes, 
were resisted. Only gradually, due to the persistent pressure exerted by 
organizations and committees of former prisoners and given the continued 
evidence of right-wing radicalism in West Germany, did the realization set in 
that memorial sites should also function as places of historical enlightenment.536 
In 1965 the first serious permanent exhibition was constructed within the 
grounds of the former Dachau concentration camp (Gedenkstätte Dachau)537 (the 
project was financially supported by the Bavarian state government) and in 1966 
a document centre (Dokumentenhaus) was opened in the Bergen-Belsen Memorial 
Site where the first Jewish memorial had been erected by the former prisoners 
back in 1946. In 1965 Neuengamme Memorial Site (KZ-Gedenkstätte 
Neuengamme),538 erected in 1953, was also expanded (a document center was 
added to it only in 1981).539 
 However, it took at least another decade until in the mid-1970s when a 
new generation of West Germans started actually transforming the former 
concentration camps’ sites into “sites of learning” – places to explore what 
individual perpetrators of Nazism might have been like and how their individual 
victims had to suffer. 
 
4.2.3 1970s 
 
The change of power (Machtwechsel) as a result of September 1969 parliamentary 
elections and the subsequent formation of the first Social Democratic government 
in the history of the Federal Republic marked an important phase of transition in 
the official politics of memory.  
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Though like its predecessors the new government had to adopt an 
integrative approach focusing on the needs of the contemporaries of the Third 
Reich, it could not ignore the impulses emerging from the younger generation of 
Germans, whose support was determinant of the SPD’s victory.540 The new Social 
Democratic leaders - Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969-1974) and Federal President 
Gustav Heinemann (1969-1974) - thus tried to shape the cultural memory of the 
Nazi past for the benefit of generations whose members had no personal 
memories of the Third Reich. 
The SPD Chancellor Willy Brandt, who had himself actively resisted the 
Nazis and had been forced to leave Germany for Norway to escape Nazi 
persecution in 1933, adopted the politics of memory aimed at reconciliation and 
recognition of moral responsibility for the Nazi crimes. In 1970, with Brandt at 
the head of the West German state, the Bundestag held its first ever formal 
commemoration of 8 May, where Brandt pronounced his famous formulation 
stating that “no one is exempt from history.”  
Brandt also attempted to rebuild West Germany’s relationship with the 
countries of the Eastern Bloc, pursuing in his government’s New Eastern Policy 
(Neue Ostpolitik) paths of rapprochement and reconciliation that had been 
regarded as impossible by his predecessors in office.541  
On 7 December, 1970 Chancellor Brandt signed the treaty with Poland 
(Treaty of Warsaw) recognizing the Oder-Neisse line between Germany and 
Poland as a permanent border, not to be changed by force. This was accepted as 
a “result of history” (die Ergebnisse der Geschichte). On the same day Brandt knelt 
down after laying a wreath at the memorial to the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of 
1943, the gesture seen as an obvious sign of the recognition of German guilt for 
what happened under the Nazis and during the war.  
The image of Brandt’s kneeling became, thus, in the minds of many 
Germans and Poles a powerful symbol of reconciliation policy based on moral 
principles and of the emergence in the Federal Republic of a growing acceptance 
of collective responsibility for the past crimes.542 Thirty years later, at the 
dedication of Willy Brandt Square in Warsaw on 6 December, 2000, German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder recalled how “this image of Willy Brandt kneeling 
had become a symbol of accepting the past and of understanding it as an 
obligation for reconciliation, as an obligation for a common future. Like so many 
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Germans and Poles I will never forget this image. It has come to be a reminder 
and a political credo for entire generations.”543 
Back in the 1970s, however, the Brandt’s signing the Warsaw Treaty and 
his kneeling in front of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising Memorial, symbolizing a 
radical break with the old course of the West German foreign policy, polarized 
German society. The Chancellor was heavily criticized by the conservative 
CDU/CSU opposition for betrayal of national interests, and for “wallowing in 
masochism.” The cover of the popular Der Spiegel magazine, which came out a 
week later, posed the question, “Should Brandt Have Knelt?” 
The attacks, however, did not make Brandt, who was awarded in 1971 the 
Nobel Peace Price for the Ostpolitik, change his policy. During the 1971 Week of 
Brotherhood he stated that, “The name of Auschwitz will remain a trauma for 
generations. Illusions are not allowed: the injuries that in the dark twelve years 
were done to the soul of the people of the victims and to the soul of the people of 
the perpetrators will not heal so rapidly. For the image of man was injured, man 
that we understand as the image of God.” He thus drew the specific as well as 
general lessons: “This experience – it is the actual catastrophe of humanity, more 
than all wars and their horrors – burdens Jewry, not only Israel; and it burdens 
us Germans. Here the reference to the youth that was given the freedom of 
unaffectedness does not help. No one is released from the responsibility of history.”544 
Furthermore, Chancellor Brandt, President Heinemann and his successor 
President Walter Scheel (1974-1979) became the first federal government officials 
to sponsor exhibits and museums for the teaching of contemporary German 
history, breaking, thus, prolonged official silence on the crimes of the Third 
Reich. On 6 May, 1975 in the 30th anniversary of 8 May, 1945 address President 
Scheel remarked that, “Only if we don’t forget can we again be proud to call 
ourselves Germans.” Commenting on this statement, Bill Niven has pointed to 
the shift in 8 May commemoration in the 1970s “towards integrating self-critical 
awareness of the Nazi past into West-German self-understanding in the present, 
and one away from the vague, self-pitying and inculpatory tone of the 1950s and 
1960s.”545 
In 1973 Federal President Gustav Heinemann initiated the first nationwide 
German history school competition, which evolved in a regular annual project. 
Interest in one’s own history was to help develop in the younger generation of 
Germans the consciousness of responsibility. It was argued that without this 
knowledge of history the past could not be worked through. Therefore, 
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organizers of history competitions tried to focus young participants’ attention 
not on simple retelling of the well-known events of 1933-1945, but on exploring 
German history, particularly from local and regional perspectives. Among the 
questions formulated by the organizers were such as, “How in everyday life the 
criminal character of the regime was manifested?”; “What laws were abused and 
why so many people actively supported the regime and/or adapted to it?” and, 
finally, “What should your outlook and your behavior aimed at peaceful co-
existence of peoples be like?” 
Since 1973 over 115,000 students have taken part in more than twenty 
students competitions on German history for the President’s award and have 
submitted more than 25,000 papers in which their searching for clues to the past 
in their local areas got reflected.546 Focusing on a different topic or question each 
time the competition that successfully has functioned till these days has stressed 
exploratory learning, or learning by discovery, and has demanded rather high 
level of autonomy on the part of participants. Competitors conduct on-site 
research, interview people, find newspaper articles, documents, publications, old 
photos, family papers, and use other archival materials in their projects. The final 
presentations are in a variety of forms including books, collages, exhibitions, and 
video documentations. The competitions, thus, have become a valuable not only 
in developing historical skills and understanding in young people, but also in 
preparing the way for future studies by historians.547 
It is important to point out that some works by German school students 
indeed contained valuable information on various aspects of the history of the 
Third Reich. For instance, on the basis of numerous documentary sources 
collected by young participants the Körber Foundation together with German 
Evangelical Church organized in the mid-1980s a mobile exhibition devoted to 
the destinies of the Soviet prisoners of war and Osterbeiters.548 
Historical and political education as well as historical and political 
didactics were gradually becoming elements of German system of education, 
creating thus conditions for “working through” the past in German schools. 
History didactics (Geschichtsdidaktik) as a science of history learning has become 
an independent scientific discipline dealing with the important category of 
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‘historical consciousness,’ including the mental operations (emotional and 
cognitive, conscious and unconscious), through which experienced time in the 
form of memory is used as a means of orientation in everyday life.549 In the 1970s 
and 1980s this category evolved into one of the key categories of history 
didactics. This increased interest in pedagogy and didactics reflected the 
awareness that young people needed to be informed, especially in view of the 
danger of neo-Nazism.550 
In the 1970s academic history also underwent significant transformations. 
The usual methods of historical analysis were strongly challenged by the rise of 
the history of everyday life (Alltagsgeschichte) that rapidly evolved in an 
influential popular movement. As Wulf Kansteiner explained, Alltagsgeschichte, 
as an intellectual movement, “represented a critical appropriation of a number of 
different traditions: the neo-Marxism of the Frankfurt school, in particular, 
Habermas’s writings, and the writings of independent Marxist philosophers such 
as Ernst Bloch; the phenomenological and ethnological traditions of German 
sociology, reaching as far back as Edmund Husserl; the debates on fascism that 
occupied West Germany’s leftist intellectuals in the 1960s; and various imports 
such as Anglo-American anthropology (for instance, Clifford Greetz’s), Michel 
Foucault’s theory of power, and Peirre Bourdiue’s theory of practical action, as 
well as microhistorical and neo-Marxist role exemplars such as the works of 
Carlo Ginzburg, Natalie Davis, and E.P. Thompson.”551 
Institutionally, the movement drew support from several West German 
research institutions like the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich, the 
Max Planck Institute in Göttingen, the Open University in Hagen, and most 
important, from a large number of local, grassroots initiatives loosely organized 
in an association of history workshops. Especially the latter were firmly rooted in 
the new social movements. Originally, however, history workshop movement of 
the 1970s (just like multiple citizen-initiatives of the same period) evolved from 
the protest student movement of 1968, whose critical stance on the past gave rise 
to the intellectual as well as organizational side of Alltagsgeschichte. Importantly, 
some projects within everyday history framework were launched by highly 
motivated, liberal historians outside academia.552 
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However, as a popular phenomenon, Alltagsgeschichte went far beyond a 
definite number of local projects, producing a wave of publications aimed at the 
general audience, resulting in an unprecedented wave of exhibitions and new 
museums, and sparking new ways of doing history, such as the history 
workshops.553  
Although Alltagsgeschichte was initially not focused on the Holocaust 
theme only, this topic soon attracted much research interest. As a result, many 
local and regional studies finally gave voices to the victims of the Nazi policies of 
persecution and extermination, primarily its Jewish victims. Increased interest in 
the history of everyday life, both within and outside academia, produced a wave 
of publications which provided details about life in the Third Reich to 
generations whose members had no personal memories of the period.554 In this 
way Alltagsgeschichte considerably broadened the social involvement in the 
process of confronting the Nazi past, thoroughly transforming West Germany’s 
historical culture. More and more Germans, especially young people, started 
realizing the necessity to remember the victims. They took part in student 
competitions, were getting involved in history workshops or participating in the 
educational projects within former concentration camps’ sites.555 
Perhaps most important, however, is that Alltagsgeschichte gradually 
changed West German television, especially its image of Nazism. Although 
German public television had always addressed the topic of Nazism, albeit often 
in a detached, “objective,” and heavy-handed manner, beginning in the late 
1970s a new generation of television producers and executives bought and 
produced large numbers of programs that presented the history of the Third 
Reich from the perspective of an average citizen. Visually attractive and cast in 
popular formats, such as docudramas and TV films featuring standard, popular 
plot types, these programs were very successful with audiences. Late 1970s, as 
Wulf Kansteiner asserted, were also marked by the onset of the survival paradigm 
on television.556 
Starting in 1978 television makers started interviewing survivors both in 
Germany and abroad and the first wave of survival narratives, thus, consisted of 
documentaries and features which developed the dialectic of suffering and 
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survival on the basis of individual case studies. The second wave of survival 
narratives, however, was directly linked to the success of the US-made Holocaust 
TV miniseries (1978) aired in January 1979.557  
The film Holocaust that dramatized the fate of German-Jewish Weiss 
family forced German audiences to confront the human dimension of the Nazis’ 
mass murder. Importantly, the film was watched by more than 20 million 
Germans, i.e. by more than 50 percent of the country’s adult population, reaching 
thus more people than any other broadcasting of the German television networks 
that dealt with the topic of contemporary history up to that date. The percentage 
of younger people among the viewers was remarkably high: about 56 percent of 
the viewers were people who had completed only elementary schooling, and 
about 15 percent were only 8 to 13 years old.558 
Furthermore, Holocaust TV miniseries caused immense and intensive 
response of the thousands of viewers. Although the ground for the response had 
been prepared by the networks in advance (weeks before the actual dates, 
preparatory broadcasts and press previews partially outlined the film and its 
story; schools were provided with information packages and the network 
managers stirred public debate), the reaction was totally unexpected.  
The film was shown in parts on four consecutive evenings. After each part 
the viewers were offered open-ended opportunities to phone in and ask 
questions or offer comments. Panels of specialists represented by survivors of the 
Holocaust and professional historians were available to answer questions and 
exchange opinions on the film as well as on German fascism in general. But no 
one could predict the emotional outpouring that the broadcast of the NBC 
miniseries caused.559 
During four evenings the WDR studio received about 10,000 incoming 
telephone calls. According to the Jewish historian Julius Schöps, who witnessed 
the public’s reaction, “For many people in the Federal Republic, Holocaust was an 
emotional introduction, the first encounter with the almost incomprehensible 
horrors of the Nazi regime. More than just a few became aware for the first time 
that they had repressed the murder of the Jews that was committed in the name 
of the German people and had previously avoided dealing with the past. […] 
Over the course of the four evenings on which Holocaust was broadcast, there 
were more and more voices who claimed not to have seen, heard, or known 
anything. Some were ashamed, blamed themselves, some cried. […] Most calls 
revolved around the concepts of “forgetting,” “guilt,” and “How could it have 
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come to that?” I could not help feeling that many callers felt the need to talk with 
someone to let out their feelings of sadness, consternation, and shame.”560 Schöps 
added that anyone who took note of the initial telephone response to the film 
was left with the surprising impression that there had been no sustained 
discussion in the Federal Republic of the Nazi past up to that time.561 
In the survey conducted after the broadcast to explore the reactions the 
film generated among the audiences more than 80 percent of the respondents 
told that in their view the film presented an appropriate interpretation of the 
situation and living conditions under Nazism. And more than half of the 
respondents acknowledged to have talked to relatives, friends and colleagues 
about the film. Among those who had watched the film, votes approving a 
“moral obligation of Germany to pay compensation and restitution” increased 
remarkably (45 percent accepted this line before the broadcasting, while 54 
percent of those who had watched it agreed afterward). Also, the statement that 
all adults during Nazism “shared at least some guilt” was rated positive by more 
people after they had watched the film (16 percent before, 22 percent 
afterward).562 
Critics argued that the showing of the miniseries accomplished much 
more than the historical research, extensive educational activities in schools and 
in the media had achieved during the previous years. Thanks to this rather non-
intricate film millions of viewers for some hours became able to replace quite 
common attitude of bystanders by sympathy and identification with the 
sufferings of Nazi victims. For the first time in the postwar period most West 
Germans started to realize, quoting the historian Hans Mommsen, that “the 
burden of the Nazi past has not been lightened” and that “the historical 
consequences of the “Thousand Year Reich” have not been resolved.”563 
Furthermore, the film also semantically affected the historical discourse: 
following the broadcast the term the Holocaust has gained widespread acceptance 
and has become widely used in Germany to refer to the extermination of the 
European Jews, euphemistically defined by Nazis as the “Final Solution of the 
Jewish Question” (Endlösung der Judenfrage). 
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It can be argued that the film showing also affected rethinking of the past 
in the religious circles of West Germany. The “working through” of the past by 
Christian churches, which gradually led to the recognition of moral and political 
responsibility for the catastrophe, was linked to the fact that after Hitler’s rise to 
power the churches – Protestant and Catholic, European and American – could 
speak in support of Jews, but never did so.564 
The moral issues, in particular, the attitude of the papacy during World 
War II and the Holocaust had been critically assessed by historians and artists 
already in the early postwar period. For instance, as early as November 1950 
historian Léon Poliakov was one of the first to address these problems in his 
article The Vatican and the ‘Jewish Question’ - The Record of the Hitler Period-And 
After that appeared in the influential Jewish journal Commentary. In 1963, due to 
the publication of the Der Stellvertreter by the German playwright Rolf Hochhuth, 
the discussion of Poliakov’s initial investigations in this area took on worldwide 
significance. In 1968 the Jewish philosopher Emil Fackenheim wrote: “The 
Gentile world shuns Auschwitz because of the terror of Auschwitz—and because 
of real or imagined implication in the guilt for Auschwitz.”565  
The recognition of responsibility by the church representatives, however, 
came much later and was linked, to a large extent, to the general shift in 
perception of the Nazi crimes in German society after the broadcast of the 
Holocaust miniseries. 
In December 1979 on the occasion of the Day of Remembrance of the 
Victims of the Holocaust, a man who helped spiritually prepare the way for 
changes in Christian–Jewish relations, the Lutheran theologian Friedrich-
Wilhelm Marquardt wrote: “Today Auschwitz stands for us like a judgment 
upon our Christianity, upon the way we as Christians were and are today… 
Auschwitz is for us a call to change. Not only our behavior, but our beliefs 
themselves must change. Auschwitz must not only lead to consequences for 
ethics but also for Christian belief. Auschwitz calls us to hear God’s word today, 
transformed from the ways in which it was handed down to us by teachers of 
theology and preachers in past generations. This change affects the essence of 
Christianity as we have understood it up to now.”566 
                                                 
564 Lezov, Sergei. Christianity after Auschwitz at <http://www.vehi.net/asion/lesev.html> 
565 Fackenheim Emil L., Jewish Faith and the Holocaust, in: Philosophy in the Age of Crisis, Harper 
& Row, New York, 1970. 
566 Marquardt, Friedrich-Wilhelm. Christsein nach Auschwitz // Freiburger Rundbrief: Zeitschrift 
zur christlich-jüdischen Begegnungen. Dezember, 1979. XXXI Folge. Nummer 117-120. p. 87. 
Also: Marquardt, Friedrich-Wilhelm; Friedländer, Albert Hoschander. Das Schweigen der Christen and 
die Menschlichkeit Gottes. Gläubige Existenz nach Auschwitz, München 1980. pp. 9 – 10. 
 182 
The recognition of the church’s responsibility for the genocide was 
expressed, in particular, in the declaration “Toward Renovation of the 
Relationship of Christians and Jews” made by the Synod of the Evangelical 
Church of the Rhineland in January 1980.567 
Notably, in the same year when the US-made TV miniseries Holocaust 
transformed the West German public opinion the screen adaptation of the 
Günter Grass’s novel The Tin Drum (Die Blechtrommel, 1979) by the German film 
director Volker Schlöndorff won an Oscar Academy Award for Best Foreign Film 
as well as the Palme d’Or at the 1979 Cannes Film Festival. 
 
4.2.4 1980s 
 
The political elite of the Federal Republic could not definitely ignore the shift in 
the media discourse and public perception of the Nazi crimes in the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s. In an immediate, symbolic reaction to the television film 
Holocaust, in July 1979, the parliament abolished the statute of limitations for 
murders committed during the Nazi period, an option politicians had rejected 
for several decades. During the following years, West Germany’s political 
leaders slowly and tentatively shifted their attention toward the victims of the 
“Final Solution.”  
In 1985, in response to the growing attempts of the right-wing extremists 
either to deny the Holocaust, the existence of the gas chambers, or to diminish 
the scope of extermination of the Jews (the so-called “revisionism” or 
“negationism” (Negationismus)), a new Section 130 was inserted into the German 
Criminal Code in 1985 (later revised in 1992, 2002, and 2005) to punish the so-
called “Auschwitz lie” (Auschwitz-Lüge). According to subsections 3 and 4 of the 
130 Section, “Whosoever publicly or in a meeting approves of, denies or 
downplays an act committed under the rule of National Socialism of the kind 
indicated in Section 6.1 of the Code of International Criminal Law, in a manner 
capable of disturbing the public peace shall be liable to imprisonment of not 
more than five years or a fine” (Section 130.3) and, “Whosoever publicly or in a 
meeting disturbs the public peace in a manner that violates the dignity of the 
victims by approving of, glorifying, or justifying National Socialist rule of 
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arbitrary force shall be liable to imprisonment of not more than three years or a 
fine” (Section 130.4).568  
Representatives of the public, who argued that the new section would 
limit the freedom of expression and who, therefore, questioned the imposition of 
criminal legal notion of “the Holocaust denial” as a means of coming to terms 
with the past and insisted instead on political education, could not get their way 
because of the specificity of the German past.569  
Furthermore, in 1994 the country’s Federal Constitutional Court 
confirmed that Holocaust revisionism is not protected under the Basic Law’s 
guarantee of freedom of expression: “In weighing the importance of free speech 
against that of individual rights, courts must consider on the one hand the 
severity of the offense caused by Holocaust denial to the Jewish population in 
light of the suffering inflicted upon it by Germany. On the other hand, the 
opinion expressed is not particularly deserving of protection,” the Constitutional 
Court judges wrote, “stemming as it does from a claim of fact that has been 
proven untrue. This court has consistently protected the personal honor of those 
defamed above the right of others to make patently false statements.”570 
Perhaps the most vivid and symbolically important event of the 1980s was 
the Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker’s (1984-1994) speech delivered on 
8 May, 1985 in the Bundestag during the Ceremony Commemorating the 40th 
Anniversary of the End of the War in Europe and of National Socialist Tyranny.  
In his speech Weizsäcker presented a clear moral evaluation of the Third 
Reich, stressing the importance of “working through” the traumatic past. He 
stated, “All of us, whether guilty or not, whether old or young, must accept the 
past. We are all affected by its consequences and liable for it. The young and old 
generations must and can help each other to understand why it is vital to keep 
alive the memories. It is not a case of coming to terms with the past. That is not 
possible. It cannot be subsequently modified or made not to have happened. 
However, anyone who closes his eyes to the past is blind to the present. Whoever 
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refuses to remember the inhumanity is prone to new risks of infection. … [L]et us 
face up as well as we can to the truth.”571 
For the first time a national leader called the 8th of May “a day of 
liberation” (not a day of capitulation): “It liberated all of us from the inhumanity 
and tyranny of the National Socialist regime. Nobody will, because of that 
liberation, forget the grave suffering that only started for many people on 8 May. 
But we must not regard the end of the war as the cause of flight, expulsion and 
deprivation of freedom. The cause goes back to the start of the tyranny that 
brought about war. We must not separate May 8, 1945, from January 30, 1933.”572 
While retaining the focus on German victimhood that had dominated 
West German’s historical culture for three postwar decades, Weizsäcker 
integrated and named all victims of National Socialism – Jews, the Sinti and 
Romany Gypsies, the homosexuals, the mentally ill, the Communists, etc.  In his 
speech Weizsäcker also managed to pay tribute to the paradigm of Holocaust 
uniqueness or exceptionalism advanced by left-wing intellectuals and, primarily, 
by Jürgen Habermas. The Weizsäcker’s speech, integrating, thus, the main ideas 
and appeals of the leading German philosophers such as Jaspers, Adorno, 
Mitscherlich, Habermas presented an attempt to introduce the political program 
of antifascist consensus in a West German society. This endeavor was 
characterized by the Suddeusche Zeitung as the “courage of truth 
comprehension.”573 
However, despite the important Weizsäcker’s intervention and legal 
attempts to prevent the Holocaust denial, the general official tendency of the 
1980s was aimed not at “working through” the past but at “normalization” of 
Germany’s history. Already in the mid-1970s, after the transfer of power to 
conservatives, following the 1973 oil crisis, a general economic downturn, and 
the rise of neoconservative ideology, the CDU governments’ leaders have 
predominantly pursued normalization path portraying West Germany as “a 
Normal Nation,” one with the same problems as other Western states and with a 
history that included “highs as well as lows.” Beginning less dramatically with 
the pragmatist Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974-1982) in 1974 and entering a 
more authentically neoconservative phase with Federal President Walter Scheel 
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(1974-1979) in the mid-1970s, normalization continued to be a catchword in the 
1980s.574 
Since the early 1980s the Kohl’s CDU government (1982-1998), signaled its 
intention to inaugurate a “spiritual-moral change” (geistig-moralische Wende) in 
German society in order to repair what was believed to be the cultural damage of 
“1968” which had allegedly weakened or even destroyed the basis for common 
values and a shared sense of belonging of West Germans. Thus, part of neo-
conservatives agenda was in fostering a degree of national pride in order to 
counter what was seen as the wider population’s lack of emotional attachment to 
their German identity and to the West German state. The intention to normalize 
the West German present above all meant addressing the way the Nazi past had 
come to impinge on national identity. A German normality, for Kohl, would 
imply, first, that the Hitler period should be “historicized” – the twelve years of 
the National Socialist dictatorship should be viewed as one historical era among 
many others and not as an inevitable culmination of a national story doomed to 
disaster from the very beginning – and, second, that the war-time experiences of 
ordinary Germans should be approached with emphatic understanding.575 
If Brandt’s idea of reconciliation was based on humility and a sense of 
guilt, Kohl’s was based on erasure of the difference between Germans and their 
victims, on, in other words, the exculpations of Germans under Hitler.576 In 
developing this all-victims-together narrative Kohl wished to encourage greater 
historical consciousness, with special emphasis on the positive, legitimating 
features of the German past.  
In his inauguration address of March 1983 Chancellor Kohl brought up 
the 750s anniversary of Berlin to occur in 1987, which the government developed 
as a significant symbolic moment. Additionally, he announced the plans for two 
historical museums: a German Historical Museum to be opened in Berlin during 
the celebration year, and a collection on German history to be opened later in 
Bonn. 
Naturally, left-wing politicians and intellectuals were anxious with 
ethnically nationalist basis of the conservative identity project, rehabilitating the 
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language of Heimat, Vaterland, Volk, and nation.577 They regarded the nationalist 
rhetoric of neoconservatives in the framework of politics of normalization as 
relativizing and apologetic and strongly opposed their agenda. 
For instance, since the early 1980s Social Democrats opposed Kohl’s 
government endeavors to rehabilitate those Germans who had served the Third 
Reich, demanding to ban the highly controversial reunions of former Waffen-SS 
members. Their demands, however, were repeatedly blocked by Kohl’s 
government, and in 1983 the veterans’ organizations of the Waffen-SS were 
removed from a list of extremist right-wing groups on which the West German 
Ministry of Interior was required to make annual reports to Parliament.578 
Left-wing intellectuals and politicians were particularly indignant at the 
symbolic reconciliation performed on the 40th anniversary of the end of World 
War II in 1985 by Helmut Kohl and Ronald Reagan at the Bitburg German 
military cemetery, where among the graves of the German soldiers there were 
some graves of the Waffen-SS troops’ members.  
Intellectual polarization in treating the past brought about the Historian’s 
Dispute (Historikerstreit) – the major intellectual event of the 1980s, summarizing 
a whole series of debates on German identity and coming to terms with the past.  
The dispute was actually launched by conservative historian Ernst Nolte’s 
article published in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 6 June, 1986 entitled The 
Past that Does Not Want to Pass Away (Die Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will). In 
a short response to the Nolte’s article in which he denied the historical 
singularity of Auschwitz, characterized by him as a reaction to and imitation of 
similar events in the Soviet Union and thus “a mere technical innovation,” 
Jürgen Habermas rejected this position and accused Nolte as well as some other 
right-wing historians (in particular Andreas Hillgruber and Kohl’s historical 
advisor Michael Stürmer) of seeking to whitewash the German past. Habermas 
was especially concerned that Nolte’s argument undermined the thesis of the 
Holocaust uniqueness. In his Die Zeit publication Habermas argued that 
conservatives had violated the prior consensus stipulating that “after Auschwitz 
we can only create national self-confidence by selectively appropriating our more 
suitable traditions” through rigorous self-critical examination.579 Instead, he 
claimed, conservative historians now engaged again in “reviving a sense of 
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identity naively rooted in national consciousness.”580 Habermas, in turn, insisted 
that the only acceptable patriotism for the Federal Republic was a “constitutional 
patriotism” (Verfassungspatriotismus), rooted in a commitment to and 
identification with the democratic political order and the German Constitution, 
as well as in attachment to the Western community of values. At the same time 
such patriotism, in his view, could be secured only by placing consciousness of 
Auschwitz at the center of collective identity.581 
The debate, in the center of which were the views of Ernst Nolte and 
Jürgen Habermas, but which involved many other influential neoconservatives 
(Andreas Hillgruber, Klaus Hildebrand, Rainer Zitelmann, Hagen Schulze, and 
Michael Stürmer, Joachim Fest) and left-liberals (Hans Mommsen, Jürgen Kocka, 
Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Martin Broszat, Heinrich August Winkler, Eberhard Jäckel, 
and Wolfgang Mommsen) excited immense public interest in West Germany. 
Between 1986 and 1988, the Historian’s Dispute produced some 1,200 texts, 
ranging in size from single newspaper articles to extended monographs, with as 
many as a hundred articles per month at one point.582 As the historian Charles 
Maier summed it up, “This debate has signaled an important moment of German 
national self-interrogation. It has produced the major discussion of historical 
responsibility and national consciousness of the last two decades.”583  
Notably, the intensified public concern about the Nazi legacy in the 
Federal Republic coincided or rather commenced (just like in the 1960s) a new 
wave of Holocaust research. The study of the Holocaust from everyday history 
perspective has continued to strengthen the survivors and witnesses paradigm in 
historical research in the 1980s. As Saul Friedländer has pointed out, “The 
Alltagsgeschichte of German society has its necessary shadow: the Alltagsgeschichte 
of its victims,” and this growing understanding led to the increasing penetration 
into the daily life of the victims of the Third Reich.584 In the 1980s new collections 
of Holocaust survivors witnesses’ accounts and several important works 
analyzing previous evidence saw light. One of them was the 1982 work by 
Monika Richarz who edited autobiographical writings of German Jews about life 
                                                 
580 Kansteiner, Wulf. Op. cit. p. 45. 
581 Moses, Dirk. Op. cit. p. 232. See also: Habermas, Jürgen. Eine Art Schadensabwicklung: Die 
apologetischen Tendenzen in der deutschen Zeitgeschichtsschreibung. In: Augstein, Rudolf (ed.) 
“Historikerstreit“ Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der 
nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung. Munchen: R. Piper. 1987. pp. 62 – 76. 
582 Kansteiner, Wulf. Op. cit. p. 57. However, the impact of the debate on the broader public should 
not be overestimated. The dispute was conducted almost exclusively in the print media – 
newspapers Die Zeit and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 
583 Maier, Charles S. Op.cit. pp. 1-2. 
584 Friedländer, Saul. Memory, History and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe. Indiana 
University Press, 1993. 
 188 
in Nazi Germany breaking with the historiographical convention which had 
represented “the Jews as nameless, passive victims of an all-powerful machinery 
of destruction.”585 
Both German and foreign historians and historiographers continued to 
probe more deeply into the history of the Nazi genocide. In 1980 Hermann 
Langbein’s People in Auschwitz (Menschen in Auschwitz) was published and in 
1985 Raul Hilberg revised and republished his three-volume edition of The 
Destruction of the European Jews.586  
The last Primo Levi’s book The Drowned and the Saved (I sommersi e i 
salvati), where he tried to analyze the motives of people’s actions in the 
concentration camp, appeared in 1986.587 Without making judgments but 
focusing on the evidence and posing questions, Levi tried the analyze the 
problematic aspects of the victims’ world, examining, for example, the so-called 
“grey area,” in which Jews themselves did the Germans’ dirty work for them and 
kept the rest of the prisoners in line. “What made a concert violinist behave as a 
callous taskmaster?” asked the author, for instance. 
Gradually the figure of a Holocaust survivor has becoming not only an 
important object of inquiry, but one of the key symbolic figures in the German 
public sphere. Starting in the 1980s German school opened their doors to the 
witnesses of the Nazi era, who talked with students about the struggle for 
survival and persecution in the National Socialist state. Oral history, i.e. 
preserving the personal experiences and memories of the contemporaries of the 
past events has become a generally accepted method of studying modern history. 
As for the television, in a response to the astounding success of the 
Holocaust TV miniseries, starting in early the ZDF has commissioned, purchased 
and broadcasted Holocaust fiction showing the everyday histories of Nazi anti-
Semitic policies. The ZDF productions of Lion Feuchtwanger’s Geschwister 
Oppermann (1983) and Ralf Giordano’s Die Bertinis (1988), both directed by Egon 
Monk, Die Durchreise (1993) by Peter Weck, Regentropfen (1982) by Harry Raymon 
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and Michael Hoffman presented really successful narratives of persecution and 
survival during Nazism. Additionally, the ZDF purchased and showed 
international television bestsellers like Dan Curtis’s miniseries The Winds of War 
(1983) after Herman Wouk’ novel, Robert Enrico’s Der Schrei nach Leben (1983), 
Brian Gibson’s Murderers Among Us: The Simon Wiesenthal Story (1989), Daniel 
Mann’s Playing for Time (1980), Alan J. Pakula‘s Sophie’s Choice (1982) and other 
films.588 
In March 1986 West German television broadcasted in prime-time (except 
for Bavaria) the Claude Lanzmann nine hour-long film Shoah (1985) consisting of 
interviews with witnesses, victims and perpetrators of the Holocaust and the 
discussions of their visits to different places - Chełmno, where gas vans were first 
used to exterminate Jews; the death camps of Treblinka and Auschwitz-
Birkenau; and the Warsaw Ghetto. 
Besides, a number of TV programs about Nazi anti-Jewish policies shown 
from the survivors’ perspective presented a vital addition to Germany’s 
television landscape as they exposed German viewers to a historical perspective, 
which had been insufficiently represented in Germany’s historical culture for 
many years.  
At the same time attentive critics continued to stress that the identification 
of the viewer with perpetrators and bystanders of the “Final Solution” was 
problematic. Wulf Kansteiner summed up the representation of Nazi crimes in 
the Zweite Deutsche Fernsehen (ZDF) programs in the following way. “The 
programs do not present the perspective on the crimes which was most familiar 
to the contemporaries of Nazism among the viewers, i.e., the perspective of 
bystanders and perpetrators. Instead, television selectively supplied the point of 
view of the victims projected after the fact; it conducted an imaginary dialogue 
with the survivors and thus, at least on a symbolic level, circumvented the very 
result of the mass murder which made a real dialogue and a possible 
reconciliation with the victims impossible. By means of television Germans have 
seen some images of persecution which they or their forefathers have themselves 
witnessed, for instance the pogroms of 1938, or the deportations of Jewish 
citizens. But more often television brought eyewitness accounts and real and 
reenacted images of scenes which even most contemporaries have never seen 
with their own eyes: Jews in their embattled homes, Jews in hiding, Jews on their 
way to the ghettos and camps, the foreign world of the concentration camp 
universe, and survivors interviewed in foreign countries. Television became the 
window to the hidden world of persecution. It satisfied the curiosity born from 
the desire to see what one has only heard or read about. In comparison, some 
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crimes which did occur close to home right under the eyes of German citizens, 
‘Euthanasia,’ the abuse of the forced laborers and POWs, the local camps all over 
the country, these visually more familiar and maybe also more threatening 
images are not reproduced on television. Most important, these events are never 
represented from the perspective of the German population in ways which urge 
viewers to identify with that population’s point of view and deal with the legacy 
of silence.”589 
Kansteiner argued that according to its television image, the Holocaust 
was a crime without perpetrators and bystanders, at least until the early 1990s. 
German television had made a considerable effort to give faces and voices to 
survivors, but it never thought to identify the people who committed the crimes 
or those who watched the catastrophe unfold and remained passive. Kansteiner 
maintained his argument by quoting the critical commentary by Barbara 
Sichtermann who wrote in the context of the 1988 broadcast of Die Bertinis: “If 
television wants to critically reflect the past, including the NS past, the 
perpetrators have to begin to appear on the screen, as subjects and not as 
caricatures.”590 
The resounding resignation of the Bundestag President Philip Jenninger in 
1988 due to a falsely construed Bundestag speech on the 50th anniversary of the 
1938 anti-Semitic “Night of Broken Glass” (Kristallnacht) pogrom vividly 
revealed the fact that confronting perpetration was still highly problematic 
during the 1980s and that the tainted past was far from being either “worked 
through” or “left behind.” Jenninger’s attempt to explain the racist behavior of 
his compatriots, rather than focusing on the suffering of the Jews, was seen as 
having broken a taboo, caused a political storm and cost the speaker, who 
resigned his Bundestag presidency on 11 November, 1988, his post. Interestingly, 
one year after the incident, the Jewish community leader Ignatz Bubis, who later 
became chairman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany (Zentralrat der Juden 
in Deutschland), used several passages of Jenninger’s speech, underscoring that 
the content of Jenningers speech had not been wrong, just his performance of 
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it.591 The reading of the speech indeed suggests that Jenninger actually urged his 
compatriots to identify with the perspective of the Holocaust bystanders.592 
 
4.2.5 1990s and beyond  
 
The conservative trajectory aimed at normalization of history continued after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification of the two parts of Germany in 1990. 
Helmut Kohl, who won a landslide victory in the first since the Weimar Republic 
all-German 1990 elections and formed his forth cabinet, reinforced the 
normalization politics combining both the all-victims-together and the anti-
totalitarian paradigms.593 
In 1992, two years after unification and without parliamentary 
consultation, Chancellor Kohl declared his intention to make a building known 
as the Neue Wache in Berlin united Germany’s central national memorial to ‘the 
victims of war and the rule of violence.’ In 1993 the Neue Wache was rededicated 
as the “Central Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Victims of 
War and Tyranny.” Another new site, Bonn’s House of History, which was 
supposed to become one of united Germany’s main historical museums, 
alongside the German Historical Museum in Berlin, was launched on 14 June, 
1994. 
Notably, in the conception of the House of History, plans for which date 
back to the 1980s, a leading role was played by the conservative historians such 
as Hans Möller, Klaus Hildebrand, Michael Stürmer, and Andreas Hillgruber. 
Consequently, as Bill Niven observed, in both sites National Socialism, war and 
its effects were presented as natural catastrophes, with the Germans as their 
main victims and the significance of the Holocaust was played down.594 
However, though the mid-1990s represented for some politicians and 
historians, and for some members of the general public, a symbolic act of closure, 
several important events that took place in the public sphere in the 1990s 
managed to counteract this will to forget, ensuring that the postunification trend 
toward a more intense preoccupation with the Nazi past was not impeded.595  
In 1992 a long ago planned Joseph Wulf’s project was finally realized and 
House of the Wannsee Conference Memorial Center was established in Berlin. In 
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the same 1992 a foundation was set up to oversee the transformation of the Prinz-
Albrecht-Gelände site that formerly housed the Gestapo, the SS and the SD into a 
documentation center. Although the so-called the Topography of Terror project was 
inaugurated in the long run only on 6 May, 2010, it was important that this 
decision marked a practical implementation of the idea dating back to 1983, 
when historians and Berlin’s SPD had drawn attention to the historical 
importance of this ‘place of the perpetrators.’596 
Another important public debate and controversy was caused by the 
publication in 1996 of the book Hitler’s Willing Executives. Ordinary Germans and 
the Holocaust authored by Harvard University scholar Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, 
the son of the Holocaust survivor in the Ukrainian ghetto.597 Goldhagen’s book, 
which was a reply to Christopher Browning’s 1992 publication Ordinary Men: 
Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, posited that ordinary 
Germans not only knew about, but also supported, the Holocaust because of a 
unique and virulent “eliminationist anti-Semitism” in the German identity, 
which had developed in the preceding centuries. Goldhagen argued that, 
“Historically, the expression of nationalism, particularly in Germany, has gone 
hand in hand with the expression of anti-Semitism, since the nation was in part 
defined in contradiction to the Jews. In Germany and elsewhere, nationalism and 
anti-Semitism were interwoven ideologies, fitting hand in glove.”598  
The public controversy and a world-wide debate facilitated by the 
Goldhagen’s assertion of the existence of a long-standing historical tradition of 
“eliminationist anti-Semitism” in Germany let some historians speak of an 
extension of the Hitorikerstreit.599 Goldhagen’s greatest achievement, however, 
was that he brought to light the incontrovertible facts of participation of many 
police units in extermination operations, showing through numerous examples 
how ordinary soldiers participated in the mass murder of the Jews.  
Another contribution to the critical reflection on the Nazi past and the 
problem of perpetration in the public sphere was made by a groundbreaking 
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exhibition entitled War of Annihilation. Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941 to 1944 
(Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944) produced in 1995 by 
historians Hannes Heer and Gerd Hankel from the Hamburg Institute for Social 
Research (Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung). The exhibition, that challenged 
the established view of the “unblemished” German armed forces (Wehrmacht), 
asserted with the help of written documents and photographs that the 
Wehrmacht was “involved in planning and implementing a war of annihilation 
against Jews, prisoners of war, and the civilian population.”600  
In April 1997, Die Zeit journalist Benedikt Erenz commenting on the effect 
of the exhibition wrote that “seldom has a contemporary-history exhibition made 
such an impact on so many people.”601 Seen by an estimated 1.2 million visitors, 
the traveling exhibition caused a huge controversy and was accused of 
inaccuracy and blackmail, which made the organizers suspend the display in 
1999 and wait for a review of its content by a committee of historians.  
The committee’s report in 2000, however, stated that accusations of forged 
materials were not justified. “The fundamental statements made in the exhibition 
about the Wehrmacht and the war of annihilation in ‘the east’ are correct,” 
stateed the report. “It is indisputable that, in the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht 
not only ‘entangled’ itself in genocide perpetrated against the Jewish population, 
in crimes perpetrated against Soviet POWs and in the fight against the civilian 
population, but in fact participated in these crimes, playing at times a 
supporting, at times a leading role. These were not isolated cases of ‘abuse’ or 
‘excesses’; they were activities based on decisions reached by top level military 
leaders or troop leaders on or behind the front lines.”602 The committee 
recommended that the exhibition be reopened in revised form, presenting the 
material, and as far as possible leaving the formation of conclusions to the 
viewers.  
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The revised exhibition Crimes of the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a War 
of Annihilation 1941-1944 (Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des 
Vernichtungskrieges 1941–1944) travelled from 2001 to 2004 and since then, it has 
permanently been opened at the German Historical Museum (Deutsches 
Historisches Museum) in Berlin. Later the two versions of the exhibition as well as 
the reaction of the public were reflected in Michael Verhoeven’s 2006 
documentary The Unknown Soldier (Der unbekannte Soldat). 
The topic of Wehrmacht criminality due to the efforts of the exhibition 
organizers moved, ineluctably, to the centre of public discourse. Just like 
Goldhagen’s book, Crimes of the Wehrmacht exhibition vividly showed that 
criminality was a cohesive element in the Third Reich, linking politics, 
bureaucracy, the SS, the army and the ‘ordinary’ German soldiers and reservists. 
Together with other important public endeavors such the opening of House of 
the Wannsee Conference Memorial Center, and the Topography of Terror project 
all based on the pathbreaking research of the mechanisms and psychology of 
perpetration and all causing massive discussions in the public sphere the 
exhibition considerably advanced the so-called perpetrator research 
(Täterforschung) in Germany and abroad. 
Historical research focusing on the Nazi extermination system started in 
the 1970s - 1980s when caused by the general interest in Alltagsgeschichte new 
publications about the death squads (Einsatzgruppen), the death camps, and the 
war of extermination on the Eastern front considerably advanced the German 
historiography of the Holocaust.603 
However, the 1990s marked the period in which perpetrator research was 
considerably developed. New wave of publications included the studies of 
individual perpetrators such as Ulrich Herbert’s biography of one of the leaders 
of the Gestapo and later of occupied France and Denmark Werner Best (1996), in-
depth research of the Nazi concentration camp system by Ulrich Herbert, Karin 
Orth, Christoph Dieckmann, Wolfgang Sofsky, as well as prosopographical 
studies of major institutions such as the Security Agency (SD) of the SS by 
Michael Wildt (2003).604 Some of the best works of the 1990s provided regional 
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studies of the origins and realization of the “Final Solution” in occupied Eastern 
Europe. Such authors as Walter Manoschek, Dieter Pohl, Thomas Sandkühler, 
Christian Gerlach sought to understand what concrete, local factors had 
contributed to the development of genocidal policies and how these local factors 
had interacted with political directives from Berlin.605 
The scholars focus was also shifting towards the social and psychological 
dimensions of perpetration. For instance, the sociologist Wolfgang Sofsky, basing 
on Eugen Kogon’s research, outlined the perspectives of studying the 
concentration camp as a social system.606 To Sofsky belongs an extremely 
important conceptualization that “perpetrator research forces one to accept the 
unwelcome insight that the transformation of human beings into mass murderers 
requires little time and will power. Neither long biographical adaptation nor 
time consuming indoctrination appear necessary.”607 
The research launched in many respects by Christopher Browning, Jonah 
Goldhagen, the Hamburg Institute for Social Research historians and expanded 
by Aly Götz, Yehoshua Büchler, Michal Unger, Michael Alberti, Bogdan Musial, 
and other German and foreign historians showed that participation in the 
murder was widespread, generally knowing and willful and that the 
perpetrators themselves were generally quite ‘normal’ people. The hidden 
menace of such a ‘banality of evil’ has turned perpetrator research into one of the 
prevailing social study areas in Germany until these days.608 
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Furthermore, in the course of the 1990s, the Holocaust research has 
developed into an international scholarly discipline with several centers, 
research institutions and academic programs specializing in it. Among the 
institutions founded in the 1990s were the International Institute for Holocaust 
Research at Yad Vashem in Jerusalem in Israel (1993), the Fritz Bauer Institute in 
Frankfurt am Main in Germany (1995), the Uppsala Program for Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies in Sweden (1998), and the Center for Advanced Holocaust 
Studies at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington (1998). 
The Polish Center for Holocaust Research at the Polish Academy of Sciences was 
established in Warsaw 2003, and the International Primo Levi Studies Center 
(Centro Internazionale di Studi Primo Levi) was created in Turin, Italy in 2008. 
The public focus on the motives of the average Germans who had 
implemented the “Final Solution” finally made the perpetrators a focus of 
inquiry of German television producers. The ZDF 1990 series such as Hitlers 
Helfer (Hitler’s Henchmen, 1996, 1998) and Hitlers Krieger (Hitler’s Warriors, 1998) 
authored by Guido Knopp inquired into the motives of the Nazi leadership while 
ignoring the “average” perpetrators of the genocide. Despite the fact that  
Knopp’s programs were strongly criticized as presenting the Third Reich too 
superficially and as “editing history” so as to play down the role of the German 
public in building and supporting the Hitler regime, his programs had really 
high ratings and attracted significant public attention.609 
Similarly powerful and controversial appeared the best-selling semi-
autobiographical novel by German law professor and judge Bernhard Schlink 
Reader (Vorleser) published in 1995 and also tackling the problem the Holocaust 
perpetration. In a very human and sympathetic manner the novel portrayed a 
former concentration camp guard whose secret illiteracy had profoundly affected 
her actions in the past as well as fatally undermined her defense during the 
Auschwitz trial.  
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The German attitudes towards the Nazi era were also affected by the 
German release of the Steven Spielberg’s film Schindler's List in 1993.  
Additionally, in the 1990s Germany was also engaged in stormy disputes 
regarding the memorial “for the murdered Jews of Europe” in Berlin. The idea of 
its construction belonged to the journalist Lea Rosh who in 1989 founded a 
support group and started collecting donations. With growing support, the 
Bundestag passed a resolution in favor of the project, in April 1994 a competition 
for its design was announced and in November 1997 Peter Eisenman’s plan 
emerged as the winner of the competition.  
Notably, in October 1998 the well-known German writer Martin Walser 
used the occasion of his acceptance speech for the Peace Prize of German 
Booksellers to refer to the Holocaust Memorial planned for Berlin as the 
“monumentalization of shame,” questioning at the same time “why in this 
decade the past is presented as never before.”610 Walser’s critique of the 
“instrumentalization” of the past, his charge that a “routine of accusation” had 
led to a meaningless ritual of mourning in Germany, and his admission that he 
was “beginning to look away [from] the relentless presentation of our shame” 
prompted a sharp response from Ignatz Bubis, head of the Central Council of 
Jewish Communities in Germany, who accused Walser of “intellectual arson” 
and countered that if Walser could no longer stand to look at the “horror of 
Auschwitz” it was because “he had never looked” in the first place. 611 
The so-called Walter-Bubis debate was influenced (but not totally 
dominated this time) by the usual right-wing dichotomy typical of debates on the 
National Socialist past in Germany. As a result of this debate, support for the 
memorial became associated with those who wanted to remember the Holocaust, 
criticism of it with those who wanted to forget. The SPD and Green 
parliamentarians, having no personal experience of Nazism, in turn, were aware 
that young people could not commemorate without first being informed of what 
it was they were supposed to be commemorating. But the general agreement that 
commemoration should be less abstract and symbolic, more ‘concrete’ was a 
result of intense discussion of Walser’s speech.612 
In the course of the thrashing out of these conflicting views in the public 
realm, it became a truism for politicians and intellectuals to argue that the 
memorial (that was, by the way, inaugurated only on 10 May, 2005) was not as 
important as the debate surrounding it. Indeed the discussion was itself a kind of 
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memorial. One 1,200-page compendium of articles on the subject appeared under 
the title The Memorial Debate – The Memorial? (Der Denkmalstreit – das Denkmal?).613 
In the 1990s the history of what became known itself as “overcoming the 
past” itself became an independent subject of historical research – a development 
running more or less parallel to the emergence of public debates over the 
Holocaust and the Germans, the Wehrmacht’ crimes in World War II, slave labor 
and reparations, as well as over the forms and appropriate degree of social-
historical memory.614 
The persistence of discussions and the continual presence of the Nazi past 
in the German present-day public sphere mean that “working through” the past 
has indeed evolved in Germany into an on-going public obligation. Notably, 
during commemoration held in 2005 upon the 60th anniversary of the liberation 
of the Nazi death camp at Auschwitz German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
expressed his “shame for the deaths of those who were murdered and for the fact 
that, the survivors, were forced to go through the hell of a concentration camp.” 
He emphasized the fact that “the vast majority of the Germans living today bear 
no guilt for the Holocaust. But they do bear a special responsibility.”615  
The fact of a constant public recognition of the German national guilt by 
the country’s leaders testifies to the high level and strength of the antifascist 
consensus in modern Germany. And it confirms that the traumatic page of 
German national history is by no means closed. 
The same argument may refer to any social fields of the German life such 
as education, literature, television, etc. As Stephen Brockmann conceptualized: 
“The paradox is that Nazi crimes rarely present in broad public discourse during 
the immediate postwar period have become ever more present, ever more 
visible, and ever more broadly addressed with the passage of time, to the point 
where it would be no exaggeration to say that reflection on the Nazi past has 
become the primary intellectual and spiritual contribution of the Federal 
Republic of Germany to world culture, indeed a source of its very identity.”616 
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Postwar German literature was preoccupied with coming to terms with 
the Nazi era and the Holocaust. As the German scholar Jochen Vogt has written, 
from the beginning up through the 1980s, postwar West German literature, has 
made National Socialism in all its dimensions its most important theme.617 
According to Brockman, since 1960s “German political and literary culture has 
been a continuous process of mourning.”618 
In the late 1980s Jürgen Habermas suggested that Germany’s postwar 
identity was based on an attempt to understand Auschwitz. In Habermas’s view 
“unfortunately, in the cultural nation of the Germans, a connection to 
universalistic constitutional principles that was anchored in convictions could be 
formed only after—and through – Auschwitz.”619 The writer Günter Grass 
strengthened this conception of Auschwitz as a contributing factor in German 
identity when he wrote: “Nothing, no national emotion, no matter how 
idyllically tinted, not even any protestations of the amiability of those born too 
late, can relativize or easily do away with this experience, which we as the guilty 
have had with ourselves, and which the victims have had with us as unified 
Germans. We will not get around Auschwitz. We should not even attempt such 
an act of violence, no matter how much we might wish to do so, because 
Auschwitz belongs to us, it is a permanent scar on our history, and it has, on the 
positive side, made possible an insight which might run like this: now, finally, 
we know ourselves.”620 
As for the German television, Wulf Kansteiner showed that between 1963 
and 1993 ZDF broadcasted on impressive number of programs which dealt with 
the Nazi past and its postwar legacy. In the period of 31 years the station aired 
1,217 shows totaling over 87,000 minutes of airtime. The ZDF station has 
consistently dedicated between 1 and 1.5 percent of its program time to the task 
of educating and informing its viewers about Germany’s problematic past and 
about contemporary efforts of mastering its legacy. Each year the ZDF produced 
or purchased between 30 and 50 programs on Nazism with an average length of 
71 minutes each. Statistically the viewers could expect one program on the topic 
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every nine days. Since the station’s administration has never developed any 
guidelines regarding the quantity of historical programming in general and of 
programming on Nazism in particular, the figures attest to the editorial staff’s 
continuous commitment to the project of Vergangenheitsbewältigung.621 
For most Germans, the Holocaust is not an event that happened in a 
faraway place in some distant past, but is a living part of their recent history. To 
a large extent, the credit is due to the German educational endeavors. 
Importantly, teaching about Nazi dictatorship and the Holocaust at schools is not 
limited to a niche in the history syllabus. Instead, it is discussed again and again 
in different ways, in a number of subjects, and at different points in time.622 
In his article on Holocaust Education in Germany Gunter Wehrmann 
described this process as follows: “The treatment of the Nazi period in all its 
aspects – Hitler’s rise to power; his establishment of a dictatorship in Germany; 
the abolition of the rule of law; the persecution of all kinds of political opponents; 
the racially motivated persecution of the Jews, culminating in the Holocaust; the 
reticence and opposition of German citizens; and, Germany’s instigation of 
World War II - is compulsory teaching matter at all types of schools in Germany 
and at all levels of education. The Holocaust viewed as the most important 
aspect of the period of Nazi rule is treated in various school subjects in different 
ways. In history classes, the Nazi period is dealt with in the context of 20th century 
German, or world, history. Students who pass the Abitur exam, the prerequisite 
for university study at the age of 18 or 19, receive a formal historical presentation 
of German history in the 20th century twice - during their final two years before 
graduation and at 9th or 10th grade level. 
In civic studies and current affairs classes, the lessons from the Holocaust are 
related to the teaching about Germany’s political institutions and about the 
values that govern political life in a democratic society. When current affairs are 
discussed - such as antisemitic incidents and rightwing extremism in Germany 
and elsewhere; ethnic cleansing in Bosnia; and, the Middle East conflict - teachers 
emphasize the importance of tolerance and the rule of law as lessons to be 
learned from the Holocaust. 
In religion or ethics classes, the Holocaust is discussed with reference to the 
guilt and responsibility of those Germans who did not risk their lives to fight 
National Socialism or to protect Jews. Since the notion of interreligious tolerance 
and the knowledge of other world religions are subjects of religious studies 
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courses at German public schools, the teacher will often arrange a meeting with 
members of the organized Jewish community, a visit to the local synagogue, or to 
a Holocaust memorial or museum. 
The fate of the Holocaust victims and what Germans did or did not do 
during the Third Reich often become subjects of German literature classes, when 
the works, novels, short stories, and plays of authors such as Alfred Andersch, 
Ilse Aichinger, Heinrich Böll, Günter Grass, Rolf Hochhuth, Marie-Luise 
Kaschnitz, Siegfried Lenz, and others are discussed in the context of teaching 
about contemporary German literature. 
A visit to a Holocaust memorial or a Holocaust museum at the site of a 
former concentration camp is a standard feature of school excursions. In fact, the 
largest category of visitors at former concentration camps is often German high-
school students led by their teachers. 
The objective of teaching about the Holocaust is not limited to educating 
students about historical facts. Instead, the primary political and educational 
objective for confronting young Germans with their country’s darkest past and 
their ancestors’ guilt is, above all, to make them understand the consequences of 
Hitler’s dictatorship, the uniqueness of the Holocaust, and to make them 
appreciate the values and institutions that protect freedom and democracy.”623 
The following quotations from government education documents serve as 
illustrations of the philosophy of Holocaust education in Germany today.  
Paragraph One of the Berlin school law, whose mandate dates back to the 
immediate post-war period and the goal of re-education, expresses the consensus 
of all the federal states on the education priorities: “The goal must be the 
education of individuals, capable of standing resolutely against Nazi ideology 
and all other violent political belief systems. They must also be able to build a 
state and society based on democracy, peace, freedom, and human dignity. 
Individuals must be aware of their responsibilities toward society, and their 
behavior must recognize the basic equality of rights for all human beings, respect 
every honest conviction, and understand the necessity for progressive social 
conditions as well as peaceful understanding among nations.”624 
Gunter Wehrmann quotes the syllabus directive issued by the education 
ministry of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia for the treatment of the Holocaust 
in 9th grade Realschule history classes emphasizes the importance of democratic 
institutions and ideas. The directive entitled “From Anti-human Ideas to the 
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Extermination of Human Lives” reads in part as follows: “Students should learn 
to recognize: the destruction of a democratic government based upon the rule of 
law; the enforcement of the Führer’s principles; total regimentation of the 
population through propaganda; discrimination and terror, and the anti-human 
ideas of the prerogative of an Aryan race form the basis from which Hitler could 
unleash a world war and embark upon the systematic destruction of human 
lives.” Wehrmann explains that, “According to a document prepared by the 
North Rhine-Westfalia ministry of education, directives for Holocaust teaching in 
Hauptschulen stipulate among other things that: (1) Teaching must seek to 
counter obliviousness to the past and critically examine tendencies toward a 
“normalization” of German historical awareness. The examination of the causes 
of the success of National Socialism in Germany must therefore be a focal point 
in teaching. (2) Teaching is to be devised in such a way that students realize the 
present and future significance of remembering National Socialism. Therefore, 
teaching of these topics had to address the questions associated with the 
responsibility of later generations, and the present manifestations of neo-Fascism 
and neo-anti-Semitism. (3) Teaching must, in particular, convey the perspective 
of the victims and give students the opportunity to learn about everyday life 
under National Socialism in a vivid and tangible way.”625 
 
In the next section of this chapter I will dwell on the development of 
collective memory narratives in post-Soviet Russia. 
 
4.3. Collective Memory of the Soviet Past in Russia  
 
4.3.1 1980s 
 
Although de jure the post-Soviet period started with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, an important point of departure in terms of socio-cultural 
transformations was the perestroika period of the second half of the 1980s. It was 
launched by the last Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991), 
who announced at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) in February 1986 a new policy of restructuring (perestroika) defined by 
him as “the conference of development of democracy, socialist self-government, 
encouragement of initiative and creative endeavor, improved order and 
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discipline, more glasnost, criticism and self-criticism in all spheres of our society; 
[…] utmost respect for the individual and consideration for personal dignity.”626 
The introduction of “openness” (glasnost), as one of the most important 
elements of perestroika, finally broke the silence regarding the past and let 
suppressed memories of the Soviet history come to the surface. In 1987 on the 
17th anniversary of the October Revolution Gorbachev admitted that mass 
repressions of Party members and other Soviet citizens had taken place under 
Stalin and announced that it was time to fill in the blanks of the country’s 
history. 
As a consequence of these developments, an explosion of revelations 
about the nature of the Soviet system took place. In the first instance, the world 
of the Soviet concentration camps began to unfold as the Gulag survivors’ and 
witnesses’ accounts and other previously forbidden writings about the Stalin era 
began to appear. Notably, in 1987-1990 the majority of the texts that had been 
either previously disseminated via underground channels within the country 
(samizdat) or had been smuggled abroad (tamizdat) were for the first time 
‘officially’ published in the Soviet Union.627 
Among the most important works of the Gulag survivors published 
largely in the period between 1987 and 1990 were autobiographical Varlam 
Shalamov’s Kolyma stories (Kolymskie rasskazy, 1954-73), Eugenia Ginzburg’s 
Journey into the Whirlwind (Krutoi marshrut, 1967, 1975-77), Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago (Arkhipelag Gulag, 1973–78) and The First 
Circle (V kruge pervom 1968), Yuri Dombrovsky’s The Keeper of Antiquities 
(Khranitel’ drevnostei, 1964) and The Faculty of Useless Knowledge (Fakul’tet 
nenuzhnykh veshei, 1975), Vassily Grossman’s Life and Fate (Zhizn’ i sud’ba, 1963) 
and Forever Flowing (Vse techet, 1961), and Anatoly Rybakov’s anti-Stalinist saga 
The Children of Arbat (Deti Arbata) written in the 1960s. Additionally, memoirs by 
Nadezhda Mandelshtam (1960s-1970s) as well as the works by Lydia 
Chukovskaya – a short novel Sofia Petrovna (1939—1940), Descent Into Water 
(Spusk pod Vodu, 1972) and her legendary The Akhmatova journals (Zapiski ob Anne 
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Akhmatovoi) – that all had been forbidden during the Soviet times finally became 
available for the Russian readers in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Importantly, the demand on these publications was immense. The scale of 
popularity of the theme can be easily traced through the unprecedented growth 
of the circulation of journals and magazines in which the abovementioned texts 
appeared. For instance, the circulation of Druzhba narodov magazine after it 
published Anatoly Rybakov’s Children of the Arbat in 1988 grew from 119,000 in 
1985 to 775,000 in 1988, and in 1990 it exceeded 1,000,000 copies. Novyi mir—the 
journal that had been most active in combating Stalinism during the Khrushev’s 
Thaw and had been destroyed in 1970—had a circulation of 425,000 in 1985. At 
the beginning of 1989, however, its circulation had already reached 1.5 million; 
and in the summer of that year, when Novyi mir began to publish The Gulag 
Archipelago, its circulation exceeded 2.5 million. The circulation of one of the 
glasnost’ flagships Ogonyek weekly grew from 1.5 million in 1985 to 3.5 million in 
1989.628 Some observers noted that during the perestroika “it has become more 
interesting to read than to live.”629  
At the beginning of 1987 Tengiz Abuladze’s film entitled Repentance 
(Pokayanie) powerfully raised the problem of coming to terms with the Stalinist 
era legacy. The film symbolically represented the society burdened with its 
criminal past through the dictator’s corpse, which, no matter how many times it 
was buried, returned to haunt his successors because his crimes had not been 
publicly condemned.630 
From the end of 1986 onward in a new environment of weakened state 
censorship intellectuals, writers, artists, filmmakers, as well as ordinary citizens 
were finally starting to talk openly about their country’s long-suppressed past. 
The truth about such aspects of the Soviet history as collectivization, forced 
industrialization, the mass reprisals and terror of the 1930s, the deportation of 
entire peoples, postwar anti-Semitism and reprisals became gradually unveiled 
and discussed.631 Historian Maria Ferretti described the situation as follows: 
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“From late 1987 onward, daily and weekly newspapers—and television, too—
began filling in the “blank spots.” They faced the problem of restoring to 
memory entire pages of national history, individuals, and events that had been 
erased from the past (for example, the disastrous situation during the first 
months of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) or the fate of the Bolshevik old 
guard and of the opposition under Stalin). These publications provided readers 
with factual and documentary proofs of events pictured in fiction and film. In the 
same period, open discussions were held, featuring clashes of opinion on the 
sources of Stalinism and its place in Russian history as a whole and in the more 
narrow time span of its postrevolutionary history.”632 
Publicists, writers, social scientists such as Yuri Karyakin, Ludmila 
Savraskina, Dmitry Furman, Yuri Afanasiev, Grigory Pomerants, Vasily 
Selyunin, Vladimir Kantor, Alexander Shindel’, Alexander Tsypko, Anatoly 
Rybakov, Tatiana Zaslavskaya, Andrei Sakharov, Mikhail Gefter, Lev Karpinsky, 
Yuri Levada, Vyahceslav Ivanov, Daniil Granin, to name just a few, were actively 
involved in the process of “working through” the past, an “honest labor of self-
discovery.”633 According to Leon Aron, “This national act of acknowledgment 
was thought to be more than a tribute to the dead. […] The horrors of Stalinism 
had to be recognized in shame and remorse, shuddered and wailed over, forever 
and unequivocally condemned, and, most important, redeemed by the creation 
of a state and society that would never allow the country to be ruled by terror.”634 
As one of the critics formulated it in the 1989 Znamya magazine publication, it 
was imperative “to create such social, political and state structures that would 
firmly block any negative tendencies and any tilt toward self-exterminating 
past.”635 Such mechanisms would not work without a moral overhaul, and such 
an overhaul was impossible without unflinching self-discovery. Above all, 
perestroika needed a most sober, most merciless burning out (vyzhiganie) of any 
self-delusion.636  
Washington Post correspondent David Remnick called the process taking 
place in the Soviet Union during the perestroika as “the return of history.”637 
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Another foreign observer Adam Hochschild compared Russia to “a person who 
endured unimaginably terrible suffering as a child, then for many years was 
strictly forbidden ever to mention it, and who now at last, in middle age, was 
able to speak” and “the words came pouring out.”638 “It is hard to recall another 
case where the government and press of a major country were so preoccupied, 
almost daily, with events that had happened forty or fifty years before,” 
confessed the impressed Hochschild.639 
In 1988, riding the wave of this sentiment the International Historical-
Enlightenment Human Rights and Humanitarian Society Memorial was created 
with the goal of perpetuating the memory of Stalin’s victims. The organization 
began collecting documents and testimony, laying the foundation for a list of 
victims of reprisals. Local branches of the association collected information all 
across the Soviet Union. For this reason, the first serious studies of Soviet 
concentration camps, published already in the 1980s, were written by members 
of Memorial.640  
A year later in 1989 the Moscow historical literary society The Return 
(Vozvrashenie) was founded by former prisoners of the Gulag. It started collecting 
witnesses’ accounts – memoirs, diaries, letters, literary works and photographs, 
etc. – of former camps’ inmates, organized meetings of former political prisoners, 
held conferences, and published the journal Volya containing articles on the 
camps and the totalitarian system primarily written by former prisoners. 
Meanwhile, the need to create completely new history textbooks became 
urgent and some teachers and young historians took the initiative and began to 
write them.641 The previously taught version of the country’s history was so 
distorted that the national high school examination in history, required for 
graduation and the diploma, was abolished in 1988.642 The exam was restored the 
next year, but the old textbooks remained banished and new ones were readied 
for the 9th and 10th grades (the junior and senior years).643 
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4.3.2. 1990s 
 
It is important to point out that the period which the famous Russian actor and 
himself a former prisoner in Stalin’s camps Georgy Zhzhyonov called the time 
“of societal penitence and moral cleansing,” appeared rather short-lived.644 
Already in 1991 the opinion polls started revealing the growth of defense 
reactions in the social and cultural periphery, as 62 percent of the respondents 
lamented that the press “devotes too much attention to the theme of Stalin’s 
repressions” (only 16 percent thought that “too little”), that it “smears the heroic 
past,” etc.645 The theme of Stalinism was soon excluded from the public 
discourse.  
The surveys vividly showed a decline of interest in the crimes of the Stalin 
period over the 1990s. If in 1989 36 percent of the respondents listed the mass 
repressions among the most significant events in the country’s history, in 1994 
this opinion was shared only by 18 percent. This trend continued: in 1999 the 
number was reduced to 11 percent and in the 2003 poll mass repressions were 
mentioned already by less than 3 percent of those surveyed.646 
Certainly, there are several reasons for the removal of the theme of 
Stalinism and repressions from the public memory of the post-Soviet society. 
Most likely that the new ruling elite who actively used history as a weapon in 
struggling against their political opponents was in charge of this ousting and 
even repression of memory. 
The first Russian President Boris Yeltsin (in office 1991-1999) selected the 
strategy of opposing himself to the Communist Party led by Gorbachev, 
portraying it as the embodiment of all Soviet times horrors. The breakup 
argument was validated through representation of the October Revolution as a 
kind of accident of history that “had derailed Russia from its natural track and 
plunged it into the ‘black hole’ of Soviet non-history.”647  
The pre-revolutionary imperial Russia, in turn, became chosen as a 
symbol of Russia’s lost greatness and as an ideal, a promise for a better future, 
and the new Russian politics was legitimized through appeals of a return to the 
lost “normalcy.” As Maria Ferretti put it, Yeltsin’s representation of history 
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“founded on a mythical image of pre-revolutionary Russia, whose inheritor and 
restorer Yeltsin proclaimed himself to be, while Gorbachev incarnated all the 
horrors of Soviet history.”648 Yeltsin indeed presented himself as a symbol of the 
breakup with the criminal Soviet regime and promised the national revival 
which had to be manifested in the return to the period prior the year 1917. He 
positioned himself as the leader called to revive the former Russian imperial 
greatness.  
The verbal idealization of the imperial Russia was accompanied by the 
revival of symbols and rituals of that period (the double-headed eagle, a tricolor, 
various official ceremonies, and the return to pre-Revolutionary political 
terminology), and by the building or reconstruction of ancient Russian 
architectural monuments destroyed in the Soviet period primarily Orthodox 
churches and cathedrals, the most well-known being the Cathedral of Christ the 
Savior in Moscow, dismantled in the 1930s and rebuilt under the patronage of 
Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov (in office 1992-2010) in the 1990s.  
Observers also pointed to the relevant innovations introduced to the 
school textbooks. For instance, in the 1993 history textbook for 8-graders History 
of the Fatherland (Istoriia Otechestva) by Boris Rybakov and Alexander 
Preobrazhensky (which had a circulation of 2.6 million copies), Russian 14 year-
olds could find maps and charts describing the contributions made by both the 
Rurik and the Romanov imperial dynasties to the growth of Russia’s territory. 
Additionally, the textbook devoted much space (32 pages out of 289 pages) to 
Peter the Great and his major social and economic reforms.649 As Joseph Zaida 
conceptualized, “Although the students learn that under Peter tsarist rule 
became absolute, he is portrayed as a great builder of symbolic power. One of his 
major reforms included his civil and military service division ranks (tabel o 
rangakh). To consolidate the centralization of power and the monarchy, he also 
popularized the design of the Imperial Coat of Arms (Ivan III used it in 1497, as 
his royal seal, the year that marked the centralization on the state), the now-
renowned czarist two-headed eagle symbol that was resurrected after the fall of 
the familiar hammer and sickle in 1991 to decorate official Russian documents 
and the new parliament house.”650  
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Thanks to the myth representing the October revolution and the 
establishment of the Soviet regime as an interruption of the normal line of the 
Russian state development, the entire Soviet period could be effaced from the 
history of the country, simply set aside. The perception of Communism as a 
foreign, imported phenomenon alien to the Russian history and transformation 
of the Bolsheviks into the real source of all evil, relieved Russian authorities as 
well as the Russian people of the responsibility for the crimes of the Soviet 
regime (of which most leaders of the new Russia had been once a part). No 
longer were they obliged to repent or “work through” the past that was “a black 
hole,” a rupture, a non-history. In this context even the plan to erect in the 
Russian capital a monument to the victims of Stalinism, first proposed as far back 
as the Khrushchev era and later revived during the perestroika, has not been 
carried out.651 
Thus, at the initial stage, particularly during the period of Yeltsin’s high 
popularity, the myth was attractive and found a ready welcome in the public as 
it presented a simple solution to the insolvable problem of guilt and 
responsibility. Furthermore, it allowed Russian citizens to improve their opinion 
of their own country and of themselves. The survey data revealed an apparent 
link between the improved self-assessment of the Russian citizens and their 
declining interest in the crimes of the Stalin era. If at the end of 1989, when the 
exposure of Stalinism reached its peak, shame over the past was dominant, by 
the middle of the 1990s the prevailing feeling was pride in their national 
history.652 
Maria Ferretti conceptualized this consequences of leaving the past behind 
in the following way: “This vision of the past, the way in which it is constructed, 
made it possible to set Stalinism easily aside and thereby dispense with the 
crushing weight of collective guilt, which had previously haunted society and 
had in the end fractured the country’s collective identity, breaking the image 
Russia had of itself. By this operation, Russia not only liberated itself from a past 
whose weight had proven too heavy to bear by constructing an acceptable past. 
It also acquired a consolatory virtual past, capable of salving the wounds of the 
real history, replacing it with an imaginary history: had it not been for the 
accident of the revolution, then we, today, would be as rich as the West, or even 
richer. This virtual past not only has the function of permitting the construction 
of a positive identity. It is also […] a promise for the future, for if such a past 
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would have been possible without the revolution, that means it can be returned 
to by picking up the path where it was abandoned—which the radicals in fact 
promised to do. This reassuring sort of ‘future past’ was particularly important 
at a moment of grave social crisis, marked also by the loss of orientation and 
identity: at one and the same time it provided Russians with anchorage in the 
past, giving them a feeling of being rooted in the longue durée of national 
history, while reassuring them about the future, making it less threatening.”653 
The usable past thus offered Russians both liberation from a sense of guilt 
about the past and a promise for a better, more radiant future. However, as the 
general disillusionment with Yeltsin’s attempts at liberal reform grew and the 
social and economic crisis in Russia aggravated, it was getting more and more 
evident that “catching up” with the West in terms of well-being was a much 
more complicated task than it had been initially perceived. In this context of 
disenchantment with the liberal democratic project which did not bring the 
desired prosperity, the nostalgia for the Soviet era has taken root. By that time 
the crimes of Stalinism had long ceased to dominate the national agenda, but the 
memories of once belonging to a “strong” state “respected” and “feared” on the 
international stage, as well as memories of an alleged stability and well-being 
during the Soviet times haunted the people who used to depend on the state in 
most aspects of their lives. 
Importantly, it was initially the denigrated during perestroika as a time of 
stagnation, lack of freedom, and ‘doublethink’ Brezhnev era that started gaining 
in popularity first and which gradually become seen as the ‘golden age’ of the 
Russian history. If in 1994, 36 percent of respondents regarded the Brezhnev era 
mostly positively, in 1999 this number had reached 51 percent; meanwhile, the 
number of those who evaluated that period negatively was reduced from 16 
percent to 10 percent.654 
Although the level of well-being during the time when Leonid Brezhnev 
was a General Secretary (1966-82) was far from the standards established in the 
same period in the West, it was depicted in the recollections of some segments of 
the population as “a time of stability, relative comfort, and group solidarity, 
dramatically different from the incomprehensible, troubled contemporary life.”655 
According to Ferretti, another, not secondary component of this nostalgic 
feeling for the Soviet era was nostalgia for lost identity. As the historian 
explained it, “Carefully fostered by propaganda, the identity proposed to Soviet 
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citizens [in the Brezhnev era] was centered on a sense of belonging to a country 
whose authority and strength were recognized throughout the world; a country, 
moreover, which was in a certain manner superior to others by virtue of its 
messianic role. One of the powerful symbols of this success was the conquest of 
space, whose most celebrated hero was the cosmonaut Gagarin, the first man to 
be sent into the cosmos.”656 
Since turning the Soviet Union into the second-greatest world power was 
mostly due to a determining role it played in the victory in World War II (which 
is known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War), the victory over Nazi Germany 
was soon turned into the main symbol structuring the Russian national identity. 
As Yeltsin’s regime was drifting into authoritarianism after the recourse to 
force in October 1993 and establishment of superpresidential regime in 
December, it was employing more often the legitimation patterns used by its 
Soviet predecessors. Most important, since the mid-1990s the regime started 
reintegrating the symbol of victory in the war and interpretation of the events of 
the war created in the Brezhnev period into the Russian official politics of 
memory. 
If for the political elite reactivation of the symbol of remembrance “victory 
in the war” served as an instrument of power consolidation, legitimizing and 
sustaining the regime that was getting more and more authoritarian, for the 
Russian population, in turn, it became attractive for several reasons. On the one 
hand, the re-integration of the Great Patriotic War into national memory (as a 
continuation of the process started during the Brezhnev era in 1965) provided a 
necessary basis for positive national identification replacing the fading pre-
revolutionary ideal. It also compensated for the disappointments of the previous 
years – the disintegration of the USSR, the failure of the post-Soviet reforms, the 
noticeable weakening of mass hopes, and the disappearance of the illusions of 
perestroika that have furnished the content of a traumatic experience of national 
failure.657 
The symbol thus helped Russians improve their own image and image of 
the country through whitewashing history previously full of nascent doubts 
about its creditworthiness and justifiability. The latter were linked with the truth 
about the criminality of the Soviet regime that emerged during the perestroika 
period. As the victory in the war has been progressively gaining in relevance, the 
memory of Stalinist repression, on the contrary, has faded. In fact, it appeared so 
that the memory of the victory actually ousted or replaced the memory of terror. 
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As the chairman of the International Memorial Society Arseny Roginsky 
observed, “Victory means the Stalinist era, and the terror means the Stalinist era. 
It is impossible to reconcile these two images of the past, except by rejecting one 
of them, or at least making serious corrections to it. And this is what happened – 
the memory of the terror receded. It has not disappeared completely, but it has 
been pushed to the periphery of people’s consciousness.”658 
The politics of memory, following the Soviet traditions of dealing with 
history, immediately got a reflection in the school history textbooks. Observers of 
Russian school textbooks of the 1990s noted that they paid little attention to the 
Soviet repressions and mass deportations of ethnic groups.659 At the same time 
teaching history in schools was becoming viewed as a means of patriotic 
upbringing which was mostly achieved through the study of the Great Patriotic 
War.660 If in early 1990s some textbooks portrayed a critical view of the war 
presenting specific figures of the enormous losses of the Soviet army, these 
specific figures were not mentioned in the more recent history textbooks.661 
As the Stalin’s leadership became inseparable from the triumph of the 
Soviet Union over Nazi Germany, the Stalin’s rule in general became justified 
and rehabilitated. Despite the enormous human loss of which the broad public 
by that time had been more or less aware, Stalin’s regime could be nevertheless 
seen as legitimate and praiseworthy because of the victory in the war that 
seemed to justify the enormous loss of human lives during the Stalin’s reign of 
terror. “The implication is, – explained analyst Maria Lipman, – that individuals 
may have been cowed, and that the ferocious state treated them mercilessly, but 
the state was the vehicle that inspired Russia’s victory in World War II, its 
greatest achievement of the 20th century.”662  
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It was in this context that the image of Stalin was restored, the dictator 
being presented as the author of the victory, the leader who gave back to Russia 
the power it had lost with the revolution, assuring it of a preponderant place in 
the world. If in 1989 Stalin was mentioned among the most important and 
authoritative figures of the Russian history by only 12 percent of the 
respondents, in 1994 the number of his admirers increased up to 20 percent, and 
in 1999 – up to 35 percent.663 If in 1990 only 8 percent of the respondents 
considered Stalin the most positive character in history of the country, in 1997 
this viewpoint was already shared by 15 percent. And if in 1990 Stalin was 
regarded as the most negative character in the country’s history by 48 percent of 
Russians, in 1997 this number decreased to 36 percent.664  
The Soviet nostalgia, as Maria Ferretti underscored, has constituted a 
powerful driving force for the intensification of nationalistic sentiments, which 
since the mid-1990s has acquired an ever-growing place in the ideology of 
Russia. Simultaneously the national isolationism manifested in the revival of the 
Russian “unique path” mythology started developing rapidly. According to 
public opinion surveys, the number of people convinced that Russia must choose 
its own path instead of following Western “chimeras” has grown steadily since 
the beginning of the 1990s. 54 percent of the respondents in 1994 and 59 percent 
in 1995 agreed that Russia should follow its unique path of development665 and 
by 1999 the number of this view’s proponents reached 69 percent.666 
The more evident became the authoritarian features of the post-Soviet 
Russia and the stronger became the disappointment of Russian society, the more 
space was occupied by the nationalistic sentiments and values in the discourse of 
power, ousting the democratic values to which postcommunist Russia initially 
appealed. Since the beginning of the first Chechen war launched in 1994, 
imperial syndrome alongside aggressive nationalism continued to expand their 
positions. The growth of nationalism reached its peak with ascent to power of 
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Vladimir Putin who made imperial ideas of state superiority and isolationism the 
basis of Russia identity’s and of the government ideology.667 
The Soviet repressive past continued to interest only a small group of 
intellectuals, largely historians working on it. As for this professional work on 
the Soviet history and the problems of its repressive past, it is worth mentioning 
that with the partial opening of the archives historians got access to the 
information previously closed for any access for decades. The intensive 
historians’ work in the archives let observers define the 1990s as “the decade-
long ‘archival period’ of work on Soviet history.”668 Generally speaking, the 
historical research of the Stalin period during the 1990s was characterized by 
accumulation of new, primarily, archival sources, and by obtaining basic 
knowledge about the Soviet leaders as well as about the structure, functions and 
activities of the Soviet repressive organs.  
In the 1990s a number of important biographical studies by Anton 
Antonov-Ovseyenko, Dmitry Volkogonov, Alexandr Kozlov and other historians 
saw light.669 Additionally, the publications of several reference works as well as 
general research on the history of the repressions, camps, prison and other 
repressive Soviet institutions have significantly contributed to historiographical 
developments and opened up new prospects for future research. In this regards 
the reference works edited by Mikhail Smirnov (1998), Nikita Petrov and 
Konstantin Skorkin (1999), Alexandr Kokurin and Nikita Petrov (1997, 2003) can 
be pointed out.670  
Another group of historians such as Sergei Krasil’nikov and Viktor 
Danilov (1992-96), Viktor Shashkov (1993), Tatiana Slavko (1995), Viktor Danilov 
et al. (1999) focused on the mass repressions of peasants, forced collectivization 
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and dekulakization, and “special resettlement” (spetssylka) of “kulaks.”671 The 
research of the departmental subdivisions of the Gulag and the camps was done 
by Vasily Makurov (1992), Olga Elantseva (1994), Lyubov’ Gvozdkova (1994), 
Viktor Berdinskikh (1998), Anatoly Shirokov (2000).672 There also appeared 
publications, primarily by the Memorial historians, on the repressions of 
representatives of different ethnic groups and nationalities – Poles, Russian 
Germans, Jews, etc.673 
On the basis of archives some research on the daily operations of the 
higher echelons of power and relations between Soviet leaders became 
possible.674 Furthermore, the archives have in many ways shaped the nature of 
work on culture and science in the Stalin period – mainly research on the 
interrelationship between state and intelligentsia, mechanisms of censorship and 
ideological control, and so on. Here the works of Vitaly Shentalinsky (1995), 
Nikolai Krementsov (1997), Denis Babichenko (1997), and Leonid Maksimenkov 
(1997), Vladimir Esakov (2000) are worth mentioning.675  
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In the second half of the 1990s the first attempts to get into the everyday 
life of Stalin period, to analyze the Soviet society, its standards of living, and the 
daily behavior of ordinary Soviet citizens were undertaken by both Russian and 
Western authors.676 
However, despite the importance of the work performed by historians in 
that period, experts expressed criticism that the decade of studies was marked by 
“the production of a large number of documentary publications and reference 
works” alongside “a depressingly small number of scholarly monographs.”677 
According to Oleg Khlevniuk, “The same picture can be observed in 
regard to specialized historical journals, in which substantive research articles 
have clearly made room for the publication of selected documents, memoirs, and 
current debates (publitsistika).”678 Peter Holquist also suggested that “if there are 
any blank spots now, they lie more in our conceptualizations than in the archives 
themselves.”679 
Indeed, practically no generalizing works on the Stalin’s reign of terror 
and totalitarian character of the regime appeared in the post-Soviet period. 
Galina Ivanova’s 1997 monograph on Gulag in the System of a Totalitarian State 
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was a rare exception.680 Various aspects of the history of the Gulag, despite the 
existence of a major source base, have not been the subject of in-depth research 
and analysis. For instance, largely non-studied remained the development of 
camps as a social phenomenon of a particular type. 
Another serious problem with historical research lies in the fact that this 
field of studies remained marginal and rather unpopular. Observers reported the 
number of Russian specialists seriously devoted to the study of Soviet history to 
be too small expressing concern that very few young researchers entered into the 
historical profession and were eager to work on the topics lined with the Soviet 
reign of terror in the 1990s.681 
Some important sociological research of the Soviet society was conducted 
in the 1990s by the Analytical Levada Center sociologists. The Soviet Man (Homo 
Sovieticus) project directed by the organization’s head Yuri Levada was launched 
in 1989. Since then five waves of all-Russia public opinion surveys were 
conducted in 1989, 1994, 1999, 2003 and 2008. The Russian sociologists just like 
their German colleagues from the Frankfurt school half a century before studied 
the human type that developed under the Soviet totalitarian regime and tried to 
trace continuities between the Soviet and post-Soviet social identification of 
individuals. Already initial results made the experts underscore a very high 
stability of attitudes of mass consciousness in post-Soviet Russia.682 
Since 1992 the Moscow historical literary society The Return (Vozvrashenie) 
founded in 1989 has been publishing memoirs, poems and other literary 
witnesses of life in the Gulag. In 1996 the Andrei Sakharov Museum and Public 
Center “Peace, Progress and Human Rights” was founded in Moscow. The 
Museum’s Permanent Exhibit developed by architect Evgeny Ass presented 
Soviet history as seen through the prism of political repressions and resistance to 
the regime. Since 1997 the museum has been collecting information on the 
authors of memoirs on the Gulag as well as on the monuments to the victims of 
political repressions erected within the territory of the former USSR in a project 
entitled “Memory of Lawlessness”. As a result of this initiative the databases 
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“Memoirs on Gulag and their authors” and “Monuments to victims of political 
repressions within the territory of the former USSR” were created.683  
In the same 1996 the only Russian Museum for the History of Political 
Repression “Perm-36” built on the site of the former labor camp for political 
prisoners in the Perm region was opened for visitor admission.  
Nevertheless, despite these important contributions by rather small 
groups of individuals (largely consisting of former victims of the Soviet regime 
or their children), the trajectory of memory aimed at critical assessment and 
“working through” the Soviet totalitarian past did not produce any series public 
impact in the 1990s. Since the mid-1990s the official politics of memory has been 
more and more dominating the public sphere, preventing the crystallization of 
any independent agents or communities of memory. 
 
4.3.3 2000s 
 
Since President Putin’s rise to power in 2000 the state has been claiming 
practically absolute monopoly over the interpretation and the use of history in 
the public sphere. As the ruling elite were suppressing independent institutions 
(free elections, independent press and television outlets, political parties, etc.) 
and getting hold of the public sphere, it has been also intensifying its attempts to 
control national history and to impose the official version of memory of the 
national past. And the more official system of propaganda has been working in 
this direction, the more imperial and nationalistic sentiments have been 
dominating the mass consciousness. Thus, the growing authoritarianism of the 
2000s was accompanied by the ever increasing nationalist and pro-imperial 
rhetoric and sentiments, alongside with the continuing devaluation of liberal 
values. 
The developments of memory politics are most clearly visible in the 
memorialization of the Great Patriotic War the victory in which, as previously 
noted, was reintegrated into national identity as its core symbol already in the 
second half of the 1990s. Boris Dubin (2004, 2005, 2008), Lev Gudkov (2005), 
Arseny Roginsky (2008), Christian Folk (2009), Dina Khapaeva (2009) and other 
observers have repeatedly pointed to the continual increase of the significance of 
victory in the official politics of memory since Putin’s rise to public office. 
If in 1996, 44 percent of those surveyed mentioned the victory in the war 
in response to the question, “What makes you personally most proud in the 
                                                 
683 See electronic databases “Monuments to victims of political repressions within the territory of 
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country’s history?” in 2003 the figure was 87 percent.684 Approximately the same 
number of the respondents (75-85 percent) has traditionally named the victory 
over Nazi Germany as the greatest moment of history, the most important event 
that determined Russia’s fate in the 20th century. The opinion polls show that 
victory in the Great Patriotic War is the most potent symbol of identification in 
present-day Russia.685 
It is often noted that the war in Russia is still discussed in the news media 
as if it was a recent event and not an increasingly distant history. The annual 
Victory Day parade on May 9th, broadcasted all over Russia by all major 
television channels, is held with great pomp and with symbolic demonstration of 
force. Thousands of personnel participate in the traditional military parade on 
the Red Square which after the 17 years of break starting in 2008 has featured a 
large-scale display of the country’s military hardware.686 
It is important to point out that the symbol of “victory in the war,” 
powerfully exploited by the Kremlin administration in the 2000s, has greatly 
contributed to the justification and legitimization of a uncontrollable power, “a 
strong, authoritarian regime, disregarding costs in the name of the interests of 
state power, which thus legitimizes all kinds of policy.”687 Despite numerous 
evidence attesting that the country actually won the war despite, not because of, 
some of Stalin’s actions (such as his decimation of the officer corps through 
repeated purges, his secret deal with Hitler, and his manifest lack of 
preparedness), due to the state propaganda, official monopoly over the public 
sphere and passing on of history, the victory became linked with the figure of 
generalissumus Stalin. Although historians have confirmed that the enormous 
death toll of the Soviet citizens during the war was largely the result of Stalin’s 
disdain for the lives of his own men and of the atrocious bungling of Soviet 
commanders, the general public has continued to view it as a noble sacrifice 
necessary for gaining victory in the war and, similarly important, turning the 
Soviet Union into the great empire and world superpower.688 
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At the same time, the general acceptance of the symbol of victory helped 
Russians avoid the toilful and inevitably complex process of critical self-
assessment, rationalization and subsequent making up for the failures of 
structural transformations, bringing about new alternative programs of 
development. The Russian population, instead, generally accepted the model of 
the omnipotent state clinging consciously or unconsciously to the image of Stalin 
as the embodiment of the great power and state. As Lev Gudkov put it, “Victory 
does not only crown the war, but as it were purifies and justifies it, at the same 
time withdrawing its negative side from any attempt at rational analysis, 
tabooing the topic. It makes it impossible to explain the causes and course of the 
war, or to analyze the actions of the Soviet leaders and the nature of a regime 
that subordinated all spheres of social existence to its preparations for the war. 
The victors’ triumph masks the ambiguity of the symbol. Victory in the war 
retrospectively legitimizes the Soviet totalitarian regime as a whole and 
uncontrolled rule as such; justifies the “costs” of Soviet history and the 
accelerated military-industrial modernization – the repressions, famines, 
poverty, and enormous numbers of deaths after collectivization; and creates a 
version of the past that has no alternative and provides the only possible and 
significant framework for interpreting history.”689  
The memory of victory also replaced the genuine memory of the war – of 
its everyday hardships, of everyday struggles for life, of the 1941 invasion, of 
imprisonment and terror, of evacuation, etc. It actually repressed a number of 
uncomfortable facts from mass consciousness such as “the aggressive nature of 
the Soviet regime, Communist militarism and expansionism, which were the 
reason for the USSR’s expulsion from the League of Nations after its attack on 
Finland; the fact that World War II began with a joint attack on Poland by two 
partners and then allies – Hitler’s Germany and the Soviet Union; the human, 
social, economic, and metaphysical cost of war; and the responsibility of the 
country’s leadership for the beginning and course of the war, and the 
consequences of the war for other countries.”690 
The symbol of victory thus became (or, to be more precise, was 
intentionally made) a kind of a stumbling block on the way of any critical 
rationalization of the Soviet history. Any attempt to critically assess the glory of 
that triumph often defined as “sacred” is tabooed and perceived as hostile. 
Russian authorities reject any critique of the USSR’s role in defeating Nazi 
Germany. For instance, in May 2005 on the 60th anniversary of the end of World 
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War II in Europe, Putin strongly rejected the Bush administration’s request that 
he denounce the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.691  
Any attempts to revisit the history of war and its implications, to unveil 
the truth about it within the country are also vehemently resisted. In February 
2009 a television documentary about the Red Army’s enormous death toll during 
World War II Rzhev: Marshal Zhukov’s Unknown Battle (Rzhev: Neizvestnaya Bitva 
Georgia Zhukova) aired on Russian television caused a fierce backlash in Russia. 
Some indignant viewers even demanded to arrest the film’s narrator, the TV 
journalist Alexei Pivovarov, accusing him of treason.692 
Several high-ranking members of the Russian government, in turn, called 
for a new law based on Holocaust denial legislation in Germany that would 
criminalize any attempts to revisit the Soviet Union’s role in World War II. The 
ruling United Russia party also proposed a draft law that would make it a 
criminal offence to “infringe on historical memory in relation to events which 
took place in the Second World War.”693 
At the same time the opinion surveys revealed that most Russians 
remained unaware of the implications of the war history. For instance, 41 percent 
of those surveyed in the recent Levada Center opinion poll were unaware of the 
secret protocol included in the nonaggression pact, signed on 23 August, 1939 by 
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and his German counterpart 
Joachim von Ribbentrop that divided up Northern and Eastern Europe into Nazi 
and Soviet “spheres of influence.”694 In a July 2009 survey 61 percent of Russians 
said they did not know that Soviet troops invaded eastern Poland in September 
1939.695 Furthermore, many Russians remained unaware – intentionally or 
unintentionally – of the Red Army’s wartime atrocities such as mass rape of the 
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German women in the final war period or of the Katyn massacre of the Polish 
officers carried out by the Soviet secret police NKVD in April–May 1940.696 
On 15 May, 2009 Putin’s successor President Medvedev (2008-present) set 
up a special commission to investigate and counter falsified versions of history 
that damage Russia’s “international prestige” in order to “defend Russia against 
falsifiers of history and those who would deny Soviet contribution to the victory 
in World War II.”697 He empowered the commission—led by the presidential 
administration chief of staff, Sergei Naryshkin and comprising senior military, 
government and intelligence officials—to launch inquiries, unearth historical 
documents, and call government and expert witnesses, as well as formulate 
possible policy responses for the president to consider. Medvedev noted that 
attempts to falsify history had become intolerable and that in his view “such 
attempts are becoming more hostile, more evil, and more aggressive.” “We must 
fight for the historical truth,” said Medvedev in his video blog.698  
As the state has been claiming a monopoly on the creation of history and 
passing on of memory, it’s been trying to use the teaching of history in Russian 
educational establishments to promote a sense of national identity (Vladimir 
Berelovich 2002; Robert Maier 2005; Karen Till 2006; Joseph Zajda 2007; 
Aleksandr Kiselev 2008; Ekaterina Levintova and John Batterfield 2009).  
To begin with, in 2001 the cabinet of ministers headed then by Prime-
Minister Mikhail Kasyanov paid close attention to the content of several history 
textbooks and criticized them. In 2002 the Ministry of Education launched a 
competition aimed at creating new history textbooks for 9th – 11th graders that 
would contribute, among other things, to “nurturing patriotism, civic and 
national consciousness, historical optimism, respect for the historical and cultural 
heritage of the peoples of Russia and the world, the formation of key social 
competencies.”699 
In November 2003, Russian authorities with the approval of President 
Putin himself removed Igor Dolutsky’s National History of the 20th Century 
(Otechsetvennaja Istoria: 20 vek)—a text known for its thorough and meticulous 
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discussion of Stalin’s repressions, his role in World War II as well for its critique 
of Putin’s regime—from public schools. Dolutsky’s textbook was stripped of its 
Education Ministry license just days before the December parliamentary 
elections. Since then, the Ministry of Education decreed that, in view of new state 
standards in education, all history textbooks had to be examined and evaluated 
by panel of experts, including the Federal Experts Council on History, the 
Academy of Sciences, and the Academy of Education.700 
The same month, on the eve of the parliament elections, while addressing 
history teachers Putin stressed that “textbooks should really present historical 
facts; they should inspire, especially among young people, a feeling of pride for 
their own history and for their country.”701 Referring to the ‘numerous’ 
complaints of the war veterans Putin directed the Russian Academy of Science to 
examine all history textbooks used in schools throughout Russia and report the 
results by 1 February, 2004. 
In April 2005, in his annual spring address to the Russian parliament 
Putin declared that “the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical 
catastrophe of the 20th century”702 Putin argued that “for the Russian people, it 
became a real drama. Tens of millions of our citizens and compatriots found 
themselves outside the Russian Federation.”703 It is noteworthy that 78 percent of 
the respondents later agreed with this statement.704  
 In a few years under Putin’s administration guidance high school history 
textbooks have been virtually rewritten. At a Kremlin-organized meeting 
convened in June 2007 to discuss “Contemporary Issues of Teaching Modern 
History and Social Sciences,” Putin again criticized existing history and social 
science texts for devoting too much emphasis to “black pages” in Russia’s history 
and argued that “we must not allow others to impose a feeling of guilt on us.”705 
According to him, Russia has fewer “problematic pages” than “do some 
countries, and they are less terrible than in some countries.” “In any event, - 
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stated Putin, - we have never used nuclear weapons against civilians, and we 
have never dumped chemicals on thousands of kilometers of land or dropped 
more bombs on a tiny country than were dropped during the entire Second 
World War, as was the case in Vietnam. We have not had such bleak pages as 
was the case of Nazism, for example.”706 
 On the occasion two new textbooks were unveiled, one on history and 
another on social studies (Obshchestvoznanie), written largely by Kremlin political 
consultants and intended as guides for teachers and for new textbooks to be 
introduced in 2008. Both manuals reflected the dominant themes of official 
discourse, including strong statehood and national sovereignty, hostility towards 
the United States and a laudatory treatment of President Putin who allegedly 
restored Russian strength despite American efforts to isolate the country. “We 
see, - states the history textbook’s last chapter, - that practically every significant 
deed is connected with the name and activity of President Putin.”707 
Authors of the new teachers’ handbook appear to have the explicit aim of 
reversing what one of its editors, Alexander Filippov, deputy head of the 
National Laboratory of Foreign Policy, a research institute affiliated with the 
Kremlin, called a “propaganda offensive” directed from both inside Russia and 
abroad. According to him, the old, Yeltsin-era books dwelt too much on the evils 
of Soviet rule, which implied “Russia has no place in the company of the so-
called civilized nations,” and also that Russia, “as a successor of a totalitarian 
regime, is doomed forever to repent for this regime’s real or invented crimes.”708 
The editor of the social studies manual Leonid Polyakov explained their 
purpose as follows: “We are developing a national ideology that represents the 
vision of ourselves as a nation, as Russians, a vision of our own identity and the 
world around us… Teachers will then be able to incorporate this national 
ideology, this vision, into their practical work in a normal way and use it to 
develop a civic and patriotic position.”709   
Furthermore, the textbooks propagate the “sovereign democracy” concept 
invented by the Kremlin’s chief ideologist and first deputy chief of staff 
Vladislav Surkov, to justify the authoritarian nature of Putin’s regime. The social 
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studies textbook, edited by Polyakov, states that “the regime of sovereign 
democracy is the ideal form of action of any political system,” bearing a 
resemblance to the statements made in the Soviet era about the superiority and 
universal validity of the Soviet system.710 
The historical texts in a history guide The Modern History of Russia: 1945-
2006, edited by Alexander Fillipov, view Stalin’s reign of terror through the lens 
of strong leadership in a long line of autocrats going back to the czars and 
asserting that Russian history at times demands tyranny to build a great 
nation.711 The history manual assessed Stalin as “the most successful leader of the 
USSR.” “As for the methods of coercion used toward the ruling bureaucratic 
elite, the goal was to mobilize the leadership in order to make it effective in the 
process of industrialization, as well as in rebuilding the economy in the postwar 
period,” the manual stated. According to the authors, “This task was fulfilled by 
means of, among other things, political repression, which was used to mobilize 
not only rank-and-file citizens but also the ruling elite.”712 
According to the chairman of Memorial Arseny Roginsky, “In the new 
history textbooks Stalinism is presented as an institutional phenomenon, even an 
achievement and the terror is portrayed as a historically determined and 
unavoidable tool for solving state tasks. This concept does not rule out sympathy 
for the victims of history. But it makes it absolutely impossible to consider the 
criminal nature of the terror, and the perpetrator of this crime.”713 Roginsky, 
however, believed that, “The intention is not to idealize Stalin. This is the natural 
side-effect of resolving a completely different task – that of confirming the idea of 
the indubitable correctness of state power. The government is higher than any 
moral or legal assessments. It is above the law, as it is guided by state interests 
that are higher than the interests of the person and society, higher than morality 
and law. The state is always right – at least as long as it can deal with its enemies. 
This idea runs through the new textbooks from beginning to end, and not only 
where repressions are discussed.”714 Another critic, a historian Nikita Sokolov, 
believed that the manual was so equivocal on Stalin’s terror that “his crimes are 
being taken into the shadows.” According to Sokolov, the introduction of the 
textbooks is “very dangerous” because it brings the country back to unified 
                                                 
710 See the discussion in Abramov, Aleksandr. Sovereign Democracy in Schools // Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, 31 October, 2007. 
711 Kramer, Andrew E. New Russian History: ‘Yes, People Died, But...’ // International Herald 
Tribune, 15 August, 2007. 
712 Quoted in Finn, Peter. New Manuals Push a Putin’s-Eye View in Russian Schools // 
Washington Post, 20 July, 2007. 
713 Roginsky, Arseny. The Embrace of Stalinism // Open Democracy, 16 December, 2008.  
714 Ibid. 
 226 
thinking, for “the president and the presidential administration believe we lack 
the national self-confidence to confront and debate the past.”715 
 Similar critique, however, has no place in the officially monopolized 
public space. One of the history textbook’s contributors Pavel Danilin, an editor 
at Kremlin affiliated the Effective Policy Foundation, who wrote the chapter on 
“Sovereign Democracy,” bluntly expressed his intentions on his web blog in 
response to criticism from teachers who argued the book was nothing else but 
the crude Kremlin propaganda. “You will teach children in line with the books 
you are given and in the way Russia needs,” wrote Danilin. He continued, “To 
let some Russophobe (expletive), or just an amoral type, teach Russian history is 
impossible. It is necessary to clear the filth and if it doesn’t work then clear it by 
force.”716 
The negative reaction to those individuals and organizations who have 
opposed the Kremlin politics of memory has not been only verbal. On 4 
December, 2008 the St Petersburg office of the Memorial Society housing 
information on the victims of the Soviet political repressions was raided by the 
police and the entire electronic archive, representing twenty years of work, was 
confiscated. According to the office director Irina Flige, Memorial was targeted 
for being on the wrong side of Putinism, specifically in dissonance with the idea 
“that Stalin and the Soviet regime were successful in creating a great country.”717 
Only after several months of struggle and international pressure were hard 
drives as well as optical discs and some documents returned to Memorial on 6 
May, 2009.718  
Besides, in the fall of 2009 a Russian historian and professor of history at 
Arkhangelsk’s Pomorsky University investigating the fate of Germans deported 
by Stalin during World War II was imprisoned, his computer and all his hard 
drives have been seized by the FSB.719 
 Meanwhile, high evaluations of Stalin and the Soviet regime, particularly 
among the Russian youth, continued to grow. The survey conducted by St 
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Petersburg sociologists in 2008 revealed a high moral evaluation of the Soviet 
past by the Russian population - 44 percent of the respondents believed that the 
Soviet past had a positive influence on the morality of contemporary Russians, 
and 50 percent said it had a positive effect on the development of the national 
culture.720  
About half of young people aged between 16 and 29 (51 percent) surveyed 
in June 2005 agreed that Stalin was a wise leader, while 39 percent disagreed. A 
majority (61 percent) thought Stalin should receive credit for victory in World 
War II; only 28 percent thought he should not. Similarly, 56 percent thought that 
he did more good than bad, and only one-third disagreed. Opinion was about 
equally divided over whether he had been a cruel tyrant: 43 percent agreed, and 
47 percent disagreed. On one hand, 70 percent concurred that he had 
imprisoned, tortured, and killed millions of innocent people. Yet, about 40 
percent agreed with the statement that people today tend to exaggerate Stalin’s 
role in the terror.721 
Furthermore, according to the Levada Center 2007 poll, around 40 percent 
of Russians believed that the Gulag system and mass repressions should be less 
discussed as there is no need to rake up the past and 68 percent of the 
respondents thought is unnecessary to find and call to justice those guilty in the 
repressions and violence of the past.722 
In 2008 the architect of the Soviet Gulag system Joseph Stalin was voted 
one of the greatest historical figures in the nationwide television project.723 At the 
end of August 2009 a fragment of Stalin-era Soviet national anthem, removed in 
the 1950s during Krushev’s period of de-Stalinization, was re-inscribed at 
Moscow’s Kurskaya metro station which reads: “Stalin reared us on loyalty to 
the people. He inspired us to labor and heroism.” To add to this, in 2010 the 
Moscow government came up with plans to display billboards with Stalin’s 
portraits in Moscow as part of World War II Victory Day celebrations. Memorials 
to Stalin have begun to appear in several regions of the country. At the same time 
no state-sponsored monument to the victims of the Stalin’s reign of terror has 
been established. 
Against this background even some official acts that might be regarded as 
positive does not produce an impression of change. This may refer, for instance, 
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to Putin’s marking the Day of Memory of Victims of Political Repressions and 
the 70th anniversary of the Great Purge on 30 October, 2007 with a visit to the 
Butovo Grave Memorial Complex, a former firing range of the People’s 
Commissariat (Ministry) for Internal Affairs just outside Moscow, where mass 
executions were held in the 1930s and the 1940s.724 The same can be said about 
President Medvedev’s address on 30 October, 2009 which was published in his 
video blog. In the address Medvedev condemned Joseph Stalin’s crimes and 
called on the nation not to forget about past political repression or its victims. 
Calling Stalin’s repressions “one of the greatest tragedies in Russian history” 
Medvedev expressed concern that “even today it can be heard that these mass 
victims were justified by certain higher goals of the state.” But according to him 
“no development of a country, none of its successes or ambitions can be reached 
at the price of human losses and grief.”725 
This statement, which led the state-controlled television news, was so 
sharply at odds with official rhetoric of the past decade that observers strongly 
hesitated in evaluating it. As Maria Lipman explained it, “Medvedev’s address 
may have sounded radical,” but many Russian observers are “skeptical that the 
president’s words would actually bring change” for “the number of alarming 
signals of Stalin’s rehabilitation is growing. And in general over the year and a 
half of his presidency, Medvedev’s often well-intended rhetoric has not been 
matched with policy.”726  
Furthermore, the President’s internet address remained largely unnoticed 
by the public. According to the recent survey, only 6.6 percent of respondents 
saw or read it and only 14.6 percent heard about it, and of these 426 respondents, 
only 194 (9.6 percent of the total sample), identified the theme correctly.727 
The public interpretations of history in a totally state-controlled media 
environment seem to reflect the controversial impulses coming from the official 
realms. On the one hand, as it was shown before, Russians approve of Stalin and 
give tribute to him for the victory in the Great Patriotic War. The Levada Center 
February-March 2003 poll marking the 50th anniversary of the dictator’s death 
found that “53 percent of respondents approved of Stalin overall, 33 percent 
disapproved, and 14 percent declined to state a position. 20 percent of those 
polled agreed with the statement that Stalin “was a wise leader who led the 
USSR to power and prosperity,’ while the same number agreed that only a 
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‘tough leader’ could rule the country under the circumstances in which Stalin 
found himself. Only 27 percent agreed that Stalin was ‘a cruel, inhuman tyrant 
responsible for the deaths of millions,’ and a similar percentage agreed that the 
full truth about him is not yet known.”728 30 percent of those surveyed in the 
Levada Center December 2003 polled expressed the conviction that “whatever 
errors or defects are attributed to Stalin, the most important thing is that under 
his leadership, our people came out the winner in the Great Patriotic War.”729  
On the other hand, in the recent Levada Center May poll, conducted in 
May 2010, 49 percent of respondents stated that the reason for huge losses in the 
first war years was in Stalin’s errors such as purging the military of top officials, 
failing to prepare for combat and abandoning millions of Soviet prisoners of war. 
When asked to identify the guilty of huge losses in the war, 30 percent of 
Russians named Stalin personally and 20 percent named the Soviet leadership 
and the Communist Party, of which the dictator was the leader at the time.730 
According to the recent research on Russian public attitudes toward 
history and contemporary issues performed by Sarah Mendelson and Theodore 
Gerber in cooperation with Levada Center, nearly 75 percent of those sampled 
would like to have a complete picture of the extent of the repressions in the 
Stalinist period and 83 percent expressed an opinion that the government ought 
to do more to commemorate victims. 88 percent of those who heard about 
repressions (17 percent total and 35 percent of the 20-29 age group actually never 
heard of them) expressed the view that they were not justified.731  
According to the sociologist Alexandr Etkind, “surveys reveal the 
complex attitudes of a people who retain a vivid memory of the Soviet terror but 
are divided in their interpretation of this memory. Far from demonstrating an 
outright denial of the Soviet catastrophe, the vast majority of Russians show 
knowledge of their history. In their attitude towards this history, Russians are 
split almost evenly. It is not the historical knowledge which is at issue but its 
interpretation, which inevitably depends upon the schemes, theories, and myths 
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that people receive from their scholars, artists, and politicians.”732 Etkind has 
defined the process taking place in contemporary Russia as “making sense” of 
the trauma (as opposed to La Carpa’s two typical responses to a trauma 
“working through” and the obsessive “acting out” of it).733 As he has 
conceptualized, “In the period of terror, the power which affirms its sovereignty 
by creating zones of exception, denies responsibility for the abuses committed in 
these zones. But with the passing of time and with the scale of abuses revealed, 
the sovereign changes his strategy. His last resource is a sacrificial interpretation, 
which presents victims as sacrifices, and suicidal perpetrators as cruel but 
sensible strategists. Approximately half of the Russian population believes in 
this. They explain the Soviet terror as an exaggerated but rational response to 
actual problems which confronted the country. Many believe that the terror was 
necessary for the survival of the nation, its modernization, victory in the war, etc. 
If it was necessary in the past, it can be desirable in the present and possible in 
the future. Making sense of the catastrophic past is a performative act, “an 
interpretation which transforms what it interprets.”734 
The trajectory of memory aimed at “working through” the past in 
contemporary Russia remains extremely marginal. Though some efforts in this 
direction are taken by a handful of intellectuals, they mostly remain largely 
unnoticed by a more general public and practically non-rationalized in the public 
sphere. 
However, in the 2000s a significant number of reference works and 
collections of documents on the Soviet history of repressions continued to be 
appear. The publication of The History of Stalin’s Gulag in seven volumes by 
Russian Political Encyclopedia publishing house (ROSSPEN) revealed a deeper 
exploration of the complex and cumbersome set of documents.735 The result of 
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the project was also the collective monograph Gulag: Economics of Forced Labor, 
published in 2005.736 Several important collections of documents were published 
in the same period by the Democracy International Foundation in “Russia. 20th 
Century. Documents” series.737 
The 2000s were also marked by appearance of several new reference 
works such as the works by Aleksandr Kokurin and Nikita Petrov (2002), Nikita 
Petrov and Konstantin Skorkin (2010) and historical studies of the law 
enforcement agencies (Gleb Aleksushin 2005).738 The research of “special 
resettlements” (spetssylka) of peasants was also continued by Sergai Krasil’nikov 
(2009, 2010) and other historians.739 
Notably, several collections of the camp survivors were published the 
Russian Way (Russkij Put’) publishing house, including the collection of 
eyewitnesses’ accounts edited and compiled by Alexander Solzhenitsyn.740 
As noted previously, in the late 1990s some historians (Leonid Borodkin, 
Oleg Khlevniuk) underscored a need to move from the identification and 
publication of documents to the preparation of articles and monographs in 
studying the Soviet history. Unfortunately in the 2000s again there appeared 
practically no generalizing works on the Soviet centralized system of prison 
labor. The major work in this regards was performed by an American journalist 
Anne Applebaum who traced the origins and expansion of the Gulag system on 
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the basis of newly accessible Soviet archives as well as scores of camp memoirs 
and interviews with survivors. Presenting the life-and-death cycle of the Soviet 
Gulag from arrest by the secret police through interrogation, to deportation and 
hard labor, Applebaum detailed camp life, including strategies for survival, 
discussed the various ways of calculating the camps statistics as well as the 
meaning of the Gulag in the international community of memory.741 The 
translation of Applebaum’s work became available for the Russian audience in 
2006.742 
Important publication in 2008 on Political Systems in Russia and the USSR in 
20th century was authored by Igor Dolutsky and Tatiana Vorozheikina (2008).743 
Several studies of the Soviet society were performed by the Russian sociologists 
such Elena Zubkova’s (2000) research of the postwar Soviet society and Oleg 
Kharkhordin’s (2002) study of the “Russian personality.”744 
Sociological studies of the Soviet society and the Soviet personality as its 
main “institution” (following Yuri Levada’s definition) was proceeded in the 
2000s by the Levada Center sociologists under The Soviet Man project.   
Several important works on repressions of the artists also appeared in the 
2000s. The poet and writer Vitaly Shentalinsky, the Chairman of the Committee for 
the Literary Inheritance of Writers, spent more than twenty years on investigating 
how a large number of Russian writers had been persecuted during the Stalin 
era. In the 2000s he published two volumes The Denunciation of Socrates (Donos na 
Sokrata) in 2001 and Crime without Punishment (Prestuplenie bez nakazanija) in 2007 
which made a trilogy together with his first 1995 book The Slaves of Freedom.745 
Three volumes by literary critic Benedict Sarnov Stalin and Writers highlighting 
the destinies of Russian authors living during the Stalin reign of terror appeared 
in 2008-2009. 
Positive endeavors notwithstanding, the overall picture of literature 
devoted to the Soviet past has been really controversial for in bookstores the 
works about the history of Communist terror have coexisted with a wide range 
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of books that take a much more positive view of Stalin and his regime. Likewise 
on television, praise of Stalin and his henchmen has appeared side by side with 
series and programs based on works by Alexander Solzhenitsyn and other 
chroniclers of Stalin’s repression.746  
According to Alexander Daniel, the Memorial society TV monitoring has 
revealed that Russian television networks annually show around 300 programs 
on the Soviet past, but the interpretations of the past they present differ a lot. 
Anti-Stalinist programs and series coexist with those openly apologetic or 
estheticising the image of the Soviet dictator (like, for example, the 2007 Russian 
TV 40-part series Stalin live aired by NTV channel). 
At the same time some positive initiatives in popularizing history of the 
repressive past in the media space are worth mentioning. For instance, since 2003 
a journalist and historian Nikolai Svanidze has been producing the TV 
documentary series, History Chronicles with Nikolai Svanidze, about Russian 20th 
century history in which a highly critical view of the Soviet regime in general 
and Stalin’s reign of terror in particular is presented. The war history 
documentaries by TV reporter Aleksei Pivovarov such as Rzhev: Marshal Zhukov’s 
Unknown Battle (Rzhev: Neizvestnaya Bitva Georgia Zhukova, 2009), Moscow. 
Autumn 1941 (Moskva. Osen’ 1941, 2009), and Brest. Heroes of the Fortress (Brest. 
Krepostnye geroi, 2010) have also contributed to a better understanding of the 
Soviet past. 
The 2000s were also marked by several important television adaptations of 
the anti-Stalinist novels. Children of the Arbat (Deti Arbata) 16-part television series 
based on the Anatoly Rybakov’s trilogy and directed by Andrei Eshpai were 
aired on the Channel One network in 2004. In late 2004, the same Channel One 
broadcasted a TV-series directed by Dmitry Barshevsky and consisting of 22 
episodes based on Vasily Aksyonov’s anti-Stalinist trilogy Generations of Winter 
(Moskovskaya saga, 1994).  
In 2005 one of Varlam Shalamov’s Kolyma short stories, The Final Battle of 
Major Pugachoff (Poslednij Boi Majora Pugacheva), was made into a 4-part series of 
the same name by Vladimir Fatyanov. In December 2005, a 10-part series 
television adaptation of Mikhail Bulgakov’s Master and Margarita novel directed 
by Vladimir Bortko was aired by the Rossiya TV channel. In January 2006, the 
Rossiya aired miniseries on Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s The First Circle (V kruge 
pervom) directed by Gleb Panfilov. Solzhenitsyn himself helped adapt the novel 
for the screen and narrated the film. In 2007 the Rossiya TV channel aired a 16-
part series based on the life and works of Varlam Shalamov’s Lenin's Testament 
(Zaveshanie Lenina) directed by Nikolai Dostal’. 
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Some initiatives aimed at remembering the horrors of Stalinism are 
continuously undertaken by some civil society groups, primarily by the 
Memorial Society and its branch organizations. For example, since 2007 the 
Memorial Society has annually held commemoration of the victims of the Great 
Terror by reading their names near the Solovetsky stone in Moscow on The Day 
of the Political Prisoners on October, 30th. In some provincial centers descendants 
of the victims come annually to the local memorials. 
Since 1999 the Memorial Society has conducted annually the all-Russia 
school history competition “Man in History: Russia – 20th Century.” 
Unfortunately, unlike its German counterpart, the Russian history school 
competition has not been turned into a national project supported by the state 
and consequently it has been unable to attract as much public attention and reach 
the scale of the school history competition in Germany. 
According to the Sakharov Museum and Public Center August-September 
2007 exhibition in Moscow, there are now over 1000 monuments and memorial 
plaques at various sites of the Gulag within the territory of the former Soviet 
Union: stones, crosses, obelisks, bells, bas-reliefs, and angels. The overwhelming 
majority of these memorials resulted from grassroots initiatives by the former 
victims of the Gulag or their relatives. 
These important contributions notwithstanding, upon the whole, the 
attitudinal change on the societal level in Russia did occur, as the public opinion 
surveys reveal, and the alternative memory trajectory has remained marginal 
and non-institutionalized. The Russian state has virtually been not involved in 
the work of remembrance and commemoration. 
In the next section of the chapter I will turn to the comparative analysis of 
the collective memory transformations in postwar West Germany and post-
Soviet Russia. 
 
4.4 Comparative Analysis of Collective Memory Transformations 
in Postwar West Germany and Post-Soviet Russia 
 
The presented overviews of collective memory narratives in post-WWII West 
Germany and post-Soviet Russia seem to confirm the Alexander Etkind’s 
statement that “the cultural memories of Russian and German terror developed 
in such different ways that they seem to defy comparison.”747 However, there 
were several important similarities in the processes of memory structuring in 
both countries especially at the initial stages of transformations. 
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In the first instance, in both German and Russian societies a desire to leave 
the traumatic, shameful pasts behind as quickly as possible was very high. Such 
an approach to the past became associated with various avoidance strategies and 
defense mechanisms that reflected the general unwillingness of people to 
acknowledge their complicity and accept responsibility for their roles in the 
criminal regimes. Public opinion of both nations was inclined to embrace an 
approach to the shameful past described as far back as in 1885 by Friedrich 
Nietzsche in his Beyond Good and Evil: “’I have done that’ says my memory. I 
could not have done that – says my pride and remains implacable. Finally, my 
memory gives up.”748 
This avoidance tendency was manifested, among other things, in 
presenting the events of the past as actorless, portraying them as something 
wholly beyond human control, as well as in the frequent use of metaphors, such 
as the concept of “catastrophe” in relation to the Holocaust or the concept of 
“unjustified repressions” in relation to the Stalinist mass murders, arrests, and 
deportations. Etkind noted that the concept of “unjustified repressions” widely 
used in Russia starting from the Khrushchev de-Stalinization campaign was 
“always mentioned in the plural [as] a formula for senseless acts of violence 
which do not specify agency and therefore, elude responsibility.”749 Thus, 
according to the observer, “’Unjustified repressions’ means, exactly, self-
imposed, meaningless social catastrophe.”750 
Another important strategy of avoidance and defense mechanism widely 
employed in Germany and Russia was the notion of victimhood. Presenting 
themselves as victims of the Third Reich and focusing excessively on their own 
sufferings helped many Germans to avoid moral responsibility for their roles as 
Holocaust perpetrators, bystanders, and collaborators. The same argument may 
refer to millions of Russians who together with President Putin lamented the 
collapse of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th 
century” and chose to view it as a great personal drama rather than a liberation 
from totalitarianism.751 
Another similarity is that, quoting Etkind, both national cultures were 
“familiar with attempts at particularizing their respective catastrophes and 
insisting upon the methodological principle of incomparability.”752 Several other 
myths were created and widely exploited in both national contexts. One of them 
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was the incomprehensibility claim stating that the traumatic past cannot be 
comprehended and, consequently, rationalized and discussed.  
Another popular myth in both West Germany and Russia can be defined 
as a “rupture myth” as it was expressed in presenting the repressive totalitarian 
regime as a rupture in the national history. The ‘intentionalist’ school in West 
Germany, for instance, traditionally portrayed the Third Reich as a creation by a 
small group of Nazi leaders led by Hitler and thus used to regard Nazism as a 
phenomenon alien to German history. Importantly, intentionalist view of history 
was a prevailing historical discourse in the first postwar decades. Similarly, the 
myth representing the October revolution and the establishment of the Soviet 
regime as an interruption of the normal line of the Russian state development, as 
well as the perception of Communism as a foreign, imported phenomenon alien 
to the Russian history were dominant in Russia during the immediate post-
Soviet period. 
It is noteworthy that the consequences of the general tendency to close the 
books on the past and to forget its uncomfortable implications as quickly as 
possible also appeared quite similar in the both national contexts. 
It can be argued that the new regime’s drift into authoritarianism occurred 
in the post-Soviet Russia with the emergence of a ‘rupture myth’ and with the 
political elite’s appeal to a pre-Revolutionary ‘ideal’. The nostalgic idealization 
and mythologization of the imperial Russia led to the growth of imperial and 
nationalistic sentiments. Those sentiments, in turn, restored continuity of the 
post-Soviet Russia not only with the pre-revolutionary, but also with the Soviet 
era. 
It is linked, primarily, with the fact of quite evident continuity of the two 
regimes - the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, - which appeared much 
more close in the principles and methods of state-building, exercise of power, 
and in their national policy, than they were represented by the new Russian state 
ideologists. As Ghia Nodia justly argued, “The Russian imperial nationalist 
tradition completely coincided with communist principles.”753 Additionally, 
centuries-old citizens’ unfreedom, punitive, repressive bodies of the imperial 
Russia afford reasonable grounds for assertion that the Russian Empire was not 
as an antipode, but rather a forerunner of the Soviet Union. There is also enough 
ground to assert that Stalinism was a fruit of a lingering Slavophile idea of a 
‘unique Russian path’ as well as traditional Russian longing for a ‘firm hand.’  
The eulogy of the imperial epoch concealed in itself a danger of return to 
inherent in it (as well as in the subsequent Soviet era) authoritarian methods of 
government. Idealization of the prerevolutionary Russia and the efforts at 
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establishing the continuity with it meant refusal to recognize that the Russian 
autocracy in its methods of government adhered in many respects to the 
principles, similar to those practiced by the Bolsheviks. Thus, an attempt of the 
new Russian state to become the successor of “the greatness” of the Russian 
Empire became an obstacle in the way of democratization, promoting 
nationalism and rejection of the responsibility for the past.  
Since the idea of reviving pre-revolutionary tradition became a distinctive 
feature of the Yeltsin regime, as soon as it started losing its legitimacy with the 
citizens’ growing disenchantment and disillusionment, the rhetoric as well began 
to loose its attractiveness and persuasiveness. But even thought the nostalgic 
image of the imperial past was turned into “an insipid picture and a model of 
empty rhetoric,” its implicit nationalistic components were still kept.754   
It is therefore not surprising that the disappointment in Yeltsin’s reforms 
led not to the strengthening of democratic attitudes (the potential of which by 
that moment had already been lost), but to the increasing nostalgia for the Soviet 
past. This nostalgia was manifested, for example, in the emphasis on certain 
symbolic figures and events of those years (like the flight of Yuri Gagarin into 
outer space and the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War). 
Moreover, as noted previously, this process was accompanied by the growth of 
positive evaluations of the Soviet leaders, including the figure of Stalin, as well as 
the revival of the Russian “unique path” mythology.  
Interestingly, however, that in the West German case some historians 
underscored the importance of a strong disposition to put the past away and 
start afresh for the postwar restructuring. According to the historian Tony Judt, 
for instance, the process of a “collective amnesia” in postwar Europe in general 
and Germany in particular has provided a necessary foundation for the 
transformations. Judt argued that, “Without such collective amnesia, Europe’s 
astonishing postwar recovery would not have been possible. To be sure, much 
was put out of mind that would subsequently return in discomforting ways. But 
only much later would it become clear just how much postwar Europe rested on 
foundation myths that would fracture and shift with the passage of years. In the 
circumstances of 1945, in a continent covered with rubble, there was much to be 
gained by behaving as though the past was indeed dead and buried and a new 
age about to begin. The price paid was a certain amount of selective, collective 
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forgetting, notably in Germany. But then, in Germany above all, there was much 
to forget.”755 
In his article on Seven Types of Forgetting Paul Connerton also 
conceptualized that it would be impossible to return to self-government and civil 
administration in Germany if the purge of Nazis continued to be pursued in a 
sustained way. So stopping to identify and punish active Nazis was necessary 
after 1945 in order “to restore a minimum level of cohesion to civil society and to 
re-establish the legitimacy of the state in societies where authority, and the very 
bases of civil behavior, had been obliterated by totalitarian government.”756 
Connerton defined such forgetting as “prescriptive” for it was believed to be in 
the interests of all parties to the previous dispute and it could therefore be 
acknowledged publicly.757 
According to another historian Wulf Kansteiner, the memory paradigm 
aimed at working through the past became possible in West Germany “precisely 
because the conservative contemporaries of the Third Reich were so successful in 
managing the present, that is, the challenges of economic and ideological 
reconstruction.”758 Kansteiner noted that these achievements of the conservative 
elite “forced their critics and younger competitors to return to the sins of the past 
and use them as political leverage” at a later stage.759 
The idea that forgetting was necessary and justified seems, however, 
ambiguous and problematic. Forgetting means disclaiming responsibility for the 
past and similar strategy, as both the Russian and German experiences have 
revealed, may lead to the rise and strengthening of authoritarian tendencies as 
well as to the growth of aggressive nationalism in political and social life. 
Though Judt, Connerton and other authors mentioned the necessity of oblivion 
at the initial stage of transformations, it is unclear whether the government and 
society will be ready and willing to return to and “work through” the formerly 
“forgotten” or neglected issues in the future.  
Another problem with such argumentation is linked with the fact noted 
by James Booth, namely, that, “the past has a habit of returning involuntarily, in 
an almost Proustian fashion.” “More than that, forgetting, - continued Booth, 
especially if it is forgetting of our past injustices and our responsibility for them 
(or of our past benefactors and our debt of grateful remembrance to them), 
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savors of a wrong, of the violation of a duty, or, as Habermas writes, of the debt 
of atoning remembrance.”760 Booth insisted that, “Time and human volition 
cannot erase the fact of what has been done, and since we are our past as well as 
our future, they cannot erase the presence of the past, although they can, of 
course, repress recognition of it. They also cannot absolve us of the moral 
burdens that we, individually and collectively, assume for our past, although, 
again, the recognition of that moral imperative can be denied. Denying it does 
not free us from its reality, and although nothing within or among us may call us 
back to that past, there are likely others who will awaken us from the sleep of 
forgetting and seek to force us to do the work of remembrance.”761 
Thus the past has a way of breaking through forgetting (or forgetfulness) 
and it might have serious socio-psychological implications. As Sigmund Freud 
stated in his famous 1919 essay The Uncanny, the repressed past may turn into 
new and strange forms and it threatens to return as the uncanny. Freud’s 
formulas, reminds Etkind, defined the uncanny as a particular form of memory, 
one which is intimately connected to fear: “The higher the energy of forgetting, 
the stronger is the horror of remembering. The combination of memory and fear 
is, precisely, the uncanny.”762 
“What we conceal and what we fear are one and the same,” wrote Dmitry 
Furman in a 1988 collection of the perestroika period essays There Is No Other Way 
(Inogo ne dano).763 He continued asserting that, “If hiding the truth is the sign of 
fear, revealing it is inseparable from the disappearance of the dread.”764  
In the light of these arguments the advantages of forgetting (or its ‘gains’, 
using Judt’s formulation) appear highly problematic. Although, as Paul Ricoeur 
conceptualized, the phenomenon of forgetting is an indispensible component of 
cultural memory, the choice made by societies in this regard is likely to 
determine their identity and socio-political development. Ricoeur, therefore, 
insists on “the duty of memory” as the imperative of justice stating that “the 
duty of memory is the duty to do justice, through memories, to an other than the 
self.”765 
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Therefore the major source of change of the cultural situation in West 
Germany was, as it appears, not in forgetting about the national catastrophe, but 
rather in alternative remembering or in the appearance of alternative versions of 
memory and interpretations of the past in the immediate postwar years.  
Indeed, in the decades following the end of World War II West Germany 
has seen a remarkable turnabout in the memory of the Third Reich marked by 
the reinvention of the Holocaust remembrances and the revaluation of the 
meaning of victimhood. As Alon Confino asserted, in the last sixty years German 
public sphere became not simply more inclusive of the victims of the war, but 
dominated by them.766  
Certainly, this turnabout marks a profound difference in the way 
collective memory of the totalitarian past developed in the Federal Republic in 
comparison with post-Soviet Russia. While in Germany the memory of the 
criminal Nazi past was gradually obtained, which led to its rethinking and to 
subsequent “working through” it in the public sphere, in Russia one could 
observe an opposite phenomenon – the work of memory, launched during the 
perestroika period gradually subsided and was ousted, leading to intensification 
of imperial ambitions and nationalistic sentiments.  
It is certainly no easy matter naming the exact reasons for that slow but 
steady shift of the West German public consciousness which occurred in the mid-
1960s and the early 1970s. There is also no single explanation of memory 
suppression that has dominated the public opinion in Russia since the early 
1990s. Certainly in both cases the confluence of several factors should have been 
at work. At least in the German case, as conceptualized by Jürgen Habermas, 
“retrospective interpretation of 8 May, 1945 as a ‘liberation day’ became a result 
of the collective decades-long educational process.”767 Certainly, the reasons for 
getting over general forgetting and victimhood in the West German society 
represent a major analysis interest.  
The literature on West German collective memory contains a wide range 
of explanations for the origins of its unusually self-critical historical culture. The 
cultural historian Wulf Kansteiner names some of the factors that have 
influenced the formation of such culture in Germany. In the first instance, the 
importance of foreign influence on the West German politics of memory is 
emphasized. Some scholars argued that in the wake of the Eichmann trial in 
Jerusalem in 1960-1961 and a sustained GDR propaganda campaign against 
former Nazi in positions of power, the West German elite was forced to revise 
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the policy of leniency.768 Other experts used to highlight the accomplishments of 
a small group of liberal jurists in the state administrations, who convinced 
regional politicians to found a Central Agency for the prosecution of Nazi 
crimes. Starting in 1958, The Central Office for the Investigation of National 
Socialist Crimes (Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung 
nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen) in Ludwigsburg launched the first systematic 
German effort to research the crimes of the regime and bring perpetrators to 
trial.769 At the same time, a new democratic spirit held sway over West German’s 
public sphere. Historians pointed to the rise of a protest environmental 
movement which brought tens of thousands of demonstrators into the streets, 
and a thriving intellectual scene, which produced its own critical memory 
events.770 These critical voices were amplified by the national press corps, whose 
members played a key role in scandalizing anti-Semitic behavior and the 
shortcomings of the courts in their dealings with old and new Nazis.771 
This overview of factors brings us to the first most evident source of 
change in West German post-WWII collective memory, namely, “the diffusion 
and multiplication of social memories, […] directed explicitly against some 
overarching national political memory.”772 
 
4.4.1 Official Memory Contested: Emergence of the Communities of 
Memory 
 
In the introduction to this chapter we mentioned that change in the realm of 
collective memory is associated with the appearance of “multiple, diverse, and 
fluid memory discourses, with different institutional fields operating according 
to different rules and interacting with each other in different and shifting 
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ways.”773 We hypothized then that official narratives of the past are likely to 
change when the variety of actors become involved presenting their versions of 
the past or contesting the official memory narrative. In this section of the chapter 
I will analyze this source of change in relation to the cultural transformations in 
the two analyzed cases. 
 As for the German case, Wulf Kansteiner has imagined the social 
geography of West German collective memory in the form of a pyramid with a 
complex interior structure. The imagined pyramid revolves around three axes 
that influence all arenas of collective memory. First, there is the obvious divide 
between conservative and liberal collective memories of Nazism, which splits the 
pyramid into two antagonistic but dialectically related halves. In addition, all 
interpretations of the past have been the product of cross-generational 
competition and cooperation that involves at least three important age groups – 
the war, Hitler Youth, and postwar generations. Finally, collective memories of 
the Third Reich and its crimes have been constructed in many different 
professional and social settings, which vary tremendously in size and social 
status and can be divided into three general hierarchical categories.  
The top of the imagined pyramid is filled with elite discourses, such as 
professional historiography, that feature restrictive entrance criteria for 
authorized speakers. The members of such elite groups strive to reach general 
public, but in practice, they either communicate among themselves-producing 
detailed, ambitious professional memories of Nazism – or reach an audience 
located in the second broad layer of the pyramid, which Kansteiner designates as 
the politically and culturally interested public. He posits that the interested 
public, representing perhaps 15 to 25 percent of the population, consists of the 
readers of the national press and consumers to highbrow TV. This group takes an 
active interest in the cultural products of the elite; its representatives selectively 
listen to the historians, novelists, auteur filmmakers, and museum designers – 
often by way of the national press – who provide them with relatively complex 
and self-reflexive texts. In the day-to-day reproduction of the Germany’s public 
sphere, this politically and culturally interested public can be relatively clear 
differentiated from the majority of citizens (readers of the Bild-Zeiting and Hör-
Zu, viewers of Guido Knopp’s TV productions, and members of Germany’s 
famous pub culture - Stammtischkultur).774 
As Kansteiner’s pyramide reveals (and as it was previously shown in the 
overview of the German case), the German memory discourse was and at times 
remains relentlessly polarized. However, as it appears, it is precisely this 
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polarization and resulting struggle for memory that became a productive basis 
for changing the German political culture.775 The struggle of different generations 
and different groups of intellectual elites for the renewal of national culture, on 
the one hand, and the struggle for its preservation, protection, normalization and 
destigmatization, on the other hand, has been productive for both the 
transformation of national political culture and for the formation of a stable 
political system in the postwar period. The domestic public debate and 
contestation over the narratives of the past (Art 2006) made West German 
democracy, according to the precise definition of the intellectual historian Dirk 
Moses, primarily a “discursive achievement.”776 The political consensus about the 
liberal political institutions of the new republic emerged out of a protracted and 
bitter public discussion about the meaning of the German past for the Federal 
Republic’s present and future.777 
It is important to point out, however, that the pursuit of what got 
expression in the German terms of ‘working through the past’ (Aufarberung der 
Vergangenheit) and ‘coming to terms with the past’ (Vergangenheitsbewä1tigung) 
was initially a predominantly intellectual preoccupation.778 The first makers of a 
critical and aware Federal Republican identity were West German intellectuals –
social philosophers, educators, film directors, and writers. Notably, the critic 
Frank Schirrmacher in the 1990s called German literature itself a “production 
center of West German consciousness.”779 
The critical and conscientious trajectory of memory, however, was 
considerably intensified in the 1960s during the students’ revolts and further 
extended its support base in the 1970s marked by the emergence of massive 
social movements. Notably, historians today tend to view the demonstrations 
and debates of the 1960s as a consequence rather than a cause of the critical 
memory paradigm for, it is argued, “they did not alone initiate confrontation 
with the Nazi past, but rather dramatized and popularized an ongoing 
process.”780 The 1960s are thus best viewed as an important, if limited, 
reorganization of West German policies towards the Third Reich that began to 
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“reverse the direction of memories from exculpation to criticism” in the Federal 
Republic rather than definitively resolving them.781  
In the subsequent period of the 1970s and 1980s marked by the mass 
popularity of the history of everyday life (Alltagsgeschichte) the population as a 
whole and not just intellectuals or their subgroups became gradually involved in 
the process of confronting the Nazi past. As Kansteiner observed, “In the course 
of the 1970s and 1980s, West Germans would come to embrace emotionally 
engaging, biographically concrete, and visually entertaining formats for the 
representation of Nazism.”782  
The historical disputes of the 1980s and 1990s – the Bitburg controversy 
and the Historians’ Debate of the mid-1980s, numerous museum exhibitions, 
film, and television dramas about the Nazi past, etc. – also attracted much 
attention and involved many people in the relevant discussions. 
Thus one of the dominant factors of “working through” the past in West 
Germany was an emergence of a critical public sphere in which the leading German 
intellectuals constantly made judgments and evaluations, trying to rationalize the 
German national past and national identity. The official narratives of the past in 
West Germany gradually changed through processes that involved a variety of 
actors, including intellectual and artistic groups, numerous civil society actors, 
religious groups, activists on the left and right, academics, teachers, writers, 
artists, and numerous mass media outlets. 
In Russia, as it was shown, the condemnation of Stalinism in the 
intellectual discourse quickly receded into the background. The problems of 
Soviet totalitarianism were seldom discussed in post-Soviet Russian literature, 
artistic space, and in social sciences. The historical research of the Soviet past is 
still far from being complete. Many archival funds of the Stalin era continue to 
remain inaccessible to researchers. There are practically no generalizing works 
on the Soviet totalitarianism which makes an overall picture of the regime highly 
mosaic and unsystematic. Besides, there are very few thorough scientific and 
public discussions of these problems in the public space.783 
Furthermore, observers point to the widespread resistance to any coming 
to terms with Russia’s violent past. According to Allen C. Lynch, “in striking 
contrast to post-Nazi Germany, except for a brief period in the late Gorbachev 
era, there has been virtually no movement in Russian society to bring to account 
– either politically or legally – those implicated in the mass murders of the Stalin 
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period. Unlike in post-Nazi Germany, which continued with war crimes 
prosecutions on its own past after the end of Allied occupation (the most 
significant post-Nuremburg trials having taken place in the early- to mid-1960s), 
not one person connected with these crimes has even been brought to trial, much 
less convicted, in post-Soviet Russia. And unlike post-1968 West Germany, no 
social movement in Russia has initiated a public discussion to identify and hold 
to account those responsible for the crimes of the past and thereby to influence 
the political culture of the country. Russian intellectuals are virtually silent on 
this issue. Few appear interested in trying to identify and understand who were, 
to invoke Daniel Goldhagen’s words, Stalin’s “willing executioners.”784 Lynch 
refers to Timothy Garton Ash’s work in which he recalls more than 2,400 
movements worldwide seeking to establish political and/or legal justice for 
crimes of mass violence committed in the living past; that count represents 
virtually every country in the world, save Russia.785 
Although many Russian and foreign observers note the successful efforts 
of some civil society organizations and, above all, the efforts undertaken by the 
Memorial Society in structuring an alternative memory space (Etkind 2009), one 
has to acknowledge that this trajectory of memory in Russia remains really 
marginal, fragile and non-institutionalized.  
As noted previously, the memory of the Soviet past in the contemporary 
Russian discourse is almost totally monopolized by the state. Since the mid-1990s 
the dominance of the official politics of memory has been growing, preventing 
the crystallization of any independent agents or communities of memory. Since 
Putin’s rise to power in 1999, the state has been claiming nearly absolute 
monopoly over the interpretation, the use and the reproduction of national 
history. 
 
4.4.2 Transformation of Values and Identity: Introduction of New 
Symbols 
 
Change in collective memory narratives, as it was already mentioned, is closely 
linked with change of collective identification. Transformation of identity in the 
former dictatorship is to be expressed in bringing about new identification 
patterns, new values, principles and symbols, which would subsequently lead (if 
consistently realized) to new patterns of state-society relations. These changes are 
to be manifested, above all, in the embrace of values of human life and human 
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dignity and rejection of state violence and repressions as the basic features of a 
totalitarian rule. A democratic state will observe the freedom of expression and 
allow dissent thus acknowledging the potential agency of independent 
individuals and society as a whole (not viewing them merely as objects of state 
policies). The establishment of a democracy in a former dictatorship will require, 
therefore, “a symbolic cut between past and present […] as a form of ritual 
renewal.”786 What are then those new symbols or symbolic structures that would 
signalize a change of identity in a post-totalitarian state? This section of the 
chapter will explore the symbolic structure and social values that were adopted 
by the two analyzed post-totalitarian German and Russian states and societies. 
It was mentioned before that in the German case the memory of the Nazi 
dictatorship - of which the Holocaust is an integral part - and its traumatic 
legacies were in the center of the West German identification shaping its 
collective memory as well as state policies. Such symbols as the Nazi 
concentration camp and the symbolic figure of the Holocaust survivor and 
witness became the central symbolic structures of the West German national 
identity. 
The concentration camp may certainly be regarded as the quintessential 
expression of a totalitarian rule. This assumption determines the relevance and 
importance of the concentration camp as a cultural symbol. In her seminal work 
on the Soviet Gulag Anne Applebaum insightfully observed that, “In Stalin’s 
Soviet Union, the difference between life inside and life outside the barbed wire 
was not fundamental, but rather a question of degree. Perhaps, for that reason, 
the Gulag has often been described as the quintessential expression of the Soviet 
system. Even in prison-camp slang, the world outside the barbed wire was not 
referred to as “freedom” but as bolshaya zona, the “big prison zone”, larger and 
less deadly than “the small zone” of the camp, but no more human – and 
certainly no more humane.”787 
Referring to the Soviet concentration camps, the Russian writer and the 
Gulag survivor Varlam Shalamov argued that “the camp theme […] is a basic, 
fundamental question of our day.” “Is the destruction of human beings by the 
state not the main issue of our time, our morality?” asked one of the most 
important witnesses of the Soviet Gulag.788 According to Shalamov it was “a 
subject-matter that can freely accommodate a hundred writers of Solzhenitsyn’s 
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rank, and five Tolstoys.”789 He based this conviction of his on the assertion that 
“a camp is world-like.” This idea emphasized that the theme of resisting 
inhuman circumstances, resisting the cogs of the state machinery, was universal 
and eternal. It made Shalamov conclude, “My stories are basically advice to a 
man on how to act in a crowd.”790 
The vision of a concentration camp as a universe ruled by specific logics 
was also presented in many works by the Nazi camp survivors and witnesses, 
primarily, Primo Levi. Based on Levi’s writings, Giorgio Agamben later 
conceptualized that “since camps were permanent zones of exception from law, 
life in these zones could not be expressed in terms which were meaningful 
outside of these zones. Suspended in the luminal space between social and 
biological deaths, the victim’s life was “bare”; it was not subject to any legal, 
political, or religious order. Essentially, it was the life of an animal, of chattel. In 
the Soviet camps, these people were called “the soon-to-be-dead” (dokhodiagi); in 
Auschwitz, they were called “muslims” (Musselmen).791 To define the status of the 
victim of a “state of exception”, Agamben developed the concept of Homo Sacer, 
“a human victim that may be killed but not sacrificed,” arguing that only that life 
which has value may be sacrificed.792 
The transformation of values in post-WWII Germany got manifested in 
the gradual acceptance of responsibility for the criminal deeds of the former 
regime and reinvention of the values of human life and human dignity. The 
growing understanding of the homicidal nature of the camp’s universe turned it 
into one of the most important public symbols called to guarantee that the future 
will not bring a repetition of the past atrocities. 
As previously mentioned, since the mid-1960s many of the former Nazi 
concentration camps’ sites have been turned into the sites of memory and 
learning, the Holocaust memorial and document centers being erected and 
developed within the grounds of the former camps. Numerous trials of the 
former concentration camps’ officials for their roles in the Holocaust made the 
German public confront the problems of victims and perpetrators of the Third 
Reich in the 1960s and 1970s. Subsequently, in the 1970s and 1980s the figure of 
the Holocaust survivor (as a person who can bear witness of what had actually 
happened) was turned into one of the most important symbolic figures. This 
became, as it appears, one of the main signs of the Germany’s cultural renewal.  
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In post-Soviet Russia, by contrast, both the abovementioned symbols – the 
concentration camp and the figure of a witness - remained largely neglected. 
Instead, a mythological construction of victory in the war has dominated the 
official memory discourse as well as the public opinion, thereby preventing the 
rationalization of the Soviet totalitarian past. Additionally, a war veteran became 
an important symbolic figure in the construction of the past in the official 
memory discourse. This figure that had been actually introduced during the 
Brezhnev era continued to dominate the post-Soviet public realm together with 
the Brezhnev era’s vision of the war history. The victory myth and the war 
veteran figure as its indispensable part actually ousted the memory of the Gulag 
and repressions from the mass consciousness in which there has been no room 
for mourning, contemplation, and reflection for the victims of the regime.793 
Since the act of witnessing is always an individual act of free will (only a 
witness himself and only in a given moment can decide whether to testify or not) 
this act cannot be ritualized. While the symbolic figure of the witness contradicts 
history as the ceremony, the war veteran figure, by contrast, promotes 
ceremonization. Pompous celebrations of the annual Victory Days on 9 May 
seem to confirm this statement. 
Another problem with the war and victory myth is that it renders an 
essentially anti-modern connotation. As Lev Gudkov explains it, the myth is 
“’switched on’ mainly by mechanisms of the conservation of the social whole 
that prevent society from becoming more complex and functionally 
differentiated. Memories of the war are required above all to legitimate a 
centralized and repressive social order; they are built into a general post-
totalitarian traditionalization of culture in a society that has not been able to cope 
with budding social change. This is why the Russian authorities constantly have 
to return to those traumatic circumstances of its past that reproduce key 
moments of national mobilization.”794 
It is therefore not surprising that the appeal to different cultural values 
and symbols led in the long run to totally different cultural and political 
consequences in West Germany and Russia.  
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In the first case, revaluation of the political-cultural values centered on the 
victims of Nazism became a cornerstone of the national identity. The memory 
culture dominant in contemporary Federal Republic was formed as a result of an 
open critical discussion and acceptance of guilt. Consequently, the cultural 
reproductive institutions were involved in this work of memory: Holocaust 
teaching was integrated into the school curriculum, television and other 
institutions of culture contributed to confronting the past in the public sphere. 
All these endeavors contributed to a generational change in perspective. “For 
younger Germans today, - Bill Niven asserts, - the National Socialist past is not 
so much a source of personal shame, as, increasingly, a reminder of the 
importance of taking moral responsibility in the present and future.”795 
As Niven justly argued, “Myths can only be disposed of if the process of 
enlightenment reaches deep into society.”796 In his Facing the Nazi Past the author 
recalls that Hannes Heer has pointed out that the first generation of Germans to 
ask the question ‘Father, where were you?’ was the 1968 generation. But this 
generation, according to Heer, had formulated this question as a self-righteous 
accusation: ‘We can handle things differently today’. According to Heer, ‘Only if 
we can supplement the question ‘Father, where were you?’ with the question ‘On 
which side would I have stood? How would I have reacted?’ will we be able to 
bring this war to an end once and for all.’797 
Such a shift from a self-righteous to a more judicious, even self-critical 
assessment of the role of others was identified in Germany by many 
commentators primarily in their analyses of the effects of The Crimes of Wehrmacht 
exhibition in the 1990s. One newspaper reported that the important question for 
the 250 classes of schoolchildren that have seen the exhibition in Marburg was 
the personal one of ‘How would I have behaved?’ which meant that they 
examined the strength of their own moral reserves.798 
In Russia, by contrast, there are practically no public institutions that 
rationalize and “work through” the totalitarian past. The absence of the public 
sphere and functional cultural institutions able to retain and reproduce critical 
treatment of the past, has led to creation of a largely forgetful and cynical society. 
In this context, the Soviet Gulag system architect is voted one of the greatest 
historical figures in the nationwide TV project, his reign of terror is regarded in 
the history textbooks as an example of the most “effective management” in the 
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country’s history, while 35 percent in the 20-29 age group confess to have never 
heard of the repressions.799 
The nostalgia for the Soviet past coexists with the myth of “the unique 
Russian path” and a strong imperial complex. The idea of a “great Russia” and 
its rebirth (or preservation) has become the central idea of various ideological 
programs of the post-Soviet intelligentsia.800 While in Germany the nationalistic 
sentiments have gradually subsided, in Russia, by contrast, they have been 
experiencing in the last years a steady growth.  
 
* * * 
 
Trying to trace the reasons for continuity and change in German and 
Russian national identities and collective memories of their totalitarian pasts the 
factor of imperial status loss, as it appears, is worth considering. It may be 
argued that the Federal Republic’s rather successful confrontation with its 
totalitarian legacy was due to the loss of its imperial status after World War II 
which motivated Germans to actively search for a new identity. Reinventing 
national identity and obtaining a brand new national image and status were 
indeed important goals of West German transformations. Russia, by contrast, did 
not have similar motivation and continued wishing to preserve and restore its 
former military-imperial status.801 The imperial status factor may be thus viewed 
as determinant in explaining the specific nature of political, economic and public 
transformations in the analyzed cases. 
Such reasoning is, however, not deprived of defects. In the first instance, 
though after its military defeat in World War II Germany, unlike Russia, totally 
lost its imperial status it did not loose its imperial and nationalistic ambitions. 
According to the OMGUS surveys conducted in the American zone of the 
occupation in the late 1940s, 52 percent of the respondents agreed that territories 
such as Danzig, Sudetenland, and parts of Austria should be returned to 
Germany, 39 percent shared anti-Semitic views, and 48 percent believed that 
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some races were more fit to rule than others.802 Furthermore, a substantial 
number of Germans continued to sympathize with Nazi ideology as well as with 
other reactionary ideas. 
Nationalist tendencies in politics also persisted. Earlier it was noted that 
the 1960s were marked by the activization of neo-Nazis, as well as by Kiesinger’s 
government actively lobbying projects of authoritarian anticonstitutional 
emergency laws, the refusals to recognize the postwar borders with Poland along 
the Oder-Neisse line, etc. So the very fact of disintegration of empire can hardly 
be considered as an imperial complex panacea. It seems more reasonable to 
conclude that democratic political culture and tradition gradually taking root in 
West Germany deprived nationalist sentiments of a chance to prevail. 
At the same time, though Russia unlike postwar Germany entered the 
period of liberal-democratic transformations remaining the nuclear power which 
had not suffered a military defeat, it had not been doomed, as it appears, to the 
failed reforms. The possibility of achieving public consensus and creating a 
modern democratic state was rather high in the early 1990s when the popularity 
of democratic ideas and leaders was still high. In this way the imperial syndrome 
and the problems of finding new national identity could have been overcome.  
Obviously, the predominant atmosphere of hopes and renewal of the 
perestroika and the early post-Soviet period was in many respects linked with a 
newly found popular faith in democracy as the best way of solving private and 
public problems. However, the disappointment in the post-Soviet reforms put an 
end to those unsteady convictions and hopes. The inconsistent implementation 
and incompleteness of the reforms, undemocratic methods employed by the new 
Russian elite, the growth of authoritarian tendencies in politics and the 
subsequent discredit of democratic ideals led to the revival of imperial, 
nationalist sentiments in the Russian society.  
Thus military defeat in itself did not relieve Germany of imperial 
complexes and ambitions. At the same time the majority of Russians did not start 
seeking the restoration of its lost military-imperial status immediately after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Although in political cultures of the both nations 
authoritarian traditions were strong, it did not mean the predetermined outcome 
of their development. It is possible to assume that Russia and Germany were 
equal in their nationalist predisposition as well as in their democratic potential. 
All depended on the choices that would be made by the two societies and by the 
tendencies that would prevail in them in the long run: authoritarian or 
democratic. It is important to underscore, however, that the trajectories of the 
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socio-political development in both cases largely depended on the ways the two 
societies would confront the legacies of their respective totalitarian pasts. 
The historian Maria Ferretti, among other researchers, has pointed to a 
close link between completing “mourning” and constructing a democratic 
identity, as well as between a melancholic attitude toward the past and the 
growth of authoritarian ideologies—above all, nationalism. Ferretti has argued 
that to the extent that mourning demands that individuals perceive the past as a 
common heritage for which they share equal responsibility with others, that 
volitional act makes them active subjects of political life who will actively 
participate in promoting the changes that are necessary to prevent the past from 
recurring. This is, according to the author, precisely the link between mourning 
and democratic values. On the contrary, melancholic attitudes toward the past 
and passive contemplation of the catastrophe deprive individuals of their sense 
of responsibility. They see themselves only as victims and, instead of taking on 
responsibility for the past, they nostalgically long for what existed “before.” In 
perceiving the past only as a result of unknown, higher forces, individuals do not 
become active participants in political life. On the contrary, they search for the 
patronage of a firm hand and authoritarian power, which are the basis of all 
nationalism.803 
Thus, the more plausible explanation of a gradual shift in West German 
public consciousness can be found, as it seems, in initially strong orientation of 
West German political elite towards political democracy with its system of 
values. 
As one the most influential West German thinkers Jürgen Habermas put 
it, “Germans who found themselves to the west of the Soviet zone of occupation 
had drawn the better lot, and not only from a material point of view: the 
conditions for a change in mentality were also objectively better. The 
reestablishment of the democratic constitutional state, the inclusion of the 
Federal Republic in the Western alliance, and the fundamental improvement in 
economic conditions were the major changes in direction. In addition, 
encumbrances that had still plagued the Weimar Republic were pushed aside: 
Prussian centralism, the imbalance and the split between religious 
denominations, the primacy and the tradition-forcing power of the military, and, 
above all, the political significance of elites rooted in traditional social structures. 
Moreover, the superpower lineup, made for a beneficial primacy of interior 
politics, and the economic upswing of the period of reconstruction created a 
space for constructing and developing a welfare state. Finally, not only the loss of 
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national sovereignty but also our own interests ultimately facilitated an 
energetically pursued integration into the European Economic Community. 
Thus, in an increasingly prosperous society, citizens were able to acquire 
confidence in their political order.”804 
 “My thesis, - continued Habermas, - is that the Federal Republic has 
become politically civilized only to the degree that the obstacles of our 
perception of a heretofore unthinkable breach in civilization have been swept 
away. We had to learn to publicly confront a traumatic past. That a liberal 
political culture could develop in a highly developed civilized society such as 
Germany only after Auschwitz is a truth difficult to grasp. The fact that it 
developed because of Auschwitz, because of reflection on the incomprehensible, 
is less difficult to understand if one considers what human rights and democracy 
meant at heart; namely the simple expectation that no one will be excluded from 
the political community and that the integrity of each individual, in his or her 
own otherness, will be similarly respected.”805 
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4.4.3 Institutionalization of Collective Memory Discourses 
 
It is important to point out that the change of identity in post-WWI Germany 
would have been impossible without the profound structural or institutional 
transformation of the German political and cultural sphere. The formation of 
effective democratic institutions became, as it appears, the basic guarantee of 
overcoming totalitarian legacy in the Federal Republic. The basis for this 
overcoming was certainly laid by the denazification program which helped to 
remove moral and legal protection from the Nazi regime-forming state 
institutions – Wehrmacht, courts, the police, industry, science, educational 
system, mass media, etc. As Lev Gudkov conceptualized, “Without a forced 
fixation of the truths traumatizing national consciousness in the practical activity 
of various institutions ethical, publicist or theoretical thought would not have, 
most likely, not only developed, but would not have probably emerged at all, as 
reveals the experience of GDR – the country, which has gone through two 
different forms of totalitarianism and which till now has not yet recovered from 
this experience.”806 
The denazification program, conducted by the Allied authorities in the 
immediate postwar period, and its positive contribution to the German future 
transformations should be certainly given tribute. By characterizing a war of 
aggression the Nuremberg Tribunal presented not only a moral-ethical 
estimation of this war, but formulated an accurate legal position laying the 
foundation for international law. Thanks to the denazification program, the Nazi 
ideology and leaders were condemned and the most active Nazis were removed 
from the positions of power in state structures, public and private organizations. 
 Moreover the denazification process in general and the Nuremberg trial in 
particular increased West Germans’ awareness of the Nazi era. In December 
1945, 84 percent of the American zone respondents indicated that they had 
learned something new from the trial: 64 percent specified the concentration 
camps, 23 percent the extermination of Jews and other groups, and 7 percent the 
character of the Nazi leaders; one out of eight (13 percent) said that he had 
known nothing about the evils of National Socialism prior to the trial.807 
On the other hand, it is clear that neither the denazification process nor the 
trial brought about significant changes of the German political culture. This fact 
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is confirmed, primarily, by the general unwillingness of the population to reject 
Nazism completely. The surveys conducted in the period from November 1945 
till December 1946 showed that an average of 47 percent expressed a conviction 
of National Socialism being a good idea only badly carried out; by August 1947 
this figure had risen to 55 percent remaining fairly constant throughout the 
whole occupation period. At the same time the share of respondents thinking it a 
bad idea dropped from 41 to about 30 percent.808 
Besides, 18 percent of Germans were convinced that “only a government 
with a dictator is able to create a strong nation”; 29 percent believed that “the 
publication of no book that criticizes a government or recommends any changes 
in government should be permitted”; 37 percent denied that “extermination of 
the Jews and Poles and other non-Aryans was not necessary for the security of 
Germans.”809 
However, despite the fact that the denazification process did not produce 
considerable shift towards a more democratic public consciousness, it 
nevertheless laid the foundation and created significant preconditions for its 
further formation. It became a reference point for Germans, a painful experience 
to which they would still refer decades later. 
In post-Soviet Russia, by contrast, no similar process has taken place. 
Though the Communist regime was formally condemned as well, it was never 
outlawed. The leaders of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet special 
services, state employees and others regime officials were neither lustrated, nor 
prohibited to perform political or public activity in future. There have been no 
retributions against Communism and no systematic assessment of its role over 
the 70 years of its existence. As Nancy Adler correctly asserted, “Thus far, no 
institutional way has been found to judge the crimes of Soviet rule. Nor do the 
Russians have a concept like the German Vergangenheitsbewältigung to describe 
the process of coming to terms with the national past. Though a far cry from the 
official amnesia that was practiced throughout much of the Soviet period, state-
sponsored acknowledgement of past repression is still limited in Russia. Not 
only were individual perpetrators not brought to justice, but also, the system 
itself in which they operated was not brought to justice. The fact remains that 
KPSS [CPSU] was never condemned. Since it was also never banned, the Party 
faithful do not even have to regroup under another name.”810 
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Although an attempt to put the Communist Party on trial was undertaken, 
it did not succeed, first of all, because it presented a defense of the new Russian 
power against the attempt of the CPSU restoration. The very fact that the 
Constitutional (and not the Criminal) Court set the stage for this trial speaks 
volumes.811 Though the trial was actually won by Yeltsin and the 
unconstitutional activity of the CPSU was acknowledged it did not, however, 
mean a full and final condemnation of the Communist Party and its leaders. 
Furthermore, as the overwhelming majority present at the court hearings from 
both parties, had been previously members of CPSU, such a condemnation was 
fairly possible. 
Thus, the real trial – the trial over the crimes committed during the 73 
years of communist rule – did not occur. And with each passing year the 
probability of such trial is getting more unlikely. Nevertheless, according to the 
former Soviet dissident historian Vladimir Bukovsky, as those events are passing 
by, the more crimes are being committed while the people’s interest in the 30-80 
years’ old events is subsiding. Theoretically the possibility of persecuting those 
responsible for the regime crimes still exists in Russia. For, according to 
Bukovsky, “our inspectors, our judges who falsely convicted us for political 
reasons are still alive. Alive also are the psychiatrists who recognized us 
mentally sick and who exposed us to forced-treatment in psychiatric hospitals 
used by the regime. The diagnoses from of those who have gone through 
psychological reprisals in the USSR have not been cancelled till now.”812 Though 
Bukovsky believes that there is a lot of people who should bear responsibility for 
the crimes of the Soviet regime he reveals no optimism regarding the possibility 
of bringing them to justice in modern Russia. He posits that until the present 
Russian regime is at office any trial over the CPSU or any serious condemnation 
of the past atrocities is unlikely.813 
Upon the whole, unlike the practice of denazification in West Germany, 
anticommunist criticism in post-Soviet Russia was rather superficial and short-
lived. Quoting Lev Gudkov, it “was mainly aimed at discrediting the legitimate 
legend of the ex–authorities but it did not deal with the institutional system of 
totalitarianism itself. Nor was it accompanied by a deep moral reappraisal of the 
past. As a result, the conservative reaction to changes and the pressure caused by 
them, the crisis, partial pauperization, the loss of prestige and status by the ex-
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privileged groups have brought to the surface of public realm old symbols and 
values of totalitarian society.”814  
Certainly, the choices the elites of the analyzed countries made in both 
managing the present and representing the past got reflected in the cultural 
institutions. The treatment of the past is connected to such institutions of cultural 
transmission as schools and universities, media, museums, national libraries, 
national holidays and remembrance days, commemorations, as well as the 
veneration of places (graveyards, war monuments, concentration camps sites, 
etc.). 
As we have seen, the rebuilding of cultural institutions in West Germany 
was largely determined by a serious effort to confront the horrors of the Nazi 
dictatorship and by searching for safeguards in order to prevent history from 
repeating itself. Most important, however, is that confrontation with the Nazi 
period of history was integrated into in the country’s educational institutions 
(both in the curricula and textbooks) as the main agents of systematic cultural 
transmission.  
The treatment of the Nazi period in all its aspects has been turned into 
compulsory teaching and learning matter in all types of schools in Germany and 
at all levels of education. The duties of both federal and state offices include the 
history of the Nazi period, the history, culture, and politics of the state of Israel, 
and, since 1980, the documentation of memorials to victims of National Socialism 
in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Standing Conference of State Cultural 
Ministers (Kultusministerkonferenz, KMK) has stressed the necessity to focus 
intensively on National Socialism and its crimes, since this part of German 
history is closely bound to basic constitutional values and “the credibility of the 
Federal Republic as a free and democratic constitutional state.”815 
German textbooks teach about the crimes of the Third Reich making the 
readers confront its shameful legacy. Yasemin Soysal wrote that German 
textbooks “reflect a condemnation of the Nazi past,” and provide “extensive and 
negative coverage of the Nazi history as a time of violence, persecution, death, 
and destruction.”816 
As for Russia, the persistence of authoritarian methods of school teaching 
in the post-Soviet schools has been noted in the previous chapter. The content of 
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history school program as well as the government’s approach to history teaching 
has not undergone significant change. The Soviet Gulag as well as the Holocaust 
are not present in the Russian school curricula. A study from 1997 found that, “it 
is unfortunate that Russian schools have failed to address the Holocaust when 
teaching modern history.”817  
History textbooks have been intently monitored and roughly censored by 
the Russian authorities despite the fact that there has existed since the mid-1990s 
a formal procedure of expertise and classification of textbooks.818 School history 
texts thus remain the instruments in the Russian process of ideological 
transformation and nation-building.819 The Russian bureaucrats are not known 
for plans to introduce any school programs on civic education similar to that in 
West Germany (at the same time their intentions to introduce the basics of the 
Orthodox culture into the secondary school curriculum are well-known). 
German commemoration (in comparison with Russian) as well reflects an 
extraordinarily high level of reflection and apology about the national past. As 
James Young wrote, “Berlin and its environs are rich with excellent museums 
and permanent exhibitions on the Holocaust […] from the Wannsee villa to the 
Topographie des Terrors, from the new Jewish museum on Lindenstrasse and 
the Spielberg video archives it will house, to the insightful exhibitions at 
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen.”820 Other notable memorials include the 
Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, the Memorial to the Bookburning at 
Bebelplatz, Street Signs in the Bavarian Quarter and the Neue Wache, 
rededicated in 1995 as the “Central Memorial of the Federal Republic of 
Germany for the Victims of War and Tyranny.” No similar national museums 
and memorials are found in the Russian capital. 
To add to this, West Germany and then unified Germany have pursued 
highly apologetic policies of remembrance. Since 1995 the Germans have 
celebrated Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27th - the day Auschwitz 
was liberated. On November 9th Germany commemorates the anniversary of the 
Night of Broken Glass (Kristallnacht), a massive nation-wide anti-Jewish pogrom 
                                                 
817 Poltorak, David; Klokova, Galina. Ob izuchenii Holokosta // Prepodavanie istorii v shkole, № 7, 
1997. p. 35. 
818 The two most notorious cases here are prohibitions of the textbooks The Modern History of the 
20th Century (Noveishaja istoria: 20 vek) by Alexander Kreder (in 1997) and National History of the 
20th Century (Otechsetvennaja Istoria: 20 vek) by Igor Dolutsky (in 2003) by the Russian authorities. 
819 See Zajda, Joseph. The New History School Textbooks in the Russian Federation: 1992-2004 // 
Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 1469-3623, Vol. 37, № 3, 2007. 
p. 291. 
820 Young, James A. Berlin’s Holocaust Memorial // German Politics and Society, Vol. 17, № 3, Fall 
1999. p. 55. 
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that took place on 9-10 November, 1938. Even though November 9th was the day 
on which the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 and the country was finally 
reunified, Germans chose a different date to commemorate the country’s 
unification – October 3rd. In early March the annual Week of Brotherhood (Woche 
der Brüderlichkei) is traditionally celebrated. This annual event, supported 
primarily by the Societies for Christian-Jewish Cooperation, has often included 
addresses by the Federal Republic’s government leaders, and thus has been an 
important moment for remarks on the Nazi past and the legacies of anti-
Semitism, as well as on how the past might be overcome.821 
 Annual commemorations on May 8th have long served as a decisive 
referent in German political culture posing a central question for German 
identity: Was Germany defeated or liberated on that date?822 This has thus 
become a day of critical reflection on the national past. 
In Russia, in turn, May 9th - Victory Day (Den’ Pobedy) - has become one of 
the biggest national holidays, a day of victory celebrating the Soviet army’s 
triumph over Hitler’s Germany. It has not evolved into a day of mournful 
commemoration of the dead, the human suffering, and the material 
destruction.823 It is commemorated with a huge military parade, hosted by the 
President on Red Square in Moscow. Similar parades are organized in all major 
Russian cities. It is also the day to commemorate the dead soldiers (flowers and 
wreaths are laid on wartime graves) and to pay tribute to war veterans (special 
parties and concerts are organized for them). 
While actively remembering its effort in defeating Nazi Germany in the 
Great Patriotic War, Russian society forgets about the trauma of the Gulag and 
crimes committed in its name in other former states of the Soviet Union.824 The 
Day of Memory of Victims of Political Repressions on October 30th is by no 
means a national event – it is remembered by a handful of dissidents and the 
former victims. As we have seen, public officials avoid giving public apologies, 
building monuments, discovering the mass graves, reconstructing concentration 
camps, or opening archives in Russia. A critical approach to Russia’s past has 
been replaced by a “patriotic consensus” (Sperling 2001) that has expressed a 
Russian concept of identity.825 
 
                                                 
821 Olick, Jeffrey K. 1993. Op. cit. 
822 Olick, Jeffrey K. 1999. Op. cit. 
823 Gudkov, Lev. The Fetters of Victory. How the War Provides Russia with Its Identity // Eurozine, 
3 May 2005. 
824 Folk, Christian. Op. cit. 
825 Sperling, Walter. “Erinnerungsorte” in Werbung und Marketing // Osteuropa 51, 2001. pp. 1321-
1341. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
5.1 Summary and Main Findings 
 
This dissertation has addressed transformations of political culture in the two 
post-totalitarian societies of post-World War II West Germany and post-Soviet 
Russia. More specifically, in this work I have tried to discover and understand 
determinants of political culture transformations and the factors affecting 
democratic consolidation in the analyzed cases. Realizing that the complexity of 
post-totalitarian contexts cannot be grasped without attention to different 
spheres or levels of change – political, economic, social and cultural, – since the 
beginning of the research process I was inclined towards the study of the 
interplay between different levels of post-totalitarian transformations in fostering 
democratic political culture. 
Following this logic, I started the research by addressing in Chapter 2 the 
political context of post-totalitarian transformations in postwar West Germany 
and post-Soviet Russia. On presenting the review of the political reforms in both 
cases I turned to the comparative analysis of the political transformations trying 
to address the set of questions posed in the introduction to the chapter: Has a 
political system in each case been formed and has it replaced the command-
administrative system? Have there been created mechanisms of horizontal 
accountability in the form of effective system of “checks and balances”? Have the 
lessons of the past regarding the collapse of the former totalitarian system been 
taken into account in both analyzed transformations?  
The comparative analysis has revealed that as a result of the postwar 
transformations a political system (as a system of independent institutions) was 
created in the Federal Republic of Germany where the representative institutions 
of the parliamentary republic became the main centers of decision-making. In 
post-Soviet Russia, by contrast, the super-presidential regime established with 
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the adoption of the 1993 Constitution significantly limited accountability of the 
executive to the legislative and other braches of power. Consequently, the real 
centers of power in Russia were concentrated not within the formal 
representative institutions, but in nontransparent structures of the Presidential 
Administration and Federal Security Service (FSB). This absence of horizontal 
accountability, in turn, reduced efficiency of vertical accountability in a form of 
electoral competition. 
Taking into account the utmost importance of economic transformations 
for societies which face the necessity of reforming their political and economic 
systems simultaneously, in the same chapter I also explored how the economic 
reforms had affected the two analyzed transformations. Economic 
transformations in the analyzed contexts interested me as an essential condition 
of political system consolidation during the exit from totalitarian rule. 
As the analysis of the postwar West German development revealed, the 
Economic Miracle accelerated consolidation of the new German state. Citizens of 
the Federal Republic became for the first time convinced that democracy was 
compatible with economic growth. While during the Weimar period many had 
tended to look back at the authoritarian but more economically successful 
German Empire, for the majority of the Economic Miracle contemporaries the 
financially safe, democratic present seemed the best of all periods. 
In Russia, by contrast, unprecedented economic recession took place in the 
era of post-Soviet “democratization.” It is not surprising therefore that 
democracy, associated with the chaos of the 1990s, became linked in the public 
opinion with poverty and humiliation. To illustrate, by 1998 72 percent of the 
respondents approved of the pre-1985 period and only 35 percent positively 
estimated the existing regime.826 
The experiences of West Germany and Russia, thus, confirmed that 
through rising of living standards economic development provides a political 
regime with necessary legitimacy and long-term sustainability. Besides, as was 
shown in the following Chapter 3, economic development can positively affect 
cultural changes which, in turn, facilitate democratic consolidation. It favors the 
development of interpersonal trust and tolerance, and leads to the distribution of 
post-materialistic values with their priority of self-expression and participation 
in decision-making. 
                                                 
826 Rose, Richard; Shin, Doh Chull. Qualities of Incomplete Democracies: Russia, the Czech Republic 
and Korea // Compared Studies in Public Policy. Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 
№ 302, 1998. p. 21.  
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Upon the whole, the general understanding of the institutional context of 
transformations in the two cases provided an important basis for further analysis 
of cultural transformations in West Germany and Russia. 
This dissertation has employed and developed a view of political culture 
as a system of symbols and meanings that determines both the collective 
identification and the citizens’ attitudes toward politics and their role within the 
political system. This understanding of political culture has defined a twofold 
analysis of political cultures in West Germany and Russia from both attitudinal 
and symbolic perspectives. 
In Chapter 3 political culture transformations in the two cases have been 
analyzed from the individual-level perspective. The rationale behind that chapter 
was to offer an overview of the political culture developments from the 
perspective of citizens’ orientations towards political system and their 
participation in it. Thus, in that chapter I analyzed transformations of West 
German and Russian societies along such variables as interest in politics, the feeling 
of political efficacy, political participation, social trust, and support for democratic 
values. Differently, the study investigated how attitudes toward self (civic 
attitudes, and primarily, the feeling of political efficacy) and toward others in 
politics (trust, cooperative competence) as well as toward the political system 
changed in the course of post-totalitarian transformations in the two analyzed 
societies.  
As was discussed in Chapter 3, despite a rather protracted period of 
citizens’ apathy and non-participation, West German political culture has 
experienced a gradual turn away from authoritarian patterns of thought to a 
tentative embrace of democratic values. The gradual increase in political interest 
and political discussion, in political efficacy, general trust, and, eventually, 
political participation, finally occurred with the most drastic increase by 
practically all analyzed variables taking place in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
These changes have coincided (or, arguably, were caused by) with the emergence 
of the highly active protest student movement of 1968, thousands of citizen-
initiative groups across the country, and, subsequently, the new social 
movements of the 1970s-1980s – the environmental, the anti-nuclear energy, the 
women’s, and the peace movements. 
In post-Soviet Russia one could observe an opposite situation – the wave 
of public activity subsided within the first post-communist years and since then 
there has been an overall decline by practically all variables of political 
involvement. With some minor exceptions of rare and nonsystematic citizens’ 
activism the overall picture, as the survey data have shown, has largely remained 
unchanged. Only in the recent years (approximately since 2005) some grassroots 
initiatives and networks have begun to appear in Russia. These new independent 
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endeavors have united both those eager to assert their interests and rights, as 
well as those ready to struggle for more general public good issues like 
protection of environment or preservation of cultural heritage. Surely, these new 
networks and grassroots initiatives, founded on weak ties, provide an interesting 
aspect of further investigation. 
The comparative research has discovered (confirming some of the 
conclusions previously made by other authors) that among main sources of 
change of West German political culture on the individual level were overall 
system performance, socioeconomic modernization that impacted the change of 
social structure, and the transformation of socialization patterns in which 
political values are formed and through which they are transmitted. The latter 
change in the German case, as it was shown, was largely determined by the 
educational reforms which affected both the content and the structure of 
secondary and higher education. 
As it was argued, sociopolitical modernization of the West German society 
was closely linked with the transformation of political system (discussed in 
Chapter 2), creation and well-performance of democratic institutions as well as 
with the overall rise of affluence and the expansion of higher education in the 
postwar period. These factors transformed the social structure in direction to a 
more participatory citizenry increasingly concerned about public matters.  
It was shown also that post-Soviet Russia experienced no similar growth 
of civic engagement except for a short late Soviet period which was followed by 
protracted ebb. The system in Russia was not sufficiently modernized and 
democratized in the post-Soviet period and became characterized not by 
institutional differentiation and further strengthening of democratic institutions, 
but by quite archaic unequal, hierarchical, clientelist relations. The unchanged 
structure of state-society relations stifled the formation of independent civil 
society agents.  
The relative growth of civic activity in Russia in the recent years has been 
linked, as it appears, with the overall economic and income growth which has 
taken place in the last decade. However, the problem with these groups is that 
most of them have no formal status and are not institutionalized, and in the 
context of authoritarian political system their future is quite uncertain. In any 
case, this new phenomenon is certainly of interest and requires further 
investigation. 
In Chapter 4 I turned to the explanatory analysis of the symbolic 
dimension of political culture that affects the legitimation of polities and the 
formation of national identity. In this part of the dissertation I explored the 
determinants of West German and Russian collective memory narratives 
regarding their respective totalitarian pasts and investigated how these 
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narratives have evolved in the course of exit from totalitarian rule. More 
specifically, my intention was to understand the ways in which democratizing 
West Germany and Russia had confronted their totalitarian legacies and how 
they had remembered their respective totalitarian regimes – the Third Reich and 
the Soviet Union. At first I reviewed how the collective memory discourses in 
each country evolved across time. On presenting the developments in both cases, 
I turned to the analysis of the sources of change (and continuity) in official 
discourses of traumatic historical events.  
I have shown that the decades following the end of World War II, and 
especially since the late 1960s, West Germany has seen a remarkable turnabout in 
the memory of the Third Reich marked by the revaluation of the meaning of 
victimhood, the reinvention of the Holocaust remembrances and placing them in 
the center of German identity. I have argued that the major sources of change in 
the cultural situation in West Germany was, first, diversification of memory 
narratives and the appearance of alternative versions of memory and 
interpretations of the past in the postwar period, i.e. the ‘alternative 
remembering’ that challenged and contested the official memory narratives. 
Second, change in the official narratives of the German repressive past was due 
to the transformation of social values and the basis of collective identification 
that manifested in the introduction and sustaining of new symbols (for e.g. the 
Holocaust survivor and the concentration camp) and symbolic events (for e.g. the 
liberation of Auschwitz and the Kristallnacht). Finally, the cultural change was 
brought about and further sustained through institutionalization of the new 
collective memory discourses in such institutions of cultural transmission as 
schools and universities, mass media, museums, national libraries, national 
holidays and remembrance days, commemorations, as well as the veneration of 
places (graveyards, war monuments, concentration camps sites, etc.). 
While in Germany the memory of the criminal Nazi past was gradually 
obtained which led to its rethinking and to subsequent “working through” it in 
the public sphere, in Russia, by contrast, the work of memory launched during 
the perestroika period gradually subsided and was ousted, leading to 
intensification of imperial ambitions and nationalistic sentiments. As we have 
seen, the memory of the Soviet past in the contemporary Russian discourse has 
remained almost totally monopolized by the state. Since the mid-1990s, the 
dominance of the official politics of memory has been growing, preventing the 
crystallization of any independent agents or communities of memory. By 
imposing such symbols as the victory in the Great Patriotic War and the figure of 
the war veteran the dominant official memory narrative pushed the theme of the 
Gulag and repressions to the periphery of mass consciousness. Furthermore, the 
symbol of victory in the war, as it was shown, has retrospectively legitimized the 
 265 
Soviet totalitarian regime as a whole and Stalin as its leader justifying the “costs” 
of Soviet history and the accelerated military-industrial modernization (such as 
the repressions, famines, poverty, and enormous numbers of deaths after 
collectivization).827 If West German cultural institutions – schools and 
universities, mass media and museums, etc. – have reflected a high level of 
reflection and apology about the national past, Russia has considerably lacked 
public institutions rationalizing and “working through” the totalitarian past in 
the public sphere. A critical approach to Russia’s past has been replaced by a 
“patriotic consensus” (Sperling 2001) that has expressed a Russian concept of 
identity. 
For this concluding chapter I set the task of untangling how these multiple 
transitions in political and cultural spheres affected each other and overall social 
development in the two cases. On the one hand, I would like to explore how 
political change and institutional transformations in post-totalitarian societies 
have affected political culture. At the same time, I will try to see how collective 
memory discourses influenced the national identity and political processes in 
post-WWII West Germany and post-Soviet Russia. Additionally, I will also focus 
on the sources of change or mechanisms through which change in the analyzed 
political cultures has occurred. 
 
5.2 Mutual Effects of Transitions: Interplay between Institutional 
and Cultural Levels of Post-Totalitarian Transformations 
 
In this section I will focus on the interplay between different levels of post-
totalitarian transformations (more specifically between the levels of institutional 
change and transformations of political culture and collective memory) and its 
role in fostering democratic political culture. 
The core research goal of the comparative historical analysis of 
transformations in postwar West Germany and post-Soviet Russia was to 
investigate the sources of cultural change, or, differently, the factors bringing 
about change in citizens’ attitudes and behavior, affecting a social turn from 
authoritarian to democratic patterns of thought and behavior. Within this general 
framework there was a more specific task to understand how institutional 
transformations in the post-totalitarian societies of West Germany and Russia 
affected their political cultures. 
Upon the whole, the analysis of democratization in the two cases revealed 
a close link between the institutional and cultural levels of transformations. 
                                                 
827 See Gudkov, Lev. The Fetters of Victory. How the War Provides Russia with Its Identity // 
Eurozine, 3 May, 2005. 
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While in Germany the establishment of functioning democratic institutions 
(discussed in Chapter 2) contributed to the long-term growth of political efficacy 
and civic skills, in Russia, by contrast, the emergence of a super-presidential 
regime and non-performance or absence of democratic institutions resulted in 
the low levels of political efficacy and weakness of civil society, impeded social 
development and stifled social organization. As it was shown in Chapter 3, in the 
West German democracy, based on the rule of law and the separation of powers, 
citizens got numerous chances of participation in the political system which, in 
turn, led to a steady increase in the political skills and resources of the German 
society. Differently, as West Germans were getting acquainted with the 
democratic processes of the Federal Republic, they were getting more and more 
involved in them, and this involvement, in turn, made them more assured that 
they can affect political decision-making. In this way, the democratic system 
performance contributed to the growth of civic norms in postwar Germany. Most 
observers agreed that the performance of the political and economic system was 
an important factor in the increase in system support and the growing 
appreciation of democracy in the first two decades following the war. It can be 
argued therefore that the change of identity in post-WWII West Germany would 
have been impossible without the profound structural or institutional 
transformation of the political sphere. The formation of effective democratic 
institutions, as it appears, became the basic guarantee of overcoming totalitarian 
legacy in postwar Germany.  
In post-Soviet Russia, by contrast, the weakness or sometimes lack of an 
institutional framework within which democracy could actually be practiced 
prevented in many respects the development of civic skills and political 
efficiency that are vital for supporting and consolidating a democratic system. 
The social involvement remained extremely limited due to the conservation of 
the old structures and further non-development of democratic institutions (such 
as the rule of law, strong legislature and more broadly a competitive political 
system, independent media and courts, etc.) which impeded social development 
and stifled social organization. 
As for the causation of the correlation between political democratization 
and citizens’ involvement in political affairs, it is noteworthy that changes in 
individual political attitudes and behavior in postwar West Germany lagged 
behind institutional and economic changes for almost two decades. One can 
argue that political culture has begun to ‘catch up’ with the democratic structure 
only since the late 1960s – early 1970s. The analysis of the German case thus 
seemed to confirm the arguments made by Brian Barry, Dankwart Rustow, and 
other observers who had asserted that political culture should be viewed as the 
effect and not as the cause of political processes. Indeed, in the Federal Republic 
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the change of political culture followed institutional transformation, Germany 
thus representing the case in which “democracy made democrats” rather than 
vice versa. In Russia, as it appears, the failed political democratization became 
the main obstacle on the path of democratization of political culture and, more 
broadly, of democratic consolidation. Following this formula, it can be argued 
that in Russia the lack of democracy has resulted in the lack of democratic 
citizens, and, consequently, in the lack of democratic political culture. 
As for the interplay between the transformations of political culture and 
collective memory, it is noteworthy that while there was a temporal gap between 
politico-economic reforms and transformations of political culture, the processes 
of the civic culture emergence and the critical collective memory development in 
West Germany, on the contrary, coincided. Moreover, challenging of the existing 
official memory narrative was at the core of the protest student movement of the 
late 1960s. In the period often referred to as the “long 1960s” the West German 
society was taking on not only a more active role in managing social matters, but 
was also taking a greater moral stance on their nation’s past. In fact, historically 
this new critical stance vis-à-vis the past coincided with grassroots movements 
and new forms of civil society that implicitly questioned traditional German 
attitudes and replaced them with more modern views of authority, civic 
engagement, nationalism, militarism and other concepts.828 Thus the overall 
growth of civic activity in the late 1960s and the 1970s, manifested in the 
appearance of the protest student movement and the spread of thousands of 
local citizens’ initiatives across the country, actually coincided with an increasing 
diversification and fragmentation of West Germany’s historical culture.  
The interdependence of general civic involvement and critical treatment of 
the repressive past was also vividly revealed in the Russian case. As was shown, 
the overall decline of political participation since the early 1990s in Russia has 
also coincided with a decline of interest in the topics of mass repressions and 
other Soviet crimes and the growth of defense reactions in the social and cultural 
periphery. 
  
5.3 The Sources of Political Culture Change: Expansion of the 
Public Sphere and Institutionalization of Value Change. 
Socialization and Generational Change 
 
One of the main sources of change in the West German postwar political culture 
was an emergence and subsequent expansion of a critical public sphere in which the 
                                                 
828 See Hockenos, Paul. The Grassroots Republic: How Intellectuals, Students and Civic Movements 
Changed German Culture // The Atlantic Times. May, 2009. 
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representatives of political, artistic, academic, educational and civil society elites 
persistently rationalized the national present and past, articulated, debated, and 
negotiated different interests, values, positions, policies, viewpoints, etc. Linked 
with the public sphere expansion was the institutionalization of new democratic 
values and their subsequent transmission through cultural and educational institutions. 
The latter component was decisive, in turn, in sustaining new political values 
and in further transmitting them to the next generations. Differently, the 
institutionalization of new values, principles and norms was crucial to 
guaranteeing their transmission and continuity across the succession of 
generations as the new cohorts could internalize these new values in the process 
of their socialization. In the following sections I will dwell more on these sources 
of cultural change in the two analyzed cases. 
 
5.3.1 Expansion of the Public Sphere 
 
As noted previously, the expansion of the public sphere in the Federal Republic 
affected equally more broad democratization processes as well as the processes 
linked with the critical confrontation with the Nazi past. Thus the embrace of the 
new values of human life and human dignity, civic engagement and 
codetermination in the public sphere and in different cultural institutions went 
along with the ‘coming to terms’ with the traumatic past in the same settings. 
These processes, in turn, fundamentally transformed the German national 
identity and considerably furthered democratic consolidation in the country. 
It is noteworthy that since the late 1960s the public sphere in West 
Germany (understood as the space where meanings and interests are articulated, 
debated, distributed and negotiated) has involved several independent arenas of 
struggle for new political and social issues, as well as for more critical reflection 
on the past: the national and regional political scenes, television, the national and 
regional press, and a large variety of specialized yet interconnected intellectual 
settings, including cinema, literature, law, and academic history and social 
sciences. 
In those settings, on the one hand, numerous civil society agents – 
environmental activists, student movement leaders, representatives of trade 
unions and teachers’ associations, etc. – struggled for representations of their 
interests and for furthering of such issues as educational reform, environmental 
protection, urban development, legalization of abortion, codetermination of 
workers, etc. Consequently, the growing engagement of civil society actors and 
the promotion by them of the above-mentioned New Politics issues produced, as 
we have seen in Chapter 3, a change in basic orientations toward politics and the 
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political system, bringing about a greater citizen input. Furthermore, this value 
‘struggle’ and subsequent value change in Germany considerably affected the 
state-society relations and the overall political agenda. Most notably, the 
increased citizens’ involvement and the rise of New Politics concerns have 
weakened the traditional social basis of German politics. 
At the same time, numerous intellectual, religious and artistic groups, 
various groups of victims, survivors, veterans, and other ‘communities of 
memory,’ as well as activists on the left and right, academics, teachers, writers, 
artists, lawyers, and journalists were simultaneously involved in the process of 
‘coming to terms with’ the repressive past in the public sphere. Consequently, 
the public confrontations with the Nazi past have gradually become an intrinsic 
part of West German democracy. 
In Russia, the public sphere that has emerged as a result of the Soviet 
system collapse, has been, on the contrary, constantly narrowing. On the one 
hand, it was linked with the weakness of civil society and citizens’ 
disengagement throughout the 1990s. This meant that independent initiatives in 
the public sphere were rather weak and unsystematic and that civil society 
agents that would make claims regarding political or memory-related issues 
simply did not appear. On the other hand, the public space has gradually been 
monopolized by the ever more authoritarian state. Since 2000 under Putin’s 
presidency significant limitations of freedom, primarily the freedom of 
expression and association, as well as the elimination of the public sphere 
settings such as free parliament, civil society, mass media, etc. severely 
undermined the public sphere in Russia.  
 
5.3.2 Institutionalization and Transmission of Values 
 
Perhaps even more important is the fact that the new values gaining recognition 
in the public sphere were institutionalized in West German cultural institutions. 
The latter were increasingly integrating the new democratic values and searching 
for safeguards in order to prevent history from repeating itself.  
Initiated by the Western Allies, the process of ‘working through’ the 
traumatic past was substantially expanded by the West German society and state 
that have been seeking for means to deal with the former injustice, alleviate the 
suffering of the victims, to minimize the possibility of a repetition of what had 
happened, to comprehend the causes of the crimes committed and to document 
them. Incidentally, this procedure has not only ended, but it has become an 
essential part of national and cultural identity of contemporary Germans.  
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‘Coming to terms’ with the National Socialist past in West Germany began 
with the legal action: punishing the perpetrators, the rehabilitation of victims of 
Nazism, the revision of racial laws and, most important, the prosecution on Nazi 
crimes in the German courts. Upon the whole, in the period between 1945 and 
1997 a total of 912 trials were held in the German courts involving 1,875 
defendants accused of homicidal crimes committed during World War II in the 
service of National Socialism.829 This process that actually took decades to fulfill 
was accompanied by a historical study of National Socialism and by a critical 
evaluation of norms and values of the Nazi period in different cultural 
institutions – mass media, museums, and most importantly schools and 
universities as the main agents of systematic cultural transmission. These steps 
were inspired by the society’s and government’s intention to make an antihuman 
nature of Nazi value system known to the public and to counter it with 
democratic values. 
In Russia the already mentioned absence of the public sphere able to 
produce and broadcast social meanings in conjunction with the deliberate 
marginalization or absence of the groups able to create and transmit those 
meanings has blocked the possibility of retaining and transmitting any collective 
memory versions differing from those superimposed on the existing cultural and 
educational institutions by the state. As we have seen, the democratic values and 
norms as well as the memory of the Soviet Gulag and repressions have been 
integrated neither into the Russian political and legal institutions, nor into its 
national holidays and commemorative traditions; neither into national museums, 
nor into schools and universities, etc. 
 
5.3.3 Socialization and Generational Change 
 
As mentioned previously, such sources of change as the public sphere expansion 
and institutionalization of democratic values and norms are vital for sustaining 
new political values and in further transmitting them to the next generations.  
Gabriel Almond et al. (1980, 2006) observed that political cultures are 
sustained or changed as people acquire their attitudes and values. Differently, 
citizens usually acquire norms, attitudes, values and patterns of behavior in the 
process of political socialization. If political socialization refers to “learning 
process by which the political norms and behaviors acceptable to an ongoing 
political system are transmitted from generation to generation,” then the sources 
                                                 
829 The Prosecution of National Socialist Homicidal Crimes before Courts in West Germany and 
the Federal Republic, 1945-1997. A short Introduction on Statistics and Priorities. 
<http://www1.jur.uva.nl/junsv/JUNSVEng/WGermpros.htm> 
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from which individuals acquire these norms and attitudes and the experiences 
through which they internalize them are many.830 It is the abovementioned public 
sphere settings and various cultural institutions that transmit norms, values and 
behavior and help individuals internalize different types of political attitudes at 
different points in the life cycle. These agencies, among which the school is 
arguably the most influential (Verba 1964), also play a major role in resocializing 
the population after the system’s crisis or disintegration. 
 Political cultures that are normally subject to continuity may, however, 
experience change (as the example of postwar West Germany has vividly 
revealed). It happens once old institutions are destroyed or undergo some crisis 
causing discontinuities in the socialization process. When new institutions are 
formed, next cohorts are being socialized under them as they age. It is precisely 
the character of these new institutions that determines whether the new cohorts 
will socialize differently and will acquire new values and norms or not. 
 Karl Mannheim (1928, 1952) underscored that new generations emerge in 
response to a series of formative events that are perceived as challenges to the 
prevailing social and political order. System crises and other potentially 
formative event may not be constitutive of a political generation as long as there 
is no similar response, i.e. if these occurrences are not perceived as contradicting 
structural elements of the political culture associated with the previous order. 
Differently, if individuals do not translate the lessons drawn from shared 
historical experience into political practice and do not transmit their values and 
norms through cultural institutions, their experience will not suffice to form a 
generational change. If there is no change in socialization patters, new cohorts 
are unlikely to socialize differently under new institutions and the change in 
political culture is unlikely to occur. However, any system crisis as well as the 
destruction of traditional political beliefs and values may open a window of 
opportunity for new generations to emerge. For, as noted previously, these social 
collectives emerge in response to a perceived crisis of traditional political beliefs 
and values.831 
The analysis of political culture transformations in West Germany has 
revealed that institutionalization of new values and principles was crucial to 
guaranteeing their transmission and continuity across the succession of 
generations as the new cohorts could internalize them in the process of their 
socialization.  
                                                 
830 Sigel, Roberta. Assumptions about the Learning of Political Values // The Annul, Vol. 361, 
September 1965. 
831 See Luecke, Tim. Blast from the Past: The Generation of 1914 and the Causes of World War II. 
APSA 2009. Toronto Meeting Paper, 2009. 
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Based on different socialization experiences of postwar West Germans, the 
students of Germany typically distinguish at least three rather well-defined 
generations in the postwar Federal Republic: (1) the pre-war generation, (2) the 
so-called “Hitler Youth” generation, and (3) the postwar generation.  
The pre-war generation which socialized before the First World War and 
lived through the Third Reich as adults, is also known as the West German 
“founder” generation for the majority of the immediate postwar elite, including 
the Federal Republic’s first chancellor Konrad Adenauer (b. 1876) belonged to 
it.832  
The generation in between, the so-called “Hitler Youth generation” of 
those born between 1922 and 1932 and socialized in the youth structures of the 
Third Reich (1933-1945), is often referred to as the “generation of 1945,” or “forty-
fivers,” because the collapse of the Nazi regime and beginning of liberal 
freedoms became the turning point of their lives and the beginning of their as 
well as the country’s intellectual and emotional (geistige) reorientation.833 The 
same age cohort is also referred to in literature as “skeptical” (Schelsky 1957), 
“forty-eighters” (Marcuse 2000), “betrayed,” “searching,” and “reconstruction” 
generation.834 
Finally, the postwar generation was the first cohort that socialized in the 
postwar Federal Republic. It became also known as the “1968 generation,” or the 
“sixty-eighters,” for its representatives formed the bulk of the protest student 
movement of the late 1960s. The members of this cohort that came of age in the 
years of the Economic Miracle in the late 1950s and in the 1960s were born 
between the late 1930s and the early 1950s (ca. between 1937 and 1953).835 
                                                 
832 See Pfetsch, Frank R. Die Gründergeneration der Bundesrepublik. Sozialprofil und politische 
Orientierung // Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 27, 1986. pp. 237–51; Recker, Marie-Luise. ‘Bonn ist 
nicht Weimar.’ Zur Struktur und Charakter des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland in der Ära Adenauer // Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 44, 1993. pp. 
287–303. 
833 Moses, Dirk A. Op. cit. p. 51. See also Kaiser, Joachim. Phasenverschiebungen und Einschnitte in 
der Kulturellen Entwicklung. In: Broszat, Martin (ed.) Zäsuren nach 1945: Essays zur 
Periodisierung der deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990. pp. 69–74. Claus 
Leggewie follows him in “The ‘Generation of 1989’: A New Political Generation?” In: Monteath, 
Peter; Reinhard Alter (eds.) Rewriting the German Past: History and Identity in the New Germany. 
Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1997. pp. 103–14. 
834 Marcuse, Harold. Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration Camp, 1933-
2001. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Moses, Dirk A. Op. cit. p. 51. 
835 Marcuse, Harold. Generational Cohorts and the Shaping of Popular Attitudes towards the 
Holocaust. In: Roth, John; Maxwell, Elizabeth (eds.) Remembering for the Future: The Holocaust in 
an Age of Genocide. London: Palgrave, 2001. Vol. 3. pp. 652-63. 
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Naturally, the social conditions under which representatives of different 
generations of Germans socialized largely defined their outlook, habits and 
behavioral patterns. German cohorts socialized before and during World War II 
lived though long periods of economic hardship and felt the destructive 
consequences of the war. Both an older generation of Germans born during the 
period of German Empire (1871-1918), and the Hitler Youth generation born in 
the Weimar Republic period (1918-1933) lived under autocratic regimes. Younger 
Germans born during or after World War II, by contrast, have grown up in the 
period of rapid social change, economic advancement, and international stability. 
Importantly, they were raised in democratic political setting of the Federal 
Republic.  
This cohort of younger Germans that reared in the material and personal 
security of the postwar years have developed value priorities very different from 
the concerns of their elders. As a consequence of the affluence and social change 
of the postwar period, the attention this younger generation paid to traditional 
socioeconomic cleavages lessened, and individual attitudinal forces replaced 
social and cultural forces as determinants of political behavior. Kendall Baker et 
al. (1981) have shown, for instance, that the development of party identification 
in Germany has had a distinctive generational component.836 
In the early 1980s when the members of the first cohort socialized into the 
political system of the Federal Republic reached the ages of 45-54, many 
observers acknowledged success of their socialization in terms of the political 
culture change. As noted previously, in comparison with the 1950s skepticism 
and ignorance have declined and the willingness to engage in public matters has 
risen noticeably since then.837 
It is noteworthy that the research conducted by Frederick Weil has 
revealed that the older cohort (which he defines as “Nazi cohort”) lagged 
initially in embracing the new West German democracy after 1945 due to the 
socialization and propaganda its members experienced under the Nazi regime. 
Notably, however, later sociological studies by Weil (1982, 1987), Kendall L. 
Baker et al. (1981), and others have discovered that the views of older cohorts 
have subsequently converged with those of the younger cohorts. Though the 
weakening of traditional social cleavages has led to great differences between the 
formative experiences of the younger and older cohorts, the elder Germans 
eventually caught up with the younger generation in internalizing democratic 
values and principles. This was mostly due to the performance of the new 
                                                 
836 See Baker, Kendall L. et al. Op. cit. p. 12. 
837 Zinnecker, Jürgen. Op. cit. p. 101. 
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democratic institutions, the rise of affluence, the constellation of international 
relations, as well as the other change-determinant factors previously discussed.838 
While the role of the postwar generation in bringing socio-cultural change 
in Germany is commonly emphasized, it is important to remember that the 
activization of young people in the late 1960s became a consequence rather than 
a cause of the reformist cultural paradigm. As Dirk Moses (2007) convincingly 
proved it was “forty-fivers” who actually had the greatest impact on West 
Germany’s postwar restructuring. Having entered the postwar academia, the 
legal profession and subsequently political arena in the 1960s-1980s, “forty-
fivers” saw their mission in ensuring that the Federal Republic “as a project of 
consolidation and reform” would succeed.839 The representatives of this cohort, 
as opposed to the ‘rebellious’ postwar generation of the late 1960s, “were radical 
reformers rather than revolutionaries.” However, it was mostly due to the efforts 
of this cohort “committed to a democratic and republican system of government, 
even if they disagreed about its precise meaning” that the next generations of 
German citizens could socialize under different institutions.840 
Arguably, similar function in the Russian case could be performed by the 
so-called “sixtiers” (shestidesyatniki). The representatives of this cohort born 
approximately between 1925 and 1945 were socialized during World War II and 
during a more ‘liberal’ period of Khrushev’s Thaw when, following Stalin’s death 
in 1953, repressions and censorship in the Soviet Union were partially reversed 
and millions of Soviet political prisoners were released from Gulag labor camps. 
Though they themselves could not possibly form a separate generation as they 
were raised and socialized under the Soviet institutions which remained rather 
uniform throughout the Soviet history, they could contribute to changing the 
institutions under which the post-Soviet cohorts would socialize. 
In this regards the perestroika period, the subsequent collapse of the Soviet 
regime and the formation of independent Russian state in 1991 could become 
real formative events (Mannheim) constitutive of a new post-Soviet generation. 
The discontinuities caused by the Soviet system collapse have certainly produced 
vastly different life experiences for different age cohorts in Russia. The cohorts 
that were born in the 1980s and 1990s and came of age in the post-Soviet period 
had vastly different socialization experience from the older ‘Soviet’ cohorts. 
Undoubtedly, young Russians were raised in a much more liberal political and 
economic environment and could enjoy a much more open access to information 
                                                 
838 Weil, Frederick D. Cohorts, Regimes, and the Legitimation of Democracy: West Germany Since 
1945 // American Sociological Review, Vol. 52, № 3, June 1987. pp. 308-24. 
839 Moses, Dirk A. Op. cit. p. 54, 64. 
840 Ibid. p. 64. 
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and to different sources of media. Furthermore, they grew up with few 
limitations on their right to travel, to hold foreign currency, to practice the 
religion of their choice, to choose the spheres for their self-realization, etc. 
On the surface this group indeed seemed to acquire a set of preferences 
about the economy, the polity, and the world that were distinct from those of 
their parents (the cohort that had been socialized under the Soviet regime but 
experienced its collapse and had thus to be productive in two radically different 
systems) and from those of their grandparents, who were socialized and worked 
mostly in the Soviet system.841 As Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul have 
reported based on the 1999–2000 survey data, younger Russians between 18 and 
39 years of age appeared more likely to support free market, embrace democratic 
ideas and express more concern for individual liberties. However, the authors 
have acknowledged that these values’ support in the analyzed group appeared 
to be rather declarative. As McFaul concluded in his 2002 publication, “[T]he 
embrace of democratic values has not influenced behavior to the extent that we 
might expect from the polls. Russia’s youth value the ideas of democracy. But, 
like the rest of society, they do not believe that their democratic system works 
very effectively and therefore are unwilling to invest much time or effort in the 
democratic enterprise. In fact, Russia’s youth appear to be less engaged in the 
political process than any other age cohort in Russia. They vote with less 
frequency. They join groups less often. They are extremely inactive in social and 
political organizations... They have weak partisan affiliations. Even university 
students do not identify firmly with Russia’s ideological parties.”842 Furthermore, 
other studies of the Russian youth have suggested that the ‘post-Soviet’ cohort 
has shared many of the traditional and conservative attitudes, especially 
regarding the country’s past, with the older of cohorts of Russians.843  
This data confirm once again that, though the liberalization policies 
launched by Gorbachev and his team in the mid-1980s facilitated the growth of 
democratic orientations, Russians failed to internalize and institutionalize the 
democratic system of values. The explanation can be found primarily in the 
unchanged socialization patterns that are basically in charge of transmission of 
values. To illustrate, there appeared a striking similarity in the ideological and 
political values that were represented in the schools textbooks and in the values 
and beliefs shared by the majority of the population. While, according to 
observers, the history textbooks in the 1990s represented, “a contradictory 
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combination of the ideological symbols of nationalism, Westernization, and a 
reinterpretation of communism,” the Russian political culture quite similarly 
resulted in “a contradictory bundle of values and beliefs” in which “a sturdy core 
of commitment to democratic values” was “accompanied by pronounced 
disillusionment with the way democratization and market reforms have worked 
out in Russia.”844 High levels of nationalistic attitudes in the public opinion also 
coincided with the ideas that permeated school textbooks. 
As this dissertation has shown, the systematic rationalization and 
institutionalization of the new meanings of social and cultural changes in post-
Soviet Russia has not taken place. Instead, mass cynicism and cultural amnesia 
manifested in the absence of common memories, values and norms have formed 
a hard core of mass orientations. It is this hard core that is transmitted to and 
inculcated in the young persons as they socialize under institutions of 
contemporary Russia.845 
Patriotic official rhetoric and heroic myth-making hinders the creation of 
alternative political language and collective memory versions as well as 
formation of independent elites and institutions that could form a basis for new 
social solidarity. Nevertheless, until such solidarity emerges, the political culture 
change in Russia will arguably remain a delusion. 
 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
The conclusions drawn from the comparative historical analysis of cultural 
transformations in post-World War II West Germany and post-Soviet Russia 
seem to emphasize differences of the two cases more than similarities. At the 
same time, without comparison, as Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin observed, it 
would have been “impossible to evaluate the extent of difference.”846 Based on 
Kershaw and Lewin’s argument that “comparative analysis welcomes both 
sameness and difference,” this study was actually aimed at drawing lesions from 
                                                 
844 Lisovskaya, Elena; Karpov, Vyacheslav. New Ideologies in Postcommunist Russian Textbooks // 
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peremeny, № 2 (58), 2002.  
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post-totalitarian democratizations in the two cases rather than searching for 
sameness or similarities in them.847  
Most important, the comparative research of different aspects of 
transformations in the two national contexts has shown that democratization is a 
complicated process that cannot be reduced to the task of addressing political 
institutions and evaluating their performance. The analysis of post-authoritarian 
and post-totalitarian democratization should enhance transformations on the 
cultural level, as well, including explorations of both individual and symbolic 
dimensions. The congruence between culture and structure that has often 
perceived as an important prerequisite of successful democratization 
presupposes not only emergence of civic culture and citizens’ participation but 
also the transformation of the whole “program of culture” (using Yuri Levada’s 
formulation). Differently, it requires no less a national identity that is congruent 
with democratic principles and institutions and that is likely to transmit values 
and norms conducive to consolidating and sustaining the political system of 
democracy. As both experiences of West Germany and Russia have revealed, 
collective memory transformations are crucial to democratic consolidation and 
relevant identity formation. For, as the Russian case has vividly revealed, post-
totalitarian societies that deny, repress, or narrowly define pasts that include 
state-organized terrorism are likely to continue to bear signs of the regimes from 
which they emerge.848 The German experience, in turn, has provided us with 
invaluable conclusion that democratization is a matter of choice rather than path 
dependency. 
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